[00:00:00] Speaker 01: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:00:05] Speaker 01: I think that the question of extraterritorial with respect to the application of the Russo case is not relevant when you are talking about interstate workers. [00:00:17] Speaker 01: When you come to the regulation of interstate employment, it's not sufficient to ask whether the relevant law was intended to operate extraterritorial. [00:00:29] Speaker 01: Better question. [00:00:31] Speaker 01: as cited in the evolving case law is what type of connections you have to California to trigger the relevant provisions of California law. [00:00:42] Speaker 04: Council, if these events had occurred in Nebraska instead of on the high seas, we wouldn't be asking those questions. [00:00:51] Speaker 04: We would say California law doesn't apply to things that happen in Nebraska. [00:00:56] Speaker 04: Why should it be any different when it's outside the territorial waters? [00:01:01] Speaker 01: Well, the Northern District of California in Stouffville applied FIHA, California law, to a worker in Nashville, Tennessee, who was hired from a California corporation. [00:01:14] Speaker 01: And the termination took place from California. [00:01:18] Speaker 01: And they identified the individual who made the termination. [00:01:21] Speaker 01: And in this case, the termination, of course, occurred, the final one, in Oakland, California, from the director of the Labor Relations Board for [00:01:31] Speaker 01: So in many cases, when you have remote workers or interstate workers, you have to expand the scope of the FIHA. [00:01:46] Speaker 01: When FIHA was passed, of course, we didn't have interstate workers or remote workers. [00:01:51] Speaker 01: So in this case, we've now expanded the law. [00:01:55] Speaker 01: And of course, when you have a merchant seaman, [00:01:57] Speaker 01: There's no issue of conflict with any other state if you're concerned about the sovereignty of the other states. [00:02:04] Speaker 01: So if the court wanted to establish a general maritime law for discrimination, as it did, as the court has the power to do under Article III, Section 2, such as the meringue versus US lines, [00:02:17] Speaker 01: or an insurance company versus Dunham, it could establish, as in Lanny Soundings versus Townsend for maintenance and care, it has the ability to do that. [00:02:30] Speaker 01: Nowhere in the legislative history of FIHAG do they discuss extraterritorial. [00:02:40] Speaker 01: In fact, the case cited by the lower court [00:02:44] Speaker 01: Arco versus Campbell first said, well, the person was a resident of Washington, non-resident of California, but then it says, well, therefore it doesn't apply, but there's no residency requirement in FIHA. [00:03:03] Speaker 05: Under the test, even in the cases that you cite, Ward and Sexton, the court rejected the use of residency as a factor. [00:03:14] Speaker 05: They said in that case, they relied on the fact that the pilots and flight attendants had officially designated a home base in the state of California. [00:03:26] Speaker 05: At this point, even under this test, what would be the permissible things we could consider that establish the sufficient connection to California? [00:03:37] Speaker 01: Well, on page two of our open, I guess, in our opening brief and our reply brief, we went through all of Mr. Cain's connections with California. [00:03:50] Speaker 01: We also attached the discharge slips. [00:03:54] Speaker 01: this excerpts of record, page 360 through 373. [00:03:58] Speaker 01: Out of the 14 times he shipped with Matson, he reported in California, either San Francisco, Oakland, or Long Beach. [00:04:08] Speaker 01: Two times he reported in Salvador and once in Hawaii. [00:04:13] Speaker 01: Of course, Matson had to fly him to those foreign ports because as a California resident, [00:04:19] Speaker 01: He pays California taxes, Matson pays into state disability for California, and he filed for unemployment when he was discharged, and Matson could [00:04:31] Speaker 01: availed itself of California laws, unemployment laws, and opposed it. [00:04:36] Speaker 01: So it doesn't seem fair that Madison could avail it. [00:04:38] Speaker 05: Right, but the residency is already something the court said we shouldn't consider. [00:04:41] Speaker 05: The residency and the taxes is already something I understand that the California Supreme Court said are factors we should not consider. [00:04:49] Speaker 05: So that leaves the fact that I think he departed from California some of the times. [00:04:55] Speaker 05: Is there any evidence that California was designated as his official home base? [00:05:00] Speaker 01: Well, I don't know if there's a designation as official home base, but his residence, his union house at Sailors Union Pacific here in San Francisco, and that's where he throws in his car, pulls his jobs. [00:05:13] Speaker 01: So he's always reported for the 14 times he shipped with Matson in the last couple years. [00:05:19] Speaker 01: 12 of them were shipping out of California. [00:05:22] Speaker 01: So he always reported to work in California, and Sexton indicated that it's actually the, not only the, that was more or less war that says where you report to work, but Sexton says it's the final termination, which was also in California. [00:05:39] Speaker 05: Well, I understood he was terminated actually while he was on the high seas, wasn't he? [00:05:43] Speaker 01: Well, the letter of warning came in the high seas. [00:05:47] Speaker 01: And as they were approaching Guam, which is just a port, he doesn't work out of Guam. [00:05:52] Speaker 01: And then he was terminated with, after the letter of warning, he was given a letter of termination, which he had to leave the ship. [00:06:01] Speaker 01: And they flew him back. [00:06:02] Speaker 01: He's required to be repatriated back to his ship. [00:06:05] Speaker 01: So he's repatriated back to his home port, which was Long Beach. [00:06:10] Speaker 01: That was the Union rules. [00:06:11] Speaker 01: That's his place of reporting for work. [00:06:14] Speaker 01: So and then thereafter, two days later, he received the ban or the two-year ban for termination for two years. [00:06:25] Speaker 01: So I think that the court has to [00:06:35] Speaker 01: bring itself to consider that we have interstate workers. [00:06:40] Speaker 01: I was, I don't know if this is a good hypothesis, but suppose this court was sitting in the Sandra O'Day Connor Courthouse in Phoenix and it brings its court staff there and then there's an act of discrimination. [00:06:55] Speaker 01: Well, the act of discrimination, of course, was in Phoenix, Arizona. [00:07:01] Speaker 01: The reporting to work was in Arizona, but the staff was only there for one day to hear cases, and they come back here. [00:07:08] Speaker 01: Is FIHA not going to apply extraterritorial? [00:07:12] Speaker 01: It's a different age where people are working remotely or they're in interstate commerce. [00:07:19] Speaker 01: Now, the pilots fly through many different states. [00:07:22] Speaker 01: Sometimes the pilots don't even report [00:07:25] Speaker 01: They have to fly to Atlanta to pick up their plane, yet they're based in California. [00:07:31] Speaker 01: So it's a whole different type of theory after applying FIHA. [00:07:36] Speaker 01: So you have Mr. Kane, who is covered to territorial waters. [00:07:42] Speaker 01: I wrote 12 miles. [00:07:43] Speaker 01: I think it might be only 3 miles under government code 170. [00:07:47] Speaker 01: All of a sudden, he's not covered by anything. [00:07:50] Speaker 01: In other words, the cases in the case we cited, the subsequent citations, we cited that if effectively, if they work in many jurisdictions, they have no protections. [00:08:04] Speaker 04: Well, counsel, there are remaining claims in the case that are unrelated, so I'm not sure it's accurate to say that he has no other recourse for alleged wrongs. [00:08:20] Speaker 01: That's true, but the other claims are for lost wages, double wages for not being paid. [00:08:26] Speaker 01: The other claims are for defamation, inflection, emotional distress, and maintenance and cure, which is a maritime case. [00:08:34] Speaker 01: We also, what was dismissed was the breach of contract case and the applied breach of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the contract case. [00:08:47] Speaker 01: I believe it's maritime law, and you have to look at the Cossack versus United Fruit, where there was an oral agreement. [00:08:55] Speaker 01: In other words, maintenance incurs general maritime, you have to pry it. [00:08:58] Speaker 04: Counsel, how is a letter of warning contractual? [00:09:02] Speaker 04: All it essentially does is promise that if you keep acting bad, they'll fire you, but it doesn't seem like what we would ordinarily think of as a contract. [00:09:12] Speaker 01: It says that they have to comply with the specific ship's rules. [00:09:18] Speaker 01: I can't pronounce it. [00:09:19] Speaker 01: Kaimana-Hila rules. [00:09:23] Speaker 01: And those are ship's rules. [00:09:24] Speaker 01: And so those are additional rules imposed by the captain. [00:09:29] Speaker 01: So if the court asks me, we want you to amend your table of contents. [00:09:35] Speaker 01: If you don't do it in five days, we're going to dismiss your case. [00:09:40] Speaker 01: And I said, OK, I'll do it. [00:09:41] Speaker 01: And before I can do it, you dismissed my case, didn't it? [00:09:44] Speaker 01: Wasn't that a subset agreement of the appellate rules and the circuit rules? [00:09:50] Speaker 01: So that's the way I look at it, that that was an oral contract, just like in Cossack, where there was an obligation to provide medical treatment at the public hospitals. [00:10:00] Speaker 01: But they made an oral agreement that if, in fact, it was negligent, that we will pay for private medical doctors. [00:10:09] Speaker 01: It was negligent, and the court upheld it, and the United States Supreme Court upheld it and said, of course, oral agreements are valid. [00:10:18] Speaker 01: This is a written agreement, which he signed. [00:10:20] Speaker 01: So that's a modification of a preexisting obligation. [00:10:24] Speaker 01: So the only thing, if there's no more questions, the lower court never ruled on the statute of limitations in Del Castello for the six months on the CBA. [00:10:39] Speaker 01: Collective Bargain Agreement. [00:10:41] Speaker 01: It appears after the United States Supreme Court ruled in Wong that these statute of limitations, Del Castello said there's no statute of limitations stated, so we will borrow from other statutes. [00:10:58] Speaker 01: However, Wong said that basically if Congress hasn't clearly stated a statute of limitations, then at most it's a claim processing rule. [00:11:09] Speaker 01: In this case, even though the court really never decided it, any claim that would come under the Collective Bargain Agreement appears to be as decided by the Fifth Circuit. [00:11:22] Speaker 01: And this circuit in Marx versus, I didn't cite that, Marx versus Holozowski argued last year, 33 fed forth, 115.7 and 1163. [00:11:35] Speaker 01: The time limit is just a claim processing. [00:11:39] Speaker 01: If the defendant wanted to challenge it, they could challenge it on summary judgment. [00:11:48] Speaker 05: Council, did you want to reserve time? [00:11:50] Speaker 01: Yes, I do. [00:11:51] Speaker 01: I'm sorry. [00:11:51] Speaker 01: I don't have any more. [00:11:52] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:12:04] Speaker 00: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:12:05] Speaker 00: Mike Guasco on behalf of APA-LEE. [00:12:08] Speaker 00: Mr. Kane, [00:12:09] Speaker 00: applied for a job in Hawaii. [00:12:12] Speaker 00: He was accepted for a job in Hawaii. [00:12:15] Speaker 00: He was flown by Matson from Hawaii to California, where he boarded a ship that then went out immediately into international waters. [00:12:27] Speaker 00: He complains about harassment and bullying that occurred in international waters. [00:12:34] Speaker 00: He complains about a letter of warning that happened in international waters. [00:12:39] Speaker 00: And then he complains about a letter of termination that was given to him in Guamanian territorial waters. [00:12:45] Speaker 00: The only connection that this case has to California is that that's where Mr. Cain boarded the ship. [00:12:53] Speaker 00: None of the conduct that— What about the— [00:12:57] Speaker 03: The letter coming out of Oakland. [00:12:59] Speaker 00: The letter coming out of Oakland, Your Honor, was just ratifying what had already happened. [00:13:07] Speaker 00: In the cases that talk about ratification, it's important that all of the cases use the and conjunction instead of the or. [00:13:17] Speaker 00: in order for a decision-making process in California to be enough to meet a connection for FIHA, and this is the Stovall case, it talks about being directed and ratified. [00:13:31] Speaker 00: And there is no evidence here in the record that anything other than ratifying Captain Bernhard's decision, which is in the record and which was presented in international waters, that says, [00:13:47] Speaker 00: that it was directed by Matson in Oakland. [00:13:51] Speaker 00: There's nothing that says that anybody in Oakland was consulted prior to the termination. [00:13:59] Speaker 00: Rather, the letter of termination was given by Captain Bernhard in Guamanian waters. [00:14:06] Speaker 00: So it's not enough to say that just because some paperwork came from Oakland, that that suddenly means that the doors to any California court are thrown open. [00:14:19] Speaker 04: Council, I do have a question related to what the opposing council asserted. [00:14:25] Speaker 04: If California law does not apply, then although there are some other theories here, there would presumably be no statutory or common law protection for bullying and retaliation, which is essentially the FIHA claim. [00:14:46] Speaker 04: Is that correct? [00:14:47] Speaker 04: And if so, [00:14:49] Speaker 04: Is it a so what? [00:14:52] Speaker 00: So I would say first, no, that's not correct. [00:14:55] Speaker 00: And as a matter of fact, the court below and the transcript of the argument on the final motion is included in the record. [00:15:04] Speaker 00: And this court may notice that Judge Oreck actually specifically suggested that a request to amend the complaint to assert Title VII [00:15:15] Speaker 00: that he would consider that. [00:15:17] Speaker 00: For reasons that are not clear to me, appellant did not take the court's suggestion. [00:15:23] Speaker 00: Possibly it's the higher damages that they're hoping for, the caps imposed by Title VII, but it's not accurate to say that it's fija or nothing. [00:15:36] Speaker 00: because there is Title VII. [00:15:38] Speaker 00: Additionally, there are provisions for harassment and bullying when they cause physical symptoms under the able-bodied semen provisions of the Jones Act. [00:15:52] Speaker 00: So to the extent that bullying ever becomes so pervasive that it causes physical symptoms, now all of a sudden you've got a claim for personal injury under the Siemens Act, which [00:16:05] Speaker 00: as the court, this court has noted many times, is almost equivalent to the railroad workers. [00:16:14] Speaker 00: There are cases that have upheld a Fila cause of action for bullying that leads to physical symptoms. [00:16:26] Speaker 00: So that's the answer to the first half of the question, Judge Graber, is no. [00:16:32] Speaker 00: I respectfully disagree with my colleague that it's fee-har nothing. [00:16:39] Speaker 00: Even if this court disagrees with me on that, [00:16:42] Speaker 00: That isn't enough to say that California now suddenly has a right to reach not only into other states, but into international waters, but into territorial waters. [00:16:58] Speaker 00: What if this had happened in Japanese territorial waters? [00:17:03] Speaker 00: Should California have a right to reach into Japan and tell them how to operate their employment system within their territorial waters? [00:17:16] Speaker 00: And that brings me back to kind of the overall arching principle that this case really applies. [00:17:24] Speaker 00: This court, the US Supreme Court, [00:17:27] Speaker 00: Up, down, and sideways has said extraterritorial application of state law raises serious constitutional questions. [00:17:37] Speaker 00: Campbell, Rousseau, Stovall, there are cases that are legion that talk about the issue that California cannot reach out of the state. [00:17:51] Speaker 00: And the Supreme Court recently addressed that in the issue of [00:17:56] Speaker 00: Pig raising. [00:17:58] Speaker 00: And what is regulation within the state versus without the state? [00:18:04] Speaker 00: And the Supreme Court said that application of California law in that case is permissible because it only regulates conduct within the state of California, namely the sale of pork and how it had to have been raised to allow that pork to be sold within the state of California. [00:18:26] Speaker 00: There's nothing here that gives that type of a hook. [00:18:31] Speaker 00: Additionally, my colleague has said that remote work is relatively new. [00:18:37] Speaker 00: And I agree with them on that. [00:18:39] Speaker 00: Remote work is relatively new in the way that we know it. [00:18:45] Speaker 00: We all remember the days of going into the office five days a week. [00:18:49] Speaker 00: And quite frankly, that's not the reality anymore. [00:18:53] Speaker 04: Some of us still do. [00:18:56] Speaker 00: Then I should say that's not the reality for everybody. [00:18:59] Speaker 00: How about that, Your Honor? [00:19:02] Speaker 00: Yet to say that FIHA was passed with no consideration of merchant mariners defies logic. [00:19:15] Speaker 00: Merchants on the high seas is probably one of the oldest professions in mankind. [00:19:23] Speaker 00: And to say that, oh, the California legislature could not have imagined that people were going to get on ships and transport goods from one place to another simply ignores reality. [00:19:35] Speaker 00: That merchant seamen have been with us since before this country was founded, as a matter of fact, [00:19:43] Speaker 00: The first US Supreme Court cases are almost exclusively admiralty cases. [00:19:50] Speaker 00: Yet there's nothing that the California legislature has ever said that, hey, we think it's important that these people that have been doing this work for hundreds, if not thousands of years, that they should be covered. [00:20:05] Speaker 00: And in fact, California courts have said the opposite. [00:20:09] Speaker 00: They said residency, as Judge Sung you noted earlier, Ward specifically said residency of the employee and employer are not relevant to determining whether California law applies. [00:20:25] Speaker 00: Rather, it's where the principal place of work is. [00:20:30] Speaker 00: And as the court asked my colleague, is there anything in the record about where his home base is? [00:20:39] Speaker 00: And my colleague said that the record shows that 12 of 14 times he boarded in California. [00:20:46] Speaker 00: I don't think that's actually in the record. [00:20:49] Speaker 00: I don't remember it being in the record, and I tried to look quickly when I saw that and could not find it. [00:20:55] Speaker 00: So I don't think that's in the record. [00:20:57] Speaker 00: I think what's in the record is he applied for a job at the Union Hall in Hawaii, got it in Hawaii, and then was flown from Hawaii to California. [00:21:08] Speaker 00: That's not enough to say that California law should apply. [00:21:11] Speaker 00: There's got to be more of a connection. [00:21:14] Speaker 00: And his residency is not enough. [00:21:18] Speaker 00: And my colleague takes issue with Russo relying on Campbell because of the fact that in Campbell, the plaintiff was a non-California resident. [00:21:29] Speaker 00: But that's not all Campbell said. [00:21:31] Speaker 00: Campbell said, not a California resident, and then went on to say all of the things that Ward specifically approved of. [00:21:41] Speaker 00: Here there's no evidence that Long Beach or California can be considered Mr. Kane's home base. [00:21:50] Speaker 00: If there is a home base, it would be Hawaii. [00:21:54] Speaker 00: That's where he got the job and started his responsibility to Matson. [00:21:59] Speaker 00: When he boarded a plane to fly to California, he was under Matson's control and required... Did he take that flight to California because that's where the ship was in Long Beach? [00:22:14] Speaker 00: That's where the ship was going to depart, Your Honor. [00:22:16] Speaker 00: I don't know if there's anything in the record that says that the ship was in Long Beach. [00:22:22] Speaker 02: That's where he was supposed to board the ship and start his work. [00:22:25] Speaker 00: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:22:27] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:22:28] Speaker 00: So I realize, I apologize if it sounded like I was dicing. [00:22:32] Speaker 00: I just wanted to make sure I was answering your question accurately based on what actually is in the record. [00:22:40] Speaker 00: Now, I want to come back to something [00:22:43] Speaker 00: Your honor, Judge Tashima, that you mentioned and that my colleague hit on big time, that he said that the termination originated in Oakland. [00:22:52] Speaker 00: The record does not support that. [00:22:56] Speaker 00: The termination letter was issued by Captain Bernhardt, signed by him, and it was attached as an exhibit to the complaint, and specifically said that the decision was made by personnel aboard ship. [00:23:12] Speaker 00: It actually says that in the letter. [00:23:16] Speaker 00: And that his conduct prevented the good operation of the ship. [00:23:24] Speaker 00: If the court doesn't have any other questions about FIHA, I'd like to move very quickly to the contract causes of action. [00:23:34] Speaker 00: Hearing nothing, so I'll move over there. [00:23:37] Speaker 00: Judge Graber, you hit on it when you asked a very pointed question. [00:23:42] Speaker 00: How is a letter of warning a contract? [00:23:46] Speaker 00: The way I see Appellant's argument sort of blends two different concepts, so I really think we need to separate them back out. [00:23:56] Speaker 00: Either, counsel is asserting that there is a contract under California law, and if that's the case, this case is easy. [00:24:07] Speaker 00: because California courts have repeatedly said it does not make sense to say that a letter of warning could ever be an employment contract because it would have the perverse incentive of encouraging employers to not try and correct behavior and to go straight to termination. [00:24:30] Speaker 00: Because if warning somebody can turn into a complaint, excuse me, into a contract, then how [00:24:38] Speaker 00: would any employer ever take that risk? [00:24:42] Speaker 00: If counsel is saying that we should look to maritime law, I would note that counsel has not suggested a single case in which any court has suggested that a letter of warning could ever be considered a contract under maritime law. [00:25:01] Speaker 00: And because of that, we've got to go back to basic principles. [00:25:05] Speaker 00: And Justice Scalia, in earlier cases, talked about how we establish Admiralty Common Law. [00:25:12] Speaker 00: We look to general principles of fairness and what the law should do. [00:25:19] Speaker 00: And if that is the case, the logic of California and nearly every single state and federal court that has addressed this issue under state contract law, the principle is the same. [00:25:34] Speaker 00: We don't want to encourage employers to go straight to termination. [00:25:41] Speaker 00: Lastly, the issue of preemption. [00:25:48] Speaker 00: The reply brief talks very briefly about Mr. Kane reaching out to the union and asking the union essentially to go back and look and makes the suggestion that the statute of limitations should essentially restart every time he sends a new communication. [00:26:07] Speaker 00: However, [00:26:09] Speaker 00: There's nothing in the law that supports that statement. [00:26:13] Speaker 00: And logic would strongly suggest that that can't be the rule because there's no limiting principle. [00:26:20] Speaker 00: If Mr. Kane sent an email today, what about in 10 years? [00:26:25] Speaker 00: Does that restart the clock every time? [00:26:27] Speaker 00: And what's in the record is that every communication is essentially the same one. [00:26:34] Speaker 00: Hey, are you going to file a grievance for me? [00:26:37] Speaker 00: No. [00:26:38] Speaker 00: Wait a little bit. [00:26:40] Speaker 00: I really think you should file a grievance for me. [00:26:42] Speaker 00: Already said no. [00:26:45] Speaker 00: That can't restart the clock every single time. [00:26:48] Speaker 00: And I see that I'm running out of time. [00:26:50] Speaker 00: Thank you very much for your time, Your Honors. [00:26:53] Speaker 00: And I submit. [00:27:02] Speaker 01: I'd like to touch on a few points. [00:27:04] Speaker 01: As I stated previously, the discharges are in the excerpts of record 360 through 373. [00:27:10] Speaker 01: So, Councils, my colleague is incorrect. [00:27:17] Speaker 01: The Council gave you the argument that, well, when the ship's in Japan, are you going to apply Japan law? [00:27:24] Speaker 01: That's the issue, because [00:27:26] Speaker 01: nature of a pilot or transportation workers, they're going from state to state. [00:27:33] Speaker 01: Or in the international, you're not going to apply Japan law, or if you're in Arizona for one day, you're not going to apply Arizona law, you're going to apply the law of the forum where you were. [00:27:47] Speaker 01: He accepted the job, he actually went from California because the job was available in Hawaii to pull the job from Hawaii. [00:27:55] Speaker 01: So okay, he got the assignment in Hawaii, but he reported that's his home base in Long Beach. [00:28:02] Speaker 01: And the fact is, is that there were three tours on this job. [00:28:07] Speaker 01: So during the harassment that occurred, his port of home base was leaving Long Beach and then going on the high seas, and that's where the bullying took place. [00:28:17] Speaker 01: The fact that we talked about ratification, the December 9th letter that's in the record attached to the second amended complaint, it is a ratification of the final ratification. [00:28:35] Speaker 01: Nowhere in the CBA is there any discipline for two years banning from shipping out. [00:28:43] Speaker 01: You can be terminated and ship out the next day. [00:28:46] Speaker 01: But this is two years. [00:28:47] Speaker 01: That's the final ratification. [00:28:49] Speaker 01: With respect to the bullying, there's a Jones Act claim that incorporates field of the rail workers. [00:28:55] Speaker 01: That's how Jones Act was passed. [00:28:57] Speaker 01: However, there's no physical injury allegation in this case, okay? [00:29:02] Speaker 01: In other words, it's a wrongful termination. [00:29:04] Speaker 01: And then, of course, there is intentional infliction, emotional distress, defamation. [00:29:10] Speaker 01: Those are not Jones Act claims. [00:29:13] Speaker 01: So I can't say that there's a Jones Act claim here. [00:29:16] Speaker 01: In fact, the whole idea that ARCO versus Campbell, what it says, it was designed to protect California residents. [00:29:24] Speaker 01: It says that that was what the purpose is. [00:29:29] Speaker 01: That's what the purpose of FEHA is. [00:29:32] Speaker 01: And that was echoed in our reply brief on Malloy on page five of our brief. [00:29:38] Speaker 01: So you have to recognize that the final act of termination, of course, was here in California. [00:29:45] Speaker 01: He's a California resident. [00:29:48] Speaker 01: On page 28 of our opening brief, I list something like 14 things. [00:29:54] Speaker 01: He's a resident of California. [00:29:56] Speaker 01: He's in California, so the job was posted. [00:30:01] Speaker 01: And he went to Hawaii to get the job. [00:30:04] Speaker 01: He flew from Honolulu to report to work on the ship. [00:30:09] Speaker 01: He joined the ship in territorial waters. [00:30:13] Speaker 01: And it would be sort of unconscionable that he, when he passed 12 miles out to sea, [00:30:19] Speaker 01: or three miles, he would be left without a remedy. [00:30:23] Speaker 01: I think the modern view is that you have to expand some protections, and there, with respect to the argument that his claim before the FIHA, where he got a letter of right to sue, that was also a claim under EEOC, because the departments are together, and we think we put that in our brief. [00:30:43] Speaker 05: Okay. [00:30:45] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:30:45] Speaker 05: My colleagues have no questions. [00:30:46] Speaker 05: I think you've used your time. [00:30:48] Speaker 05: I think you've used up your time. [00:30:50] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:30:51] Speaker 01: Thank you very much. [00:30:52] Speaker 01: I appreciate it. [00:30:53] Speaker 05: Thank you counsel for your arguments. [00:30:56] Speaker 01: This matter is committed for decision.