[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
I would like to... Good morning.

[00:00:02] Speaker 04:
Good morning.

[00:00:03] Speaker 00:
I would like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:05] Speaker 04:
Keep your eye on the clock.

[00:00:06] Speaker 04:
We'll try to help you.

[00:00:06] Speaker 04:
We'll do.

[00:00:07] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:00:10] Speaker 00:
The California courts in this case excluded, as hearsay, the confession of Mr. Alvarez's co-defendant, Christopher Madrigal, in which Mr. Madrigal... Could you lift up the microphone a little bit?

[00:00:20] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:00:20] Speaker 04:
Because you're on TV and they want to be able to hear you.

[00:00:23] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:00:24] Speaker 00:
How's that?

[00:00:25] Speaker 04:
That's better.

[00:00:27] Speaker 00:
Madrigal, the co-defendant...

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
admitted robbing and stabbing the victim in the robbery murder, in this case, the robbery homicide.

[00:00:35] Speaker 00:
And the California Court of Appeals ruling constitutes an unreasonable application of chambers versus Mississippi, because the excluded confession was reliable under the circumstances, and it was critical to Mr. Alvarez's defense.

[00:00:50] Speaker 04:
But, counsel, what you did, what you wanted to do, rather, was to take a small piece

[00:00:58] Speaker 04:
of the testimony that you want that seems to be helpful to you and exclude the other part where the man intentionally inculpated your client.

[00:01:10] Speaker 04:
You're trying to get us to bifurcate that.

[00:01:12] Speaker 04:
Can you cite any case relying on chambers or any other case that says that that's permissible?

[00:01:20] Speaker 00:
Yes, yes, your honor.

[00:01:22] Speaker 00:
Now Chambers, of course, that doesn't happen, but Chambers is the right to present a defense.

[00:01:26] Speaker 00:
And in that case... But you've relied on that in part, haven't you?

[00:01:29] Speaker 00:
But indeed, when the only... The ruling here was a hearsay, was a hearsay ruling by the state court.

[00:01:38] Speaker 00:
And

[00:01:39] Speaker 00:
The self-incriminating statements were the only statements by the co-defendant, by Madrigal, that arguably satisfied the hearsay exception, the statement against interest.

[00:01:48] Speaker 00:
Now that was, the defense lost that ruling, but the defense only had a basis for admitting the hearsay statements that were against Mr. Madrigal's interest.

[00:01:59] Speaker 00:
It couldn't, there was no basis to put,

[00:02:02] Speaker 00:
to introduce the whole thing.

[00:02:04] Speaker 04:
Your appeal is based on hearsay?

[00:02:06] Speaker 00:
No, no.

[00:02:07] Speaker 00:
That's the state rulings based on hearsay.

[00:02:09] Speaker 00:
My appeal is based on chambers.

[00:02:10] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:02:11] Speaker 04:
Well, that's how we get back to what we're talking about.

[00:02:14] Speaker 04:
It seems to me your argument is that Chambers gives you a second bite at the apple because the court did not permit you to take a piece of what was said by, what the gentleman's name, I know it starts with M.

[00:02:33] Speaker 04:
What he said, you didn't want the whole thing.

[00:02:37] Speaker 04:
But if you put the whole thing in, he inculpated your client.

[00:02:40] Speaker 04:
You didn't want that.

[00:02:41] Speaker 04:
Indeed.

[00:02:42] Speaker 04:
So where's the case from relying on chambers that says that's permissible?

[00:02:48] Speaker 00:
I don't see that particular case, Sean.

[00:02:52] Speaker 00:
It is a very common practice.

[00:02:56] Speaker 00:
not necessarily in an application of chambers, but when you're talking about, there are many cases where when you're introducing the statement against interest by a code defendant, that you only introduce that part of the statement, not the entire thing.

[00:03:09] Speaker 04:
But it still has to be in context though.

[00:03:10] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:03:12] Speaker 00:
Two comments to that.

[00:03:13] Speaker 00:
First, it was the statement against interest that were most reliable.

[00:03:18] Speaker 00:
And the other statements, he had a clear motive to falsely implicate Mr. Alvarez.

[00:03:24] Speaker 00:
And only with his own statements, he had no incentive to falsely implicate himself.

[00:03:31] Speaker 00:
The second point is that had the trial court, and I'm getting back to the hearsay, but I'm keeping my eye on chambers.

[00:03:40] Speaker 00:
had the court admitted, under the hearsay exception, the statements against interest.

[00:03:45] Speaker 00:
At that point, other statements for context would have become admissible.

[00:03:49] Speaker 00:
For instance, the prosecutor had no basis to introduce the statements implicating Mr. Alvarez under the hearsay rule until the self-incriminating statements by McGregor comes in.

[00:04:01] Speaker 00:
Then you've got evidence code 356 in California and evidence code 1202, which both would allow greater context to come in.

[00:04:08] Speaker 00:
The trial court just never got to that decision point.

[00:04:10] Speaker 03:
You're not arguing, per se, admissibility of the magical statement, are you?

[00:04:16] Speaker 03:
Not under the California hearsay rules, but under, yes, under chambers.

[00:04:20] Speaker 03:
So if the district court has some discretion, even under chambers, don't we look at whether the court abused its discretion?

[00:04:30] Speaker 03:
Is that your argument that the court abused its discretion by its admissibility ruling?

[00:04:36] Speaker 03:
And that no fair-minded judge would think otherwise under our standard of review?

[00:04:42] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, if the court had applied chambers.

[00:04:44] Speaker 00:
It's a little tricky in that regard because

[00:04:47] Speaker 00:
the chambers is different than the hearsay rule and here the state court never applied chambers if chambers is different than the hearsay rule doesn't that doom your argument because there's not clearly established supreme court law that would guide us in the any circumstances I think there is I think um I think chambers chambers guides us here

[00:05:07] Speaker 00:
And the hearsay rule was the basis for the state court's ruling, but chambers is the basis for the federal right we're talking about.

[00:05:14] Speaker 00:
And the state court's not required to apply chambers, but that's the framework we have to look at this in as chambers.

[00:05:21] Speaker 01:
Can you describe what you think chambers stands for?

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
You just say the chambers rule.

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
What do you think the chambers rule is?

[00:05:30] Speaker 00:
that a defendant or criminal case has a right to present a co-defendant self-incriminating, a co-defendant or arguable, a third party culpability's self-incriminating statement if that statement is reliable under the circumstances and it's critical to the defense.

[00:05:47] Speaker 00:
I believe chambers stands for that.

[00:05:48] Speaker 01:
Well, I mean, Chambers technically says, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanically to defeat the ends of justice.

[00:06:00] Speaker 01:
So to me, it just seems like Chambers is saying the judge needs to balance all the interests involved and then decide whether or not to exclude evidence, not that you can't exclude evidence under the appropriate balancing test.

[00:06:14] Speaker 00:
Well, I agree.

[00:06:16] Speaker 00:
The test under chambers would be whether it's reliable, whether it bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness, essentially whether it's reliable under the circumstances.

[00:06:26] Speaker 00:
That's the test for chambers, and I think that's what we look at here.

[00:06:30] Speaker 01:
So even if that's true, how do we know the statement here was reliable?

[00:06:33] Speaker 01:
I think he changed his statement five different ways during the course of one interview.

[00:06:38] Speaker 00:
I believe it's reliable.

[00:06:39] Speaker 00:
He changed it many times.

[00:06:40] Speaker 00:
But if you look at the progression of the interview, he begins by claiming he wasn't even there.

[00:06:44] Speaker 00:
He was watching a movie with his girlfriend.

[00:06:45] Speaker 00:
Then he was there, but he tried to help the victim.

[00:06:49] Speaker 00:
And the police are confronting him with the inconsistencies and the implausibilities of that.

[00:06:53] Speaker 00:
And it's the end of the interview.

[00:06:55] Speaker 00:
He's taken down a road by the officers.

[00:06:58] Speaker 00:
They tell them they have a video, which that's the point.

[00:07:01] Speaker 00:
He starts telling some of the truth because he then lied at that point, didn't he?

[00:07:06] Speaker 00:
He kept lying, but, um, but, but he, but he tells the, he implicates himself more and more as the interview continues.

[00:07:14] Speaker 00:
And.

[00:07:15] Speaker 00:
Reliable, I think, because he has no incentive to falsely incriminate himself.

[00:07:19] Speaker 00:
He has every incentive to incriminate Mr. Alvarez, to shift blame.

[00:07:23] Speaker 00:
But he has no incentive.

[00:07:25] Speaker 00:
He admitted committing first degree murder.

[00:07:27] Speaker 00:
He admitted facts that make him guilty of first degree murder and multiple theories, aiding and abetting, felony murder at the least.

[00:07:33] Speaker 01:
But he also admitted that Mr. Alvarez was more culpable.

[00:07:37] Speaker 00:
He did.

[00:07:37] Speaker 01:
He tried.

[00:07:39] Speaker 00:
Well, he certainly shifted blame to Mr. Alvarez.

[00:07:43] Speaker 01:
I guess my point is, even if you're right that Chambers stands for a proposition that reliable hearsay evidence have to be admitted, it seems like a reasonable decision to say this one is not so reliable.

[00:07:57] Speaker 00:
That's certainly a central point of the argument.

[00:08:02] Speaker 00:
I am arguing that it was reliable, indeed.

[00:08:04] Speaker 00:
If it's truly not reliable,

[00:08:08] Speaker 00:
then well, that's what chamber says.

[00:08:10] Speaker 01:
Our question is whether or not reasonable jurors can decide it's not reliable.

[00:08:15] Speaker 01:
It's hard to say that it's completely unreasonable given the shifting and ultimately he doesn't even fully, he shifts some blame to Alvarez.

[00:08:29] Speaker 00:
Again, I'd go back to

[00:08:30] Speaker 00:
Of course he's trying to lie his way out of it.

[00:08:34] Speaker 00:
But to say that he stabbed the victim, to say that he robbed the victim, that's not a lie you would tell to get out of criminal liability.

[00:08:42] Speaker 00:
I think those statements are totally reliable, because no rational person would have made them unless they were true.

[00:08:47] Speaker 04:
But counsel, as we're all saying to you, I think, is this is under EDPA.

[00:08:52] Speaker 04:
You've got a tough burden.

[00:08:54] Speaker 04:
And you've got to show basically that the state court just completely misconstrued Supreme Court law or misconstrued the facts.

[00:09:04] Speaker 04:
And what you really seem to be saying is that the trial court got it wrong in terms of the admissibility of this evidence, but it's an abuse of discretion standard.

[00:09:12] Speaker 04:
That's a whole different world than a constitutional violation, which you're alleging, is it not?

[00:09:18] Speaker 00:
Well, for the hearsay ruling,

[00:09:22] Speaker 00:
the standard of review is abuse of discretion in California court.

[00:09:25] Speaker 00:
I think that's not, I think whether it's abuse of discretion or de novo, the standard of view is not relevant

[00:09:31] Speaker 00:
to the constitutional question.

[00:09:33] Speaker 00:
That's the standard of view for a hearsay ruling.

[00:09:35] Speaker 00:
And I can't argue that that hearsay ruling was wrong.

[00:09:38] Speaker 04:
But ultimately, as we've heard, I mean, the standard is whether a fair-minded jurist could find otherwise.

[00:09:46] Speaker 04:
And of course, they could.

[00:09:49] Speaker 04:
And doesn't that damn your case?

[00:09:50] Speaker 00:
No, I don't think so.

[00:09:51] Speaker 00:
I think the trial court's ruling, a fair-minded jurist could

[00:09:57] Speaker 00:
could rule this way under the California hearsay rule, but not under Chambers.

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
It's two different standards.

[00:10:03] Speaker 00:
And I think Chambers makes that clear.

[00:10:04] Speaker 00:
The Mississippi court and Chambers, they made a correct ruling under Mississippi law.

[00:10:09] Speaker 00:
They violated the federal constitution by doing so.

[00:10:12] Speaker 00:
And I think that's precisely the same.

[00:10:14] Speaker 04:
I asked you earlier, and I want to be sure that you understood, I asked you whether there is any case based on Chambers where you have a factual situation like this where

[00:10:27] Speaker 04:
You have Mr. Madicle lying all over the place.

[00:10:31] Speaker 04:
He says good things to help your client at one part, but the other part he inculcates your client.

[00:10:36] Speaker 04:
Have you got any case that says Chambers applies in that context without having the whole thing, having the whole context?

[00:10:45] Speaker 04:
I haven't found any.

[00:10:46] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:10:47] Speaker 00:
Let me answer that.

[00:10:48] Speaker 00:
The simple answer is no, I do not have that case.

[00:10:52] Speaker 00:
However, I would just cite Ed Pacase law, Panetti versus Quartermann, and Bradley versus Duncan, I think, this case.

[00:11:00] Speaker 00:
I don't need this claim on appeal here.

[00:11:05] Speaker 00:
It doesn't require of such a precise fit to the facts of the case.

[00:11:09] Speaker 04:
We have to show those clear constitutional law that was violated here.

[00:11:15] Speaker 04:
And you're not telling me there is.

[00:11:16] Speaker 04:
You're telling me there isn't.

[00:11:17] Speaker 00:
I believe that this scenario in this case is within the clearly stated constitutional principle of chambers.

[00:11:25] Speaker 04:
And what is that principle?

[00:11:26] Speaker 00:
Well, I think it's that without regard to the excerpts, that it wasn't the entire interview, that the self-incriminating statements by Mr. Madrigal were admissible under chambers because they met this chamber's test.

[00:11:39] Speaker 04:
But counsel, with respect, what you seem to be saying is that you've got this pot of lies, and your client can pick out of the pot A, B, and C, and use it to his benefit, but ignore everything else that was said, which, of course, undercuts the whole concept of the reliability of Mr. Madrigal.

[00:11:56] Speaker 00:
I think the motion made by the defense in this case to admit these excerpts was in accordance with the hearsay rule.

[00:12:07] Speaker 00:
They proffered the statements that satisfied the exception to the hearsay rule, the statement against interest.

[00:12:13] Speaker 00:
That was the defense motion.

[00:12:16] Speaker 00:
If those statements had been admitted, it wouldn't necessarily have only been those excerpts because the prosecutor had a right to bring in other evidence.

[00:12:23] Speaker 01:
Under the rule of completeness, right?

[00:12:25] Speaker 01:
And so all the evidence that Madrigal said that your client was guilty would also come in.

[00:12:31] Speaker 00:
Yeah, potentially some of it.

[00:12:33] Speaker 00:
I'd say it would be a matter of context.

[00:12:35] Speaker 00:
Because the statement against interest would be admissible, and then other statements could come in to add context to that or impeach the hearsay doctrine under the other evidence code.

[00:12:46] Speaker 00:
It's hard to see the prejudice here if he's saying your client's guilty too.

[00:12:51] Speaker 00:
Because then the argument is, well, of course he is.

[00:12:53] Speaker 00:
He's trying to get a deal.

[00:12:55] Speaker 00:
Of course he is.

[00:12:56] Speaker 00:
But the statements that he said implicating himself

[00:12:59] Speaker 00:
There's no reason he would ever lie about that.

[00:13:00] Speaker 04:
You want to save the rest of your time there, counsel?

[00:13:02] Speaker 04:
I do.

[00:13:02] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:13:03] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:13:04] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:13:05] Speaker 04:
Let's hear from the government.

[00:13:06] Speaker 04:
And that's, you said meth, right?

[00:13:10] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:13:10] Speaker 04:
That's meth.

[00:13:12] Speaker 04:
Usually we think of meth in a different context than our court.

[00:13:14] Speaker 02:
Yep.

[00:13:15] Speaker 02:
Well aware.

[00:13:18] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:13:18] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:13:19] Speaker 02:
Melissa Meth for Respondent Appellee.

[00:13:21] Speaker 02:
And may it please the court?

[00:13:23] Speaker 02:
The state court here upheld the trial court's exercise of discretion to exclude hearsay evidence that did not fit the criteria for the statement against interest exception.

[00:13:34] Speaker 02:
And as this court has said in Brown and Moses, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the discretionary exclusion of evidence and the right to present a complete defense.

[00:13:44] Speaker 02:
And therefore, appellant is not entitled to habeas relief.

[00:13:48] Speaker 02:
However, Your Honors, even if Chambers v. Mississippi supplies the applicable rule here, Appellant is still not entitled to relief.

[00:13:55] Speaker 02:
The statements do not bear the same persuasive assurances of trustworthiness that existed in Chambers.

[00:14:01] Speaker 02:
These were statements made in a custodial interrogation as opposed to spontaneous statements to a close acquaintance.

[00:14:09] Speaker 02:
His his story changed numerous times throughout the course of that investigation or the interrogation from not being present at all to being present but not really doing anything ultimately to stabbing the victim but not but but because Mr Alvarez pressured him to do so.

[00:14:27] Speaker 02:
And so his shifting narrative makes all of those statements unreliable.

[00:14:30] Speaker 02:
And then there's that fact that he always places more of the blame on appellant.

[00:14:34] Speaker 02:
It was always appellant whose idea was to rob the victim, who stabbed the victim, and appellant was the more culpable party.

[00:14:43] Speaker 02:
And so because of that, courts have said that in that context, those types of statements of I'm guilty, but X is greater, is guiltier than I am, that those are not truly against the declarant's penal interests.

[00:14:55] Speaker 03:
The way the jury structured its decision regarding the knife, doesn't that suggest that maybe this evidence might have been helpful to Alvarez and its exclusion would be prejudicial to his theory of the case?

[00:15:13] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor, I actually think the opposite.

[00:15:15] Speaker 02:
I think because of the jury's verdict on the knife enhancement, Appellant already effectively received the benefit he would have received had these statements come in.

[00:15:26] Speaker 02:
Because while Reyes and SM both testified that Appellant was holding the bloody knife when he got back in the car,

[00:15:33] Speaker 02:
there was evidence that Christopher had had a knife earlier in the evening at the 7-Eleven.

[00:15:39] Speaker 02:
And so I think to the extent, we of course don't know exactly what the jury's thought process was, but to the extent they had a doubt about who might have stabbed the victim, I think that's already reflected in that verdict.

[00:15:53] Speaker 02:
And Christopher's statements wouldn't have done anything more to add to that.

[00:15:58] Speaker 04:
And then- Pretty overwhelming evidence of his involvement, right?

[00:16:01] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:16:02] Speaker 02:
I mean, we have Ray as an SM both placing an appellant in the car saying he wanted to rob someone, them attacking the victim, having the knife, the blood evidence, the victim's blood is in the front seat of the car, which is where appellant was sitting.

[00:16:18] Speaker 02:
And then after the fact, his statement to Joel that he had stabbed someone, wanted to hide the evidence, and he had the victim's belongings, the cell phone, and the checkbook were found at appellant's house.

[00:16:28] Speaker 02:
And so with all of that,

[00:16:30] Speaker 01:
Can I ask, why does the fact that he gives more culpability to Alvarez really make a difference against, why does it not make it a statement against penal interest?

[00:16:42] Speaker 01:
He basically admitted first degree murder, murder felony.

[00:16:46] Speaker 01:
I mean, what more could he have done?

[00:16:48] Speaker 01:
There's no other charge he could have been charged.

[00:16:50] Speaker 01:
So it doesn't matter whether or not the other guy is more culpable, because they're both guilty of first degree murder felony.

[00:16:58] Speaker 02:
Yes, your honor, but we have to look at that statement as a whole.

[00:17:01] Speaker 02:
And so this is a statement of a co-defendant in an interrogation, hoping to do the best he can do.

[00:17:09] Speaker 02:
in terms of what he says, I think.

[00:17:10] Speaker 02:
And so even though, yes, certainly his statements are self-inculpatory.

[00:17:15] Speaker 01:
To the highest degree, because usually, I mean, if you're saying someone's trying to be more culpable than the other, so he's trying to say, I should be charged with something lower.

[00:17:24] Speaker 01:
But the mission is, the floor he's admitting is so high, just the fact that Alvarez has a higher floor, it doesn't matter, because they're both guilty of murder or felony.

[00:17:35] Speaker 02:
Well, I think, Your Honor, I mean, we don't know what exactly he hoped to gain, but this was in the context of, you know, the police officers saying that they had video of him, and so he's trying to sort of, you know, and they were, you know, encouraging him to tell him the truth about what was happening.

[00:17:51] Speaker 02:
And so I think it's just the motivations.

[00:17:56] Speaker 02:
is still that if Alvarez is more culpable than him, that that still might benefit him, right?

[00:18:02] Speaker 02:
I mean, you know.

[00:18:04] Speaker 01:
Maybe that he would try to get cooperation points or something, maybe.

[00:18:07] Speaker 02:
Right, exactly.

[00:18:09] Speaker 04:
What is the government's position as to the meaning of Alvarez, I mean, excuse me, as the meaning of Chambers in this case?

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
Well, I think ultimately Chambers is inapplicable in this case.

[00:18:23] Speaker 02:
Chambers,

[00:18:24] Speaker 02:
So first, in chambers there was a problem with the procedural rule itself.

[00:18:29] Speaker 02:
The hearsay rule in that case only allowed for statements against pecuniary interest and not statements against penal interest.

[00:18:36] Speaker 02:
And so what the Supreme Court said was that in that context where the third party culpability statements were very clearly

[00:18:44] Speaker 02:
against the declarant's penal interest.

[00:18:46] Speaker 02:
There was other assurances of trustworthiness, and it was critical to the defense because it was truly exculpatory of the defendant.

[00:18:54] Speaker 02:
If the confession was true, then the defendant was not guilty of the crime.

[00:18:59] Speaker 02:
But in that context, that evidence should have been admitted.

[00:19:03] Speaker 02:
The statements there were clearly against the Declarence Penal Interest.

[00:19:07] Speaker 02:
And Chambers doesn't provide any guidance in terms of how to determine if a statement that is more nuanced is in fact against the Declarence Penal Interest.

[00:19:18] Speaker 04:
And applying Chambers to this case, what is your explanation?

[00:19:23] Speaker 04:
What's your view?

[00:19:26] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry, Your Honor.

[00:19:27] Speaker 04:
In other words, in what way, if at all, was Chambers violated in this case?

[00:19:33] Speaker 02:
It wasn't, your honor.

[00:19:34] Speaker 02:
I think this case is readily distinguishable from chambers because we don't have the-

[00:19:40] Speaker 02:
um, assurances of trustworthiness that existed in chambers.

[00:19:45] Speaker 02:
Um, ultimately to this, this evidence is not exculpatory.

[00:19:48] Speaker 02:
I mean, Christopher's statements as a whole are not exculpatory of appellant.

[00:19:52] Speaker 02:
And so I don't think the evidence is as critical to the defense.

[00:19:55] Speaker 04:
So in chambers, you had a situation where there was truly credible evidence that would have been a big impact in the case for us here.

[00:20:04] Speaker 04:
You've got somebody who inculpates himself, inculpates Mr. Alvarez.

[00:20:10] Speaker 04:
It's just all over the map.

[00:20:12] Speaker 04:
You've got all kinds of statements, line, line, line.

[00:20:15] Speaker 04:
And it's just not the same situation.

[00:20:17] Speaker 04:
Is that your view?

[00:20:18] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:20:19] Speaker 02:
And I think Appellant effectively said that he doesn't disagree with the hearsay ruling itself.

[00:20:26] Speaker 02:
And that, I think, is effectively fatal to his claim because

[00:20:31] Speaker 02:
Because the trial court found that these are not, in fact, statements against the declarance penal interest, we are now fully distinguishable from chambers in that sense.

[00:20:41] Speaker 02:
And so I think ultimately, too, as Your Honor noted, the standard here is the state court's decision only had to be reasonable.

[00:20:49] Speaker 02:
It doesn't have to be correct.

[00:20:50] Speaker 02:
And certainly, it was reasonable under these circumstances.

[00:20:53] Speaker 04:
The fair-minded jurors concept, right?

[00:20:55] Speaker 02:
Yeah, exactly, Your Honors.

[00:20:57] Speaker 02:
And so we would request that this court affirm the judgment.

[00:20:59] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:21:00] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:21:00] Speaker 04:
Thank you very much.

[00:21:01] Speaker 04:
You have a little rebuttal time, counsel.

[00:21:08] Speaker 00:
I have a couple of points to make.

[00:21:09] Speaker 00:
I'd be happy to entertain any questions from the panel.

[00:21:15] Speaker 00:
Very well.

[00:21:18] Speaker 00:
Regarding whether this is truly exculpatory, as Your Honor noted, the issue here is aiding and abetting are first degree murder.

[00:21:27] Speaker 00:
Both men can obviously be guilty, so one having done all the stabbing, it doesn't necessarily.

[00:21:33] Speaker 00:
It's exculpatory for Mr. Alvarez here because of his voluntary intoxication defense.

[00:21:38] Speaker 00:
And so it's not a question of did he participate or not, but there was undisputed evidence that he was extremely intoxicated, consumed a prodigious amount of alcohol.

[00:21:48] Speaker 00:
The jury was instructed that it could consider that to negate specific intent, which would be required for first-degree murder under any theory.

[00:21:56] Speaker 00:
And the defense presented expert testimony to the same effect.

[00:22:00] Speaker 00:
And I think this does go to that because Mr. McGregor's role in the

[00:22:09] Speaker 00:
The extent to which he participated affects the credibility of the key prosecution witness, Cassandra Reyes.

[00:22:16] Speaker 00:
She described the incident.

[00:22:18] Speaker 00:
She claimed to have seen it and described only Mr. Alvarez being the stabber.

[00:22:23] Speaker 00:
That's what she saw.

[00:22:24] Speaker 00:
And if the jury hears Mr. Madagral's statement, it casts serious doubt on whether she was actually able to see it.

[00:22:31] Speaker 00:
And in fact, the jury already knew that she said three or four times

[00:22:35] Speaker 00:
in official statements and interviews that she hadn't been able to see it.

[00:22:40] Speaker 00:
Then right before trial, when she's getting a deal from first degree murder to manslaughter, she says, oh yeah, I saw the whole thing, and Mr. Alvarez was the only stabber.

[00:22:48] Speaker 00:
I think Mr. Madrigal's statement could make the jury reject her testimony entirely.

[00:22:52] Speaker 00:
Even if it already found it, eh, they could reject it entirely, in which case the prosecution has very little evidence to rebut the voluntary intoxication defense.

[00:23:06] Speaker 04:
Okay, your time is almost gone.

[00:23:08] Speaker 04:
You have anything else you want to know?

[00:23:09] Speaker 00:
Just thank you, Your Honor.

[00:23:10] Speaker 04:
Well, thanks to both counsel for your argument.

[00:23:13] Speaker 04:
The case of Alvarez versus Lundy is submitted.