[00:00:00] Speaker 05: Good morning. [00:00:00] Speaker 05: You may be seated, and welcome to the United States Court of Appeals, the Richard Chambers Courthouse. [00:00:09] Speaker 05: It's a pleasure to be here and to see all of you here present today. [00:00:14] Speaker 05: We have a number of cases that have been submitted. [00:00:16] Speaker 05: Let me just go through some of those, and then we have two cases in which there'll be oral arguments. [00:00:22] Speaker 05: The first case, Hassan Abdullah Tahil versus Merrick Garland, has been submitted on the briefs. [00:00:29] Speaker 05: Henry Heartwise, Vitamins Online, Inc., versus Heartwise, Inc., Magleberry, and Cactasinos, and Greenwood has been submitted on the brief. [00:00:42] Speaker 05: Guillermo Bayardo Sandoval and Alberta Bayardo versus Merrick Garland has been submitted on the briefs. [00:00:50] Speaker 05: And so that brings us to our first oral argument case today, and that's Live, Life, Bea, Vida, LLC, and Gary Dorjic and Nava Dorjic versus Cruising Yachts, Inc. [00:01:06] Speaker 05: and Eduardo Loiza. [00:01:09] Speaker 05: Council's ready. [00:01:10] Speaker 05: You may come forward. [00:01:14] Speaker 02: Good morning. [00:01:15] Speaker 02: May it please the Court and Council. [00:01:17] Speaker 02: My name's Marker Lovell. [00:01:20] Speaker 02: Appellants live life Bella Vita LLC and Gary and Nava Dordrecht who were the owners of the vessel Involved in the incident that gives rise to this maritime limitation of liability action And that's what we're dealing with today and on appeal here is the district court's decision to [00:01:46] Speaker 02: grant the request for relief from the stay or the injunction allowing the claimant Eduardo Loaiza to return to state court for determination of various liability issues. [00:02:02] Speaker 02: And what's unique here is there are other joint tort feesers who are also named by Mr. Loaiza. [00:02:08] Speaker 02: in the limitation action as well as in the state court action and have also made cross claims for indemnity and attorney's fees and other remedies against our clients as the vessel owners to determine liability as we're dividing up the pie of liability in the case. [00:02:30] Speaker 02: which creates a multiple claimant situation where without adequate stipulations to protect the district court's jurisdiction to determine limitation, which means two things. [00:02:45] Speaker 02: A, what's the value of the vessel? [00:02:47] Speaker 02: And B, whether or not my clients, the owners of the vessel, had privity or knowledge of the cause of this casualty or this incident. [00:02:59] Speaker 02: And the court has to ensure that the district court's ability to make that decision cannot be disturbed or prejudice by anything that happens in a parallel state court proceeding. [00:03:14] Speaker 02: And the best way to do that is to ensure that appropriate stipulations are [00:03:21] Speaker 02: executed by all of the parties because it's a multiple claimant situation. [00:03:26] Speaker 02: And there's really two ways to do that and three points I want to make on that point. [00:03:32] Speaker 02: First, this court ruled in Williams Sports Rentals earlier this year. [00:03:39] Speaker 02: That case has been up and down to the Ninth Circuit a couple of times. [00:03:43] Speaker 02: And earlier this year, it issued a ruling holding that when there is a [00:03:50] Speaker 02: And when there's a multiple claimant situation, there has to be adequate stipulations executed by all parties to ensure that the, um, the, um, the, um, the, um, the, um, the, um, [00:04:10] Speaker 02: province of the district court to make the limitation decisions is adequately protected. [00:04:15] Speaker 03: Council, can I interrupt you and ask you exactly what you're asking us to decide? [00:04:21] Speaker 02: Absolutely. [00:04:22] Speaker 03: Absolutely. [00:04:23] Speaker 03: You've taken a very strong position that this is a multi-claimant situation and you don't have adequate stipulations from your perspective. [00:04:30] Speaker 03: Are you asking us to remand for the district court to take another run at adequate stipulations or what exactly? [00:04:36] Speaker 02: What we would like to see the court do is reverse to the district court because it's a multiple claimant situation. [00:04:45] Speaker 02: and with instructions to the district court as to what the stipulations must be that must be executed by all of the parties to ensure that the limitation jurisdiction of the district court and their right to make that decision is protected. [00:05:02] Speaker 03: So again, forgive me for interrupting, but you're asking us to dictate what the stipulation would say? [00:05:07] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: And if you're interested, I can tell you exactly what I think I'm suggesting. [00:05:13] Speaker 03: I'm pretty interested. [00:05:13] Speaker 03: OK. [00:05:14] Speaker 03: Because Mr. . [00:05:14] Speaker 05: . [00:05:15] Speaker 05: . [00:05:15] Speaker 05: I mean, I guess Lois is proposing what he calls a simple fix, and that's sort of a unilateral stipulation. [00:05:22] Speaker 02: Right. [00:05:22] Speaker 02: And the unilateral stipulation, which is what he's already been successful with in the district court and why we're here today, is [00:05:32] Speaker 02: is wholly insufficient under any of either the majority rule, which is set forth by the Second, Seventh, Third, and Fifth Circuits, and also Williams Sports Rentals now, which is the Ninth Circuit decision on that point. [00:05:50] Speaker 05: Because those are the two significant developments since the district court's decisions, correct? [00:05:55] Speaker 05: It seems like SNK Dive had not filed their claim or its counterclaim. [00:06:01] Speaker 05: and the Williams Sports Rentals case has been decided, correct? [00:06:07] Speaker 05: Correct. [00:06:08] Speaker 05: And so in your view, that impacts the result here. [00:06:12] Speaker 02: Oh, absolutely. [00:06:13] Speaker 02: And the 100% certain thing is that attorney's fees claim makes it a multiple claimant situation. [00:06:22] Speaker 02: And what should the stipulation say to protect our client's limitation rights? [00:06:30] Speaker 02: One, the district's courts exclusive jurisdiction is to determine all issues related to limitation of liability. [00:06:38] Speaker 02: Two, no party is going to attempt to execute any of the state court judgments or results. [00:06:46] Speaker 02: seeking indemnity contribution from the vassal owner in state court, which happens with equitable indemnity cross claims and procedural issues like that, at any point in the limitation action, because of the need for the district court to determine privity and knowledge. [00:07:04] Speaker 02: All parties waive the right to use decisions in the state court case that impact limitation. [00:07:11] Speaker 02: How does two differ from three? [00:07:15] Speaker 03: Forgive me for interrupting. [00:07:16] Speaker 03: How do two and three differ? [00:07:20] Speaker 02: Well, I think it depends on the nature of the ruling in the state court. [00:07:26] Speaker 03: Your concern is that somebody's going to get a judgment in the state court and seek to use it in the federal court under the doctrine of res judicata, if I can loosely summarize. [00:07:36] Speaker 02: Right, right. [00:07:37] Speaker 02: I mean, the way I look at it, we've got two parallel cases. [00:07:40] Speaker 02: We've got the district court case that's over here, and we've got the state court case that's over here. [00:07:45] Speaker 02: And we all know if the state court case gets tried with multiple parties in a tort case like this, and you're dividing up that pie of liability, there's without an agreement by all parties, [00:07:56] Speaker 02: that they'll be still bound by the district court's jurisdiction over here. [00:08:01] Speaker 02: There's all kinds of prejudicial things that could happen in federal court. [00:08:04] Speaker 02: Right. [00:08:04] Speaker 02: So we understand that. [00:08:04] Speaker 02: Forgive me for interrupting. [00:08:05] Speaker 03: We understand that? [00:08:06] Speaker 03: Yeah. [00:08:06] Speaker 03: I'm just trying, because your time is ticking, I'm just trying to figure out how did the second and third points in your preferred stipulation language differ, sir? [00:08:13] Speaker 02: Okay. [00:08:15] Speaker 02: I think it's just the difference of the nature of the ruling in the state court, whether [00:08:22] Speaker 02: Simple. [00:08:24] Speaker 02: They're very similar. [00:08:25] Speaker 02: They're very similar. [00:08:26] Speaker 02: OK. [00:08:27] Speaker 02: Race, judicata, collateral, estoppel. [00:08:28] Speaker 02: Issue per collusion is the issue. [00:08:31] Speaker 02: And then the fourth thing that I think the stipulation has to say is that the attorney's fees claim, which is acknowledged to be a separate claim, has to take precedence over Loise's claim. [00:08:46] Speaker 02: I think those are the four points that we would ask the court to reverse and instruct the district court to include in the required stipulations that would have to be- The attorney's fees has to take precedence over Louise's claim? [00:09:01] Speaker 01: Is that what you're saying? [00:09:03] Speaker 01: It's a separate claim. [00:09:04] Speaker 01: It's a separate claim. [00:09:05] Speaker 01: It's a separate claim. [00:09:07] Speaker 01: Right. [00:09:09] Speaker 05: more important when you say take precedence? [00:09:12] Speaker 02: Well, we have to deal with, there's going to be the limitation fund, which is the value of the vessel, and then there's the attorney's fees claim. [00:09:19] Speaker 02: And we have to ensure that there's separation there in the district court. [00:09:24] Speaker 03: But you're suggesting one takes priority, that the attorney's fees take priority, which is what Chief Judge Murkey is asking you to explain. [00:09:30] Speaker 02: Right. [00:09:31] Speaker 02: And I think that's what Williams Sports Rental says. [00:09:33] Speaker 02: So that's what we're relying on to get there. [00:09:37] Speaker 05: Well, didn't William Sports Runnels said, you know, attorney's fees are definitely a separate claim? [00:09:44] Speaker 05: And basically that these other claims, our contribution, probably are separate claims, but we're not going to rule on that at this point. [00:09:58] Speaker 02: Well, William Sports Runnels, the way I read what the Ninth Circuit did there was they [00:10:04] Speaker 02: Declined to take a position on the circuit split And decide whether the the ninth circuit in the ninth circuit the rule is going to be the majority rule or the minority rule and [00:10:19] Speaker 02: They stopped by saying, look, we've got a separate claim by way of the attorney's fees claim. [00:10:24] Speaker 02: So we don't have to reach the issue that the other circuits that I listed off earlier have already decided, which is if you've got the majority rule is if you have contribution and indemnity claims among the various [00:10:40] Speaker 02: joint tort feesers, then you have a multiple claimant situation and everybody has to agree to get back to state court to protect the limitation jurisdiction of the district court. [00:10:54] Speaker 02: I would suggest that that's a very common sense rule. [00:11:00] Speaker 02: I've been doing this for my whole career and oftentimes [00:11:05] Speaker 02: Many of the lawyers involved have treated it as such, given how much sense it makes, because it does always protect the limitation proceeding. [00:11:17] Speaker 05: So I'm trying to understand from that response, do you think we need to address whether indemnity and contribution claims also create a multiple claim situation? [00:11:30] Speaker 02: I don't think you have to, but I think that the court should. [00:11:35] Speaker 02: Because this issue, again, we're litigating the issue now. [00:11:40] Speaker 02: Williams Sports Rental's case is litigating the issue again. [00:11:45] Speaker 02: And it has been for about five years. [00:11:49] Speaker 02: And I know of other cases that are out there within the Ninth Circuit that I'm involved in, frankly, where this issue is becoming a bigger issue. [00:11:58] Speaker 02: and is being litigated in the district court level. [00:12:02] Speaker 02: So it seems that to have the Ninth Circuit take a position on it would be helpful. [00:12:08] Speaker 02: And it just makes a lot of sense because it [00:12:13] Speaker 02: ensures that the vessel owner is not going to be prejudiced in the limitation proceeding. [00:12:19] Speaker 05: And is it your position that unilateral stipulations can never protect a ship owner in a multiple claim situation or that just that Loise's proposed stipulations are not adequate here? [00:12:34] Speaker 02: Well, I think [00:12:37] Speaker 02: I don't think a unilateral stipulation can ever protect the vessel owner when there's multiple claimants. [00:12:46] Speaker 02: Oftentimes, what you see, there'll be a limitation action, and there's no other joint tort fees involved. [00:12:51] Speaker 02: And there's a single claimant, and that's called the single claimant exception. [00:12:56] Speaker 02: In those situations, a unilateral stipulation is fine. [00:12:59] Speaker 02: But that does not apply when we're dividing up that pie of liability, which is what, you know, that's the nightmare that I have as I sit here as the vessel owner's lawyer saying, well, if we don't have that protection and we try this case to conclusion and the trier of fact makes an allocation of fault, how is that going to be sorted out by the federal judge? [00:13:21] Speaker 02: And how can I be sure that those parties aren't going to take positions that are [00:13:27] Speaker 02: consistent with that and try to convince the federal judge that those are, for instance, race judicata and create a situation where that privity knowledge determination, which is one of the liability issues in the limitation action, is prejudiced. [00:13:48] Speaker 05: Did you want to reserve the balance of your time? [00:13:50] Speaker 02: Yes, I would like to reserve the balance of my time. [00:13:53] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:14:06] Speaker 00: Thank you for affording me this opportunity. [00:14:08] Speaker 00: My name is Daniel Guiola. [00:14:09] Speaker 00: I'm here on behalf of Mr. Loaiza and may it please the court and counsel. [00:14:14] Speaker 03: I'm having a little bit of a hard time hearing you. [00:14:16] Speaker 03: Could you keep your voice up just a bit? [00:14:18] Speaker 00: Yeah. [00:14:19] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:14:19] Speaker 00: I could get closer to one of these. [00:14:20] Speaker 03: That's great. [00:14:21] Speaker 00: Sorry. [00:14:21] Speaker 00: Should I repeat or? [00:14:24] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:14:24] Speaker 00: I said thank you for providing me this opportunity. [00:14:27] Speaker 00: My name is Daniel Guiola. [00:14:28] Speaker 00: I represent Mr. Loaiza and may it please the court. [00:14:32] Speaker 00: I like to not rehash stuff that's already in the briefings, and I understand kind of some of the questions and issues raised by counsel. [00:14:42] Speaker 00: So if there's anything that the justices want to hear about, I'm sure they'll ask me. [00:14:47] Speaker 00: But I will address attorney fees. [00:14:52] Speaker 00: I've been practicing personal injury a long time in California. [00:14:55] Speaker 00: I'm not aware of a provision [00:14:57] Speaker 00: or a statute or anything that provides for the opportunity for attorney fees and personal injury claimants, some obscure situations that we're not dealing with here right now. [00:15:08] Speaker 05: But the precedent's here. [00:15:11] Speaker 00: Right. [00:15:11] Speaker 05: There's so many circuits. [00:15:13] Speaker 05: I mean, all of the circuits at this point are unanimous that attorney fees in this situation, when you're looking at the limitations act, does consider attorney fees a separate claim. [00:15:25] Speaker 05: How do you counter that? [00:15:27] Speaker 00: Right, well, my understanding is based on California law. [00:15:32] Speaker 00: I don't know with regards to other circuits whether or not they have special rules for indemnification cross complaints that provide for attorney fees or we're talking about blanket situations where there's a contractual relationship between tort feesers providing for attorney fees. [00:15:48] Speaker 00: But the question on this case decided on the facts of this case would be, what attorney fees are we afraid of that would present a risk where there would be some exposure beyond the limitation value to the vessel owners? [00:16:06] Speaker 00: And if there is no attorney fees, if it's a hypothetical attorney fees in our case, [00:16:11] Speaker 00: then just because you've pled attorney fees in your prayer for complaint doesn't mean you're entitled to it. [00:16:16] Speaker 00: A lot of people throw it in, even though there's no legal basis for attorney fees. [00:16:20] Speaker 00: Often it's met with a motion to strike, and it's removed. [00:16:23] Speaker 00: Oftentimes trial comes and goes, and they try to enforce it, and they're told there's no basis for it. [00:16:29] Speaker 05: I guess because you rely a lot on state law. [00:16:33] Speaker 05: This we have to look at under the Limitations Act. [00:16:38] Speaker 05: And so I'm trying to look for any authority. [00:16:41] Speaker 05: And can you cite any where we're supposed to look at state law and that's going to be controlling when we're in the context of the Limitation Act? [00:16:54] Speaker 00: Well, we look at state law for the underlying claim for liability. [00:16:57] Speaker 00: And in other contexts, we do look at state law. [00:17:00] Speaker 00: Give me a case. [00:17:00] Speaker 05: Give me a case. [00:17:01] Speaker 05: I'm on the spot, but- Within the Limitations Act, but that's the main reason we're here. [00:17:05] Speaker 05: I mean, unfortunately, I think for you and your client, what you have to reckon with. [00:17:14] Speaker 05: And it seems like there's overwhelming authority on the attorney. [00:17:21] Speaker 05: fees issue that says that consider, every circuit that's looked at it has said that's a separate claim. [00:17:29] Speaker 00: Yes, I actually, and not to pivot, I don't think that, I don't have issue with the attorney fee's provision. [00:17:36] Speaker 00: I'm not here to argue that attorney fee's provision shouldn't be considered separate. [00:17:41] Speaker 05: Once it's considered separate, then that completely I think undermines. [00:17:47] Speaker 00: But what we'd be arguing, sorry, what we'd be arguing is [00:17:51] Speaker 00: imaginary hypothetical attorney fees that they're never going to be entitled to under our fact pattern cannot create this illusion that there's multiple claimants when the reality is, in this case, there will never be an attorney fees exposure. [00:18:07] Speaker 00: Does that make sense? [00:18:08] Speaker 00: So in terms of- No. [00:18:09] Speaker 03: Are you talking about- Actually, I agree with Judge McKee. [00:18:11] Speaker 03: It doesn't make sense to me either. [00:18:12] Speaker 03: Are you talking about attorney fees now coming out of the parallel state court action? [00:18:21] Speaker 00: Right. [00:18:21] Speaker 00: So I guess the, so the argument with return to attorney fees is that there will be a cross complaint between tort feesers. [00:18:28] Speaker 00: I'm imagining this arises in a scenario where there's some contractual relationship between those tort feesers, providing them with a right to attorney fees, which I don't understand there to be here. [00:18:39] Speaker 00: If there was a case where there's a contractual situation, then one of the tort feesers may prevail on their cross complaint and may be entitled to an award of attorney fees. [00:18:48] Speaker 00: which would be separate, which the problem is it becomes a mathematical problem because it puts you over the limitations action. [00:18:54] Speaker 00: So I'm kind of simplifying in my own mind. [00:18:56] Speaker 00: That's how I understand it. [00:18:59] Speaker 00: In terms of setting a precedent, the court can set a precedent, and the precedent could be more specific to the fact that in order to be a plaintiff in limitation and invoke this attorney fee issue, as opposed to having it as a, for lack of a better word, be a red herring, there needs to actually be, in the underlying case, a viable attorney fee claim, and not just a prayer and a complaint. [00:19:23] Speaker 03: Let me try it this way. [00:19:24] Speaker 03: Are you saying that if we were to look at the, you know, I'm following up on Chief Judge McGurk's comment about the other circuit's rulings. [00:19:31] Speaker 03: Are you saying that you think if we were to drill down on those other rulings, those other rulings would present circumstances where there was a state law reason that provided for fees that is not present here? [00:19:42] Speaker 00: Is that what you're saying? [00:19:43] Speaker 00: That's, so I tried to do this last night before I was preparing for this and figure out how those attorney fees provisions were in the different scenarios. [00:19:52] Speaker 03: I didn't come across a California case and I can't speak for other states. [00:20:07] Speaker 03: What you're arguing in a roundabout way is that those cases are distinguishable because they involved situations where, in this parallel state court action, there was a non-hypothetical exposure to fees that we don't have here. [00:20:21] Speaker 03: But I'm not sure I'm understanding you, so I'm trying to check to see if that's what you're telling us. [00:20:26] Speaker 00: I don't want to misrepresent that I've read every single case, and I know that to be the fact, but that is my [00:20:33] Speaker 00: I could, the best way to say it appropriately is yes, that's my feeling on how I read these. [00:20:37] Speaker 00: Because when I read them, there seemed to be a concern for attorney fees in each of those cases that was beyond they pledded in their complaint. [00:20:47] Speaker 00: Does that make sense? [00:20:48] Speaker 00: Because they actually put credibility to those attorney fees claims and they relied on it. [00:20:53] Speaker 00: They didn't just say, you added the magic words in your pleading prayer and we're done. [00:20:57] Speaker 00: Does that make sense? [00:20:58] Speaker 05: I think you answered my question. [00:20:59] Speaker 00: Yeah. [00:21:00] Speaker 05: So what about the indemnity and contribution claims? [00:21:04] Speaker 00: The indemnity and contribution claims, as counsel noted, is not germane to the analysis that we're doing here. [00:21:12] Speaker 00: In terms of whether or not we should adopt the majority, [00:21:19] Speaker 00: or not or go with the minority as it's been said. [00:21:23] Speaker 00: Council mentioned it's not germane to the issues here. [00:21:26] Speaker 00: It would be an advisory decision. [00:21:27] Speaker 00: If the court wants to take a route, they could. [00:21:33] Speaker 00: I think for us, it's the in Ray Moran case that they cited to in their opening brief, I think it's on the third page, where the [00:21:42] Speaker 00: And I could quote from it, but effectively on 388, continuing on 389, they explain, and I'll paraphrase because it's a little long to read. [00:21:51] Speaker 00: But they basically say, we actually have to look at the facts. [00:21:54] Speaker 00: We actually have to look, is there an actual risk where these demands will exceed the limitation action? [00:22:00] Speaker 00: Because if it's all imaginary, we're not doing this just because there's a hypothetical. [00:22:06] Speaker 05: I don't know, because I want to give you every opportunity. [00:22:10] Speaker 05: This is a very serious case and serious injury to your client. [00:22:15] Speaker 05: But I'm trying to figure out what you mean by imaginary. [00:22:18] Speaker 05: I mean, a claim is an asserted claim. [00:22:21] Speaker 05: People think they have a claim. [00:22:24] Speaker 05: Whether they do or they don't, ultimately, the process has to play through. [00:22:28] Speaker 05: I don't think we figure out, you know, or there's a way here to say, oh, that's imaginary. [00:22:35] Speaker 05: I thought in your briefs what you were arguing that that was, like other arguments have been made on these indemnity and contribution claims, is that they're derivative. [00:22:46] Speaker 05: But that's been rejected by a lot of the recent courts to look at this issue, because I thank the bottom line for a lot of the courts that have looked at these kind of claims under the Limitations Act. [00:23:03] Speaker 05: is that if there's some risk of exposing the ship owner to excess liability in the federal admiralty proceeding, then that's going to be considered a separate claim. [00:23:18] Speaker 05: And I wanted to give you every opportunity to argue that here and to help me understand your position. [00:23:26] Speaker 00: And I apologize, I meant imagine, and I should be more precise with my words. [00:23:31] Speaker 00: I meant in the context, for example, of the attorney fee claims, an attorney fee prayer and a complaint without a statutory contractual or legal basis is not valid, meaning that you can pray for attorney fees, but you wouldn't get it unless you could actually show that you're entitled to it based on statute, contract, or otherwise. [00:23:53] Speaker 00: So that's why I meant in terms of imagining, meaning I just put it in there, but I don't have anything to support it. [00:23:58] Speaker 00: And I should be more precise with my words. [00:24:01] Speaker 00: With regards to the indemnity issues, there's been two approaches. [00:24:05] Speaker 00: And I think that the approach from the Williams case and the other districts that consider it derivative, I think it's because they actually drill down more into the risk of exposure instead of having this standard rule where indemnity claims automatically are multiple claimant, contribution claims are on. [00:24:26] Speaker 00: I think that's the difference is that the approach here is more of a [00:24:32] Speaker 00: factual approach of what actually in that particular case is going on and it gives the judge in the district court the discretion on a case by case basis to see whether or not based on the facts presented there is a risk. [00:24:48] Speaker 00: And that is the benefit of the minority approach, whereas if you adopt the blanket approach that the more circuits have adopted, I granted, where it would automatically be considered a separate claim, multiple party, gets you back into fed court, deprives you of your jury trial in state court, then it takes away that discretion from the district court judges to be able to look at the case that they're actually have in front of them on their docket. [00:25:15] Speaker 00: and decide based on the facts of that case whether or not this one should be sent out to state court because I understand that there's a cross complaint and in the cross complaint they've asked for indemnity contribution or attorney fees but I know because I practice this law of this state with this is my file, this is my case on my docket and I know there's no risk and I don't have to keep it in the district court. [00:25:40] Speaker 00: And that becomes the benefit of not going, at least in my mind. [00:25:44] Speaker 00: I'm sure there's other arguments that are in the brief that the court has read. [00:25:48] Speaker 00: But in my mind, that would be the reason not to adopt that rule, because we would be depriving the state court of the discretion of actually looking at what's going on in their case before them. [00:25:57] Speaker 04: But that discretion only works one way, right? [00:26:00] Speaker 04: Because it always puts the person that's subject to the protections of the federal law [00:26:07] Speaker 04: at some risk, unless the district court turns out to be wrong. [00:26:10] Speaker 04: You're saying the district court should forecast, right, but the district court isn't all-knowing, so if the district court turns out to be wrong, then the people that are supposedly protected by this federal law end up not being protected. [00:26:25] Speaker 04: It's understandable why you'd be arguing in the position that you're in for that, because it never puts your [00:26:34] Speaker 04: your side at risk. [00:26:35] Speaker 04: All the risk of that sort of approach falls on the, of the district court being wrong, falls on the people that are supposedly protected. [00:26:44] Speaker 00: Well, if we use the example of attorney fees, the district court judge can look at the file and know the facts and know the cause of action for negligence. [00:26:53] Speaker 00: In this case, does not provide you for an opportunity for attorney fees, nor does the cross-complaint for indemnity. [00:26:59] Speaker 04: You haven't pled that you have a contract that provides- But I guess what I'm getting at is there's the fact that it's asymmetrical risk and you're basically putting, but it's also just that you're putting a lot of a burden on the district court to have to figure out [00:27:13] Speaker 04: both on the attorney's fees. [00:27:15] Speaker 04: Is there any real chance of attorney's fees? [00:27:17] Speaker 04: And is there any real chance that there might be another claimant here who is going to push us above the limit? [00:27:29] Speaker 04: The district court's having to figure that all out on the front end, which I'm guessing is why the majority of courts have just said let's just make a bright line rule, partly just probably to make it easier for the district court. [00:27:43] Speaker 00: I know my time is up. [00:27:45] Speaker 00: You still have a minute and 30 seconds. [00:27:49] Speaker 00: I guess the burden needs to be compared to your depriving a claimant and injury claimant victim of their right to a jury trial, which again in the case law seems to be something that we want to preserve under the safety suitors clause. [00:28:03] Speaker 00: And with regards to the burden, I would surmise that the burden's not any more than having the case remain on their document and having to litigate the whole case where they would have to make all these decisions anyways. [00:28:14] Speaker 00: So I don't know how extensive that burden would be. [00:28:17] Speaker 00: I think in terms of, again, to use a simple example of the attorney fee provision, the burden is just so much as understanding what the causes of action are and whether or not there was an indemnity contract between the parties or some type of provision that would give them a right to attorney fees. [00:28:33] Speaker 00: it's very easy to ascertain that it could be viewed from the pleadings. [00:28:38] Speaker 00: You'd have to plead the contract and plead your attorney fees the property of predicate cause of action for indemnification to be entitled to attorney fees. [00:28:46] Speaker 00: So I don't think it would be much of a burden in that regard if you use that example. [00:28:50] Speaker 00: In terms of the derivatives, again, that could also be resolved by [00:28:56] Speaker 00: the stipulation. [00:28:57] Speaker 00: And if you want me to address the stipulation requiring that it be unanimously entered, again, we don't want to allow one holdout cotort feezer to deprive the victim of their right to attorney fees. [00:29:08] Speaker 00: So that becomes the problem where we've seen in the case law, they've provided it, a stipulation can be worded to allow the protection. [00:29:18] Speaker 00: and I'll leave with one thing, I'm sorry, is as far as the priority thing they mentioned, again, the attorney fees given priority means that we'll take the attorney fees off the top and then Loaiza, for example, would agree to accept up to what's left. [00:29:35] Speaker 00: That type of a stipulation unilaterally will give the same protection as if the other, it doesn't require, it's just like a foreclosure situation. [00:29:44] Speaker 00: I'm second in line on the lien. [00:29:46] Speaker 00: I'll agree to be second. [00:29:47] Speaker 00: and take what's left over after the first takes priority. [00:29:50] Speaker 00: So that answers that question briefly. [00:29:54] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:29:54] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:30:04] Speaker 02: A couple quick points. [00:30:08] Speaker 02: As it relates to the attorney's fees claim, an attorney's fees claim has been made by SNK dive against our clients. [00:30:16] Speaker 02: We have to defend that claim. [00:30:18] Speaker 02: And the law is unanimous in support of the position that that requires the stipulations that were discussed, but that we've suggested here. [00:30:29] Speaker 02: Even in the cases, even in the circuits that have followed the minority rule, [00:30:36] Speaker 02: They've still acknowledged the need, for instance, the Sixth Circuit and the S&C shipping case, when there was an attorney's fees claim, in addition to the contribution and indemnity claims, they required all parties to stipulate. [00:30:51] Speaker 02: The second point, real quick, is there's no place for state law in this analysis. [00:30:58] Speaker 02: Limitation of Liability Act and supplemental admiralty rule F occupy the maritime law on this point. [00:31:05] Speaker 02: Those are federal statutes. [00:31:07] Speaker 02: That's how we analyze when there might be a need for state law to supplement admiralty law as A, is there a statute that occupies that space? [00:31:17] Speaker 02: Here, the answer is yes, twice. [00:31:19] Speaker 02: If we're not looking at a statute, then the question is, is there general maritime law on point? [00:31:26] Speaker 02: Yeah, actually, there is general maritime law on point at the circuit level in almost every circuit. [00:31:31] Speaker 02: I didn't count them up, but almost every circuit. [00:31:33] Speaker 02: One has a majority rule, and then there's a couple with a minority rule. [00:31:37] Speaker 02: But that law governs. [00:31:40] Speaker 02: And only if there was ambiguity and there wasn't a general maritime law rule on point will we look to state law on any of those issues. [00:31:48] Speaker 02: This is a federal issue that needs to be decided at the federal level by the circuit court interpreting federal law. [00:31:56] Speaker 02: And that's all I have. [00:31:58] Speaker 02: And I would ask that the court reverse the district court's decision on the terms that we've suggested. [00:32:07] Speaker 02: Thank you very much. [00:32:09] Speaker 05: Thank you both very much for your argument presentations here today. [00:32:14] Speaker 05: The case of Live Life, Mea Vida LLC versus Cruising Yachts and Edward Loaiza is now submitted.