[00:00:05] Speaker 01:
please the court.

[00:00:06] Speaker 01:
My name is Eric Frazier on behalf of the appellant, Sheriff Russ Skinner.

[00:00:09] Speaker 01:
I'd like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal if I may.

[00:00:13] Speaker 01:
This lawsuit, as you know, began as a case about racial profiling and immigration enforcement under a different sheriff.

[00:00:21] Speaker 01:
Those days are over.

[00:00:23] Speaker 01:
There's a new sheriff and we've come a long way.

[00:00:25] Speaker 01:
There are no more sweeps.

[00:00:26] Speaker 01:
There are no more detaining people based on immigration status.

[00:00:30] Speaker 01:
And we're working very hard to clear the backlog of complaints.

[00:00:34] Speaker 01:
And we're not challenging the vast majority of the third order.

[00:00:37] Speaker 01:
This appeal instead is very narrow, but it's important.

[00:00:41] Speaker 01:
It's a narrow procedural challenge about how much power a judge can give to a non-judicial officer.

[00:00:48] Speaker 04:
Could I ask a preliminary question?

[00:00:52] Speaker 04:
more carefully the objections that the sheriff lodged to the paragraphs that are now at issue.

[00:00:59] Speaker 04:
It's not clear to me at all that he lodged objections to what you're now complaining about.

[00:01:07] Speaker 04:
He said with regard to paragraph 346, for example, that he recognizes that appointing the monitor necessarily must grant the monitor some additional authority over the complaint and intake process, and then says that

[00:01:20] Speaker 04:
He wants to add in consultation with the PSB commander, the monitor shall make determinations and establish policies, which is essentially what was added with the clarification that the monitor then had independent authority.

[00:01:33] Speaker 04:
So I don't see where there was even an irrelevant objection.

[00:01:37] Speaker 04:
And the same is true in the next paragraph.

[00:01:38] Speaker 04:
Well, the next paragraph doesn't even have that objection.

[00:01:42] Speaker 04:
The only objection with regard to 347 is that it had this language about any other issues raised by the monitor, which I think came out.

[00:01:50] Speaker 04:
So I don't think you would be even objected, aside from the 350 problem.

[00:01:56] Speaker 01:
So first of all, Your Honor, neither of the appellees is contending that we waived anything other than paragraph 350.

[00:02:03] Speaker 04:
Fine, but I'd like to know why you think you didn't.

[00:02:06] Speaker 01:
So, in the objections to paragraphs 346 and 347, we asked the court to apply the procedures under paragraph 353 of the second order.

[00:02:17] Speaker 04:
No, actually not.

[00:02:19] Speaker 04:
It should be consistent with the policies established pursuant to this paragraph, so and so and so and so.

[00:02:25] Speaker 04:
So, in other words, it was watched the policy decisions to be

[00:02:28] Speaker 04:
consistent with the policies established under 348 and 353, it doesn't say with regard to the procedures.

[00:02:36] Speaker 01:
So again, I think because paragraph 353 contains the process for seeking judicial review before those things are implemented, I think the fair reading of paragraphs 346 and 347, or at least our objections thereto,

[00:02:51] Speaker 01:
include that provision of paragraph 353 about judicial review.

[00:02:57] Speaker 01:
And I think the other issue was that some of the most problematic language that were challenging in these paragraphs was added after our objections.

[00:03:04] Speaker 04:
Well, the only language was this clarifying language that said that after consultation he should have independent authority, which seemed to be implicit with what was said anyway.

[00:03:12] Speaker 04:
And with regard to 347, there's not even an objection of that kind.

[00:03:16] Speaker 01:
Well, again, I think that the text that was added, independent authority to make the ultimate decision, that was the text that was added to 346 and 347.

[00:03:25] Speaker 04:
But not inconsistently with anything that was said before or anything in the objections.

[00:03:29] Speaker 04:
The objections said he should consult but recognize that he was going to have the authority.

[00:03:34] Speaker 04:
It says so.

[00:03:35] Speaker 04:
Well, I mean, you can go on, but I think there's a major problem here.

[00:03:39] Speaker 01:
Well, again, so the initial proposal from the management consultant was that the CPA would be advisory only.

[00:03:45] Speaker 01:
That's at page 105, note 28 of our excerpts of record.

[00:03:50] Speaker 01:
And in response to the consultant's report, MCSO said that the CPA should be limited to providing input without authority to dictate intake classification decisions.

[00:04:00] Speaker 01:
That's at page 90 of our excerpts of record.

[00:04:03] Speaker 01:
And so then again, when we responded to the draft third order in paragraphs 346 and 347, when we referenced paragraph 353, I think that's consistent with the position we've taken all along, which is that the monitor, including the monitor's CPA powers, should be advisory only.

[00:04:19] Speaker 04:
It's not even mentioned, as I say, with regard to 347.

[00:04:21] Speaker 04:
There's nothing about 353 or anything else.

[00:04:26] Speaker 01:
And again, neither of the appellees is contending that we waived anything other than paragraph 350.

[00:04:30] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
Go ahead.

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
And our position is the same as the position we've taken all along, which is that the powers of the monitor should be advisory only.

[00:04:39] Speaker 01:
Back from when the monitor was very first appointed, including when the monitor's authorities were expanded to include those of the CPA, we consistently told the court that that should be an advisory only role, and he should be making recommendations to the district court that the district court then implements.

[00:04:56] Speaker 01:
I think the easiest, the most straightforward way to resolve this case, Your Honors, is under Rule 65, the injunction rule, because the third order is an injunction.

[00:05:05] Speaker 01:
There's no dispute about that.

[00:05:06] Speaker 01:
There's no dispute that Rule 65 applies to the third order.

[00:05:10] Speaker 01:
And injunctions have to be self-contained.

[00:05:12] Speaker 01:
They cannot even refer to other documents to specify what a party has to do.

[00:05:18] Speaker 01:
And these three paragraphs that we're challenging go far beyond that.

[00:05:20] Speaker 01:
They refer to a separate person.

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
They say that we have to do what the monitor says we have to do.

[00:05:26] Speaker 01:
Paragraph 347 says that the sheriff and MCSO shall expeditiously implement the monitor's directions or decision.

[00:05:33] Speaker 01:
This is just like what the Second Circuit vacated in the Michaela's case.

[00:05:38] Speaker 01:
There, the district court ordered a gun shop to adopt.

[00:05:41] Speaker 04:
But here, there was a very specific, two very specific orders.

[00:05:45] Speaker 04:
And this is just implementing a very specific order.

[00:05:50] Speaker 04:
In the Second Circuit opinion, there was basically, they just said, you know, go implement the law.

[00:05:58] Speaker 04:
Here, this was iteration three, four actually.

[00:06:02] Speaker 04:
And with regard to a very specific set of rules about how quickly things had to be done and so on, it doesn't bear much resemblance.

[00:06:11] Speaker 01:
But these specific paragraphs that were challenging go beyond that, because the court, for example, has not specified what type of complaints need to go to PSB versus to a district or to a division.

[00:06:23] Speaker 01:
The court leaves all of that to a monitor and then says that we have to do what the monitor says.

[00:06:28] Speaker 01:
That is exactly what the court did.

[00:06:30] Speaker 03:
Well, the having to do what the monitor said, it seems to me, would be cured if the district court were to incorporate

[00:06:40] Speaker 03:
terms of the first order explicitly, which was not done, which gives the court de novo review over anything that there's a complaint about.

[00:06:52] Speaker 03:
So why wouldn't that cure everything?

[00:06:56] Speaker 01:
I think that would go a long way, but I don't think that's sufficient because the type of review that I believe you're referring to is not the type of review that's required to cure the Rule 65 problem.

[00:07:08] Speaker 01:
These types of nonjudicial officers can make recommendations to the court, and then the parties can brief those, and then the court makes the decision.

[00:07:15] Speaker 01:
The way these paragraphs work right now, I don't think you could just merely apply the first

[00:07:19] Speaker 03:
Well, the other problem I guess I have with your argument is you're sort of reading them out of context.

[00:07:25] Speaker 03:
In the context of the whole thing, when you read the whole thing, it seems to me it basically says, get rid of the backlog.

[00:07:33] Speaker 03:
And once the backlog is gone, the monitor goes away too.

[00:07:37] Speaker 03:
So it's clearly in aid of, as Judge Berzon was suggesting, the specific ways in which the backlog needs to be dealt with.

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
So under Rule 65, Your Honor, once the court has determined that it wants the backlog to be reduced, it has two options, essentially.

[00:07:57] Speaker 01:
Option one is it can order the party to reduce the backlog and leave the implementation details to the defendant, which it has done in some parts here.

[00:08:07] Speaker 01:
And that can be done under penalty of sanctions, like the steep, steep monetary penalties under the third order.

[00:08:14] Speaker 01:
The other option is that the court can specify exactly the details of how to achieve that, and it has done that for some other aspects of its injunction.

[00:08:23] Speaker 01:
But what it can't do is delegate to a third party the power to specify those details.

[00:08:29] Speaker 02:
Is that because of the rules that you've indicated?

[00:08:32] Speaker 02:
But by the way, please, we're indebted to the new sheriff for the progress he's made.

[00:08:41] Speaker 02:
We are not holding his predecessor at all and considering that.

[00:08:47] Speaker 02:
That's past history now.

[00:08:49] Speaker 02:
But you've been identifying your argument on rules, and I understand that.

[00:08:54] Speaker 02:
But I'm wondering whether or not we even need to get there.

[00:08:58] Speaker 02:
Why can't a court rely on its inherent equitable powers, independent of Rule 53 in the federal procedure?

[00:09:08] Speaker 02:
Why, why, why hasn't, why can't we take that road and just do it regardless of what the rules say with the independent powers that the court has?

[00:09:23] Speaker 01:
So first of all, I think that would not solve the Rule 65 problem, which again, no one disputes that Rule 65 applies because this is an injunction.

[00:09:33] Speaker 01:
And so even if the court is operating under its inherent authority to appoint a nonjudicial officer, you still need to grapple with the Rule 65 problem.

[00:09:42] Speaker 01:
But as for Rule 53, which I think you're getting at Judge Wallace,

[00:09:47] Speaker 01:
The only source of authority that anyone identified, any of the parties or the court, the only source of authority for the monitor's role was Rule 53.

[00:09:57] Speaker 01:
When the plaintiffs asked the court to appoint the special mass...appoint the monitor... That was originally, but this is... That was originally... A different iteration, a different role.

[00:10:04] Speaker 01:
That's right, but again, the court never gave any indication that it was relying on a different source of authority than when it initially appointed the monitor.

[00:10:13] Speaker 03:
Why does it have to tell you if it has the authority?

[00:10:15] Speaker 03:
Why does it have to specify the source of it?

[00:10:19] Speaker 01:
Because again, the only source of authority that anyone has ever asked the court to invoke is its Rule 53 authority.

[00:10:24] Speaker 03:
That isn't my question.

[00:10:26] Speaker 03:
It's sort of like if we issued a decision and we didn't have the sentence in there, we have jurisdiction under section so-and-so of the federal judicial code, it doesn't mean we don't have jurisdiction just because we didn't mention it.

[00:10:40] Speaker 03:
And my question to you is similar.

[00:10:42] Speaker 03:
If the court actually had authority, does it have to say,

[00:10:47] Speaker 03:
Does it have to rely on a party to tell it what authority it has, or does it have to specify, or does it just have that authority?

[00:10:55] Speaker 01:
I don't know the answer to your question, Your Honor.

[00:10:56] Speaker 01:
I don't think that's been flushed out in the case law.

[00:10:59] Speaker 01:
But I think on this record, this court should look at the appointment of the monitor in context and the expansion of his role in context.

[00:11:06] Speaker 02:
Why do you say that?

[00:11:08] Speaker 02:
Are you suggesting that he's waived, that the district court judges waived any right to rely upon his inherent powers?

[00:11:20] Speaker 02:
My contention is that when... I'm just suggesting, again and again though, the lawyers don't bring up the issue.

[00:11:26] Speaker 02:
We see an issue.

[00:11:28] Speaker 02:
And it's the dispositor of the case and we rely on it.

[00:11:31] Speaker 02:
We don't require that to be discussed at the local court.

[00:11:34] Speaker 02:
So I think you have to confront directly whether or not the district judge had power under his inherent powers to do just what he's done, regardless of the rules.

[00:11:45] Speaker 01:
So first of all, again, I think in cases like Armstrong and the other cases that we cited, the court's inherent authority is at least

[00:11:55] Speaker 04:
drawn into question under Article 3, that delegating not- But in those cases, they were delegating judicial authority.

[00:12:01] Speaker 04:
This is not judicial authority.

[00:12:03] Speaker 04:
It is taking over a minute amount of the executive authority.

[00:12:07] Speaker 04:
So it's kind of a mini receivership.

[00:12:11] Speaker 04:
That's what seems to me it is.

[00:12:13] Speaker 04:
It's a mini receivership because it's over very little of the Sheriff's Office operations.

[00:12:21] Speaker 04:
There is authority when things go enough bad, meaning things are not getting fixed, right, to appoint mega receivers, and here he's appointing a mini receiver.

[00:12:32] Speaker 04:
What's wrong with that?

[00:12:34] Speaker 01:
Well, the receivership issue is

[00:12:37] Speaker 01:
complicated at a minimum, because the main receivership cases, Plata and Morgan, this issue wasn't challenged.

[00:12:45] Speaker 01:
The Article III power wasn't challenged.

[00:12:47] Speaker 01:
In Plata, for example, this court emphasized that the government did not object to the appointment of the receiver and did not appeal the appointment of the receiver.

[00:12:56] Speaker 01:
So by the time Plata got to this court, those arguments had been waived.

[00:13:03] Speaker 01:
But again, here too, the court did not appoint a receiver.

[00:13:06] Speaker 01:
No one is contending that the court did appoint a receiver.

[00:13:09] Speaker 04:
I mean, that's another set of words.

[00:13:10] Speaker 04:
In other words, does he have to say, I'm now going to appoint a mini receiver in order for it to be OK?

[00:13:18] Speaker 04:
I mean, a receiver is just a description of the fact that there are limited circumstances in which the only way a court can get something done after several contempts is to,

[00:13:32] Speaker 04:
appoint an outsider to do it.

[00:13:34] Speaker 04:
And here he did it in a very mild way.

[00:13:37] Speaker 04:
And then I have another question.

[00:13:39] Speaker 04:
So what's wrong with that?

[00:13:40] Speaker 01:
Again, I think when you have rules like Rule 53 and Rule 65—65 in particular, I think, is the most straightforward way—if you're going to evade those rules, or maybe not evade is the wrong word, but if you're going to avoid those rules by relying on a different source of authority, that should be—

[00:13:57] Speaker 01:
Otherwise, what's the purpose of Rule 65's limitations?

[00:14:01] Speaker 01:
Again, in Michaelis, the Second Circuit could have said, well, the court is essentially appointing a mini-receiver.

[00:14:08] Speaker 01:
That argument would have applied in the Michaelis case as well.

[00:14:11] Speaker 03:
The 65 issue, though, is really one of specificity, which is a somewhat different question than the appointment, per se.

[00:14:19] Speaker 03:
And it seems to me that

[00:14:21] Speaker 03:
For the reasons my colleagues have alluded to that it's extremely clear what it is the receiver or the individual monitor is supposed to do.

[00:14:31] Speaker 03:
So I wouldn't lump, I mean, I guess I'm confused by having you lump them together as both relating to the appointment itself.

[00:14:42] Speaker 01:
So our Rule 65 issue is not that the third order is vague.

[00:14:48] Speaker 01:
It's that under Michaelis, a district court cannot issue an injunction that requires the defendant to implement the policies and procedures specified by a third party.

[00:15:00] Speaker 01:
And that's what paragraphs 346 and 347

[00:15:03] Speaker 01:
and 350 do in the third order.

[00:15:05] Speaker 04:
Can I ask another question?

[00:15:07] Speaker 04:
This is somewhat related to Judge Graber's question about whether the authority, the oversight authority of the district court should be clarified here, or whether either section one in the first order can fill that gap.

[00:15:25] Speaker 04:
But I have another question about what might fill the gap.

[00:15:29] Speaker 04:
Paragraph 349 is very strange.

[00:15:32] Speaker 04:
Because it says, the authority granted to the monitor in this paragraph shall not be applicable when there's no backlog.

[00:15:37] Speaker 04:
But in fact, no authority is granted to the monitor in 349.

[00:15:42] Speaker 04:
So it must be referring to something else.

[00:15:45] Speaker 04:
And then it says that it goes on and eventually provides some general rules about how the monitor shall finalize and submit policies to the court with informants and so on.

[00:15:57] Speaker 04:
Could it be that it was meant for this paragraph to apply to everything they've proceeded with?

[00:16:02] Speaker 01:
So I think the best reading of paragraph 349 is that it was intended to refer to the preceding paragraph 348.

[00:16:09] Speaker 01:
It has the same structure that other paragraphs do, including paragraph 353, where it has these subparagraphs A, B, C, D, E, and F.

[00:16:20] Speaker 01:
and then provides the mechanisms for judicial review.

[00:16:24] Speaker 01:
So I think the best reading of 349 is that it refers to paragraph 348.

[00:16:28] Speaker 01:
But those... Well, suppose that was incorporated.

[00:16:32] Speaker 04:
It was clarified that it applied to 347 and 346.

[00:16:38] Speaker 04:
Would that satisfy you?

[00:16:40] Speaker 01:
Yes, I think that would satisfy us provided that we didn't have to implement these things that the monitor says to do until the procedures in paragraph 349 have concluded.

[00:16:51] Speaker 01:
In other words, we don't have to implement these things under the power of contempt until the court makes the determinations as to the final policies as the last sentence of paragraph 349 says.

[00:17:02] Speaker 01:
I believe that would satisfy us.

[00:17:04] Speaker 01:
But again, I think that's hard to read from paragraphs 346 and 347.

[00:17:09] Speaker 01:
which require us to implement what the monitor says directly.

[00:17:13] Speaker 01:
Again, the procedures in paragraph 349, 353, those are the types of things that we believe are required.

[00:17:20] Speaker 01:
I'd like to reserve the remainder of my time for rebuttal, if you'll allow me.

[00:17:24] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:17:47] Speaker 05:
Good afternoon, Your Honors.

[00:17:48] Speaker 05:
Amy Heath on behalf of the plaintiff class.

[00:17:52] Speaker 05:
In its arguments today, the sheriff attempts to cabin the equitable powers of the district court to something like Rule 53, but that is not consistent with the law, the facts before this court, or the court's orders.

[00:18:04] Speaker 05:
The district court was faced with a dire situation, years of worsening noncompliance with its orders, that it had put into place to remedy constitutional violations.

[00:18:14] Speaker 05:
In the second order, the district court specifically found that the sheriff had manipulated all aspects of the internal affairs process to avoid disciplining the very deputies who had committed constitutional violations against the plaintiff class.

[00:18:34] Speaker 02:
You showed how you disagreed with him, but that's gone now.

[00:18:38] Speaker 02:
We have a new sheriff.

[00:18:40] Speaker 02:
According to the record, he's not carrying on any of the duties that you found and we found inappropriate, and it's just a matter of how we're going to work together to get the backlog done.

[00:18:53] Speaker 02:
Isn't that right?

[00:18:54] Speaker 05:
That's right, Your Honor.

[00:18:55] Speaker 02:
There's no indication that the new sheriff is on the same path as the former sheriff.

[00:19:01] Speaker 05:
That's right, Your Honor.

[00:19:02] Speaker 05:
The point that I was going to make was that the importance of complying with this 85-day timeline does directly relate back to the underlying constitutional violations, and so it's of continuing importance.

[00:19:15] Speaker 05:
I do want to address

[00:19:19] Speaker 05:
The sheriff's counsel said today that no party has identified any source, including the court, has identified any source for the appointment of the monitor.

[00:19:28] Speaker 05:
I would direct the court to 2ER111.

[00:19:33] Speaker 05:
That is the second order.

[00:19:36] Speaker 05:
And the district court included a pretty lengthy discussion of the sources of its equitable authority.

[00:19:42] Speaker 05:
It identified three different sources of equitable authority.

[00:19:47] Speaker 05:
It talked about how it had the power to remedy past violations.

[00:19:53] Speaker 05:
It had the equitable power to remedy contempt and enforce its own orders.

[00:19:58] Speaker 05:
And it also had the equitable power to revise its own injunctions.

[00:20:02] Speaker 05:
And it relied on that equitable power in the second order where it put into place this 85-day

[00:20:11] Speaker 05:
it's the inherent powers independent of rule fifty-three exactly so i think it's incorrect to say that the district court never identified the source of its powers in the second order it clearly identified that it was invoking its equitable authority and in the third order we have this it's presented in the same context it's before the district court on a contempt proceeding

[00:20:38] Speaker 05:
entering the third order in order to remedy the contempt of his orders and to bring the sheriff into compliance.

[00:20:47] Speaker 05:
It's the exact same scenario that he discussed at length in the second order, which this court previously affirmed.

[00:20:54] Speaker 05:
In the third order, he also cites Stone versus City and County of San Francisco regarding his equitable power to remedy contempt.

[00:21:01] Speaker 05:
And so I think that there's enough there to make clear that the district court was not relying on Rule 53 in the third order.

[00:21:11] Speaker 05:
He was relying on his equitable power.

[00:21:13] Speaker 03:
What is your interpretation of paragraph 349 in the third order?

[00:21:25] Speaker 03:
More specifically, the sheriff argues that contempt should not flow from disobeying something the monitor decides until the court has had the opportunity to determine the final policies through that.

[00:21:43] Speaker 05:
In our view that there would not be any sort of automatic contempt if there is a dispute between the sheriff and the monitor as to

[00:21:54] Speaker 05:
you know, the challenged paragraphs, there's a procedure through which the sheriff, if he believes that the monitor is classifying cases incorrectly or something like that, can take it to the district court, seek the district court's input, he could move to clarify the order, there's a- But that's not exactly what paragraph 349 says.

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
Is it, or maybe it does.

[00:22:20] Speaker 05:
I'm sorry your honor.

[00:22:21] Speaker 03:
I was responding to what I I understood you to be characterizing the sheriff's argument as Well, I understood their argument to be that they can be in contempt only of something the court Orders and not something that a third party Monitor orders.

[00:22:40] Speaker 03:
Do you disagree with that?

[00:22:41] Speaker 05:
No, we agree with that your honor, okay

[00:22:47] Speaker 04:
So— But there's not—is there anything in this order that's consistent with that?

[00:22:54] Speaker 04:
In other words, is there anything in this order that says I can be in contempt for not complying with the CPA's order?

[00:23:05] Speaker 05:
Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.

[00:23:07] Speaker 04:
It would—I mean, in any event, to be— But when you said there's a procedure, were you talking about the paragraph in the first order?

[00:23:15] Speaker 04:
Is that what you're talking about?

[00:23:16] Speaker 05:
Yes, I'm referring to the first orders.

[00:23:18] Speaker 04:
Well, the problem with that is it seems quite mismatched.

[00:23:25] Speaker 04:
Because it seems to be talking about the then structure of the order, which was non-mandatory.

[00:23:39] Speaker 04:
And it says, let me see if I can find the language.

[00:23:48] Speaker 04:
All right, here we go.

[00:23:50] Speaker 04:
Is this ultimate arbitral language?

[00:23:52] Speaker 04:
Is that it?

[00:23:53] Speaker 04:
The ultimate arbiter of compliance is the court, that language.

[00:23:56] Speaker 04:
And parties may make their own submissions regarding compliance separate from the monitor's reports.

[00:24:01] Speaker 05:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:24:02] Speaker 05:
We're referring to that paragraph, and then also 126, which says the monitor shall be subject to the supervision and orders of the court.

[00:24:09] Speaker 05:
And the monitor shall have the duties responsibilities and authority conferred by the court.

[00:24:14] Speaker 05:
So that's not limited to the first order Well, yes, but it isn't incorporated in the third order.

[00:24:20] Speaker 03:
Why why isn't it limited to the first order?

[00:24:26] Speaker 05:
The first second and third supplemental orders the district court

[00:24:31] Speaker 05:
appears to have conceived of them based on the way that he numbered the paragraphs consecutively, named them first, second, supplemental, to be read as a whole, as a comprehensive remedial scheme.

[00:24:42] Speaker 05:
And this language in the first order

[00:24:48] Speaker 05:
defines the court's oversight over the monitor.

[00:24:51] Speaker 05:
And in the third order, he's giving additional authority to the monitor.

[00:24:55] Speaker 04:
He's giving authority.

[00:24:57] Speaker 04:
The paragraph that you were reading, the second paragraph you were reading from was about if the monitor exceeds his authority, but the authority has changed between the first order and the third order.

[00:25:08] Speaker 05:
That's correct.

[00:25:08] Speaker 04:
So this isn't an argument about whether the monitor has exceeded its authority.

[00:25:12] Speaker 04:
It's about the authority that the monitor was given and whether the court has to get into the weeds of every decision that, which seems very impractical, but that the monitor makes.

[00:25:28] Speaker 04:
So I don't think the second one you read is pertinent.

[00:25:31] Speaker 04:
And as to the first one, it seems to be talking about the

[00:25:38] Speaker 04:
kind of structure set up in the first order, which is that, again, the monitor doesn't have any final authority.

[00:25:44] Speaker 04:
So in any areas where the parties are not able to resolve issues with the monitor, including in those areas where the order provides input from the monitor, the parties may submit their grievances directly to the court, but that seems to be sitting on top of an order in which nothing can happen except by

[00:26:07] Speaker 04:
The monitor is only providing input.

[00:26:09] Speaker 04:
Do you have any objection or reason to be concerned if this was simply clarified?

[00:26:18] Speaker 04:
What would you want to be clarified then?

[00:26:21] Speaker 04:
You might also incorporate the answer to the question I raised about the weird paragraph that seems disconnected.

[00:26:28] Speaker 05:
The plaintiffs would not have an objection to clarifying this.

[00:26:31] Speaker 05:
That could be in the form of this court remanding with instructions to add

[00:26:36] Speaker 05:
judicial review explicitly to the challenged paragraphs, or it could be through incorporation of the first order the way that the second order explicitly incorporates.

[00:26:45] Speaker 05:
Plaintiffs would oppose vacating these paragraphs.

[00:26:48] Speaker 05:
We do not think that's necessary here, and we do not think that the sheriff has met his burden to show that that is necessary.

[00:26:57] Speaker 05:
We can simply remand with instructions to add limited language clarifying this issue.

[00:27:03] Speaker 02:
Could I ask you a question?

[00:27:06] Speaker 02:
We seem to be making a career out of this episode, but now it seems the war is over and we're in the peaceful mood of trying to decide what could occur.

[00:27:17] Speaker 02:
This would never have been a discussion in the first two cases.

[00:27:22] Speaker 02:
But you're spending an awful lot of time and a lot of briefs coming up here to get answers.

[00:27:28] Speaker 02:
Has there been any consideration of developing a mediation program on this particular issue between these particular parties?

[00:27:37] Speaker 05:
Parties did engage in mediation at this court, and I believe it was unsuccessful.

[00:27:44] Speaker 05:
So I think that has been explored.

[00:27:46] Speaker 02:
Mediation where?

[00:27:47] Speaker 05:
Before this court, the Ninth Circuit's mediation program.

[00:27:51] Speaker 02:
That was on this case.

[00:27:54] Speaker 05:
In this appeal, I believe there were discussions and we were unable to reach an agreement.

[00:27:59] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:27:59] Speaker 02:
And you can understand why because our mediators are trained to look at cases where they think people might well get together.

[00:28:08] Speaker 02:
So now fast forward, have you given any consideration after we will do our duty in this case of a mediation program just for, that could be set up through the circuit mediators as a matter of fact?

[00:28:24] Speaker 02:
But some mediation programs, so you can get the early answers.

[00:28:30] Speaker 05:
I'm not aware of discussions to that effect, Your Honor, but I believe plaintiffs always welcome the opportunity to reach agreement on issues rather than litigating them.

[00:28:38] Speaker 02:
Thank you, that's a very kind of you, and it shows a willingness to go forward, and we'll see if that works out.

[00:28:46] Speaker 02:
Because we like seeing you.

[00:28:50] Speaker 02:
Maybe we can find a less expensive way of accomplishing your evidence.

[00:28:55] Speaker 02:
Okay, thank you very much.

[00:28:56] Speaker 04:
Notice that you now have three senior judges and we're not getting younger.

[00:29:07] Speaker 00:
Good afternoon, Your Honors.

[00:29:08] Speaker 00:
May it please the Court, Natasha Babasade, for the United States.

[00:29:12] Speaker 00:
This Court should affirm the District Court's third permanent injunction.

[00:29:15] Speaker 00:
As the District Court found the Sheriff's Office's repeated failure to complete investigations in a timely manner had become so extreme as to render investigations ineffective and of no service to the complainants and the personnel involved.

[00:29:30] Speaker 00:
So the court properly relied on its equitable power to fashion the necessary and appropriate relief, and that includes appointing a CPA here with very limited authority to make decisions over complaint classifications, intake, and rooting, and in some instance, investigative training.

[00:29:51] Speaker 00:
The sheriff's primary argument rests on the assumption that there is no judicial review of these very limited decisions by the CPA.

[00:29:57] Speaker 00:
That assumption is false.

[00:30:01] Speaker 00:
The sheriff can appeal any of these decisions by the CPA to the district court for its review.

[00:30:06] Speaker 00:
There is nothing within the third order that precludes that review.

[00:30:10] Speaker 00:
And indeed, the proceedings leading up to the third order support the understanding that that review would be available.

[00:30:16] Speaker 00:
To the extent the parties disputed about what the CPA having the ultimate decision was in context of whether the sheriff would be able to veto the decisions of the CPA.

[00:30:29] Speaker 00:
Not necessarily whether the district court could at some point review those decisions.

[00:30:34] Speaker 00:
And it bears mentioning your honors that at no point since the district court entered the third order did the sheriff seek clarification with the district court about its ability to appeal the CPA's decisions to the district court, nor has it sought once in the last year and a half to appeal a decision by the CPA to the district court.

[00:30:54] Speaker 00:
In fact, the sheriff's office and- Well, I don't see how that's helpful.

[00:30:58] Speaker 03:
They may have, if they really think they can't appeal it, they wouldn't have appealed in the last year and a half.

[00:31:05] Speaker 03:
So how is that supportive of your argument?

[00:31:12] Speaker 00:
That's just really in support of, you know, that's in support of the proceedings leading up to the third order, where there was at no point, no party thought that the CPA's decisions would be unreviewable, Your Honor.

[00:31:25] Speaker 04:
Is there a timing question about when they're reviewable?

[00:31:29] Speaker 04:
Maybe that's the crime.

[00:31:31] Speaker 04:
I'm a little mystified about why the sheriff is so upset about this.

[00:31:35] Speaker 04:
And I'm wondering whether it has to do with the concern that if they had something they didn't like, it would take

[00:31:42] Speaker 04:
they'd have to keep doing it until the judge undid it.

[00:31:47] Speaker 00:
Yes, your honor.

[00:31:48] Speaker 00:
To the extent that the sheriff's office was concerned about the timing of implementing the CPA's decisions, I also want to point the court to paragraph 365 of the third order, which allows the sheriff to seek an extension for investigations if the basis for which the extension is reasonable.

[00:32:07] Speaker 00:
Now, it seems

[00:32:10] Speaker 00:
pretty obvious that if the sheriff sought to appeal a decision by the CPA to the district court for its review, that would be a reasonable basis for the CPA to grant an extension there.

[00:32:21] Speaker 04:
In any, to the extent, you know... What paragraphs they're complaining about are paragraphs in which the monitor-CPA was supposed to

[00:32:35] Speaker 04:
come up with policies about how to speed things up.

[00:32:39] Speaker 04:
Has that happened?

[00:32:40] Speaker 04:
Do the policies already exist now?

[00:32:44] Speaker 00:
To my knowledge, yes, the CPA and the Sheriff's Office have been working together.

[00:32:51] Speaker 00:
I mean, if it's of any assistance to this court, I can speak about the procedures in place.

[00:32:58] Speaker 00:
Currently, the PSB is tasked with reviewing complaints within the backlog and then reviewing the materials attached to those complaints, coming up with a determination about whether an investigation should be open in those complaints and then also

[00:33:14] Speaker 00:
coming up with a plan of action for how a complaint should be addressed.

[00:33:19] Speaker 04:
Then the CPA reviews- I know, on a case-by-case basis or on a policy, generic basis?

[00:33:24] Speaker 00:
This is currently on a case-by-case basis.

[00:33:26] Speaker 00:
I mean, to the extent that policies are involved, for example, it would be about which types of complaints, how they would be handled, who would be conducting the investigation, whether those complaints would be rooted to

[00:33:41] Speaker 00:
the districts or whether they'd be rooted to the PSB for an investigation.

[00:33:46] Speaker 00:
So they're very limited decisions in so far as the policies are concerned.

[00:33:50] Speaker 00:
It's really about how the complaint is classified and then how it's rooted.

[00:33:57] Speaker 00:
You know, the PSB takes the initial stab at coming up with a, of classifying the complaint and determining how to root the complaint.

[00:34:06] Speaker 00:
The CPA discusses with the PSB its determination of the complaint and how it should be rooted.

[00:34:13] Speaker 00:
And if it agrees, it implements exactly what the PSB had initially sought to do with that complaint.

[00:34:20] Speaker 00:
If it disagrees, the party will discuss and try to work through that disagreement.

[00:34:25] Speaker 00:
But ultimately, if there continues to be disagreement, then the CPA's decision prevails about, again, how the complaint is classified and how it's rooted.

[00:34:37] Speaker 04:
To date, as I mentioned- What you're saying in terms of judicial review is if they're still unhappy, they can go to the judge and get an extension and go to the judge.

[00:34:44] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:34:46] Speaker 04:
You're essentially saying that's just inherent in the relationship between

[00:34:51] Speaker 04:
the fact that the judge is there, the judge is supervising this whole thing, not really based on any particular provision in the order.

[00:34:57] Speaker 00:
No, nor does there need to be an explicit mechanism of judicial review, Your Honor.

[00:35:03] Speaker 00:
In fact, as we include on page 24 of our brief, there are a list of cases where courts have appointed officers with limited authority to make decisions, very similar to here and in some instance

[00:35:16] Speaker 00:
broader than the instance here.

[00:35:21] Speaker 00:
And in those cases, if you look at the actual orders appointing those officers, they don't provide an explicit mechanism for judicial review.

[00:35:27] Speaker 00:
In fact, that was the case in Plata.

[00:35:30] Speaker 00:
In any event, this court in presiding over Plata had inferred that judicial review was available in the instance that the state in that case took issue with

[00:35:42] Speaker 00:
with the decisions that were made by, in that case- Do you have any objections to asking the Judge to make it explicit?

[00:35:49] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor.

[00:35:50] Speaker 00:
If this court seeks something more explicit, we wouldn't object to a very limited remand and for the parties and the district court to confer about- I guess an alternative would be for us to simply construe the orders as a group as having this inherent necessary authority.

[00:36:09] Speaker 00:
Yeah, that as well, Your Honor.

[00:36:11] Speaker 00:
This court doesn't even need to issue a limited remand.

[00:36:13] Speaker 00:
It could just infer, just in the same way that it did in Plata, that that review is available.

[00:36:18] Speaker 00:
And moving forward, the sheriff, any fears that it could have about appealing the CPA's decisions would assuage any of the concerns they have raised.

[00:36:29] Speaker 00:
I'd also like to, you know, the sheriff also cites to Armstrong and Microsoft.

[00:36:37] Speaker 00:
I just want to be clear that those cases really don't stand for the proposition that a court must provide an explicit mechanism of judicial review, and they are distinguishable in that they involve officers that were appointed under a specific federal rule of civil procedure that limits that officer to an advisory role.

[00:36:56] Speaker 00:
And to the extent that the officer in those cases did make decisions, they were once traditionally within a district court's Article III powers.

[00:37:06] Speaker 00:
And so those officers had authority to make decisions of findings of facts and conclusions of law on fundamental issues of liability, contempt, compliance.

[00:37:18] Speaker 00:
the scope of a party's rights.

[00:37:20] Speaker 00:
That's very different here, exactly as Judge Berzani you mentioned, in that the decisions here that are being made are very limited, narrow, and involve something akin to administrative decisions.

[00:37:32] Speaker 00:
I did want to address some of the questions that were raised about contempt.

[00:37:36] Speaker 00:
There is nothing in the third order that gives the CPA authority to hold the sheriff in contempt.

[00:37:44] Speaker 00:
to the extent that contempt is an issue, that would be something that would be raised before the district court.

[00:37:51] Speaker 00:
There's obviously a standard in place for the court in determining when it can hold a party in contempt.

[00:37:57] Speaker 03:
And really, there's... Well, the question I had was slightly different from what you were saying, which is, let's say the monitor says you should do X.

[00:38:09] Speaker 03:
and the court hasn't spoken yet, hasn't even been asked perhaps to speak.

[00:38:17] Speaker 03:
If the sheriff doesn't do X, but the court has not looked at that, contempt or no contempt,

[00:38:29] Speaker 00:
well out and uh... in a situation in which the cpa tell the sheriff to do something and it doesn't comply the cpa would in its product uh... prop monthly progress report would and identify the disagreement between the parties and then the sheriff may either seek an extension on the investigation to further conversations with the cpa or to then appeal a decision by the cpa to the district court for its review it seems

[00:38:55] Speaker 00:
Of course, the issue of contempt would be one that would have to be raised by the district court, and as prior contempt proceedings, you know, in this case have demonstrated, there's an opportunity for the parties to be heard.

[00:39:06] Speaker 00:
There hasn't been an instance in which, you know, for example, the sheriff's office didn't heed a recommendation given by the monitor that the sheriff was then held in contempt, so there's no reason to believe that that would be the situation.

[00:39:21] Speaker 04:
Because these are recommendations, but on the other hand,

[00:39:24] Speaker 04:
It could be, and I'm not sure why we need to figure this out now, but it could be that you would require an order by the court in a second chance before there could be contempt, because it's usually with the order of contempt anyway, you usually get a shot at compliance, at least as a practical matter.

[00:39:44] Speaker 04:
I don't know that we need to deal with it until something happens.

[00:39:47] Speaker 00:
Absolutely.

[00:39:47] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:39:48] Speaker 00:
I also see that I've ran out of time.

[00:39:50] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:39:51] Speaker 00:
So unless there are further questions, the United States urges this court to affirm the third permanent injunction.

[00:39:55] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:40:08] Speaker 01:
I have just a few quick points first to follow up on the the waiver issue on your 27 I think that's consistent with my description of our objections to paragraph 346 says to the extent that the monitors granted authority to make determinations and establish policy decisions.

[00:40:25] Speaker 01:
which is what we're challenging, regarding how complaints should be handled, that authority should be limited to making such decisions in consultation with the PSB commander consistent with the policies and procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 348 and 353.

[00:40:40] Speaker 01:
And I think those policies and procedures pursuant to paragraph 353- Are you reading from the objections?

[00:40:44] Speaker 04:
Is that what you're reading from?

[00:40:45] Speaker 04:
What's that?

[00:40:46] Speaker 04:
Are you reading from the objections?

[00:40:48] Speaker 01:
Yes, ER 27, the objection to paragraph 346.

[00:40:53] Speaker 01:
Lines seven through 11 of ER 27.

[00:40:57] Speaker 01:
Now tell me again what you were reading.

[00:41:03] Speaker 01:
ER 27, lines seven through 11 is what I was reading.

[00:41:09] Speaker 01:
Consistent with the policies and procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 348 and 353, which includes the provisions for judicial review.

[00:41:20] Speaker 04:
In terms of judicial review- Well, you already read that before, but as I said, there's nothing like that with regard to paragraph 347.

[00:41:27] Speaker 01:
Right, so on 346 at least- You already discussed that.

[00:41:30] Speaker 01:
All right, go ahead.

[00:41:30] Speaker 01:
Thanks, thank you.

[00:41:32] Speaker 01:
For judicial review, the problem is that after the fact, judicial review doesn't work, both practically speaking, because by then we'll have already routed a complaint to a particular place, and it's not what's required by the law.

[00:41:44] Speaker 04:
But we were told that you could get an extension on that.

[00:41:46] Speaker 01:
But the extension applies to the length of the investigation.

[00:41:51] Speaker 01:
I don't think getting an extension, which the monitor can approve in his discretion or refuse, I don't think the extension accounts for how the complaint is routed or the policies and procedures that we have to follow.

[00:42:04] Speaker 04:
Is it possible for you, off the top of your head or it should be in your head, to give us a sentence or two that would solve your problem?

[00:42:13] Speaker 01:
Sure.

[00:42:13] Speaker 01:
I think really the paragraph 353 has the formula.

[00:42:17] Speaker 01:
So the monitor can make recommendations about the policies and procedures or how something should be routed.

[00:42:21] Speaker 04:
But that's a different point.

[00:42:23] Speaker 04:
Assuming that he can make the decision, then what kind of review sentence would work?

[00:42:32] Speaker 01:
So if we disagree with that, with the monitor's decision, we should have an opportunity to take it to the district court and have the district court rule on who is right before we can be held in contempt for not following what the monitor says to do.

[00:42:48] Speaker 01:
The problem with how these paragraphs are structured .

[00:42:50] Speaker 01:
.

[00:42:50] Speaker 01:
.

[00:42:50] Speaker 04:
Any realistic possibility that Judge Snow is going to hold you in contempt without giving you an opportunity to comply?

[00:42:55] Speaker 01:
I think the way these paragraphs are structured right now, the injunction requires us to do what the monitor says.

[00:43:00] Speaker 01:
And if we don't do that, we are risking contempt.

[00:43:03] Speaker 01:
I think that's the fundamental problem.

[00:43:06] Speaker 03:
Counsel, the plaintiff's lawyer and the government's lawyer have agreed that such review is available.

[00:43:18] Speaker 03:
So it seems like you're fighting with something that

[00:43:22] Speaker 03:
is a shadow, so why couldn't we either tell the district court to add a sentence or two or just construe it ourselves in that way?

[00:43:37] Speaker 01:
So you can tell the district court to add a sentence or two, and we agree with that.

[00:43:41] Speaker 01:
I think, by my read, I don't think there's any dispute from any of the parties that that would be an appropriate resolution to this appeal.

[00:43:47] Speaker 04:
But in terms of— My understanding is that your position is that that isn't good enough because you want to lift the authority of the monitor to make the decision.

[00:43:57] Speaker 01:
We should have to follow what the monitor says only after the judge has reviewed it if we object to what the monitor says to do.

[00:44:04] Speaker 01:
The problem is the type of judicial review that the appellees are telling you about, and this is why I think we're not fighting with the shadow, Your Honor.

[00:44:13] Speaker 01:
The type of judicial review that the monitors are talking about and that they're pointing to is after the fact judicial review.

[00:44:19] Speaker 01:
By then it's too late practically speaking because the complaint will already have been routed to

[00:44:24] Speaker 01:
a particular place that we may disagree with.

[00:44:26] Speaker 04:
I mean, that isn't even realistic either, because, okay, it's now routed somewhere, all right?

[00:44:30] Speaker 04:
It's still going to take a while to be decided, and if you have a problem with where it was routed, you'll have time to go to the judge.

[00:44:38] Speaker 04:
If we all agree there is implicit authority to go to the judge, routing is not deciding anything.

[00:44:42] Speaker 01:
I don't think we will have time, because first of all, by the time

[00:44:46] Speaker 01:
limit of 60 days if it gets routed to a division.

[00:44:49] Speaker 01:
Sixty days, I don't think is necessarily enough time.

[00:44:53] Speaker 04:
Sixty days after it's routed?

[00:44:55] Speaker 01:
I actually don't know when the clock starts.

[00:44:57] Speaker 04:
I mean, there's something terrible about where it's routed.

[00:45:00] Speaker 04:
You can't just, while the thing is going on, go to the judge and say, we didn't want it there, we want it somewhere else, even though it's now been routed to somewhere.

[00:45:06] Speaker 01:
Because I think if we don't follow what the monitor says in terms of where it goes, we can be held in contempt.

[00:45:12] Speaker 04:
Well, we follow it.

[00:45:12] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:45:13] Speaker 04:
You follow it, OK?

[00:45:14] Speaker 04:
He says you do it this way.

[00:45:15] Speaker 04:
You do it that way, but then you go to just notice that, you know, we don't want to do it that way.

[00:45:19] Speaker 04:
And it's still going on.

[00:45:20] Speaker 04:
It's not like anything is over yet.

[00:45:22] Speaker 04:
And we want you to take it away from there and send it somewhere else.

[00:45:25] Speaker 01:
But in the meantime, we squandered all of those resources that we think could be better used in a different way.

[00:45:29] Speaker 01:
We think the complaint may be better suited to PSB, and then meanwhile we've spent all this time in a division.

[00:45:35] Speaker 01:
If the judge agrees with us, we've now wasted that time and we're back to PSB.

[00:45:38] Speaker 04:
It does sound to outsiders, and we are outsiders, that this is all sort of angels dancing on heads of pins in terms of why you care about it so much.

[00:45:47] Speaker 04:
What about Judge Wallace's suggestion of, or maybe changing it to a mediation now?

[00:45:53] Speaker 01:
We would be happy to try that again, Your Honor.

[00:45:56] Speaker 01:
We would be happy to try that again.

[00:45:57] Speaker 04:
Because it just doesn't sound very consequential, what you're so upset about.

[00:46:02] Speaker 01:
Well, I think stepping back, Your Honor, I don't think there's any dispute now about an appropriate resolution being to remand to building these procedures.

[00:46:10] Speaker 01:
So I think at a minimum, the Court could do that.

[00:46:12] Speaker 04:
Well, there is a dispute because you want procedures that are going to stop things in their tracks.

[00:46:18] Speaker 04:
So if you go back, there's going to be an argument about that.

[00:46:21] Speaker 01:
But I agree we would be happy to try to mediate this.

[00:46:24] Speaker 01:
And in terms of why we care, there is a major difference between having the district court direct the resources of the sheriff's office versus having a third party direct the resources of the sheriff's office.

[00:46:36] Speaker 04:
But as a practical matter, just you know, has other things to do.

[00:46:39] Speaker 04:
That's the problem.

[00:46:40] Speaker 04:
I mean, for him to be dealing with the question of whether this appeal, this complaint should go over here or over there,

[00:46:48] Speaker 04:
is really something that is asking an awful lot of a district judge when it's a very ministerial decision.

[00:46:57] Speaker 04:
I understand it's important within the, so this was a way to get the decision made without involving the sheriff every time you want to send, as I understand it, tens of thousands of complaints a year or something like that.

[00:47:14] Speaker 04:
And he's gonna have to make the decision about where each one is

[00:47:16] Speaker 04:
how it's resolved?

[00:47:20] Speaker 01:
Well, I don't imagine that we would have disagreements about $10,000 a year, because I think part of the issue is just fundamental disputes over the types of cases that ought to go to different places.

[00:47:32] Speaker 01:
Those are important disputes.

[00:47:33] Speaker 04:
What is the answer to my question?

[00:47:35] Speaker 04:
Then your time is up.

[00:47:39] Speaker 04:
Insofar as we're dealing with policy decisions about where different kinds of complaints, have those decisions been made?

[00:47:44] Speaker 04:
Has the CPA already done that?

[00:47:47] Speaker 01:
It's my understanding that, yes, those decisions have been made.

[00:47:51] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:47:51] Speaker 04:
And you don't like it, but you haven't gone to Judge Snow about it.

[00:47:54] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:47:55] Speaker 04:
Why?

[00:47:56] Speaker 01:
Because in our view, we had to follow those decisions the moment he told us to follow them.

[00:48:00] Speaker 04:
Fine.

[00:48:01] Speaker 04:
OK.

[00:48:01] Speaker 04:
But you still haven't gone to Judge Snow about them.

[00:48:03] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:48:04] Speaker 04:
Why?

[00:48:05] Speaker 01:
Again, because in our view, we don't have that opportunity to do so.

[00:48:08] Speaker 04:
Even now, you really believe that if you went to Judge Snow and said, we have this problem with this policy decision, you would think he doesn't have the right to decide that?

[00:48:17] Speaker 01:
i think in our view we would have to engage entirely different procedure which is asking the court to modify the third the third order again i i think the structural issues

[00:48:29] Speaker 01:
exist for a reason.

[00:48:30] Speaker 01:
The structure of Article III, Rule 65, Rule 53, those things exist for a reason.

[00:48:36] Speaker 01:
I know this may seem minor, but these are important issues.

[00:48:40] Speaker 01:
This is why courts like the D.C.

[00:48:41] Speaker 01:
Circuit and Microsoft and so on raise these issues to espante and said that even when the parties didn't raise them, we have concerns.

[00:48:47] Speaker 04:
But they weren't talking about anything like the level of minutiae that we're talking about here.

[00:48:50] Speaker 04:
It's not minutiae, I understand, to the chairman for us, but in the larger scheme of things.

[00:48:54] Speaker 04:
Given how long these orders are and everything that's, as Judge Wallace says, has actually been fixed and things that are going on, this is not exactly like Plata where they're taking over the entire prison system.

[00:49:06] Speaker 04:
That's not what we're talking about.

[00:49:08] Speaker 01:
I understand that.

[00:49:09] Speaker 01:
And that's part of why we're seeking a very narrow remand.

[00:49:13] Speaker 01:
We're seeking a very narrow remand.

[00:49:15] Speaker 04:
We have to have the opportunity to go to- I understood that you're asking to kill these paragraphs entirely.

[00:49:22] Speaker 01:
on narrow grounds and the court could re-implement them in a way that is proper.

[00:49:26] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:49:26] Speaker 04:
Thank you very much.

[00:49:27] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:49:33] Speaker 04:
Thank you very much.

[00:49:35] Speaker 04:
The case of Melendris versus Pinzoni, non-Pinzoni, not Pinzoni.

[00:49:43] Speaker 04:
Skinner.

[00:49:44] Speaker 04:
is submitted and we are adjourned.

[00:49:50] Speaker 04:
We hope we don't see you again.

[00:49:52] Speaker 03:
And thank you for your arguments.