[00:00:00] Speaker 04: Good morning. [00:00:01] Speaker 04: I'm Judge Gould and I welcome all the advocates here today and the court staff. [00:00:14] Speaker 04: I'm presiding today and on my right I'm pleased to be sitting with Judge Lee [00:00:24] Speaker 04: and also with Judge H.A. [00:00:27] Speaker 04: Thomas on my left. [00:00:32] Speaker 04: There are a number of cases that we submitted on the briefs that I don't need to discuss, but we'll start with the first case on our argument, on our argument calendar, which is race [00:00:54] Speaker 04: Carl Reiss versus James Salmond. [00:01:04] Speaker 04: OK, so appellant's counsel can get going whenever you're ready. [00:01:11] Speaker 04: And we have 10 minutes. [00:01:13] Speaker 04: The case is set for 10 minutes per side. [00:01:17] Speaker 04: So if you want to make a rebuttal argument, please stop before all your time is gone. [00:01:24] Speaker 04: But I'm sort of a softy. [00:01:26] Speaker 04: So if you need an extra minute or two, you'll just ask for it. [00:01:35] Speaker 04: Okay, please proceed. [00:01:37] Speaker 02: Thank you, your honor. [00:01:38] Speaker 02: May it please the court? [00:01:39] Speaker 02: My name is Nancy Schwartz, and I represent the appellant, Mr. Carl Sidney Race. [00:01:45] Speaker 02: Mr. Race, who is now 74 years old, filed a 2254 petition in federal district court challenging his Montana state conviction. [00:01:54] Speaker 02: He had a conviction of two counts of deliberate homicide, two counts of attempted deliberate homicide, for which he received a sentence of four life consecutive sentences plus 40 years for use of a weapon. [00:02:06] Speaker 02: Importantly, he also received a sentence that denied him the ability to have parole. [00:02:14] Speaker 02: The Montana federal district judge, Susan P. Waters, summarily dismissed Mr. Race's petition as untimely without giving him a prior opportunity to respond, notice an opportunity to respond. [00:02:27] Speaker 02: Mr. Race appealed and this court issued a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the district court erred by dismissing the petition as untimely without notice and opportunity to respond. [00:02:39] Speaker 02: Can you just please [00:02:40] Speaker 00: Tell me or tell us what arguments your client would have made that he didn't already make, because he offered a pretty long explanation of why his untimeliness should be excused. [00:02:52] Speaker 00: So what more could there possibly have been? [00:02:55] Speaker 02: Right. [00:02:56] Speaker 02: And what benefit would there be in remanding it to the district court, which is what I'm asking. [00:03:00] Speaker 02: And in responding to that, I will adopt the answer to that argument that was given by David Ness in a recent case that was before this court, which was Nice v. Bloodworth. [00:03:11] Speaker 02: And I didn't file a 28J letter on that, but the site is 114F41038. [00:03:17] Speaker 02: And what he argued was that there's always a benefit in requiring compliance with the rules. [00:03:24] Speaker 02: And when the district court doesn't do an appropriate procedure, then it's appropriate for this court to notify the district court of that fact and make them do the right way. [00:03:37] Speaker 02: Obviously, [00:03:39] Speaker 02: Mr. Race has a very high hill to climb on this as far as establishing equitable tolling. [00:03:45] Speaker 02: I understand that. [00:03:46] Speaker 02: But the point is that his due process rights were deprived when he was not given prior notice to respond. [00:03:53] Speaker 02: And that was something that he assumed that he would be. [00:03:57] Speaker 02: And Judge Waters is a very conscientious judge, but she was also the same judge in that nice case. [00:04:03] Speaker 02: And so I think it is appropriate to remand this case back to make sure that due process is followed. [00:04:10] Speaker 03: But I guess if we think of due process, the value of it is to be heard. [00:04:15] Speaker 03: And here, he presented his argument, he cited cases, he cited statutes, he discussed it. [00:04:23] Speaker 03: So hasn't he effectively been heard already? [00:04:27] Speaker 02: On some of it, I mean, he was acting pro se, and I think that's very important. [00:04:33] Speaker 02: He was not represented by an attorney. [00:04:34] Speaker 02: And I was developing a wish list, you know, if this case were remounted back. [00:04:39] Speaker 02: One of the things I would look at was a neurological evaluation. [00:04:42] Speaker 02: and CT scan with an EEG, which was something that was recommended by one of the psychiatrists that had originally evaluated Mr. Race, and that didn't happen. [00:04:52] Speaker 02: I think Mr. Race's concern from the beginning was that he was not receiving mental health treatment, to which he had been promised as a condition of his plea. [00:04:59] Speaker 03: But due process doesn't guarantee you the best argument or the most complete argument, just opportunity to be heard. [00:05:06] Speaker 03: Here seems like he's been heard already. [00:05:07] Speaker 03: I understand he could present more things, additional evidence, but essentially he's been heard. [00:05:14] Speaker 02: Well, and also the district court didn't look at the right timeframe. [00:05:17] Speaker 02: What she looked at was the period of time that took place when he was before the district court as to whether or not he had any sort of mental impairment. [00:05:25] Speaker 02: And the real issue here is during that period of time of the equitable tolling, whether or not he had mental impairment during that period of time. [00:05:32] Speaker 02: So there wasn't any evidence presented on that issue. [00:05:35] Speaker 04: Counsel, I have a few questions for you. [00:05:36] Speaker 04: Sure. [00:05:37] Speaker 04: One is, what are the best cases that you would cite to us for the principle that notice and opportunity to be heard are fundamental to due process? [00:05:52] Speaker 02: Well, obviously, the Ninth Circuit case Wensel v. Nevin is the one that I think that is directly on point, and it does require prior notice before this can be dismissed summarily. [00:06:02] Speaker 02: I'm not challenging the district court's authority to Sue Esponte address the issue. [00:06:07] Speaker 02: What I'm challenging here [00:06:09] Speaker 02: is whether or not the district court has to provide notice to the defendant before she does dismiss it. [00:06:14] Speaker 02: I mean, the judge jumped right over from not requiring the state to respond to dismissing it without giving Mr. Race an opportunity to respond. [00:06:22] Speaker 04: Okay. [00:06:23] Speaker 04: I want to ask you a question about Judge Lee's question to you. [00:06:29] Speaker 04: So he asked whether your client [00:06:37] Speaker 04: had already made his case for why he should be hurt and the question I have is I know he made a lot of arguments about the statute of limitations but did he respond [00:06:55] Speaker 04: in advance to every jot and tittle of argument that were presented against him without having seen it. [00:07:06] Speaker 04: It would seem that would require sort of some ability to prophecy. [00:07:13] Speaker 02: I definitely agree, Your Honor, and also this is a pro se petitioner who is now 74 years old, and he also has obvious mental impairments. [00:07:23] Speaker 02: Other things that were addressed was whether or not he is blind. [00:07:27] Speaker 02: I understand he had an injury to his eye that detached a retina, so he was already blind in one eye, and since then he's developed a severe cataract in the other, so he's not able to see very well. [00:07:39] Speaker 02: So there are issues that need to be addressed. [00:07:42] Speaker 02: One of the things that I also was curious about was Judge Waters relied on the fact that he had access to other inmates to help him. [00:07:50] Speaker 02: And I really question whether or not that is something that is available to inmates at the Montana State Prison. [00:07:58] Speaker 02: You know, and of course, this is an old conviction. [00:08:00] Speaker 02: So what was going on back when he, during the timeframe of tolling here is in question. [00:08:05] Speaker 02: So all of those things need to be developed. [00:08:07] Speaker 04: He's in prison for life, correct? [00:08:09] Speaker 02: He is in prison for life without the possibility of parole. [00:08:15] Speaker 03: You had mentioned a case, Nice v. Bloodworth. [00:08:19] Speaker 03: It wasn't cited in the brief. [00:08:20] Speaker 03: What is that case? [00:08:21] Speaker 02: That was a case that came down after I filed my reply brief and I can file a 28-J letter on that. [00:08:27] Speaker 02: But that actually was a rule for dismissal by Judge Waters. [00:08:31] Speaker 02: Not on the exact same facts. [00:08:34] Speaker 02: Mr. Nice was also not given an opportunity to respond. [00:08:37] Speaker 02: But she actually went through the petition and got some additional evidence and then dismissed it without requiring the state to respond on the merits. [00:08:47] Speaker 02: And so the issue was whether or not she should have done that based on the pleadings accepted as true, whether or not she should have done that. [00:08:56] Speaker 02: And this court reversed and said no, that that needed to be remanded for further hearing. [00:09:01] Speaker 04: OK, so I think you should. [00:09:05] Speaker 04: You don't have to file a 28-J letter. [00:09:09] Speaker 04: If you want, you can just give the clerk a copy of the case site, and she can provide it to us. [00:09:17] Speaker 04: But if you want to cite the case in a letter, you can do that. [00:09:22] Speaker 04: And to be certain, we focus on it. [00:09:26] Speaker 04: But just please don't make an argument in your letter. [00:09:30] Speaker 02: Correct. [00:09:30] Speaker 04: Side only. [00:09:31] Speaker 04: OK. [00:09:32] Speaker 02: And Your Honor, for the benefit of the court, it's my understanding that counsel for the state was the person who made that argument in NICE as well. [00:09:43] Speaker 02: And with that, I'd like to reserve the remaining time for my rebuttal. [00:09:46] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:09:47] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:09:48] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:09:49] Speaker 04: OK, we'll hear from the appellee now. [00:09:59] Speaker 01: May it please the court, Corey Losing on behalf of the state of Montana. [00:10:03] Speaker 01: Because it is unmistakably clear on the face of race's habeas petition that his petition is untimely and he is not entitled to equitable tolling, the district court did not deprive race of notice of and the opportunity to be heard on the untimeliness of his petition before it dismissed it pursuant to rule four as untimely. [00:10:22] Speaker 01: Rule four [00:10:23] Speaker 01: As we've discussed, does require notice and opportunity before a federal district court can dismiss it on procedural grounds. [00:10:32] Speaker 01: However, here we're not dealing with a traditional application of rule four because we're not dealing with a traditional pro se petition that's being filed. [00:10:40] Speaker 01: Race made the choice to preemptively plead. [00:10:43] Speaker 01: Equitable tolling, which is uncommon. [00:10:46] Speaker 01: Most pro se applications just simply lay out their conviction date and their maybe post-conviction dates. [00:10:52] Speaker 00: Let's maybe stop and break down the requirements. [00:10:56] Speaker 00: What was the notice that Race received here before his petition was summarily dismissed? [00:11:02] Speaker 00: Where would you argue that that was received or when was it received? [00:11:08] Speaker 01: He was aware of the untimeliness. [00:11:10] Speaker 01: He, in the beginning of his memorandum in support of the petition, said that he recognized that there was an exceedingly long delay between his conviction and when he filed this habeas petition. [00:11:22] Speaker 00: That wasn't exactly my question. [00:11:24] Speaker 00: My question wasn't whether he was aware, but what was the notice that he received? [00:11:28] Speaker 00: Because that's what we require, is advance notice. [00:11:31] Speaker 00: So I'm just wondering if there's some place where you think he got that notice from. [00:11:36] Speaker 01: He did not get that notice from the district court. [00:11:38] Speaker 01: But he was aware, and I think that when we're looking at the flexibility that due process is with notice and opportunity, I think he was put on, he was aware of the untimeliness enough that he decided to try to excuse it by pleading equitable tolling. [00:11:52] Speaker 04: Okay, counsel, he was aware of untimeliness, and he tried to cover that in his petition. [00:12:03] Speaker 04: But was he aware of all the arguments that the government made in its motion? [00:12:12] Speaker 01: There was no motion by the government in this case, but he did assert several [00:12:20] Speaker 01: avenues to try to excuse his untimeliness through equitable tolling. [00:12:24] Speaker 01: He raised state impediments, he raised attorney abandonment, and he raised mental impairment. [00:12:32] Speaker 01: So he raised, I would say, the big three of equitable tolling to try to excuse this. [00:12:38] Speaker 01: None of them were viable in this case because he simply just wasn't entitled to equitable tolling. [00:12:43] Speaker 01: He didn't meet his burden there. [00:12:47] Speaker 01: It's similar to these circumstances that the language in the Second Circuit, Acosta versus Arturas, and the language from the Fourth Circuit in Hill versus Braxton, where they've kind of recognized that, yes, at its base, most pro se litigants are going to need this notice and opportunity. [00:13:05] Speaker 01: But there may be instances in which it's so clear from the face of the petition. [00:13:10] Speaker 00: Well, but how do we get around the language of our precedent in the Ninth Circuit in Wenzel, in which we said that [00:13:17] Speaker 00: For a pro se petitioner, the court must make clear the grounds for dismissal and the consequences of failing to respond, that there has to be notice, which you've acknowledged that we did not have here from the district court, and then an opportunity to respond. [00:13:34] Speaker 00: I mean, I'm just wondering how we as a three-judge panel are supposed to get around that. [00:13:39] Speaker 00: Where's the opening that you see in Wincell? [00:13:42] Speaker 01: In Wenzel, I don't believe that there were facts that he preemptively pled equitable tolling. [00:13:48] Speaker 01: So on the face of the petition, it was just that it was time barred. [00:13:51] Speaker 01: The district court didn't have all of the facts to support [00:13:54] Speaker 01: that there could be a possibility that the untimeliness could be excused. [00:13:58] Speaker 01: So I think that that is one avenue I think here we're dealing again with this very rare set of circumstances where the district court has all this information before it more so than the standard pro se petition to consider and here certainly race was heard on his [00:14:14] Speaker 01: Equitable tolling argument which generally would be the basis right of that notice and opportunity. [00:14:18] Speaker 00: It's the opportunity to present your position What what's the line that you would advocate for it if? [00:14:25] Speaker 00: What if a petitioner I don't know says three paragraphs about equitable tolling is that is that enough to get around? [00:14:32] Speaker 00: When cell do we have to have a page do we have to have 20 pages? [00:14:35] Speaker 00: What? [00:14:36] Speaker 00: Where do you think the line should be? [00:14:38] Speaker 01: I think it's simply looking at each case facts and circumstances and figuring out how much processes do under those cases. [00:14:46] Speaker 01: So if there's three paragraphs and they don't set forth any sufficient other than maybe like an inclusory statement that I'm entitled to equitable tolling. [00:14:54] Speaker 01: Well, I think under those, you would probably be afforded notice and opportunity that your petition is going to be dismissed on untimeliness unless you can excuse it. [00:15:03] Speaker 01: But here, he did have a developed argument. [00:15:05] Speaker 01: He set forth the Ninth Circuit standards for whether or not he's entitled to equitable tolling. [00:15:12] Speaker 01: He tried to raise several grounds, and he was heard. [00:15:14] Speaker 01: And also, back to how we kind of get around this is, [00:15:18] Speaker 01: uh... under rule four when district courts do dismiss using rule four on the merits uh... if they found that it's a frivolous claim that's being asserted before they did that type of dismissal they're not required to provide the notice and opportunity it's on the procedural bars to filing a habeas petition so you know procedural default exhaustion untimeliness but it's not on a merit-based assessment and i think [00:15:45] Speaker 01: Like race did here when he preemptively pled equitable tolling He kind of tossed into this quasi merits universe where the district court had all the arguments before it and could review those and she did here Before she dismissed it under rule four because she found that he wasn't entitled to equitable tolling. [00:16:03] Speaker 04: Okay. [00:16:04] Speaker 04: I have a further question you know It seems like [00:16:10] Speaker 04: the law ought to allow a suespante dismissal, in some cases, as the rule indicates. [00:16:21] Speaker 04: But here, in this case, where your client, not your client, but where the prisoner's got a life sentence, like I just wondered, it sounded like where's the, [00:16:37] Speaker 04: where's the fire? [00:16:39] Speaker 04: Why did the district court feel he had to act so promptly? [00:16:46] Speaker 04: The district court could not give notice to the habeas petitioner. [00:16:55] Speaker 01: I think here, Your Honor, [00:16:59] Speaker 01: She acted promptly because she just, uh, the federal district court here operated under what it's required to do under rule four. [00:17:05] Speaker 01: And if a petition lacks merit, they are required to dismiss that petition. [00:17:09] Speaker 01: She reviewed all the documents that were provided. [00:17:12] Speaker 01: She reviewed his arguments. [00:17:14] Speaker 01: She found that legally he's not entitled to equitable tolling to excuse the 24 year delay it took from the expiration of his statutory timeframe or statute of limitations. [00:17:26] Speaker 01: until he filed his habeas petition. [00:17:28] Speaker 01: And she summarily dismissed it on those grounds. [00:17:33] Speaker 01: And I don't think that it's a matter of whether or not she was too prompt or anything like that. [00:17:38] Speaker 01: I think it's just certainly under these circumstances. [00:17:40] Speaker 01: He was aware of the untimeliness. [00:17:41] Speaker 01: He attempted to excuse it. [00:17:43] Speaker 01: His arguments couldn't prevail under the law. [00:17:46] Speaker 04: Thank you, counsel. [00:17:50] Speaker 01: So under Rule 4, if we look at these different types of avenues in which it can be satisfied, again, he had the opportunity to be heard on his position before she dismissed it. [00:18:00] Speaker 01: Judge Waters considered all the available arguments that he made, and she even at times gave him the benefit of the doubt, detailing that even if she were to, for argument's sake, [00:18:13] Speaker 01: do find that he had a mental impairment that was so severe and even toll a portion of the time. [00:18:20] Speaker 01: There is just too much time there that he needed to toll in order to have a timely habeas petition filed. [00:18:27] Speaker 01: And so even looking at all those time periods, he simply could not show that his mental impairment was so debilitating that it was the but-for cause for the untimeliness. [00:18:37] Speaker 01: He filed numerous PCR petitions during that time. [00:18:41] Speaker 01: He had awareness that he needed to file his own notice of appeal. [00:18:45] Speaker 01: He requested his documents in the case during that time. [00:18:48] Speaker 01: He's made all these different moves that undermine that his mental impairment would prevent him from filing a timely petition, habeas petition here. [00:18:57] Speaker 01: And he also, in those same facts, didn't diligently pursue his rights. [00:19:02] Speaker 01: Particularly, there were chunks of time between the 2002 second petition for post-conviction relief filed and the third one filed in 2017. [00:19:11] Speaker 01: And again, the six-year gap between the 2017 PCR petition and his habeas petition being filed in 2023. [00:19:19] Speaker 01: Under all of those facts, the district court correctly concluded that his petition was untimely and it couldn't be excused. [00:19:25] Speaker 01: by equitable tolling. [00:19:27] Speaker 01: And because of that, Rule 4 required her to dismiss it. [00:19:31] Speaker 01: And of course, again, he was heard on those arguments before she did so. [00:19:36] Speaker 01: So his notice and opportunity under Rule 4 were satisfied in this case. [00:19:40] Speaker 01: I ask that you affirm the Federal District Court. [00:19:42] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:19:44] Speaker 04: Thank you, counsel. [00:19:47] Speaker 04: You will hear any brief rebuttal from the panel. [00:19:52] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:19:52] Speaker 02: And obviously, I don't want to repeat what I've already said in my first argument. [00:19:57] Speaker 02: I am asking this court to follow Wensel. [00:19:59] Speaker 02: I think that there's no way around that. [00:20:01] Speaker 02: I looked for any cases I could find where a case had been dismissed without providing prior notice and opportunity to be heard to a petitioner. [00:20:09] Speaker 02: The state had sided to a fourth circuit case. [00:20:13] Speaker 02: Even in that case, it was remanded back for a hearing. [00:20:16] Speaker 02: So I couldn't find a single case where a fourth [00:20:19] Speaker 02: dismissal took place on these grounds for procedural or for Timeliness and so I'm just asking this court to follow when Sylvie Nevin and remand this case back to the district court Thank you. [00:20:31] Speaker 04: Thank you counsel [00:20:35] Speaker 04: Unless one of my colleagues has a question, we will now submit this case and we'll decide eventually and we'll alert the parties of our decision in due course.