[00:00:01] Speaker 05:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:00:02] Speaker 05:
May it please the Court, Devin Goodman for Mr. Tackett, along with Zachary Soled.

[00:00:06] Speaker 05:
I am the student co-counsel from the UC Law SF Appellate Project.

[00:00:10] Speaker 05:
I'll watch my time, and I intend to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:14] Speaker 05:
This appeal centers on Mr. Tackett's medical malpractice claims concerning his late wife's premature and preventable death.

[00:00:21] Speaker 05:
Mr. Tackett, acting pro se, brought federal and state law claims against the Montana medical providers and the Washington healthcare providers that were responsible for his wife's care.

[00:00:32] Speaker 05:
Today, Mr. Tackett is appealing only two errors, both strictly with respect to the Washington defendants and the Washington claims.

[00:00:39] Speaker 05:
First, on personal jurisdiction, the district court did not accept Mr. Tackett's uncontroverted showing of jurisdictional facts, as it must on the 12th B.2.

[00:00:48] Speaker 05:
And alternatively, on transfer, the court outright dismissed Mr. Tackett's claims, his Washington state claims, without considering transfer at all.

[00:00:56] Speaker 05:
And this is despite Mr. Tackett's expressed request on the record for transfer.

[00:01:00] Speaker 05:
Here, not exercising discretion was a per se abuse of that discretion.

[00:01:04] Speaker 05:
I'll begin with the personal jurisdiction issue.

[00:01:07] Speaker 05:
In a minimum contacts analysis, we ask three questions.

[00:01:10] Speaker 05:
Are the contacts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction?

[00:01:13] Speaker 05:
Do the claims arise out of or relate to those contacts?

[00:01:16] Speaker 05:
And finally, is it fair to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant?

[00:01:20] Speaker 03:
So are you challenging Dr. Chaganour also?

[00:01:25] Speaker 03:
Or are we just talking about the Providence, Washington?

[00:01:30] Speaker 05:
Your Honor, we're challenging the decision with respect to Dr. Chagunar solely so that if on remand, if the court does decide to remand, that she be included for a transfer.

[00:01:40] Speaker 05:
However, the record doesn't necessarily contain facts.

[00:01:42] Speaker 03:
So you don't think she's subject to personal jurisdiction in Montana?

[00:01:47] Speaker 05:
It would require jurisdictional discovery.

[00:01:49] Speaker 05:
The record currently does not reflect, yes.

[00:01:51] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:01:51] Speaker 03:
But is there any basis for jurisdictional discovery as to her?

[00:01:55] Speaker 05:
As to the doctor?

[00:01:56] Speaker 05:
No.

[00:01:56] Speaker 05:
No, Your Honor.

[00:01:57] Speaker 05:
OK.

[00:01:59] Speaker 05:
Moving to the minimum contacts analysis, the answer to all three of the questions for this test is yes.

[00:02:06] Speaker 05:
Providence has formed ongoing contacts with Montana's healthcare network by facilitating transfers from smaller Montana hospitals.

[00:02:13] Speaker 05:
And Mrs. Tackett's transfer occurred here because of those contacts.

[00:02:17] Speaker 04:
Can you address the long arm Montana long arm statute first?

[00:02:20] Speaker 05:
Yes, your honor.

[00:02:22] Speaker 05:
The long-arm jurisdiction is a legal question, and the district court did have a duty to apply the correct law.

[00:02:27] Speaker 05:
Mr. Tackett was representing himself, pro se, and the court in its order cited Threlkeld v. Colorado, which was a Supreme Court of Montana case that analyzed malpractice claims against a non-resident service provider in both the accrual of a tort provision and the business transaction provision context.

[00:02:46] Speaker 05:
especially because Mr. Tackett's pleadings were so heavily focused on the ongoing relationship between Providence and Cabinet Peaks.

[00:02:56] Speaker 05:
The district court had everything it needed to evaluate the claims under the business transactions provision, but instead it accepted Providence's unsupported characterization of the relationship as a one-off, emergency-only transfer, and therefore only evaluated under the accrual of a tort provision.

[00:03:16] Speaker 05:
It was a difficult decision for the district court to make, especially because of the pro se briefing.

[00:03:22] Speaker 05:
But Mr. Tackett did point to the Montana long-arm statute generally when he was discussing Providence's relationship with Cabinet Peaks.

[00:03:29] Speaker 05:
And given that the court also cited throughout held the district court's decision was understandable, but it does merit reversal or at least a remand to evaluate under the correct jurisdictional provision.

[00:03:42] Speaker 03:
But what.

[00:03:44] Speaker 03:
How did they I mean they got involved because people in Montana contacted them right about your clients wife.

[00:03:51] Speaker 05:
Specifically with respect to Mrs Tackett yes cabinet peaks reached out to Providence however what's important here is that Providence.

[00:04:00] Speaker 05:
The evidence that Mr. Tackett has put before the district court showed that Providence has built an infrastructure that facilitates transfers from Montana to Providence, specifically its Spokane location.

[00:04:13] Speaker 05:
This is the transfer center theory that he articulated, and your honors will see on record page 118.

[00:04:18] Speaker 05:
that there's a record between from the cabinet peaks communications with Providence showing the how this transfer center operates to reach into Montana to provide care to Montana patients and then ultimately to transfer them to Providence when the patient might require care that is too intricate or too difficult for that smaller location.

[00:04:41] Speaker 05:
How does this differ from Threlkeld?

[00:04:44] Speaker 05:
This differs from Threlkeld specifically because in that case, it involved a veterinary malpractice action that there was no established relationship or established infrastructure that reached into Montana to facilitate

[00:05:03] Speaker 05:
in that case, horse owners to seek veterinary care at the Colorado service provider, whereas in this case, we see that specifically in record page 118 again, that Providence has created a transfer center where its own doctors provide medical care to or provide medical advice to out-of-state patients.

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
I think a distinction between the individual hospital charged, alleged to have been involved in the negligent act and the hospital system.

[00:05:38] Speaker 05:
Not necessarily, Your Honor, because looking forward for guidance from the Supreme Court recently, we're looking for affiliated contacts between the Providence and its association with Montana's health care network.

[00:05:52] Speaker 05:
And here, this court can look at the entirety of that relationship.

[00:05:58] Speaker 05:
However, if that's insufficient, Mrs. Tackett's relationship or Mrs. Tackett's transfer

[00:06:03] Speaker 05:
does fulfill that requirement because, as this court recently stated in Impossible Foods, one contact is sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction with respect to claims.

[00:06:15] Speaker 00:
Mr. Tackett had five opportunities to plead.

[00:06:22] Speaker 00:
Looking for discovery at this point and another opportunity?

[00:06:27] Speaker 05:
Well, Mr. Tackett was never granted discovery at the district court level.

[00:06:30] Speaker 05:
So he was never able to obtain the full, he was never able to show the court the full scope of the relationship between Cabinet Peaks and Providence, even over those five amended pleadings.

[00:06:41] Speaker 05:
And moreover, the district court never specifically articulated what Mr. Tackett needed to do to satisfy the long-arm statute or the sufficient minimum contacts.

[00:06:54] Speaker 05:
And it was only the defense who articulated that what perhaps was missing.

[00:07:01] Speaker 05:
And Mr. Tackett, of course, is not required to follow that.

[00:07:05] Speaker 04:
The common thread, at least to me, in the Montana long arm statute cases of what constitutes transacting business is repeatedly referred to in Thrukel, Nelson, and Grizzly, and all these other cases.

[00:07:18] Speaker 04:
Was there a contract between the parties or shipping products to the person?

[00:07:23] Speaker 04:
What's the closest thing you have here to transacting businesses and contracts or shipping products, et cetera?

[00:07:32] Speaker 05:
Looking specifically at Nelson, what's most important in this relationship is the ongoing nature of the communications and the fact that there's

[00:07:51] Speaker 05:
For example, in Nelson, we're not just looking at a contract.

[00:07:54] Speaker 05:
It's not necessary that a contract exists.

[00:07:57] Speaker 05:
It's necessary that a contractual-like relationship exists between the two.

[00:08:00] Speaker 05:
There very well may be a contract between Providence and Cabinet Peaks, and that would be something that could come out in jurisdictional discovery.

[00:08:07] Speaker 05:
However, the infrastructure that Providence has established mirrors, in cases like Nelson, in cases like Grizzly,

[00:08:18] Speaker 05:
multifaceted relationship that an out-of-state business might have with the in-state business, including negotiating contracts and shipping products into state and not just entering contracts.

[00:08:29] Speaker 05:
And when you say infrastructure, what do you mean specifically by infrastructure?

[00:08:32] Speaker 05:
Specifically the transfer center that Providence has created to

[00:08:39] Speaker 05:
facilitate transfers from Montana down to Washington.

[00:08:43] Speaker 05:
That's the process by which cabinet peaks reached out to Providence and they got a Providence doctor who took over in terms of assigning Mrs. Tackett's care.

[00:08:53] Speaker 05:
And ultimately, there's a quote in the record on

[00:08:56] Speaker 05:
page 118 that Mrs. Tackett was improving following Providence's recommendations, but Providence, quote, did not want to delay transfer, even though cabinet Pete suggested that she might benefit from further testing there.

[00:09:08] Speaker 05:
So this is really Providence's mechanism to reach into and find smaller Montana hospitals and benefit from transferring those patients down to its own facilities.

[00:09:21] Speaker 05:
And I'd like to briefly touch on transfer.

[00:09:23] Speaker 05:
If you're honest, I have no further questions on personal jurisdiction.

[00:09:27] Speaker 05:
When facing any jurisdictional defect, district courts have a duty to consider transferring claims.

[00:09:32] Speaker 05:
And there is another court that is available for the claims instead of outright dismissal.

[00:09:38] Speaker 05:
And then if it is in the interest of justice, the court must transfer.

[00:09:41] Speaker 05:
Here, the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider transfer at all, and the record does reflect that transfer was in the interest of justice.

[00:09:50] Speaker 05:
In almost all cases, remedy for filing suit in the wrong court is transfer to the right court.

[00:09:55] Speaker 05:
So this court regularly remands with orders to transfer without further review of the issue.

[00:10:01] Speaker 05:
And this is especially true when all facts regarding the interest of transfer are in plain view on the record.

[00:10:08] Speaker 05:
Here, Mr. Tackett requested transfer on record page 113.

[00:10:11] Speaker 05:
Providence addressed this request on record page 106.

[00:10:14] Speaker 05:
And however, the court's order did not address transfer at all.

[00:10:19] Speaker 05:
This court, as stated in Miller, simply can't know whether the district court actually considered the relevant interest of justice factors if it does not say anything on the record.

[00:10:31] Speaker 05:
Congress created 1631 to preserve claims exactly like Mr. Tackett's.

[00:10:37] Speaker 05:
For example, in Goldauer versus Hyman, the Supreme Court explained that an interest of justice transfer primarily functions to avoid penalizing plaintiffs.

[00:10:45] Speaker 03:
So under our, if we hypothetically, if we disagree with you on the personal jurisdiction, but agree with you on the transfer piece,

[00:10:54] Speaker 03:
Under our cases, what's the right remedy?

[00:10:56] Speaker 03:
That we would send it back to the district court to have the district court decide whether to transfer or just to order transfer?

[00:11:02] Speaker 05:
The latter, Your Honor.

[00:11:03] Speaker 05:
This court has many examples, including Taylor v. Social Security Administration and Miller, where it has been remanded with instructions to transfer because the interests of justice are clear on the record.

[00:11:14] Speaker 05:
And here, Mr. Tackett was not filing in bad faith.

[00:11:17] Speaker 05:
He had colorable medical malpractice claims.

[00:11:20] Speaker 05:
He had every reason to believe that he could have filed in Montana, given his personal jurisdiction argument.

[00:11:27] Speaker 05:
it's therefore not against the interest of justice transfer.

[00:11:31] Speaker 05:
I'll remind this court, it is rare that a transfer will not be in the interest of justice.

[00:11:40] Speaker 05:
It's simply too severe a penalty for filing in the wrong court.

[00:11:43] Speaker 05:
And if your honors have no further questions, I'll reserve the remainder of my time.

[00:11:47] Speaker 00:
I have a question about your reply brief.

[00:11:49] Speaker 00:
You suggested that if the case is remanded to the district court, the district court should reconsider whether to reassert jurisdiction over the Montana defendants.

[00:12:01] Speaker 00:
that right.

[00:12:01] Speaker 00:
Yes, your honor.

[00:12:02] Speaker 00:
Explain how that would happen.

[00:12:05] Speaker 00:
There's a there's a state action pending in Montana against the other hospital, the Montana hospital.

[00:12:12] Speaker 00:
So how would the district court get that case back?

[00:12:16] Speaker 05:
We're simply asked, Mr. Tackett's simply asking that the district court evaluate how far along the case has gone at the state level, whether it has gone too far to recall jurisdiction, because he intended for the claims and the defendants to all be consolidated together, and the only reason that the district court dismissed the Montana defendants was because it had already dismissed all the other claims.

[00:12:41] Speaker 05:
Had it, if this court finds

[00:12:42] Speaker 05:
that there was personal jurisdiction in Montana or perhaps that the court should further investigate that, then that dismissal of the Montana claims would come under a different analysis and the court would have to reevaluate there.

[00:12:56] Speaker 05:
Now the district court is in the best position to see whether that case perhaps has gone too far and that's something that the district court

[00:13:02] Speaker 05:
That's a decision the district court should make.

[00:13:05] Speaker 05:
But it would be fundamentally unfair for the Montana defendants to be able to benefit from an erroneous determination in that way.

[00:13:15] Speaker 05:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:13:16] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:13:30] Speaker 02:
Good morning, and I'm Gary Kalkstein with Hal Booth Smith, and I have the pleasure of representing, in this case, the appellees, Providence, Washington, as I referred to them in briefs, and Kavitha Shaginer, who's a physician practicing in Spokane, Washington.

[00:13:52] Speaker 02:
We very much appreciate the opportunity to present our case to you.

[00:13:56] Speaker 02:
And it's our belief that the district court ordered dismissing this action against Providence, Washington, and Dr. Chagunar was correct and should be affirmed.

[00:14:07] Speaker 02:
The district court's conclusion that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Providence and Dr. Chagunar was correct for reasons I will briefly go into.

[00:14:17] Speaker 02:
And the district court had no obligation to consider whether this case was transferable, given the fact that in order to get to that question, it would have to engage in severance of the case into component parts.

[00:14:33] Speaker 02:
And then there is simply no obligation in that situation to require transfer of such a situation.

[00:14:42] Speaker 04:
But the district court would have had discretion to do so, right?

[00:14:46] Speaker 02:
Yes, sir.

[00:14:47] Speaker 02:
It's our position that it would be permissive, but not mandated.

[00:14:51] Speaker 04:
But there's nothing in the record that shows that the district court considered that.

[00:14:56] Speaker 02:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:14:58] Speaker 04:
Why shouldn't we, and this isn't to slight the district court judge.

[00:15:02] Speaker 04:
They're busy.

[00:15:02] Speaker 04:
I know from Judge Kane, the district court's incredibly busy.

[00:15:05] Speaker 04:
So it's not sliding against the district court judge, but it seems like the court may have just missed this issue that the plaintiffs raised that didn't consider it.

[00:15:14] Speaker 04:
Why shouldn't we send it back and ask the district court to consider it?

[00:15:17] Speaker 04:
And maybe the district court will ultimately say, no, I'm not going to sever the claims, but why shouldn't we bring it back?

[00:15:21] Speaker 02:
It's our belief, Your Honor, that the relevant case law does not mandate

[00:15:25] Speaker 02:
severance into component parts, and then for consideration of transfer that, as Your Honor stated, is permissive.

[00:15:35] Speaker 04:
But I guess if I may interrupt, if the district court said, no, I'm not going to sever it, then maybe it's fine, possibly.

[00:15:41] Speaker 04:
But there's nothing in the record that shows the district court considered it.

[00:15:44] Speaker 04:
Maybe the district court was wrong in thinking that it didn't have any discretion to do so.

[00:15:49] Speaker 04:
It seems like the safest course is to send it back and let the district court consider it.

[00:15:55] Speaker 02:
i would respectfully disagree your honor because i think that presumes that the district court was not aware of some of the case law that indicates severance is permissive and that if at that point consideration should be given to the possibility of transfer it's not mandated it's also permissive and so i think that would place a higher standard

[00:16:20] Speaker 02:
on judge morris in the district court than presently exists as to my understanding of relevant case law we believe that the dispositive questions in this case are whether a court can transfer less than an entire action under section sixteen thirty one and even if a court can do so which we believe it can

[00:16:48] Speaker 02:
whether the district court was obligated to consider severing or bifurcating Mr. Tackett's claim against Providence Washington and Dr. Shaginer so that they alone could be transferred.

[00:17:00] Speaker 02:
In other words, we believe that to resolve this appeal, the overriding issue concerns not whether transferring less than an entire action is permissible, but rather whether it's mandatory and it's something that the court is obligated to do.

[00:17:17] Speaker 02:
We're aware of no authority indicating section 1631 mandates transfer of discrete components of an action.

[00:17:25] Speaker 02:
And the 10th Circuit has stated as such, and we recognize that's not binding on this court, but in Schroeder versus Bittinger, it expressly stated the court was aware of no authority requiring district courts to split up actions and transfer resulting components under 1631.

[00:17:44] Speaker 02:
The pertinent federal circuit

[00:17:47] Speaker 02:
the decision to make the decision to make the decision.

[00:18:02] Speaker 02:
the federal circuit court held that less than an entire action may be transferred under 1631, but it is not obligatory and it's permissive language that's used throughout the course of that opinion.

[00:18:16] Speaker 03:
Did Mr. Tackett ask for severance in the district court?

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
You know, it's our belief and my recollection, Your Honor, that Severance was not asked until this process began.

[00:18:29] Speaker 02:
He filed a number of different complaints.

[00:18:33] Speaker 02:
He changed the tenor of his case with regard to some of the other defendants, but that this was not an issue that was raised and addressed by the lower court.

[00:18:45] Speaker 02:
Under Galloway Farms, which is also a federal circuit case, bifurcation and partial transfer was noted to be permissive, but noted also to be atypical and not preferable.

[00:18:58] Speaker 02:
And we believe the overriding dispositive point that Mr. Tackett can't get around is even if the District Court has authority to sever the case against Providence, Washington, and Dr. Shaginer, that transfer of the new action would not be mandated

[00:19:18] Speaker 02:
And they're not obligated to consider doing so.

[00:19:20] Speaker 02:
And to my knowledge, after reading the briefs in this case, I don't believe that your honors have been provided with any authority to the contrary.

[00:19:33] Speaker 02:
With regard to personal jurisdiction, that's an interesting issue, as has been framed by my friends representing the appellees.

[00:19:46] Speaker 02:
And one of the concerns that we have

[00:19:48] Speaker 02:
And I think that this court is aware of is Montana is a rural state.

[00:19:53] Speaker 02:
There are lots of communities that are served by critical access hospitals where people simply don't have access to higher levels of care and

[00:20:08] Speaker 02:
particularly where it involves situations like missed packets.

[00:20:13] Speaker 02:
And that can be true with stroke, heart attack, serious traumatic injuries.

[00:20:18] Speaker 02:
And in this case, the record is clear and undisputed that this contact was made by the folks at Cabinet Peaks Medical Center in Libby, Montana, which was a small mining town in the mountains of Northwestern Montana.

[00:20:38] Speaker 02:
They initially tried to transfer Ms.

[00:20:42] Speaker 02:
Tackett to Kalispell, which is a higher level of care than Cabinet Peaks.

[00:20:48] Speaker 02:
And after hearing that Kalispell did not have the capacity to accept Ms.

[00:20:53] Speaker 02:
Tackett as a patient, they took it upon themselves to contact Providence, Washington.

[00:21:00] Speaker 02:
and Providence, Washington, based on their request to send a patient to a higher level of care, having the capacity to provide that care, accepted.

[00:21:12] Speaker 02:
And I would respectfully suggest that if such an acceptance of transfer

[00:21:20] Speaker 02:
creates personal jurisdiction and exposes the providers to litigation in the state where transfer is made from.

[00:21:32] Speaker 02:
that that would have a chilling effect on the ability of people in rural states such as ours to receive a higher level of care in emergency situations.

[00:21:45] Speaker 03:
I mean, are there circumstances where somebody could be operating out of state

[00:21:51] Speaker 03:
but essentially have a kind of referral service within the state of Montana that would then qualify as doing the transaction of business within Montana?

[00:22:02] Speaker 02:
Not to my knowledge, Your Honor, and what I can tell you is that in my experience, and I'm not an appellate lawyer, I'm a trial lawyer, and so this is a new experience, and I appreciate your patience, but in the experience I've had over the years, and I've had a lot of cases involving

[00:22:21] Speaker 02:
transfers of critically ill patients and children and the way that that mechanism typically is enacted is exactly as it was in this case where sometimes a critical access facility that's only staffed by mid-level providers and that's no disrespect to those people providing good service reaches out to a higher level of care in Montana and oftentimes because we don't have that many

[00:22:51] Speaker 02:
level even two and we're just getting our first level one trauma center we don't have that many centers with that many beds and so frequently if they can't do a transfer in montana they seek out of state assistance to

[00:23:06] Speaker 02:
Spokane, Seattle, Salt Lake City, Denver, sometimes even LA and Minnesota.

[00:23:15] Speaker 02:
And I'm not aware of any attempt by Providence or frankly any of the receiving centers which are oftentimes university affiliated centers.

[00:23:27] Speaker 02:
of any attempts to have a referral pattern built, unlike some of the cases that were cited in Mr. Tackett's brief.

[00:23:37] Speaker 02:
There was no attempt, certainly by Dr. Shaginer, who never had any contact with any patients in Montana, but equally certain by Providence to advertise, to seek, to solicit.

[00:23:52] Speaker 02:
It just simply is not the case, and there's no evidence to the contrary.

[00:23:56] Speaker 02:
We believe that Mr. Tack had failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie evidence that personal jurisdiction exists and as such the district court's conclusion that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Chagner in Providence, Washington was correct.

[00:24:18] Speaker 02:
I don't know if this court would like me to address EMTALA.

[00:24:22] Speaker 02:
I didn't hear it raised, but it's our belief, and we're not arguing affirmatively that this falls under EMTALA, but it's our belief that the relationship here existed as a result of contact for emergency services and for emergency care.

[00:24:40] Speaker 02:
a willingness to provide and the belief of an obligation to provide care and services to a patient in need when such services were not available at a closer location.

[00:24:55] Speaker 02:
It's undisputed in this case that transfer was requested by Cabinet Peaks and it's equally undisputed that Providence played no part in arranging anything until after it was contacted to provide the services needed.

[00:25:18] Speaker 02:
If I may, I would talk just a little bit about transfer, because I realize that my time is waning.

[00:25:28] Speaker 02:
In terms of the transfer issue, it's our belief that 1631 controls the transfer issue raised on appeal.

[00:25:36] Speaker 02:
This action was non-transferable, and 1631 neither mandates transfer nor consideration of transfer of a non-transferable action.

[00:25:45] Speaker 02:
We believe that

[00:25:47] Speaker 02:
This section controls the transfer issue raised by Mr. Tackett's appeal and under the circumstances of this case, 1631 is the proper statute that controls and applies.

[00:26:03] Speaker 02:
And Mr. Tackett concedes whether 1406 can or should also be applied as an academic issue.

[00:26:11] Speaker 02:
He concedes there's a strong argument that 1631 rather than 1406 should control issues like the present.

[00:26:18] Speaker 02:
He acknowledges that this court has stated 1631 controls the transfer issue where there's a want of jurisdiction

[00:26:26] Speaker 02:
and he specifically alleged venue was proper in the district court of Montana and no party has ever argued otherwise.

[00:26:37] Speaker 02:
Even with further analysis, these concessions, the acknowledgement and the allegations are dispositive to the point that 1631 controls the issue at hand.

[00:26:48] Speaker 02:
There was mention of the Gold Lar case and the Gold Lar case was, to my recollection, ruled upon before Section 1631 came into existence.

[00:27:03] Speaker 02:
And we believe that 1631 was the legislative attempt to, if you will, drill down and add more specificity

[00:27:14] Speaker 02:
to a situation that was otherwise somewhat confusing.

[00:27:22] Speaker 02:
We believe that this circuit has indicated on more than one occasion 6131 controls transfer when the issues concern a want of jurisdiction.

[00:27:34] Speaker 02:
In Cruz Aguilar versus INS, there was no reference to 1404 or 1406.

[00:27:42] Speaker 02:
And this court held that transfers civil actions among federal courts to cure jurisdictional deficits is governed by 1631.

[00:27:50] Speaker 02:
And this court held similarly in other cases.

[00:27:58] Speaker 02:
We believe what's important is that while 1631 controls transfer

[00:28:06] Speaker 02:
until a case is transferable and this case would not have been transferable as a whole that a district court is not required or mandated to show that it's considered separating the case into component parts in order to consider transfer and the language as I stated earlier from the cases that are contained within our brief shows that

[00:28:35] Speaker 02:
If a court takes it upon itself to engage in severance of those discrete parts, that it's permissive as to whether they want to transfer, but it's not obligated and it's not mandated.

[00:28:50] Speaker 02:
Time went much quicker than I expected it would.

[00:28:53] Speaker 02:
If there are questions, I'd be happy to do my best.

[00:28:57] Speaker 02:
But we very much appreciate the opportunity to be here.

[00:29:02] Speaker 02:
And we very much appreciate all of your considerations.

[00:29:06] Speaker 02:
Thank you so much for the opportunity to present today.

[00:29:10] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:29:15] Speaker 01:
Your honors, my name's Eli Anabnet.

[00:29:18] Speaker 01:
And we had initially indicated that we would only be here to answer questions if they were raised.

[00:29:26] Speaker 01:
But if it's all right with the court, I would like to just briefly address the response to Judge Cain's question to Mr. Tackett's attorneys.

[00:29:38] Speaker 04:
Sure, that's fine.

[00:29:40] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:29:41] Speaker 01:
And again, my name's Eli Anabnet, and for the sake of efficiency, I'm here to answer questions on behalf of both Cabinet Peaks defendants, that would be Cabinet Peaks Medical Center, Dr. Jay Maloney and Dr. Mark Harding, as well as Logan Health's providers, that'd be Logan Health, Dr. Heifel and Nurse Allen.

[00:30:01] Speaker 01:
I just want to take issue with the assertion that the basis upon which the district court

[00:30:10] Speaker 01:
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case was because it had dismissed all other claims.

[00:30:17] Speaker 01:
I think that is a gloss over the nuance that it had actually dismissed all of the claims over which it had original jurisdiction, which is the predicate for exercising the discretion under 16 or 1367 C3.

[00:30:32] Speaker 01:
The claims that remain do not provide the court with original jurisdiction.

[00:30:39] Speaker 01:
They would be diversity claims against Providence providers based on Washington law, and they'd be presented alongside non-diverse defendants, which are the Logan Health providers and cabinet peace providers.

[00:30:53] Speaker 01:
There is no original jurisdiction in that case.

[00:30:56] Speaker 01:
So the basis for the dismissal and exercise of that jurisdiction remains and has not been challenged.

[00:31:01] Speaker 01:
owing to the fact that Mr. Tackett raised no arguments in relation to the dismissal of the 1983 claims, or the RICO claims, or any other claim over which the court originally was provided subject matter jurisdiction.

[00:31:16] Speaker 01:
And there's no allegation that this was an abuse of discretion.

[00:31:21] Speaker 01:
It is just simply a request.

[00:31:23] Speaker 01:
And that is all I have.

[00:31:24] Speaker 01:
Thank you for allowing me to briefly address that, unless there are any other questions.

[00:31:29] Speaker 04:
Great.

[00:31:29] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:31:39] Speaker 05:
Two brief points on rebuttal, Your Honor, first on transfer and second on the chilling effects argument.

[00:31:45] Speaker 05:
There's two reasons why severance is not an issue here.

[00:31:48] Speaker 05:
First, several circuits including the third, tenth, and federal have found that using rule 21 severance to slice some claims off of a larger action does create a new action that can be transferred.

[00:32:01] Speaker 05:
So that is one option for this court to pursue.

[00:32:03] Speaker 05:
And second,

[00:32:04] Speaker 05:
In this case specifically, all of the other claims had already been dismissed, so there was really no need for the court to use Rule 21.

[00:32:10] Speaker 05:
It was simply dismissing what was remaining or, excuse me, transferring what was remaining or would transfer what's remaining to Washington.

[00:32:19] Speaker 05:
Goldlauer may have been a 1406 case before the Supreme Court, however, the interest of justice analysis is the same between 1406 and 1631, and what's important there and what the Court stressed in Goldlauer is that these statutes exist as justice-preserving statutes.

[00:32:37] Speaker 05:
Any justice-defeating or time-consuming technicalities

[00:32:41] Speaker 05:
are what these interests of justice transfers are supposed to avoid.

[00:32:46] Speaker 05:
And forcing Mr. Tackett to refile his claims simply because the court didn't consider transfer is just such a time-consuming and justice-defeating technicality.

[00:32:57] Speaker 05:
I'd also point the court to an earlier precedent from this court, Anrig v. Ringsby United, in which case it remanded a failure to consider severance and transfer of some claims in a larger action, because the court did not expressly consider on the record severance and transfer.

[00:33:16] Speaker 05:
Did the plaintiff expressly ask for severance before the district court?

[00:33:20] Speaker 05:
No, did not explicitly request severance, but did request transfer.

[00:33:24] Speaker 05:
The defendants who did wish to be transferred.

[00:33:27] Speaker 05:
And I see I'm out of time.

[00:33:28] Speaker 05:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:33:30] Speaker 04:
Thank you to both sides for the helpful argument.

[00:33:33] Speaker 04:
And Mr. Goodman, I know you're law students.

[00:33:35] Speaker 04:
Thank you for the excellent job and by you and your team, Mr. Soled and Ms.

[00:33:40] Speaker 04:
Sparrow for supervising them on this pro bono project.

[00:33:43] Speaker 04:
The case has been submitted.