[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
Welcome back.

[00:00:01] Speaker 02:
We have one case to submit next on the calendar, number 22-15-8-57.

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Yi Xiao versus Chief Justice John G. Roberts will be submitted on the briefs.

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Our next case for argument is number 22-35-5-22.

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Lee versus Sachs.

[00:00:20] Speaker 02:
Mr. Hart.

[00:00:22] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court.

[00:00:25] Speaker 00:
My name is Abigail DeHart, and I represent Plaintiff Appellate Tamara Lee.

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
I would like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:33] Speaker 00:
The magistrate judge erred in denying Ms.

[00:00:36] Speaker 00:
Lee's timely motion to remand under Section 1445C.

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This forum protection statute required the remand of all of Ms.

[00:00:44] Speaker 00:
Lee's claims because they arise under state workers' compensation laws.

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However, the magistrate judge lacked Article 3 jurisdiction to enter any case dispositive orders, because Ms.

[00:00:56] Speaker 00:
Lee did not consent to that jurisdiction, and the Western District of Washington's opt-out consent form is invalid under Federal Rule 73B.

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This panel need not reach the final claim preclusion decision because that should be decided by the state court in the first instance.

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However, if the panel does reach it, it should find that the magistrate judge misapplied state law.

[00:01:21] Speaker 03:
Can you help me sort out what you want in this case?

[00:01:26] Speaker 03:
I think you agree that with respect to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction, we would have to reconsider a previous decision of this court.

[00:01:37] Speaker 03:
yes so we had and week the three of us it can't do that can we we do have a pending petition for initial here right so so that's what i'm trying to figure out your your other claims your other arguments are that we should tell the district court to remand this case to the state court yes that's right that's our remand so but if we were to grasp grand initial in bank

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or you would be delayed in achieving that goal, which is your ultimate goal anyway, right?

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So I'm trying to figure out whether you really want us to go to initial in bank or whether you would be better served waiting to see how the case comes out here and then filing a petition for rehearing in bank at that point.

[00:02:25] Speaker 00:
Yes, I appreciate the question.

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And we do also argue Washington is distinguishable.

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But setting that aside, I think either way is a form of relief for Ms.

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Lee, because the remanding to the district court allows us to have the chance to argue this remand issue.

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It would be a faster and more efficient way for this court to directly reach the remand issue.

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Because if we would agree with you and the ultimate end bank court said, yes, you're right, this procedure is no good,

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then what you do is you go to go back to a district judge and start all over again.

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And I'm not sure you want that.

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Yes, as I said, it would be faster and more efficient for this court to directly send it back to state court where Ms.

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Lee wanted it.

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Her case has already been delayed because of the procedures.

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So that would be the preferable outcome, acknowledging that the magistrate judge jurisdiction issue is a form of appellate jurisdiction.

[00:03:20] Speaker 00:
So that's an instance where this court would have to essentially reach that.

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I'll turn to the section 1445.

[00:03:31] Speaker 04:
When you go there, counsel, this isn't a straightforward workers' compensation case.

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It's complicated by what happened.

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I would agree entirely if she's denied workers' compensation benefits and then the case is removed.

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She challenged that denial and it's removed to federal court.

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extenuating circumstances, right?

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She was pro se.

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Did she get notice of this?

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Is this really more of a federal due process claim or violation, or is it an application of the workers' compensation law in Washington State?

[00:04:07] Speaker 00:
It's both, Your Honor.

[00:04:09] Speaker 00:
The fact that the cause of action arises under federal due process doesn't change the fact that this court still has to decide what arising under means.

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And there is a well-known test for deciding that.

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The first prong is, while Your Honor pointed to, whether the statute or the body of law creates the cause of action.

[00:04:29] Speaker 00:
That's the straightforward.

[00:04:29] Speaker 00:
That's her first state.

[00:04:31] Speaker 00:
Claim but there's a second way to have something arise under and that's that's Set by the Grable test or as we call it in our briefs the modified Grable test and this court does have to ask whether these claims also arise under for purposes of Grable whether and that's that's the test of whether the right to relief necessarily depends on substantial questions of state law

[00:04:53] Speaker 00:
I'd say this case is actually quite similar to Grable.

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In Grable, the plaintiff brought a state quiet title action.

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No dispute that claim arose under state law, but the questions involved in resolving that state quiet title action were whether the IRS gave proper notice to the plaintiff.

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That involved interpreting an IRS statute, and the court found that deserves a federal forum.

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Similarly here, Ms.

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Lee brings a federal due process claim, but at the heart of that claim is one, whether she received proper notice under Title 51, which is the worker's compensation statute.

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There's also a question of whether there was a final order for purposes of Title 51 in the administrative code.

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So these are state

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law decisions that this court must untangle in process of deciding whether Ms.

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Leavers had a process.

[00:05:47] Speaker 04:
Counsel, the state court already decided that her claim was barred by race judicata.

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Why does she get a second chance in federal court?

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So on the issue of claim preclusion, Ms.

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Lee didn't bring this particular claim in state court at all.

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Really what she did in case one is it was an administrative claim for judicial review.

[00:06:06] Speaker 03:
Well, she didn't bring this claim, but that's not everything that claim preclusion

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applies to.

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Issue of preclusion may apply to claims, only to claims brought.

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But claim preclusion is any claim she could have brought.

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So why couldn't she have claimed in the state court proceeding that I was denied due process in the administrative hearing?

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So there was some evidence that has come out since that she has received a discovery, one that the department might have committed misconduct in backdating an order.

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That goes to this overarching judicial or the departmental misconduct question.

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But I would also point this court to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Hayes.

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In Hayes, the plaintiff brought a claim for judicial review.

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asking the court to review a board order, finding it was arbitrary and capricious, but then brought case two, which was a case for 1983 damages.

[00:07:07] Speaker 00:
The Washington Supreme Court in Hayes acknowledged these were two separate actions that could have been brought together for trial.

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They could have been joined for trial, but the plaintiff didn't have to.

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The plaintiff was the master of the complaint.

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So similarly here, Ms.

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Lee, the claim number one was this administrative law question.

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But her case number two is for damages.

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And really what Washington courts focus on one factor of claim preclusion is the theory of recovery.

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And there are two different theories of recovery here.

[00:07:37] Speaker 00:
Ms.

[00:07:38] Speaker 00:
Lee is bringing a claim in part for 1983 damages under, for the inadequate process she received in the workers' compensation statutes.

[00:07:49] Speaker 03:
if your argument is that the district court shouldn't have kept the case both because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and because of the removal statute, if you're right about those arguments, no one should address the merits, right?

[00:08:07] Speaker 03:
Because the court would be, I'm not sure it's subject matter jurisdiction, but we'd be deprived of jurisdiction to rule on the merits.

[00:08:16] Speaker 00:
Yes, exactly.

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So that's why I don't think this panel even needs to reach claim preclusion.

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It doesn't need to delve into this.

[00:08:21] Speaker 03:
But can't we only reach it if we find that there was some jurisdictional basis for the district court to hear the case?

[00:08:29] Speaker 03:
And if it wasn't properly in front of the district court, put aside the magistrate judge for a second, because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or because of the removal statute, we just can't reach it, even if we think you're dead wrong, right?

[00:08:45] Speaker 00:
So one, we do contest that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies at all for largely the same reasons as our claim preclusion issue.

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The defendant is the one who brought up Rooker-Feldman.

[00:08:57] Speaker 03:
So you don't think the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies?

[00:08:59] Speaker 03:
I don't, no.

[00:09:00] Speaker 03:
Even though it would put you back in state court?

[00:09:03] Speaker 00:
So I think it would be a procedural, it's procedural in a way, but we would get back to state court, which is what Ms.

[00:09:11] Speaker 00:
Lee wants, but with the federal court saying, oh, you already decided this state court, and it's... Well, Rooker Feldman doesn't mean that it necessarily already decided.

[00:09:22] Speaker 03:
That'll be an issue for the state court if it goes back.

[00:09:25] Speaker 03:
What Rooker Feldman means is that

[00:09:28] Speaker 03:
A scheme has been set up by the state under which you have to take, under which the federal courts will require you to take all your claims through that and go up to the Supreme Court if you want if you have a constitutional issue.

[00:09:42] Speaker 03:
It doesn't, Rooker Feldman doesn't really deal with finality as much as it deals with which branch of the federal system this belongs in.

[00:09:50] Speaker 03:
So I would think you'd want to urge your Rooker Feldman argument.

[00:09:53] Speaker 00:
I agree.

[00:09:54] Speaker 00:
I've actually thought about this a lot.

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I don't think we want a decision from this court even implying that there's maybe something, but I think that Ms.

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
Lee deserves to have section 1445C decided.

[00:10:06] Speaker 00:
And again, the director is the one who brought up Rooker Feldman.

[00:10:09] Speaker 00:
It's an additional reason why he cannot meet the remove.

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The burden of removal is on the director who simultaneously removed this case.

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
But if he improperly removed it because of the Rooker Feldman doctrine.

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And I think there's a strong argument that that's the case.

[00:10:25] Speaker 03:
Why do you care?

[00:10:27] Speaker 03:
You're now back in state court and you can make all the arguments you want to make about why this is not claim precluded or why it's a divisible claim.

[00:10:36] Speaker 03:
So I'm not sure why you're resisting victory on a different ground than the one you urge.

[00:10:44] Speaker 00:
Again, I think it's victory, but with a writing from this court that Ms.

[00:10:50] Speaker 00:
Lee shouldn't have to deal with in state court, that essentially finding perhaps that a federal decision in this court could affect her state claim.

[00:10:59] Speaker 00:
But again, at the end of the day, the result is remand.

[00:11:03] Speaker 00:
And so there are two ways to achieve remand in this case.

[00:11:06] Speaker 02:
Yeah, I guess Ms.

[00:11:07] Speaker 02:
DeHart, I can see why you would resist Rooker Feldman, because that would be

[00:11:12] Speaker 02:
Holding by this court that your complaint although you brought it in state court You didn't intend to have it put in federal court is a collateral collateral attack on the state court judgment, but Like judge Hurwitz.

[00:11:29] Speaker 02:
I'm wondering how you get out of that.

[00:11:31] Speaker 02:
I'm looking at the prayer for relief and

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And it looks like, right, the difference between, for Rook or Feldman, is whether you're adverse to the party or you're really adverse to the court.

[00:11:43] Speaker 02:
And your per-fer-ally seems all about an attack on the prior state court judgment.

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The claim to be adjudicated by way of a fair trial before a fair adjudicator, the same similar claims that you brought before or could have brought.

[00:11:58] Speaker 02:
The relief plaintiffs from the effect of inappropriately applied rest judicata, that's a notice of appeal.

[00:12:10] Speaker 00:
it held that the plaintiff could both bring this judicial action for judicial review and a claim for damages.

[00:12:18] Speaker 00:
So what Ms.

[00:12:18] Speaker 00:
Lee does here is yes, she's complaining about the process received during the state worker's compensation claim, but she's also, she's bringing a claim for damages because of this procedural injustice that happened to her.

[00:12:32] Speaker 02:
Is there then, setting aside the merits of either, can you

[00:12:38] Speaker 02:
help us work through the logic of the removal statute versus Rooker-Feldman.

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Rooker-Feldman, which also stands on the original jurisdiction statute in federal court.

[00:12:49] Speaker 02:
So why should we reach the removal statute before the Rooker-Feldman implication from the original jurisdiction statute?

[00:12:58] Speaker 00:
Yes, so again, I think, again, because Rooker Feldman goes to subject matter jurisdiction, if the court has a doubt about that, that's something that must be resolved.

[00:13:10] Speaker 00:
Again, I would point this court to the claim preclusion argument and the reasons we resist that as our answer to Rooker Feldman, and then the way this court should address

[00:13:22] Speaker 00:
the complaint is through section 1445C, which is again a, it's a forum protection statute, meaning that this court should not be delving into the issues at all because it's for the state court to reach such issues.

[00:13:37] Speaker 02:
We'll give you a, save for you at least a couple minutes on rebuttal, but I had just a detailed question about the record.

[00:13:45] Speaker 02:
Where does the $3.7 million claim come from and how, if at all, does that fit into our analysis of jurisdiction?

[00:13:53] Speaker 00:
Yeah, so Ms.

[00:13:55] Speaker 00:
Lee, that was based on Ms.

[00:13:56] Speaker 00:
Lee's calculations of what she would have received had she been getting workers' compensation benefits from back in 2011 when she was improperly denied those benefits.

[00:14:08] Speaker 00:
So that fits in because that goes into the damages calculation of what Ms.

[00:14:14] Speaker 00:
Lee was deprived of, her state property was to those workers' compensation benefits, and then there was an inadequate process.

[00:14:22] Speaker 00:
the procedural due process aspect, the damages she should receive from that is that $3.7 million.

[00:14:28] Speaker 00:
So that's where it fits in there.

[00:14:31] Speaker 02:
Can you make a similar claim for damages in the state court proceeding, the prior state court proceeding?

[00:14:38] Speaker 00:
What she did in the prior state court proceeding was straightforwardly ask the board to reopen her improperly closed claim.

[00:14:45] Speaker 00:
So again, it was a claim for judicial review of an administrative body, much more straightforward in that way.

[00:14:54] Speaker 00:
And the board and the court said no, that this, even though she received a notice of appeal, or she never received the notice of appeal, it's not going to revisit that order.

[00:15:05] Speaker 00:
So Miss Lee now brings this mosaic of factors together to show the process she received was inadequate under law.

[00:15:15] Speaker 04:
Council, speaking of mosaics, let's go back one final piece here.

[00:15:19] Speaker 04:
Do we need to address your consent issue before we get to your 1445 or the or the Booker-Feldman?

[00:15:30] Speaker 04:
How does the district court even have jurisdiction if the process is invalid?

[00:15:34] Speaker 00:
Yeah, honestly, again, I don't think that this court, and again, we point to the Washington decision, it was wrong.

[00:15:42] Speaker 00:
It was just a wrong decision on the adequacy of an opt-out form.

[00:15:46] Speaker 00:
Ms.

[00:15:46] Speaker 00:
Lee did not consent, and it goes to appellate jurisdiction.

[00:15:49] Speaker 04:
What's the inadequacy about it?

[00:15:50] Speaker 04:
You have a week to opt out.

[00:15:51] Speaker 04:
What's the problem there?

[00:15:52] Speaker 00:
Opt-out forms are not a valid form of consent under the federal rule 73B.

[00:15:56] Speaker 00:
It requires a writing.

[00:15:58] Speaker 00:
It requires someone to file.

[00:16:01] Speaker 04:
But do we need to reach this issue?

[00:16:03] Speaker 04:
How do we get to your claim if first we have to say, well, the district court didn't even have jurisdiction, you got to start all over again, right?

[00:16:10] Speaker 04:
I mean, can we remand from that point if they didn't have jurisdiction?

[00:16:14] Speaker 04:
I'm not sure how we get to your 1445 argument if we get hung up on the consent issue first.

[00:16:20] Speaker 00:
Oh, right.

[00:16:20] Speaker 00:
Again, yes.

[00:16:21] Speaker 00:
This court would then have to vacate.

[00:16:23] Speaker 00:
There was no valid order below to review.

[00:16:25] Speaker 00:
So it vacates to the district court.

[00:16:27] Speaker 00:
And we get to make this argument on remand to the district court.

[00:16:30] Speaker 00:
And then the district court remands to the state court.

[00:16:36] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Mr. Hart.

[00:16:37] Speaker 02:
We'll save you two minutes for a bottle.

[00:16:50] Speaker 02:
Mr. Padilla.

[00:16:54] Speaker 01:
May it please the Court, my name is Wilson Sosa Padilla and I represent Joel Sachs in his capacity as the Director of the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries.

[00:17:06] Speaker 01:
This Court should affirm the District Court order

[00:17:10] Speaker 01:
granting Saks summary judgment motion for three reasons.

[00:17:14] Speaker 01:
First, the case was properly removed to federal court because Lee alleges due process violations and seeks relief under section 1983.

[00:17:24] Speaker 01:
In that regard, Saks concedes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.

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The second reason summary judgment is proper is that the magistrate judge had jurisdiction

[00:17:38] Speaker 01:
because Ms.

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Lee did not decline to consent to a magistrate judge, and then she actively litigated without objection.

[00:17:49] Speaker 01:
Third, Lee's claims are barred by Residucada because all the elements showing that the first state case and this one are the same were met.

[00:18:01] Speaker 01:
So now I will address those reasons.

[00:18:03] Speaker 03:
Before you get to the merits, let me ask you a question.

[00:18:06] Speaker 03:
question you may not be able to answer, because you may not have been the person who did it.

[00:18:10] Speaker 03:
Why does a state director of insurance remove a case from state court to federal court?

[00:18:18] Speaker 03:
Why?

[00:18:20] Speaker 03:
I mean, you represent a state officer.

[00:18:24] Speaker 03:
He's being sued in state court.

[00:18:27] Speaker 03:
Why does he want the federal forum?

[00:18:29] Speaker 03:
I'm always amazed when state officials remove cases from state court to federal court.

[00:18:35] Speaker 03:
He may be entitled to, but can you help me here?

[00:18:38] Speaker 01:
Yes, I think that the only reason I can give you is that as a defendant, he's entitled to remove it to federal court and that's what happened.

[00:18:48] Speaker 03:
Whether he's entitled or not is one of the substance issues in this case.

[00:18:53] Speaker 03:
I was just trying to figure out what the motive was to get away from a state judge who is presumably more familiar with state law and raised judicata and all the issues you raise as a defense to go find a federal judge who doesn't have to deal with those issues every day.

[00:19:08] Speaker 01:
Well, but in this case we are talking about that Liz's claims are based in two process violations and she seeks relief under section 1983.

[00:19:21] Speaker 01:
So the core, and I would say the sole issue in here, is whether

[00:19:27] Speaker 01:
This case arises under workers' compensation laws of the Washington state, and they don't.

[00:19:35] Speaker 01:
So then the other issue is whether residue can apply to her... Well, Counsel, how do they not arise under workers' compensation?

[00:19:43] Speaker 04:
Section 1983 is not a substantive statute, it's procedural.

[00:19:47] Speaker 04:
So she's alleging violations of her constitutional rights arising from the disposition of her workers' compensation claim.

[00:19:54] Speaker 01:
Yes, so the thing is that we need to define what arising means.

[00:19:59] Speaker 01:
The main or the most known definition of arising under comes from Justice Holmes and says a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.

[00:20:10] Speaker 01:
This court has yet to determine what arising under in section 1445C means, but some courts have said that it's the same analysis as in section 1331, which deals with federal question jurisdiction.

[00:20:27] Speaker 01:
So under 1331, a civil action arises under federal

[00:20:35] Speaker 01:
law for purposes of Section 1331, when a federal question appears on the face of the complaint.

[00:20:42] Speaker 01:
More specifically, when a federal law creates a cause of action, or two, if a state law creates a cause of action, a federal law that creates a cause of action is a necessary element of the plaintiff's case.

[00:20:56] Speaker 01:
So states are allowed to create cause of action within their workers' compensation systems.

[00:21:02] Speaker 01:
or loss.

[00:21:04] Speaker 01:
So if a claim is brought to enforce one of those causes of action, then that cause of action cannot be removed.

[00:21:13] Speaker 01:
But here, Lee asserts due process violations and seeks relief under section 1983,

[00:21:21] Speaker 01:
none of which are a right of action within the Washington state.

[00:21:25] Speaker 03:
Well, in her due process claims, essentially, you didn't follow the procedures you should have followed by under state law in revoking my benefits.

[00:21:39] Speaker 03:
In other words, what she's saying is we weren't notified.

[00:21:42] Speaker 03:
The state requires that we get a notice of

[00:21:44] Speaker 03:
of something and we didn't get a notice so you didn't follow state law procedures in revoking this, not that the state law procedures are unconstitutional.

[00:21:55] Speaker 03:
And so it strikes me this really does arise out of your worker's compensation laws.

[00:22:01] Speaker 03:
I mean she's not, what she says is I just wasn't properly notified of the

[00:22:07] Speaker 03:
of the denial of the withdrawal of the benefits.

[00:22:10] Speaker 03:
I originally got them and they were withdrawn.

[00:22:13] Speaker 03:
I wasn't properly notified of that.

[00:22:14] Speaker 03:
Now, it would probably be a due process violation if Washington state law provided that you didn't need to be notified.

[00:22:22] Speaker 03:
But really what she's complaining about is a failure to follow the dictates of Washington law in providing her notice, isn't she?

[00:22:31] Speaker 01:
No, because the issue in here is whether, when we look at this complaint, whether this cause of action arises under Washington State workers' compensation laws, and it does, and it arises under Section 1983.

[00:22:45] Speaker 03:
Well, I mean, I know you keep saying that, but let's assume that the state had followed its own procedures.

[00:22:54] Speaker 03:
She would have been notified of the withdrawal of benefits, would she not?

[00:22:59] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:23:00] Speaker 03:
So she's really complaining that the state didn't follow its own procedures when it withdrew the benefits.

[00:23:06] Speaker 03:
Now, its failure to follow its own procedures may also be a due process violation, but I think she's, her complaint seems to be rooted in the notion that you didn't, you guys didn't do what you were supposed to do under your own procedures.

[00:23:20] Speaker 03:
So why doesn't that take us back into both the removal statute and I think the Rooker-Feldman?

[00:23:27] Speaker 01:
Because the underlying issue could be whether there was proper notice to Ms.

[00:23:36] Speaker 01:
Lee.

[00:23:37] Speaker 01:
But when we are analyzing whether this case arises under workers' compensation law, we need to see the face of the complaint.

[00:23:44] Speaker 01:
And there is nothing in her complaint that comes from the Washington

[00:23:52] Speaker 01:
Washington state work on compensation laws.

[00:23:55] Speaker 01:
For example, her complaint is titled, Relief for Violation of Federal Slash Civil Rights, Denial of Procedural Due Process.

[00:24:06] Speaker 01:
And then she says in the first paragraph that she, quote, presents this action per RCW, or Revised Code of Washington, 492-110.

[00:24:16] Speaker 03:
But every Rooker Feldman claim that's litigated

[00:24:22] Speaker 03:
has at its roots some claim that there's been a federal violation.

[00:24:26] Speaker 03:
That's why the person tries to bring the claim in federal court.

[00:24:30] Speaker 03:
You've removed it to federal court here.

[00:24:33] Speaker 03:
It's not enough that there's a complaint about a due process violation to take something out of the Rooker-Feldman framework.

[00:24:41] Speaker 03:
The Rooker-Felman framework is you should stay in the state system, stay in that silo and raise your constitutional claims in it.

[00:24:49] Speaker 03:
So I'm still having trouble, since her essential complaint is that she just failed to get proper notice, why she shouldn't be required to litigate that through the state system.

[00:25:00] Speaker 01:
Well, and that will go to where the residue can apply, but before we go there.

[00:25:07] Speaker 03:
You can raise your defense in the proper forum.

[00:25:10] Speaker 03:
I'm just trying to figure out which forum you're supposed to be in.

[00:25:12] Speaker 03:
And so why isn't this essentially a complaint about the process by which she was deprived of her benefits in the state system and one that she ought to litigate through the state courts?

[00:25:25] Speaker 01:
Because and that's where it was going when she was saying that quote she presents this action per RCW or revised code of Washington 492 110 that specific rule is titled tort tortures conduct of a state or its agent so basically that a rule or regulation a rule explains the procedures to commence a tort claims and

[00:25:51] Speaker 01:
against a state or its officials.

[00:25:54] Speaker 01:
So if we look at the face of the complaint, nothing out of the causes of action she's raising are actually coming from what we call Title 51, which is the Industrial Insurance Act, or the also known as Washington State Worker Compensation Laws.

[00:26:11] Speaker 04:
Well, Counsel, Lee was pro se at that point, correct?

[00:26:17] Speaker 04:
When she filed her complaint?

[00:26:19] Speaker 01:
When she filed the present one, correct.

[00:26:23] Speaker 04:
When she cites the state statute.

[00:26:25] Speaker 04:
But what she's complaining about is, I'm sure what it says is, you violated my rights under Washington state workers compensation law by not giving me notice of the cutoff and benefits.

[00:26:38] Speaker 04:
So again, how is that not arising under section 1445 with the section 1903 claim being a vehicle to get that claim in federal court?

[00:26:48] Speaker 01:
Because as you said, Your Honor, we are talking about the vehicle, so that is the cause of action.

[00:26:54] Speaker 01:
Just the underlying reason why she is raising her complaints is not what makes this case a workers' compensation case.

[00:27:04] Speaker 01:
So if we look, we can even argue that she is filing a tort claim under RCW 492110 and also a tort claim or

[00:27:16] Speaker 01:
monetary damages under section 1983 and that's a reason why this does not arise under.

[00:27:23] Speaker 04:
But the elements that tort claim would be whether the state followed its own workers compensation statute, correct?

[00:27:30] Speaker 01:
Yes, yes.

[00:27:32] Speaker 04:
And with regard to the 1445 and removing it despite that claim, where does the magistrate judge provide rationale for accepting jurisdiction?

[00:27:44] Speaker 01:
Well, because it is the same argument that I'm making right now, or Mr. Sachs is making right now, that it does not arise under workers' compensation claims.

[00:27:54] Speaker 04:
Does the magistrate judge explain that as order?

[00:27:57] Speaker 01:
I believe he did.

[00:28:11] Speaker 01:
I don't have it, I don't have the whole decision right in front of me, but I believe it did.

[00:28:17] Speaker 01:
And the bottom line is that it doesn't arise under Washington State workers organization.

[00:28:21] Speaker 02:
Mr. Padilla, could you, I want to ask something different, help me resolve maybe a tension between your assertion of Rice Judicata and the Rooker Feldman doctrine.

[00:28:34] Speaker 02:
So in my understanding that given the state's abandonment of the Rooker Feldman,

[00:28:40] Speaker 02:
that your view is that the rest judicata, if it's applicable here, would be applying to a set of claims that is not identical to those that have been previously litigated.

[00:28:56] Speaker 02:
In other words, for example, I think do you agree with your friend that with respect to the Section 1983 claims that there are additional causes of action that are brought that are different from those that the state court passed upon that might be disqualified under Rooker Feldman, but might still be amenable to arrest Judicata could have been brought bar.

[00:29:17] Speaker 01:
Yes, so when we do a resudicata analysis, there are four elements that must be met, and for the sake of brevity, I will just touch base on the two that there are issues, subject matter and cause of action.

[00:29:31] Speaker 01:
So subject matter in the prior state case and this one

[00:29:36] Speaker 01:
is the same.

[00:29:37] Speaker 01:
Why?

[00:29:38] Speaker 01:
So subject matter is satisfied when, quote, the prior state action and the present federal actions both concern the activities of the defendant against the plaintiffs, end quote.

[00:29:50] Speaker 01:
And in here, I'm quoting feminist women's health center.

[00:29:54] Speaker 03:
Well, let's assume you're right.

[00:29:55] Speaker 03:
I mean, let's assume that this should have been litigated in the previous matter, which is what claim preclusion means.

[00:30:05] Speaker 03:
then aren't we in Rooker Feldman land?

[00:30:08] Speaker 03:
Because this is then a collateral attack on the state court judgment.

[00:30:14] Speaker 03:
I don't believe so, and that's why when I... Well, so if we are in Rooker Feldman land, then we have no jurisdiction.

[00:30:22] Speaker 03:
And we should send it back to the state court for you to assert your claim preclusion.

[00:30:29] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:30:31] Speaker 01:
Sorry.

[00:30:32] Speaker 03:
Well, see, that's the problem.

[00:30:33] Speaker 03:
You're saying there's claim preclusion.

[00:30:35] Speaker 03:
This was either implicitly litigated or should have been litigated in the previous state proceeding.

[00:30:42] Speaker 03:
One of the purposes of Rucker-Feldman is to prevent a collateral attack in federal court on civil judgments in state courts.

[00:30:51] Speaker 03:
So that's what you say is happening here.

[00:30:55] Speaker 03:
And so why aren't we in Rucker-Feldman land?

[00:30:58] Speaker 01:
Well, because Rucker-Feldman in this specific case does not apply and that's what I said earlier in my introduction.

[00:31:10] Speaker 02:
But that would, perhaps.

[00:31:15] Speaker 02:
One way, and maybe the only way that could be true, is that these claims were not actually litigated, nor were inextricably intertwined with the claims that the state court

[00:31:30] Speaker 02:
previously adjudicated, which is why I'd asked you whether you agree with your friend that Ms.

[00:31:37] Speaker 02:
Lee's complaint here raises some claims that are different from those that the state court passed upon.

[00:31:46] Speaker 02:
Not that that would necessarily decide the res judicata issue.

[00:31:51] Speaker 02:
Washington law, maybe they could have been brought, but if they weren't actually brought and decided in an extricably twine, I guess that would be the only daylight I see between

[00:32:00] Speaker 02:
Rooker Feldman for you, which you don't want, and Ress Giudicata, which you do.

[00:32:06] Speaker 01:
Right, but the problem is that when, and my time is- You can take time to answer, thank you.

[00:32:12] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:32:13] Speaker 01:
So, and that is the issue.

[00:32:15] Speaker 01:
When we are dealing with rest judicata, as I was saying, there is that four element analysis.

[00:32:20] Speaker 01:
And if we go one by one, we notice that whether the cost of action, what are the causes of action between the first one and the second claim don't have

[00:32:31] Speaker 01:
the way that we think it should have.

[00:32:35] Speaker 01:
Because when we're talking about cause of action, the fourth element under res judicata, we are actually looking at whether the second action would destroy or impair rights established in the first one.

[00:32:48] Speaker 01:
And the most important factor under cause of action is whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of fact.

[00:32:56] Speaker 01:
So if we can answer that question as a yes, then the cost of action and the res judicata is met.

[00:33:05] Speaker 02:
And Rooker Feldman is not.

[00:33:06] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:33:09] Speaker 01:
Unless the court has any questions, Mr. Sack requests this court affirms the district court summary judgment motion.

[00:33:19] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Mr. Padilla.

[00:33:20] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:33:27] Speaker 02:
Mr. Hart will give you two minutes.

[00:33:32] Speaker 00:
I want to make something in the record clear.

[00:33:34] Speaker 00:
Miss Lee did not bring up Brooker Feldman.

[00:33:38] Speaker 00:
The director brought it up both in district court.

[00:33:42] Speaker 03:
We're required to bring it up if we think it's relevant.

[00:33:45] Speaker 00:
Yes, if this court thinks that Rooker Feldman applies, it can address it.

[00:33:49] Speaker 00:
But I just want to be clear, it goes to the propriety of removal, however.

[00:33:53] Speaker 00:
The director has the burden to show removal was proper.

[00:33:57] Speaker 00:
And by arguing that this court simultaneously has and doesn't have jurisdiction, it's fundamentally unfair to the plaintiff.

[00:34:05] Speaker 00:
So that's the Rooker.

[00:34:06] Speaker 00:
And again, we would urge this court not to find Rooker Feldman applies for reasons of our claim, preclusion argument, because we don't think Miss Lee

[00:34:13] Speaker 00:
should have to start in state court with a decision from this court finding that it's a collateral attack.

[00:34:19] Speaker 02:
Well, to pick up on where I left off with your friend, did I understand your argument to be that Ms.

[00:34:30] Speaker 02:
Lee brings claims that are different than were those that were previously adjudged in state court?

[00:34:38] Speaker 02:
such that they are not inextricably intertwined, setting aside the interaction of that federal test with the state risk judicata test?

[00:34:48] Speaker 02:
And if so, can you just summarize again, what is the difference?

[00:34:52] Speaker 02:
What are the different new claims in this complaint that weren't adjudicated in state court previously?

[00:34:58] Speaker 00:
Yes, so what wasn't adjudicated in the first case, one, again, because Washington focuses on the theory of recovery as one of the claim preclusion elements, is Ms.

[00:35:07] Speaker 00:
Lee's claim for procedural due process, which leads to damages.

[00:35:11] Speaker 00:
That wasn't addressed in case number one.

[00:35:14] Speaker 00:
Ms.

[00:35:14] Speaker 00:
Lee also in her complaint alleges various violations of Title 51, which is the state worker's compensation law.

[00:35:21] Speaker 00:
and then also a claim for equitable relief.

[00:35:23] Speaker 00:
The state court in case number one never reached those claims.

[00:35:27] Speaker 00:
I also want to say Congress already decided for this court what forum these claims should be heard in in section 1445C where it explicitly said these types of claims should not be removed.

[00:35:40] Speaker 00:
So we asked this court if it finds it has jurisdiction over the magistrate judge's orders to remand this case to state court

[00:35:47] Speaker 00:
or at a minimum reverse the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment and remand for the proceedings.

[00:35:52] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:35:53] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Ms.

[00:35:54] Speaker 02:
DeHart, and the court offers its thanks for you taking this case pro bono.

[00:35:58] Speaker 02:
Thanks to both counsel for your arguments, and the case will be submitted.