[00:00:00] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:00:03] Speaker 04: Kavrenko against Garland is submitted on the briefs. [00:00:06] Speaker 04: So the next case for argument is Al-Rakabi against Garland. [00:00:21] Speaker 04: Counselor, you may proceed. [00:00:24] Speaker 00: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:00:25] Speaker 00: Can you hear me okay? [00:00:27] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:00:28] Speaker 00: Okay, wonderful. [00:00:29] Speaker 00: May it please the court, Jessica Arena on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Al-Rakabi. [00:00:34] Speaker 00: I would like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal and I will watch the clock. [00:00:40] Speaker 00: Mr. Al-Rakabi petitions for review of this denial of his asylum request. [00:00:45] Speaker 00: We can see there are no other requests for relief for this court. [00:00:50] Speaker 00: This case turns on the nexus between persecution and a protected ground and on the likelihood of future persecution. [00:00:58] Speaker 00: Mr. Al-Rakabi has presented two claims for asylum. [00:01:03] Speaker 00: First, he suffered past persecution from Sunni extremists, ISIS, on account of his Shiite Muslim faith. [00:01:10] Speaker 00: This is his claim based on past persecution, which triggers a presumption of a well-founded fear. [00:01:17] Speaker 00: Second is his claim based on the likelihood of future harm from Shiite extremists who would target him because of his Sunni first name. [00:01:27] Speaker 00: On the nexus of the past persecution claim, the IJ's extemporaneous oral decision found that Mr. Al-Rakabi's testimony, quote, did not shed any light as to why ISIS had threatened him and his family. [00:01:42] Speaker 00: The BIA affirmed the IJ's nexus, finding on the basis that Mr. Al-Rakabi, quote, acknowledged that no one knew who made the threats against them or planted the bomb. [00:01:53] Speaker 00: Contrary to the agency's determination, Mr. Al-Rakabi repeatedly testified that ISIS had targeted him and his family because they are Shiite Muslims. [00:02:04] Speaker 00: He testified that he and his family received phone threats and text messages from ISIS threatening that they must convert to Sunni Islam or leave the region. [00:02:15] Speaker 00: Those who transmitted the threats identified themselves as from ISIS. [00:02:19] Speaker 00: An IED was planted at their home during this time. [00:02:23] Speaker 00: And two months after the threats began, another IED was planted in the car that Mr. Al-Rakabi and his father used to commute to and from work each day. [00:02:31] Speaker 00: That bomb detonated while Mr. Al-Rakabi was in the car with his father, and he watched his father, quote, be blown in pieces. [00:02:39] Speaker 00: Mr. Al-Rakabi explained these facts repeatedly to the agency below. [00:02:43] Speaker 00: He identified ISIS and their religious motive in his credible fear interview. [00:02:47] Speaker 00: He did again on his form at 589. [00:02:52] Speaker 00: He did again in his written declaration to the immigration judge, and then again in his oral testimony before the immigration judge. [00:02:59] Speaker 00: Despite all of this, the agency relied on a single statement of testimony taken out of context. [00:03:06] Speaker 00: Of course, Mr. Al-Rakabi did not know the names or precise identities of his persecutors, but he had every reason to believe that it was ISIS. [00:03:17] Speaker 00: On cross, Mr. Al-Rakabi was asked, do you know who placed the bomb? [00:03:22] Speaker 00: And he began by referring to the phone threats from ISIS to his family in the months leading up to the car bomb. [00:03:29] Speaker 00: The IJ cut him off and directed him to say yes or no. [00:03:33] Speaker 00: He replied, no, I don't know. [00:03:36] Speaker 00: Of course, Mr. Al-Rakabi did not personally witness who planted the car bomb. [00:03:40] Speaker 00: But he had every reason to believe that ISIS planted the car bomb because ISIS had repeatedly and recently threatened to harm this family and had planted an explosive at their home. [00:03:51] Speaker 00: The circumstantial evidence is consistent with the country conditions and compels a different result. [00:03:57] Speaker 00: The agency's failure to consider this evidence militates remand. [00:04:01] Speaker 00: The agency must consider circumstantial evidence, including statements by persecutors. [00:04:06] Speaker 00: The agency should also be considering the timing of the persecution. [00:04:11] Speaker 00: The agency also misstated the evidence and engaged in speculation in finding that no one took responsibility for the car bomb. [00:04:18] Speaker 00: ISIS took responsibility before the fact and their threats. [00:04:22] Speaker 00: The immigration judge speculated about whether, when, and how ISIS would take responsibility for such an act. [00:04:30] Speaker 00: Moreover, the IJ decision misstates the timing of the events. [00:04:35] Speaker 00: The decision places the threat to his mother much earlier in time than it occurred. [00:04:40] Speaker 00: This mistake is crucial because the circumstantial evidence of motive may be included based on the timing of persecution. [00:04:47] Speaker 04: You mentioned country conditions a moment ago and the government in its brief. [00:04:52] Speaker 04: says that the country conditions support the board's decision because they show that there was just a lot of generalized sectarian strife and violence. [00:05:02] Speaker 04: And I guess the inference that one could draw from that is lots of people engaged in violence. [00:05:09] Speaker 04: So we don't necessarily know that it was the same people who were threatening petitioner. [00:05:15] Speaker 04: What's your response to that? [00:05:18] Speaker 00: In the threats, the people making the threats claim to be from ISIS, and they also stated, you must join our extreme Sunni faith or leave the region. [00:05:34] Speaker 00: So even if there's general violence anywhere, there can still be targeted violence on account of a protected ground religion in this situation. [00:05:44] Speaker 01: Ms. [00:05:44] Speaker 01: Arena, I understand from the record that [00:05:46] Speaker 01: Mr. Abou Khabi, he was a Shia Muslim from a Sunni region in Iraq, is that correct? [00:05:53] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:05:54] Speaker 01: So he was a minority in a region dominated by the Sunni faith, correct? [00:06:01] Speaker 00: Yeah, yes. [00:06:02] Speaker 01: And you mentioned the time difference. [00:06:03] Speaker 01: The time difference was not a year and two months, but it was six months. [00:06:08] Speaker 01: There was a time lag of six months, was there not, after the threat to the bombing? [00:06:14] Speaker 00: Between the between the threats and the bombing, the threats continued on. [00:06:19] Speaker 00: I believe it was only two months between the last threat and the bombing. [00:06:23] Speaker 00: And in that time, there was also a bomb placed in their house. [00:06:25] Speaker 00: There was repeated threats by phone, by text message, another bomb placed in their house, and then this final event, which caused Mr. Al-Rakabi to flee. [00:06:39] Speaker 04: And so I guess there's a Judge Bennett's question that highlights the fact that different groups are in a majority in different regions, which raises the question of potential relocation. [00:06:57] Speaker 04: But I take it if we agree with you on past persecution, how should we think? [00:07:08] Speaker 04: The question is, how should we think about relocation if we agree with you on past persecution? [00:07:14] Speaker 00: Sure. [00:07:15] Speaker 00: If you agree that there's past persecution here, then the court needs to remand back to the IJ in order for the burden to shift to the government to establish that they've rebutted an assumption of well-founded fear. [00:07:32] Speaker 01: Pursuant to the CFR specifically acquiring that past persecution gives rise to a rebuttable presumption, correct? [00:07:38] Speaker 00: Right. [00:07:39] Speaker 00: And in this situation, Mr. Albuquerque wasn't given that rebuttable presumption. [00:07:44] Speaker 00: And that must happen if the court agrees there's past persecution here. [00:07:51] Speaker 04: Can I just want to be sure I understood what you said at the very beginning, which is you are at this point only asserting an asylum claim and not asking us to do anything with withholding or a cap. [00:08:02] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor. [00:08:03] Speaker 00: That's correct. [00:08:06] Speaker 00: On the topic of Nexus, before I switch to the independent, well-founded fear argument, operative here is that there is no other logical reason that Mr. Al-Rakabi and his family were targeted. [00:08:23] Speaker 00: Often in asylum cases, we'll see a multiple motive situation where maybe a family was also being targeted for some revenge or extortion or some other logical basis. [00:08:37] Speaker 00: And so there becomes a mixed motive analysis required. [00:08:39] Speaker 00: But in this case, there's no other logical reason that this family was specifically targeted. [00:08:46] Speaker 00: ISIS, the callers who identified themselves as ISIS were very specific, join us or leave. [00:08:52] Speaker 00: And immediately following, soon after following that, there's bombs. [00:08:56] Speaker 00: So that's actually a novice. [00:08:58] Speaker 00: In that case, it talks about there's no other logical reason for nexus than we need to find that there's a nexus here. [00:09:08] Speaker 00: There's a second claim as to the future harm. [00:09:11] Speaker 00: And this is based on imputed Sunni religious beliefs. [00:09:14] Speaker 00: Because although he's a Shia, he has a Sunni first name. [00:09:20] Speaker 00: And so based on this record, there's no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Mr. Al-Rakabi did not meet his relatively low burden that it is probably true that he faces a 10% chance of persecution based on his imputed Sunni religious beliefs. [00:09:38] Speaker 00: The agency committed numerous legal errors in considering his independent alternative claim of future harm based on his imputed Sunni religious beliefs. [00:09:47] Speaker 00: First, the IJ failed to apply the correct legal standard for internal relocation determinations. [00:09:53] Speaker 00: And most blatantly, the IJ never considered the reasonableness factors set forth in the regulations. [00:09:59] Speaker 00: Such an analysis would require consideration of factors such as whether an applicant would face other serious harm. [00:10:06] Speaker 00: This did not occur. [00:10:07] Speaker 00: Instead, the BIA improperly made this factual determination in the first instance. [00:10:13] Speaker 00: Therefore, remand to the immigration judge is necessary for this occurred in the first time. [00:10:18] Speaker 00: Because some of the evidence not considered the first time includes country condition evidence that Shia extremists target perceived Sunnis. [00:10:27] Speaker 00: This evidence includes reports that Shia militias operate checkpoints and that Shia militias have targeted, kidnapped, disappeared, tortured, and killed men when they are identified as Sunnis. [00:10:39] Speaker 00: Other important errors that the agency made was that the BIA incorrectly relied on the fact that none of Mr. Al-Rakabi's siblings have ever been harmed. [00:10:48] Speaker 00: Critically, none of them have Sunni first names. [00:10:51] Speaker 00: And even still, one of his brothers in Iraq has been targeted by Shia militias because he is from a Sunni region. [00:10:59] Speaker 00: And Mr. Al-Rakabi's brother was forced to relocate. [00:11:03] Speaker 00: What is more, the agency ignored evidence that Mr. Al-Bakabi's other brother and mother are safe in Iraq only because they live in a small area controlled by a humanitarian organization where his mother works. [00:11:16] Speaker 00: The agency ignored evidence that Mr. Al-Bakabi cannot live with his sister because she is married and her family will not take him. [00:11:24] Speaker 00: And the IJ did not allow Mr. Al-Rakabi to finish his testimony about why he is in danger throughout Iraq, cutting him off as he was about to explain why he could not live in the province where his sister is, was it? [00:11:36] Speaker 00: So we respectfully request this court first to remand the case back to the IJ, shifting the burden for the well-founded fear to the government to be rebutted. [00:11:47] Speaker 00: And if not that, then we respectfully ask this court to remand the case back to the immigration judge to engage in a reasonableness finding as to relocation. [00:12:02] Speaker 04: Thank you, counsel. [00:12:03] Speaker 04: You can save the rest of your time for rebuttal, and we'll hear from the government. [00:12:08] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:12:16] Speaker 02: Good morning, your honor. [00:12:17] Speaker 02: May it please the court, Andrew and Singha, on behalf of the attorney general. [00:12:22] Speaker 02: What petitioner fails to discuss is this court's deferential standard review. [00:12:27] Speaker 02: The court must find that the record is so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could have possibly found that petitioner did not and will not suffer persecution. [00:12:36] Speaker 02: The record in this case does not compel that conclusion. [00:12:40] Speaker 02: Nor do petitioners' errors, the scattershot errors, which were raised often not to the agency or often misstate the agency's findings and the record, those do not demonstrate any error or prejudice. [00:12:52] Speaker 02: For past persecution, petitioner wants his court to simply ignore his explicit testimony that he did not know who planted the bomb. [00:13:01] Speaker 02: That alone is record evidence, substantial evidence supporting the agency determination. [00:13:07] Speaker 04: No one knows for sure, I suppose, except the bomber. [00:13:16] Speaker 04: But the circumstantial case is quite strong, isn't it? [00:13:21] Speaker 04: He gets a call from ISIS saying, we are going to kill you unless you convert. [00:13:29] Speaker 04: There follows two months of threats of violence from this same group of people, and then they put a bomb in his car. [00:13:39] Speaker 04: Isn't that a pretty strong circumstantial case? [00:13:45] Speaker 02: That is circumstantial evidence, Your Honor, but doesn't compel any reasonable fact-finder to conclude. [00:13:51] Speaker 02: Again, when Pitcher-Sticks officially conceded, he did not know. [00:13:54] Speaker 04: Are you familiar with our decision in Madrigal against Holder? [00:14:00] Speaker 04: So we said there that when the petitioner has some theory of nexus that is plausible and supported by circumstantial evidence, it has to be credited in the absence of some other explanation that's at least as plausible. [00:14:22] Speaker 04: One can debate whether that's really consistent with the substantial evidence standard, but that's what we've said. [00:14:30] Speaker 04: And it has a sort of common sense underpinning to it. [00:14:38] Speaker 04: So what is the contrary explanation here of who else might have planted this bomb, if not the people who had been threatening him with violence? [00:14:50] Speaker 02: Well, first, petitioner was free to make that argument both to the board and his court, but petitioner did not do so. [00:14:58] Speaker 02: Essentially, I think what Your Honor is suggesting is exactly what the Supreme Court rejected in Ming Dai. [00:15:04] Speaker 02: A unanimous Supreme Court said that the agency is free to credit some, part, or all of a person's testimony. [00:15:15] Speaker 02: But what it's not obligated to do is simply assume something to be sufficient or persuasive simply because an otherwise credible witness says it. [00:15:29] Speaker 02: So to the extent that argument would be raised, it would be contrary to the unanimous Supreme Court's decision in Ming Dai. [00:15:38] Speaker 02: Faced with the deferential standard of review and Ming Dai, [00:15:42] Speaker 02: Petitioner otherwise asserts a variety of errors that simply don't reflect an accurate reading of the record. [00:15:50] Speaker 02: Petitioner suggests that the immigration judge simply referred to the testimony, not referring to motive or the act or [00:16:00] Speaker 02: Well, that is wrong for two reasons. [00:16:02] Speaker 02: One, the immigration judge's decision on AR-77 immediately discussed the declaration that did mention the threats to the phone. [00:16:10] Speaker 02: So the immigration judge did consider this circumstantial evidence. [00:16:14] Speaker 02: Any suggestion to the contrary ignores the immigration judge's decision. [00:16:19] Speaker 02: Second, the testimony didn't mention [00:16:23] Speaker 02: the explicit motivation petitioners reply brief sites ar 263 and 264 and suggested it was discussing conversion it didn't So [00:16:35] Speaker 04: What we're left here is well, I mean, I'm sorry, but his testimony before the ij didn't but his declaration Said In 2013 my mother received a phone call When she answered it the caller said, you know We are the islamic state of iraq and demand you to convert to convert to sunniism and be a supporter of our cause [00:17:00] Speaker 04: So, I mean, he did, it wasn't just a random threat, it was a threat tied to his religion as he described it, right? [00:17:12] Speaker 02: That is as he described it in the immigration judge. [00:17:14] Speaker 02: I mean, what Your Honor just read is explicitly in the immigration judge's decision in AR 77. [00:17:18] Speaker 02: So when petitioner alleges an error, the immigration judge didn't consider it. [00:17:23] Speaker 02: The only error here is petitioner does not read the immigration judge's decision. [00:17:27] Speaker 02: The immigration judge considered this circumstantial evidence. [00:17:30] Speaker 02: But as Ming Dai says, the immigration judge made credit against some part or all. [00:17:39] Speaker 02: In some sense, this reflects a problem that Ming Dai discusses. [00:17:43] Speaker 02: Petitioner explicitly testified, I do not know who did this. [00:17:47] Speaker 02: And then later on, on page 266, he's asked, why did they do this? [00:17:52] Speaker 02: He said, there's chaos over there. [00:17:54] Speaker 02: Petitioner argument was essentially said the immigration judge can't rely on his explicit testimony. [00:18:01] Speaker 02: That makes little sense. [00:18:02] Speaker 02: Petitioner made testified again. [00:18:05] Speaker 02: I do not know. [00:18:06] Speaker 02: And there's chaos over there. [00:18:08] Speaker 02: And again, we know that there is unfortunately at the time in 2013 there was a fair amount of sectarian violence. [00:18:16] Speaker 01: Mr. Insignia, just to follow what Judge Miller asked earlier, I understand that this court's opinion in Madrigal versus Holder, if I'm pronouncing it correctly, is that if there is any kind of plausibility stated, then it's up to the agency to at least provide some other explanation that is at least as plausible. [00:18:36] Speaker 01: So where again, I don't know what your answer is as to what is at least plausible that [00:18:41] Speaker 01: It was random violence, and there were other bombings of other cars having nothing to do between the Shia and the Sunni. [00:18:46] Speaker 01: What is the other plausible explanation on the record? [00:18:49] Speaker 01: I don't know of anything in the record indicating any suggestion of something that's just as least plausible. [00:18:57] Speaker 01: If I'm missing something, tell me. [00:18:59] Speaker 02: Well, what is plausible is we don't know. [00:19:04] Speaker 02: There's substantial evidence... Oh, no, no. [00:19:06] Speaker 01: I'm sorry. [00:19:06] Speaker 01: I don't mean to cut you off, but that... No, I'm sorry. [00:19:08] Speaker 01: That's just... That's not adequate. [00:19:09] Speaker 01: You just can't say, well, we don't know, so it's not as plausible. [00:19:12] Speaker 01: There has to be some suggestion. [00:19:13] Speaker 01: For example, it may be at the time of the bombing of the car, there were a series of other car bombings. [00:19:19] Speaker 01: There may have been bombings as to American military personnel. [00:19:22] Speaker 01: There may have been random acts of violence in a particular time period, so then there's some plausibility of no connection. [00:19:29] Speaker 01: But to say that the... At least as I understand Madrigal versus Holder, to say that [00:19:34] Speaker 01: There must be some other explanation at least is plausible. [00:19:39] Speaker 01: At least is plausible. [00:19:40] Speaker 01: That standard to me is not met by saying we just don't know because someone can't identify specifically the bombers. [00:19:48] Speaker 02: Well, you know, I would emphasize two things. [00:19:50] Speaker 02: First of all, petitioners never discuss magical. [00:19:54] Speaker 02: I can attempt to respond as appropriate as necessary. [00:19:57] Speaker 02: But there is a potential that what you're discussing has been overruled by Ming Dai. [00:20:03] Speaker 02: That is why petitioner needs to raise issues in the opening brief. [00:20:06] Speaker 02: Petitioner did not raise it. [00:20:07] Speaker 02: I would like to attempt to answer questions as best I can. [00:20:12] Speaker 02: But that is difficult when a petitioner does not raise an issue in an opening brief. [00:20:17] Speaker 02: But the second answer is, that is that. [00:20:19] Speaker 03: Would you agree, counsel, that there's no mixed motive in this case? [00:20:26] Speaker 03: I mean, if you say, for example, in gang extortion cases and so forth, there can be some mixed motives. [00:20:33] Speaker 03: But is there any alternative explanation for a motive in this case? [00:20:38] Speaker 02: Petitioner's own testimony. [00:20:40] Speaker 02: There's chaos over there. [00:20:42] Speaker 03: What Judge Bennett's question- But on the motive, he testified both in his declaration and to the hearing, ISIS threatened us, and nobody disputes the car bombing. [00:20:56] Speaker 02: The immigration judge absentee credibility finding does not speak that it occurred. [00:21:02] Speaker 02: But the plausible explanation, again, comes in the concept of the substantial evidence review. [00:21:09] Speaker 02: It can be stated two ways. [00:21:12] Speaker 02: that there's substantial evidence that supports the agency's decision. [00:21:15] Speaker 02: And that often sounds like an affirmative concept. [00:21:18] Speaker 02: There is, we know another motive. [00:21:20] Speaker 02: And that motive is not protected. [00:21:23] Speaker 02: That is one way we could phrase it. [00:21:25] Speaker 02: But the other way is often said that the record must compel. [00:21:29] Speaker 02: But what if all petitioner says is, I don't know? [00:21:35] Speaker 02: Well, then how does the petitioner who bears the burden of proof [00:21:39] Speaker 02: before the agency, and now bears the burden of persuasion to this court under a very deferential standard of view. [00:21:46] Speaker 02: What is being suggested is that the immigration judge has to ignore Petitioner's explicit statement that he does not know who did it. [00:21:56] Speaker 02: Yes, there's circumstantial evidence. [00:21:58] Speaker 02: Yes, the immigration judge considered it. [00:22:00] Speaker 02: But under Ming Dai, the immigration judge is the fact finder who's supposed to be persuaded. [00:22:05] Speaker 02: and what this court has to ask, and what petitioners have discussed but does not discuss is, there was no reasonable fact finder allowed to say, well, he said, no, I don't know. [00:22:15] Speaker 02: And there's chaos over there. [00:22:17] Speaker 02: A reasonable fact finder cannot, is compelled to not rely on his explicit testimony. [00:22:24] Speaker 02: That is exactly what Ming Dai says when the discourse prior presumption of credibility and sufficiency, it turns the burden of proof on its head. [00:22:34] Speaker 03: Well, Ming Dai was involved, our jurisprudence gave credit as true. [00:22:40] Speaker 03: I'm not sure it goes as far as you're suggesting, because I think under your suggestion, the government can never lose. [00:22:53] Speaker 02: I disagree, Your Honor, that the suggestion that the government can never lose, but when a litigant specifically testifies, I don't know, a fact finder's relied to rely on it. [00:23:03] Speaker 02: We can imagine a witness to a crime saying, I think this, I think this, and the petitioner says repeatedly, says it, but then when pushed about foundation, oh, I don't know. [00:23:13] Speaker 02: What petitions arguments? [00:23:15] Speaker 03: Well, it depends on how you read the record. [00:23:17] Speaker 03: I mean, he did testify ISIS threatened both in his declaration and at the hearing. [00:23:22] Speaker 03: And the fact that he doesn't know specifically who made that the individuals who made the threat or put the car bomb doesn't really destroy that testimony, does it? [00:23:35] Speaker 02: Destroy? [00:23:37] Speaker 02: No, the immigration judge could consider it and the immigration judge did consider it. [00:23:43] Speaker 02: The question is whether or not any reasonable fact-finders compelled to rely on that circumstantial evidence to say, absolutely, we know that ISIS did this and we know they were motivated by this. [00:23:56] Speaker 02: But what Petitioner relies on at times and then other times ignores is the vast amount of sectarian strife. [00:24:05] Speaker 02: Petitioner relies on his own brother being attacked by Shia militants in Baghdad because [00:24:12] Speaker 02: some sort of extortion or he's perceived as Sunni, the evidence is somewhat unclear, but the actor is completely different. [00:24:20] Speaker 04: Can I ask you to, I'm sorry to interrupt, just to clarify your Ming Dai argument, are you suggesting that, I mean, so the IJ made an adverse credibility finding, the board did not address that. [00:24:32] Speaker 04: Are you suggesting that the board might have not believed what he said about the threats that preceded the bombing? [00:24:42] Speaker 02: That's not what the immigration judge found. [00:24:46] Speaker 02: This is an alternative finding. [00:24:48] Speaker 02: The board relied on this alternative finding. [00:24:50] Speaker 02: This is not a believability issue. [00:24:52] Speaker 02: And that's what Ming Dai emphasizes. [00:24:54] Speaker 04: So your point is that even accepting that he really did get the threats, that we just don't know that the bombing was actually associated with the threats rather than with some other kind of violence. [00:25:09] Speaker 02: accepting that he testified that he received the threats. [00:25:12] Speaker 02: Again, Ming Dai emphasizes that credibility and sufficiency and persuasiveness are obviously related. [00:25:19] Speaker 02: But the example in Ming Dai is indicative of the situation that you can have someone, I believe they say, talk about the example. [00:25:28] Speaker 02: Someone can say, I ran a, went through the light during the traffic case and it was green. [00:25:34] Speaker 02: A fact finder can make a finding that essentially says, well, that's not, [00:25:39] Speaker 02: true or sufficient, but doesn't have to say that person's lying because that's the job of a fact finder. [00:25:46] Speaker 02: I mean, again, this is a unanimous Supreme Court. [00:25:48] Speaker 02: This is the job of the fact finder. [00:25:51] Speaker 03: But Ming Dai also recognized that the INA says, absent an explicit adverse credibility determination, the applicant has rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal. [00:26:05] Speaker 03: It's right in Ming Dai, and it's quoting the statute. [00:26:09] Speaker 03: I think you're talking apples and oranges here in terms of... [00:26:12] Speaker 03: I mean, Ming Dai was about our, except if our credit is true jurisprudence, which it overruled. [00:26:23] Speaker 03: That's a little bit different from your argument today. [00:26:26] Speaker 02: I don't believe it is, Your Honor. [00:26:29] Speaker 02: Your Honor's question suggests that the government has to come up with a plausible explanation. [00:26:34] Speaker 02: That turns the burden of proof on his head. [00:26:37] Speaker 02: It is not the government's burden, whether before the immigration judge or before this court, to offer any answers. [00:26:45] Speaker 02: I can say exactly as petitioner said, I don't know, because we don't know. [00:26:49] Speaker 02: And again, petitioner said he does not know. [00:26:52] Speaker 02: That alone does not compel any reasonable fact finder to find that he faced harm on account of his religion when his father was allegedly mobbed. [00:27:05] Speaker 02: I think my time is up and unless your honor is having to answer the question, we ask the court to deny the petition. [00:27:10] Speaker 04: Thank you, counsel. [00:27:12] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:27:12] Speaker 04: Thank you, your honor. [00:27:19] Speaker 00: Rebuttal. [00:27:20] Speaker 00: Thank you, your honor. [00:27:21] Speaker 00: First, to speak to the IJs. [00:27:25] Speaker 00: reference to the threat to his mother about converting or leaving the region. [00:27:31] Speaker 00: I'd just like to point out, it's on the record at page 78, that the immigration judge erred significantly on the timing of the threat. [00:27:41] Speaker 00: He places that threat prior to the family going to Syria for one year. [00:27:45] Speaker 00: The family went to Syria for one year in 2006 after being threatened by al-Qaeda. [00:27:50] Speaker 00: But the threat that the mother received [00:27:54] Speaker 00: saying, we, the Islamic State of Iraq and Shom, demand you confer to Sunni and be a supporter of our cause. [00:28:01] Speaker 00: That occurred just months before the bombing. [00:28:03] Speaker 00: So I just want to make that point clear. [00:28:05] Speaker 00: And to the point that petitioner failed to raise an argument somewhere, I would just like to point out that petitioner did raise Navas, Navas, Navas versus, one moment. [00:28:28] Speaker 00: versus the INS, the Ninth Circuit 2000 decision. [00:28:31] Speaker 00: And it stands for the same proposition as Madrigal v. Holder, the later decision, in which if there's no other logical conclusion for the events, then there's reason then that's in substantial evidence that compels a remount as it does in this case. [00:28:49] Speaker 00: If there's no further questions from the court, [00:28:54] Speaker 04: It appears there are not. [00:28:56] Speaker 04: Thank you, Council. [00:28:57] Speaker 04: We thank both Council for their helpful arguments and the case is submitted.