[00:00:00] Speaker 01:
Good morning, your honors.

[00:00:01] Speaker 01:
May it please the court Philip Chen on behalf of plaintiff Lauren Strobel.

[00:00:05] Speaker 01:
We're here today because the issue before the court is whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint and failing or in denying leave to amend

[00:00:15] Speaker 01:
the complaint on the grounds that neither sufficiently alleged an unreasonably dangerous condition in the dressing room at Walmart on the day of this incident.

[00:00:25] Speaker 01:
Now the district court's ruling was largely predicated on a couple of Washington cases, Brandt versus Market.

[00:00:36] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry.

[00:00:39] Speaker 01:
Brant versus Market Basket Stores and Johnson versus the Liquor and Cannabis Board.

[00:00:47] Speaker 01:
And the district court's reliances on those cases are frankly misplaced in this instance.

[00:00:51] Speaker 04:
Can I stop you for one second?

[00:00:53] Speaker 04:
So we have sort of two decisions.

[00:00:55] Speaker 04:
We have the first, the decision to dismiss the original complaint.

[00:00:59] Speaker 04:
And second, we have the decision to not grant leave to amend.

[00:01:04] Speaker 04:
And with respect to the first decision,

[00:01:07] Speaker 04:
The complaint that was dismissed was filed in state court and removed to federal court, right?

[00:01:12] Speaker 04:
That's accurate.

[00:01:13] Speaker 04:
And in state court, you don't have to comply with Iqbal Twombly.

[00:01:18] Speaker 04:
Yeah, that's right.

[00:01:21] Speaker 04:
Under Washington law, they expressly actually declined to adopt that standard.

[00:01:25] Speaker 04:
So it's not a surprise that a complaint removed

[00:01:29] Speaker 04:
from state court to federal court would not satisfy Iqbal Twombly, because when it was drafted, it didn't have to, right?

[00:01:35] Speaker 04:
That's correct.

[00:01:36] Speaker 04:
So maybe the place to really focus then, because it's not a surprise if it didn't, would be on whether to grant leave to amend.

[00:01:45] Speaker 04:
OK.

[00:01:45] Speaker 01:
Yeah, and I do think that the proposed First Amendment complaint certainly is the one that is more fleshed out of these two.

[00:01:52] Speaker 01:
As your honor correctly notes, this was a state court complaint.

[00:01:57] Speaker 01:
And frankly, my office wasn't the one that drafted it.

[00:02:00] Speaker 01:
It was a prior counsel that drafted it.

[00:02:03] Speaker 01:
So the one that we really do think is the important one here, clearly, is the First Amendment amended complaint.

[00:02:09] Speaker 03:
And in that complaint, where do you allege that the type of flooring

[00:02:15] Speaker 03:
at issue that those laminated flooring is unreasonably dangerous.

[00:02:24] Speaker 01:
So I'm looking at the excerpt of record 54, ER 54.

[00:02:31] Speaker 01:
That's the exhibit A to our motion to amend the first amendment complaint I'm looking at.

[00:02:36] Speaker 01:
54.

[00:02:37] Speaker 01:
And I think that it's fairly implied from paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3.

[00:02:45] Speaker 00:
So 2.2, I mean, it does contain the statement.

[00:02:50] Speaker 00:
The use of laminate or vinyl flooring presents an unreasonable risk of injury.

[00:02:54] Speaker 00:
But it doesn't provide any sort of non-conclusory elaboration of that.

[00:03:01] Speaker 00:
It doesn't say that laminate or vinyl is unusually slippery or

[00:03:07] Speaker 00:
anything about the condition of this laminate or vinyl.

[00:03:11] Speaker 00:
It's followed by two sentences about the phenomenon of trying to put on pants and getting your leg caught in the pants, which seems like something that would happen independent of the floor.

[00:03:20] Speaker 00:
So where do you elaborate on what it is about the floor that's dangerous?

[00:03:25] Speaker 01:
Well, I think that it's drawing inferences from those facts about taking the fact of it being vinyl laminate flooring, combined with, frankly, the fact that people aren't going to be having their shoes on.

[00:03:37] Speaker 01:
That's what keeps a lot of laminate vinyl flooring less slippery, is that we have traps on our shoes, right?

[00:03:43] Speaker 03:
Isn't that kind of flooring fairly common in stores?

[00:03:49] Speaker 01:
It is common in stores, but the question for dressing rooms is whether it's an unreasonably dangerous condition.

[00:03:55] Speaker 03:
It's really dangerous.

[00:03:57] Speaker 03:
And the argument or the allegation is that the lamination causes an unreasonable danger that people will fall.

[00:04:12] Speaker 01:
And that's correct, is that because people don't have the traction that's gained by their shoes, they're in a position where, one, it's awkward to, you know, sometimes it's awkward to try on pants.

[00:04:21] Speaker 01:
There's going to be balance concerns there.

[00:04:23] Speaker 01:
But then if you have to put your leg down through the pant leg, that slip risk is increased because of the lack of traction there.

[00:04:31] Speaker 00:
But that's true regardless of what the floor is.

[00:04:33] Speaker 00:
That's a phenomenon about pants and trying on pants.

[00:04:36] Speaker 00:
That's not a feature of floors.

[00:04:38] Speaker 01:
Well, right.

[00:04:39] Speaker 01:
But the question, but it is kind of a two-part thing, right?

[00:04:42] Speaker 01:
Or there's kind of two factors at play.

[00:04:44] Speaker 01:
One is the fact of pants, and then the other is the type of flooring.

[00:04:48] Speaker 01:
This sort of thing, even if there's some sort of risk of it happening on carpet or something else, what we're saying here is that the use of vinyl and laminate flooring in the context of the dressing room elevates that to an unreasonable risk.

[00:05:00] Speaker 00:
And why is that?

[00:05:02] Speaker 00:
I mean, is vinyl and laminate slipperier than other kinds of floors?

[00:05:07] Speaker 01:
I believe that, well, we believe that in the context of trying on clothes in a dressing room, that it is.

[00:05:11] Speaker 00:
Well, no, no, no.

[00:05:12] Speaker 00:
I mean, the slipperiness, it either is slippery or it isn't.

[00:05:17] Speaker 00:
I mean, there is some coefficient of friction between like, you know, pants material and the floor, right?

[00:05:24] Speaker 00:
Yeah, correct.

[00:05:24] Speaker 00:
And that is greater for some floors and lesser for other floors.

[00:05:27] Speaker 00:
Do you think it's greater for this kind of floor material?

[00:05:30] Speaker 01:
I believe it is greater, but the question here is that, but that- Okay, but the complaint doesn't say that.

[00:05:34] Speaker 03:
My question is that you haven't filed this yet because you were denied leave.

[00:05:39] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:05:40] Speaker 03:
So could you improve this?

[00:05:42] Speaker 03:
Are there additional allegations that you could add to really hone in on how this type of flooring is unreasonably dangerous?

[00:05:55] Speaker 01:
So I believe that, you know, I believe that that would be something that we would be needing to conduct some discovery on.

[00:05:59] Speaker 00:
And that's one of the problems here, is that we're at the... Oh, no, you don't get discovery until you get a complaint that can survive a motion to dismiss.

[00:06:07] Speaker 00:
So could you, consistent with rule 11, draft a complaint that would do better than this one, do you think?

[00:06:13] Speaker 01:
If we're talking about adding the phrasing that the vinyl laminate flooring is slipperier than other floors, then yes, we can.

[00:06:23] Speaker 03:
We have to have a good faith belief that that is the case to file those words.

[00:06:27] Speaker 01:
Well, so I think that I mean, so I do believe that I think that especially when we're talking about, you know, the question of the traction that you have, because when we're talking about a store, we're talking about, you know, the common how common laminate laminate and vinyl flooring is.

[00:06:44] Speaker 01:
most of the time we're talking about that in the context of shoes that have some traction that's not the same as a garment and it's the context of the dressing room you know that I think makes us that does make it unreasonably dangerous and you know to the extent that we can further expound on the mechanics of that you know I I can draft a complaint that that addresses that

[00:07:05] Speaker 01:
But, you know, in terms of the question of, you know, proving, you know, proving that up, you know, I do think that's a question for discovery.

[00:07:13] Speaker 01:
I do understand that, you know, we're trying to get to that point, right?

[00:07:17] Speaker 01:
But I do believe that, you know, there is a greater slip risk with vinyl flooring when you don't have shoes on.

[00:07:26] Speaker 01:
And we, you know, we need to add that language in there.

[00:07:29] Speaker 01:
We can.

[00:07:29] Speaker 01:
But I think that that's also fairly implied from paragraph 2.2 and 2.3.

[00:07:35] Speaker 01:
were fairly inferred from 2.2.

[00:07:37] Speaker 03:
I don't understand why you just didn't say that, knowing that the complaint was dismissed because it wasn't alleging the unreasonable dangerousness of the floor.

[00:07:51] Speaker 01:
Well, I think we do allege that this is unreasonably dangerous.

[00:07:56] Speaker 01:
And in terms of if we need to add specific phrasing, we certainly can.

[00:08:01] Speaker 01:
But I don't think that that complies with, or I think that that's a bit beyond what Iqbal and Twombly require here in terms of the specificity, the detailed factual allegations, which they explicitly say aren't necessary here.

[00:08:14] Speaker 04:
Can I clarify the procedural history?

[00:08:16] Speaker 04:
So there was the motion to dismiss, and then at the same time,

[00:08:21] Speaker 04:
You filed your opposition.

[00:08:22] Speaker 04:
You filed a motion for leave to amend.

[00:08:24] Speaker 04:
That's correct.

[00:08:25] Speaker 04:
Before the district court judge ever ruled on the motion to dismiss.

[00:08:29] Speaker 00:
Is that right?

[00:08:30] Speaker 04:
And so the district judge then never had, you never had oral argument.

[00:08:35] Speaker 04:
Is that right?

[00:08:36] Speaker 04:
On the motion to dismiss?

[00:08:38] Speaker 01:
I believe there may have been.

[00:08:40] Speaker 01:
My supervisor would have been the one handling that.

[00:08:44] Speaker 01:
And so, but I'm not, there may have been, I can't speak to that, right?

[00:08:49] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:08:50] Speaker 04:
But then what you got was an order denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for leave to amend at the same time.

[00:08:57] Speaker 04:
That's correct.

[00:08:58] Speaker 04:
So you didn't respond to an order.

[00:09:01] Speaker 04:
Your motion for leave to amend wasn't responding to an order saying what was deficient with the complaint.

[00:09:08] Speaker 01:
That's correct.

[00:09:10] Speaker 01:
That's correct.

[00:09:11] Speaker 01:
And so we did get, and so, you know,

[00:09:14] Speaker 01:
You know, once the 12b6 motion was filed, once our office had appeared on the case, we did kind of concurrent, more or less, not, I guess, more or less concurrently file, yes, the motion for leave to amend in this matter.

[00:09:27] Speaker 04:
I'm just wondering why you did that, as opposed to just in your opposition saying, which lawyers say all the time, if the motion is granted, please grant us leave to amend.

[00:09:41] Speaker 01:
I can't speak to the reasoning behind that strategic decision.

[00:09:44] Speaker 01:
I do think that the functional end is the same.

[00:09:48] Speaker 03:
Was there a prior attorney involved?

[00:09:50] Speaker 03:
Are you a new counsel in this?

[00:09:53] Speaker 01:
So there was a prior attorney in that.

[00:09:58] Speaker 01:
As the attorney originally filed the state complaint, that attorney was later suspended.

[00:10:01] Speaker 01:
My office handled it.

[00:10:03] Speaker 01:
And then my office jumped in on the motion to dismiss the motion for leave to amend.

[00:10:09] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:10:10] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:10:20] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:10:21] Speaker 02:
Eddie Silverman on behalf of Walmart.

[00:10:24] Speaker 02:
I'd like to begin by addressing a couple questions that the panel asked.

[00:10:28] Speaker 02:
First, Your Honor, you asked, where do you allege it was an unreasonably dangerous condition?

[00:10:35] Speaker 02:
And I would submit to you that that's nowhere in the complaint.

[00:10:40] Speaker 02:
In either version of the complaint, do they say laminate flooring is an unreasonably dangerous condition as a general matter?

[00:10:49] Speaker 02:
or inherently dangerous.

[00:10:51] Speaker 02:
In fact, in the appellant's briefing, in their reply on page eight, as your honors have the opportunity to review, there's an admission that neither version of the complaint alleges that this condition is unreasonably dangerous as a general matter.

[00:11:08] Speaker 02:
But the reason why this complaint was ultimately dismissed was because even on a specific level, particular level, with respect to the occurrence that happened, there are no facts in the complaint as alleged that would tend to establish that this floor was in a dangerous condition at the time of the incident.

[00:11:29] Speaker 04:
And there are no facts that could ever be alleged?

[00:11:32] Speaker 04:
Not that I'm certainly not that have been pled okay, but the question is to my are there any as a matter of law It could never be laminate flooring could never be dangerous in a desk Unreasonably dangerous in a dressing room.

[00:11:47] Speaker 02:
Thank you your honor this laminate flooring.

[00:11:50] Speaker 02:
No and let me explain why We've heard a lot about the issue of warning right that came up in the briefing in your counsel speak to it too much but a question that I

[00:11:59] Speaker 02:
considered and then I would submit to the panel is this, what would a warning in this case look like?

[00:12:06] Speaker 02:
Danger, laminate floor?

[00:12:09] Speaker 00:
Well, it's not an issue of warning.

[00:12:10] Speaker 00:
I mean, it's, you know, you heard my colloquy with your friend about the, you know,

[00:12:15] Speaker 00:
the friction between laminate floor and pants and I think I asked whether he could say that the coefficient of friction was greater, I meant lesser, but if he were to come back with a complaint that said like this is actually a lot slipperier than other kinds of materials that you might use and therefore it's unreasonable to use this particular kind of floor because it's so much slipperier.

[00:12:41] Speaker 00:
What in the record before us indicates that he couldn't plead that?

[00:12:45] Speaker 02:
Well, I think the fact that they didn't plead that.

[00:12:48] Speaker 04:
But there's one complaint, really, in this case.

[00:12:53] Speaker 04:
This is a case where there was essentially never leave to amend granted ever.

[00:12:58] Speaker 04:
Because the first complaint, as I pointed out, was filed in state court.

[00:13:01] Speaker 04:
We don't expect it to comply with Iqbal Twombly, because you removed it.

[00:13:06] Speaker 04:
And I'll also note, Walmart answered that complaint, right?

[00:13:11] Speaker 04:
Walmart answered the complaint.

[00:13:13] Speaker 04:
And so technically, actually, you shouldn't even have brought a motion to dismiss.

[00:13:17] Speaker 04:
It should have been a motion for judgment on the pleadings, because Walmart had answered the complaint.

[00:13:22] Speaker 04:
I don't know that that has a substantive difference, but procedurally, it was incorrect.

[00:13:27] Speaker 04:
And Walmart brought a motion for summary judgment.

[00:13:30] Speaker 04:
What inference do we draw from that, that Walmart didn't even initially move to dismiss that complaint?

[00:13:36] Speaker 02:
Let me answer the initial question first, which is, could that be pled?

[00:13:40] Speaker 02:
Could it be pled that it's slippery?

[00:13:42] Speaker 02:
One of your honors raised the issue of, well, it would have to be supportable under Rule 11.

[00:13:48] Speaker 02:
I think that we've already established in the briefing that is in the record that they cannot say that this floor is slippery as a general matter, right?

[00:13:57] Speaker 02:
And that's why I brought up the issue of warning.

[00:13:59] Speaker 02:
Not because I believe it's an issue in the case, but because I believe that implicitly that exposes the fact that common laminate vinyl flooring

[00:14:08] Speaker 02:
cannot be an unreasonably dangerous condition.

[00:14:11] Speaker 02:
Because again, if you have a wet floor, the sign would say caution, slippery when wet.

[00:14:17] Speaker 02:
Here, using the factual context, one would have to say caution, slippery when trying on pants,

[00:14:25] Speaker 02:
or shorts and wearing socks.

[00:14:28] Speaker 02:
There are conditions that are unique to this case and to what happened to the plaintiff, which ultimately when they are distilled down, this is just a repackaging of

[00:14:39] Speaker 02:
The fall.

[00:14:39] Speaker 02:
The fall is the evidence for the dangerous condition.

[00:14:43] Speaker 02:
And that is as well established of a concept as there is under common law in the state of Washington that you need more than the fall.

[00:14:52] Speaker 04:
Didn't the complaint allege also that there weren't any bars?

[00:14:56] Speaker 04:
Why couldn't you have bars in the dressing room?

[00:14:59] Speaker 04:
And that would help if you started to fall or lose your balance.

[00:15:04] Speaker 02:
Your honor, I'm sure that you could have bars, but I don't believe that that changes are ultimately affects the seminal question of whether or not that floor constituted a dangerous condition.

[00:15:17] Speaker 02:
I think if we're talking about putting other safeguards in there to make it safer,

[00:15:23] Speaker 02:
That's another question.

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
And then we're talking about, I think we're approaching the level of store as insurer of safety.

[00:15:29] Speaker 02:
You could say, well, couldn't you have padded those walls?

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
Couldn't you have put an airbag in the floor when the person falls?

[00:15:35] Speaker 02:
You could do many other things to make it safer.

[00:15:38] Speaker 02:
But ultimately, the seminal question is, was there, or to the panel's point, could there ever be,

[00:15:45] Speaker 02:
a dangerous and unreasonably dangerous condition in that dressing room?

[00:15:51] Speaker 02:
And the answer to that question unequivocally and inescapably is no.

[00:15:55] Speaker 03:
And you asked- That's where I have a problem with your argument.

[00:15:58] Speaker 03:
I think that's a step too far.

[00:16:01] Speaker 03:
I think I can't answer that question.

[00:16:04] Speaker 03:
Could it ever be dangerous?

[00:16:06] Speaker 03:
I mean, given that I might be able to answer that question if I had more information or more knowledge about the facts.

[00:16:14] Speaker 03:
But to me, yeah, it could be dangerous to have a laminated floor in a dressing room under certain circumstances.

[00:16:23] Speaker 03:
And what are those?

[00:16:24] Speaker 03:
Those are unknown because of the stage of the pleadings that we're at.

[00:16:29] Speaker 03:
respectfully.

[00:16:29] Speaker 02:
First of all, I agree with you, Your Honor.

[00:16:31] Speaker 02:
It could be dangerous.

[00:16:33] Speaker 02:
And certainly you have a situation where there's an allegation that it was dangerous because of the unique circumstances, the entanglement in the pants.

[00:16:42] Speaker 02:
But the point that we made in the briefing is

[00:16:44] Speaker 02:
Any floor could be dangerous.

[00:16:48] Speaker 02:
This floor could be dangerous.

[00:16:50] Speaker 02:
But if ultimately my proof in the complaint is that the floor is dangerous because I slipped on it?

[00:16:55] Speaker 03:
It's not proof.

[00:16:57] Speaker 03:
So we're not at a proof stage.

[00:16:59] Speaker 03:
We're at a plausibly alleged stage.

[00:17:03] Speaker 02:
I would chalk what I just stated up to a semantic mistake.

[00:17:06] Speaker 02:
It needs to be alleged that that floor is dangerous, is in an unreasonably dangerous condition,

[00:17:13] Speaker 02:
And what ultimately the district court relied on was that there were not the facts, and there can never be the facts here in this context.

[00:17:21] Speaker 02:
When your honor says, well, it could be, we would need to know.

[00:17:25] Speaker 02:
We know what happened in this case.

[00:17:28] Speaker 02:
Those facts don't exist for them to marshal and plead.

[00:17:31] Speaker 03:
You may be having an uphill battle just because of where we are, because usually we allow leave to

[00:17:39] Speaker 03:
amend a first time leave to amend as a matter of course, as a matter of right.

[00:17:45] Speaker 03:
Isn't that true?

[00:17:47] Speaker 02:
I know that it is a liberal pleading standard.

[00:17:50] Speaker 02:
I certainly would not quibble with your honor with respect to whether or not the law is true, but we're operating under a futility standard, which ultimately it invokes both 12b6 and also the rule 56 standard for summary judgment ultimately, where if ultimately that complaint is going to be subject to dismissal, that is a situation where that is considered

[00:18:15] Speaker 02:
futile and that is I see your honor looking at me quizzically I have that citation available.

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
This is a Ninth Circuit case of Johnson versus American Airlines 834 F2D 721 where it states I'm reading from

[00:18:32] Speaker 02:
But courts have discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint for, quote, unquote, futility.

[00:18:37] Speaker 02:
And futility includes the inevitability of a claim's defeat on summary judgment.

[00:18:42] Speaker 02:
Of course.

[00:18:45] Speaker 00:
I don't think any of us quarrels with that as a legal matter.

[00:18:48] Speaker 00:
The question is, how do we know that it's inevitable that it will be defeated on summary judgment?

[00:18:55] Speaker 00:
For all that we know at this stage, they can come in with a declaration from somebody who says, you know, I'm a fellow of the American Floor Society, and everybody knows you shouldn't put this kind of floor in a dressing room because it's really slippery, right?

[00:19:07] Speaker 00:
And if they had that, they would survive summary judgment, wouldn't they?

[00:19:14] Speaker 02:
I suppose that if they had that in theory, they could survive summary judgment.

[00:19:18] Speaker 02:
But getting back to the pleading stage, again, I keep harping on this, but we have the facts.

[00:19:24] Speaker 02:
The facts are available to us.

[00:19:26] Speaker 02:
The issue of whether or not they can or would or will say this floor was slippery as a general matter has been resolved against the appellant in essence.

[00:19:36] Speaker 02:
We have an admission that they cannot say this floor was slippery.

[00:19:40] Speaker 04:
He just said in an argument that if given further leave to a man, he could allege that it was slippery than other types of floor, which in this context made it unreasonably dangerous.

[00:19:53] Speaker 04:
It might be perfectly appropriate somewhere else, but their argument is in a dressing room where people are taking off their shoes, getting their feet stuck in their pants, and not having any bars, it's unreasonably dangerous and slippier.

[00:20:07] Speaker 02:
And what I would say is at the pleading stage, the evidence of that, and I'm putting that in quotes, or what they are offering to establish that, it's circular.

[00:20:17] Speaker 02:
It's the fact that the plaintiff fell.

[00:20:19] Speaker 02:
And it's unique in this complaint in that we actually have an alternate explanation in the complaint as to why she fell, which was the entanglement in the pants.

[00:20:30] Speaker 04:
You're drawing inferences in Walmart's favor with that argument.

[00:20:34] Speaker 04:
That just violates rule 12b6.

[00:20:37] Speaker 04:
You're asking us to draw an inference in Walmart's favor that she fell because of her own conduct as opposed because the floor was slippery.

[00:20:45] Speaker 02:
I would respectfully just, I will put it this way, I am not asking you to draw that inference.

[00:20:50] Speaker 02:
What I'm saying is that inference is inevitably drawn because when we are looking at what Judge Estudio and the district court relied on, it was the fact that there are no other facts other than the fall, and I believe that's a good place

[00:21:07] Speaker 02:
To to to pause for a second and just to quote from the order where it says I can't say it any better than the district court plaintiff also argues she has quote plausibly alleged that Walmart created an unreasonably dangerous condition by electing to install laminate slash vinyl flooring.

[00:21:24] Speaker 02:
that causes an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm.

[00:21:28] Speaker 02:
This argument, though, relies solely on the occurrence of a slip and fall as support.

[00:21:35] Speaker 02:
That is where we are in the pleading.

[00:21:37] Speaker 02:
And when I say that there's only one inference that can be drawn, I think when you remove what are

[00:21:47] Speaker 02:
legal conclusions and you are left with the facts under the plausibility standard that would support a cause of action, all we have is the fact of a fall.

[00:21:56] Speaker 02:
We have nothing on the floor.

[00:21:58] Speaker 02:
We don't have the floor in a defective condition.

[00:22:01] Speaker 02:
There's nothing about that floor from a common sense standpoint.

[00:22:04] Speaker 02:
It's not ice that counts here.

[00:22:07] Speaker 03:
Well, over your time.

[00:22:08] Speaker 02:
Apologies.

[00:22:09] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:22:09] Speaker 03:
We appreciate this adventure into one else of a procedure.

[00:22:15] Speaker 03:
But thank you very much.

[00:22:17] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:22:19] Speaker 03:
Strubble v. Wal-Mart is submitted.

[00:22:21] Speaker 03:
We'll take up Torres v. Garland.