[00:00:00] Speaker 03:
We will now hear argument in the case, and I'm probably going to pronounce this wrong, 2C versus NTUA wireless.

[00:00:17] Speaker 03:
You'll tell me how to pronounce the name, right?

[00:00:19] Speaker 03:
I will.

[00:00:20] Speaker 03:
I hope so.

[00:00:25] Speaker 03:
Good morning.

[00:00:26] Speaker 01:
Good morning.

[00:00:26] Speaker 01:
May it please the Court?

[00:00:27] Speaker 01:
My name is David Jordan.

[00:00:29] Speaker 01:
I represent Valina Sosi.

[00:00:32] Speaker 01:
Sosi?

[00:00:33] Speaker 01:
Sosi.

[00:00:34] Speaker 01:
The T is silent.

[00:00:35] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:00:36] Speaker 01:
Sosi.

[00:00:37] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:00:37] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:00:40] Speaker 01:
We have brought this appeal to challenge the District Court's decision that she inadequately identified NTUA Wireless LLC in her EEOC charge.

[00:00:50] Speaker 01:
I would like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:53] Speaker 01:
I will watch the time.

[00:00:54] Speaker 01:
Our position is twofold.

[00:00:58] Speaker 01:
One, by denying at the pleading stage the district court never engaged in an inquiry to determine whether NTUA Wireless was actually prejudiced, whether it had actual knowledge of the pendency of the charge, whether it had actual opportunity to participate in conciliation efforts.

[00:01:17] Speaker 01:
The only thing the district court had in front of it

[00:01:20] Speaker 01:
was the bare identification of the entity.

[00:01:23] Speaker 01:
And the entity was identified incorrectly.

[00:01:25] Speaker 01:
It was identified as a DBA instead of its own LLC.

[00:01:28] Speaker 03:
Let me just, so we narrow this properly.

[00:01:31] Speaker 03:
Certainly, sir.

[00:01:32] Speaker 03:
You only presented arguments responding to the third and fifth social exceptions.

[00:01:38] Speaker 03:
Do we correctly gather from that that you are conceding that none of the other three exceptions apply?

[00:01:44] Speaker 01:
We're focusing on the two exceptions you identified.

[00:01:46] Speaker 03:
Are you saying the others don't apply?

[00:01:47] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:01:49] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:01:52] Speaker 01:
Our position is that had the court continued and actually made a factual inquiry, at least it would have created a record to determine whether there was actual knowledge by NTUA Wireless and an actual opportunity to participate in conciliation.

[00:02:09] Speaker 01:
The Ninth Circuit has numerous times stated that the

[00:02:14] Speaker 01:
Charges are to be liberally construed, and there have in fact found many cases where the party was not identified in the charge at all, but they could have been reasonably inferred had they reviewed it.

[00:02:25] Speaker 01:
They would have known that they were parties.

[00:02:27] Speaker 00:
Does that liberal standard for reviewing the pleadings, does that apply if the person is represented by counsel?

[00:02:34] Speaker 01:
It does sometimes, but there are many cases where that is not identified as a factor.

[00:02:40] Speaker 01:
We cited the Wrighton case, which is a Ninth Circuit case, where they didn't identify that as a factor at all.

[00:02:46] Speaker 01:
They simply said, EEOC charges should be construed liberally.

[00:02:51] Speaker 01:
Title VII charges can be brought against persons not named in an EEOC complaint.

[00:02:55] Speaker 01:
They didn't identify whether they were represented by a lawyer as a factor at all.

[00:02:59] Speaker 01:
So sometimes that's identified as a factor, but frequently it is not.

[00:03:03] Speaker 01:
And one of the reasons is because the purpose of the whole process is to make sure that the party has an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

[00:03:11] Speaker 01:
and has notice.

[00:03:12] Speaker 01:
Our position is if the district court had actually denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss and allowed the parties to develop the record, the court would have found that in fact the person who engaged in the sexual harassment, Walter Haas, was on the board of directors of NTUA Wireless and was the general manager of NTUA.

[00:03:32] Speaker 01:
So the individual who was identified was a controlling person for both entities, both the parent and the child entity.

[00:03:40] Speaker 00:
At the time the charge was filed, I thought when I was reading the chronology that Mr. Haas had these positions perhaps a year that wasn't the charge filed in 2022 and he became

[00:03:53] Speaker 00:
General Manager went on the board in 2023?

[00:03:56] Speaker 00:
I may have been incorrect.

[00:03:58] Speaker 01:
That is incorrect.

[00:03:59] Speaker 01:
He's been General Manager for NTUA for several years and continues in that position today.

[00:04:05] Speaker 01:
He had been on the board of directors up until, as I recall, March or about two weeks after this incident, he was removed from the board of directors of NTUA Wireless.

[00:04:16] Speaker 01:
But when the incident happened, he was on the board of directors of NTUA Wireless and was General Manager of NTUA both.

[00:04:23] Speaker 03:
Is that your hook, if you will, for a substantially identical, for purposes of the third Sosa prong?

[00:04:32] Speaker 01:
Yes, sir.

[00:04:33] Speaker 03:
Okay, but you don't have any other evidence about ownership interests in either entity?

[00:04:38] Speaker 01:
NTUA, yes I do, NTUA is one of the two partners that formed NTUA Wireless, ComNet Wireless being the other partner.

[00:04:49] Speaker 01:
So there was an LLC with two members, ComNet Wireless and NTUA.

[00:04:54] Speaker 01:
So there is a commonality of ownership that NTUA was one half owner

[00:05:00] Speaker 01:
of NTUA Wireless, and its general manager served on its board of directors, and the general manager who served on the board of directors was the offender who in fact assaulted my client at a meeting here in Phoenix.

[00:05:14] Speaker 03:
Okay, so from your perspective, the record already shows the common ownership.

[00:05:21] Speaker 03:
They would have clearly been aware of all this.

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
There's no doubt they would have been aware of it.

[00:05:26] Speaker 01:
And we believe the district court engaged in a rather circumstantial review by just looking at how the name was identified.

[00:05:34] Speaker 01:
And the only mistake in the name was that she identified as a DBA and not an LLC.

[00:05:41] Speaker 01:
So our position is that there is very little way that NTUA Wireless could not know that it was a part of this case based on the way the charge was.

[00:05:49] Speaker 01:
The charge was identified against NTUA Wireless.

[00:05:52] Speaker 01:
Yes, it said as a DBA.

[00:05:54] Speaker 01:
It then identified that one member of its board of directors, who was also general manager of NTUA, who was one of the members,

[00:06:01] Speaker 01:
was the assaulting party.

[00:06:04] Speaker 01:
And so our position is that the district court erred by not allowing the case to go forward at that point.

[00:06:10] Speaker 01:
The purposes of the EEOC Title VII guidelines and laws were satisfied in this case.

[00:06:18] Speaker 01:
They had the opportunity to participate in conciliation.

[00:06:20] Speaker 01:
They had the opportunity to try to settle the case, to learn and to participate in the investigation.

[00:06:26] Speaker 01:
And so really we believe that everything that they should have had in this case, they in fact had.

[00:06:32] Speaker 04:
Counsel, I think that you're simplifying the error in the charge document.

[00:06:36] Speaker 04:
I think you just said the only thing that was wrong was that the correct entity was listed as a doing business as a DBA rather than the direct entity.

[00:06:45] Speaker 04:
But even the DBA name that was given is wrong.

[00:06:48] Speaker 04:
It says choice NTUA wireless, which is not the actual entity that is identified in the briefing and in the caption of this case.

[00:06:58] Speaker 04:
So does that not matter?

[00:06:59] Speaker 01:
I believe it does not matter.

[00:07:01] Speaker 01:
I believe that NTUA Wireless had adequate knowledge based on this.

[00:07:05] Speaker 01:
And more to the point, Your Honor, okay, so I understand that there's an issue with the identification of the entity in the name block, but the actual identifying party, the person who was involved in this,

[00:07:18] Speaker 01:
If you read it, you cannot conclude but that this is the person who's on the board of directors of NTUA Wireless LLC.

[00:07:27] Speaker 01:
And this is the person who caused the infraction.

[00:07:30] Speaker 04:
Does it not matter at all that the person who fills out this charge, your client, was the general manager and CEO of this entity that was so

[00:07:39] Speaker 04:
sort of inexplicably misidentified?

[00:07:41] Speaker 01:
That is a factor, but it is not a determinative factor.

[00:07:44] Speaker 01:
In our position, the overriding factor is whether or not the purposes of EEOC law and guidelines were satisfied in this case, whether they had notice, whether they had the opportunity to participate in conciliation, whether the process of investigation was hindered by the misidentification.

[00:08:03] Speaker 01:
And we believe that there's no possible set of facts where you could say that that process was hindered by this.

[00:08:09] Speaker 01:
Like I said, Your Honor, there are cases where the person who was left in by the Ninth Circuit was not identified at all in the charge.

[00:08:17] Speaker 01:
But they found that by reading the charge, they could not, they reasonably could conclude that they were a part of it.

[00:08:23] Speaker 01:
Again, we point to the Wrighton case, where the court found that somebody not identified at all

[00:08:28] Speaker 01:
reading it would realize that they were a part of it.

[00:08:33] Speaker 01:
I see that my time is up, and I'd like to reserve two minutes.

[00:08:38] Speaker 03:
All right, so Mr. Montagnini, is that correct?

[00:08:45] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honor.

[00:08:52] Speaker 02:
Again, Josh Montagnini with Mason and Isaacson.

[00:08:55] Speaker 02:
for the Appellee, N2A Wireless and Walter Haas.

[00:09:00] Speaker 02:
No matter how Appellant spins this DBA name and no matter which standard we apply, utmost liberality or plain meaning of the charge, N2A Wireless was deprived of its opportunity to participate in the EEOC proceedings below.

[00:09:13] Speaker 02:
There was no investigation that involved it and there was no conciliation proceedings.

[00:09:18] Speaker 02:
Furthermore, no matter which standard we apply, Appellant conceded in briefing below

[00:09:25] Speaker 02:
that she should have known the right name of the company that she ran.

[00:09:31] Speaker 03:
If you were, if we could set this back and the discovery proceeded, what kind of evidence would you try to gather that would show that NTUA wireless did not have notice and to participate in the EEOC conciliation efforts?

[00:09:48] Speaker 02:
I believe, Your Honor, just the evidence that's already in the record, the right to sue letter and the EEOC charge.

[00:09:54] Speaker 02:
Neither of those documents identify N2A wireless.

[00:09:57] Speaker 02:
Neither of those documents have any indication that they were sent to N2A wireless.

[00:10:00] Speaker 03:
Okay, but understand, this is not a huge world.

[00:10:05] Speaker 03:
You've got a small world of people.

[00:10:07] Speaker 03:
They know each other.

[00:10:09] Speaker 03:
The charging person I gather was the general manager.

[00:10:12] Speaker 03:
The accused person was on the board of directors.

[00:10:16] Speaker 03:
Everybody knows everybody.

[00:10:18] Speaker 03:
It's hard for me to imagine that this wasn't common knowledge.

[00:10:23] Speaker 03:
So what I'm asking you is, if discovery were to commence, what would you seek to prove that they didn't know, that you didn't know?

[00:10:33] Speaker 02:
Well, so we'd be in the position of proving a negative.

[00:10:36] Speaker 02:
And in that sense, the absence of evidence would speak volumes, as it does here today as well.

[00:10:43] Speaker 02:
And it did it before.

[00:10:45] Speaker 02:
But it would just be probably

[00:10:47] Speaker 02:
correspondence showing that N2A Wireless didn't know about it, or even if they had, the charge itself doesn't identify them.

[00:10:55] Speaker 02:
And that's why I keep coming back to the record that we do have in front of us.

[00:11:00] Speaker 03:
I guess what I struggle with, and hope you can help me, as my colleagues earlier noted, and I think your opposing counsel has concurred in, you don't need to have a pro se person to have the EEOC

[00:11:17] Speaker 03:
requirements liberally construed.

[00:11:20] Speaker 03:
So if we take that as a given, you've got people who know each other, dealing with common situations, you've got a small group of people.

[00:11:28] Speaker 03:
Why isn't it commonsensical to let this go forward rather than stand on a legal technicality which is very different than other parts of the law?

[00:11:40] Speaker 03:
The EEOC is designed to get a resolution, let people talk, try to get it resolved without litigation.

[00:11:47] Speaker 03:
But in this case, that didn't happen.

[00:11:50] Speaker 03:
Why isn't that the better construction in this case?

[00:11:54] Speaker 02:
For two reasons, Your Honor.

[00:11:55] Speaker 02:
One is that it's not a small universe.

[00:11:58] Speaker 02:
These people don't all know each other.

[00:12:00] Speaker 02:
ComNet Wireless LLC is a completely separate company from anything alleged in the complaint.

[00:12:05] Speaker 03:
I understand it's a different company.

[00:12:07] Speaker 03:
Did they work together on occasion?

[00:12:10] Speaker 02:
There's nothing in the record or the complaint.

[00:12:12] Speaker 03:
One is accused of assaulting the other person.

[00:12:15] Speaker 02:
Right, but there's nothing in the complaint that identifies ComNet Wireless at all.

[00:12:19] Speaker 02:
They are a separate entity.

[00:12:20] Speaker 02:
And then the problem here that we have is the appellant made a technical mistake that had a substantial and material consequence, and that is misidentifying N2A Wireless.

[00:12:31] Speaker 02:
What they are doing at this point still, and from the beginning of this case, is a steadfast refusal to acknowledge that ComNet Wireless is not ComNet NuCo.

[00:12:41] Speaker 02:
There's nothing in the complaint to show that these people worked together, had any commonality at all.

[00:12:45] Speaker 02:
There's no commonality of ownership.

[00:12:47] Speaker 02:
And if we look at paragraph 6 of the amended complaint on ER 13.

[00:12:50] Speaker 00:
Can I interrupt you for a moment?

[00:12:51] Speaker 00:
Even if we agree with you that the wrong entity was named in the EEOC charge, it still seems that granting a 12b6 motion to dismiss may have been in error if that's not

[00:13:08] Speaker 00:
Let me back up a moment, because there are exceptions that can apply, right?

[00:13:12] Speaker 00:
So to conclude on a motion to dismiss that none of these exceptions apply, that would have to be clear from the face of the complaint and perhaps incorporated documents.

[00:13:23] Speaker 00:
I understand the charge was attached, so the district court considered the charge.

[00:13:28] Speaker 00:
And I know your friend on the other side argued pretty passionately that

[00:13:37] Speaker 00:
that these exceptions apply, but do we even have to decide that?

[00:13:40] Speaker 00:
Is it just enough that there's a factual dispute as to whether the exceptions apply, in which case it shouldn't have been dismissed under 12b6?

[00:13:47] Speaker 00:
Maybe it's a summary judgment motion later.

[00:13:51] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor, because there's not a factual dispute.

[00:13:52] Speaker 02:
There's not a factual dispute just because the appellant says there is.

[00:13:56] Speaker 02:
The record is clear.

[00:13:57] Speaker 02:
There is no substantial identity between ComNet Wireless and NTUA Wireless.

[00:14:01] Speaker 02:
ComNet Wireless has no connection to NTUA Wireless, and we know that because of the complaint.

[00:14:06] Speaker 04:
That might go to exception three, which is that the named entity is substantially identical to the unnamed entity.

[00:14:13] Speaker 04:
That argument seems to go to that one, but it doesn't go to the fifth exception, which is unnamed party had notice or the opportunity to participate.

[00:14:21] Speaker 04:
That's the one where.

[00:14:23] Speaker 04:
Based on all the relatedness.

[00:14:25] Speaker 04:
And I understand you're trying to say that there's different entities, but we do have individuals who are participating in the different entities.

[00:14:32] Speaker 04:
And given that is set out in the complaint.

[00:14:35] Speaker 04:
Going back to Judge Beatty's question, why wouldn't we just say, well, this is premature?

[00:14:39] Speaker 04:
I have no idea if you're ultimately going to be able to prove exception five or not.

[00:14:43] Speaker 04:
But maybe you should have a chance to put on evidence.

[00:14:46] Speaker 04:
Because this is the defendant's burden on this kind of a defense.

[00:14:50] Speaker 04:
The plaintiff doesn't have an obligation to affirmatively plead around it.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
And I'm not suggesting they do.

[00:14:55] Speaker 02:
But as to that fifth element regarding the unnamed party having noticed and participating in the EEOC conciliation efforts, they have, first of all,

[00:15:04] Speaker 02:
Cognate wireless is not alleged anywhere in the complaint to have any connection to N2A wireless.

[00:15:11] Speaker 02:
And plaintiff has had three opportunities to allege or even just put in a response brief to the motion to dismiss a suggestion that there are any facts that support the conciliation occurred.

[00:15:23] Speaker 02:
They've had that opportunity.

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
When we were below, the parties had to certify that the issue raised in the 12b6 motion could not be cured by further amendment.

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
And that's important because the complaint, the amended complaint,

[00:15:34] Speaker 02:
any future amendments that might have occurred after that but didn't.

[00:15:37] Speaker 02:
That governs the scope of discovery going forward, puts guardrails on that.

[00:15:41] Speaker 02:
The plaintiff could only seek to prove what's in the complaint.

[00:15:44] Speaker 02:
And they have told us, they've told the district court, this is it.

[00:15:47] Speaker 02:
What we allege in paragraphs six and seven about the identity of the parties and exhaustion of remedies, that's it.

[00:15:54] Speaker 02:
There's no allegations or, again, even an argument put in a brief to say that there was conciliation.

[00:16:01] Speaker 02:
They've had that opportunity multiple times to say.

[00:16:04] Speaker 03:
I gather you take the position that the failure to satisfy the Fifth Social Exception was clear on the face of the complaint, is that correct?

[00:16:15] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor, the complaint understood to include the charge and the right to sue letter, absolutely.

[00:16:20] Speaker 02:
And it's not because the plaintiffs below failed to allege enough facts, it's because the facts that they allege

[00:16:27] Speaker 02:
taken in light of the charge, show that she exhausted her remedies against ComNet Wireless LLC, and then filed a complaint that says absolutely nothing about ComNet Wireless LLC, no connection at all between that company that she exhausted her remedy against and the defendant, the appellate here today.

[00:16:46] Speaker 02:
And appellant relies heavily on three cases to show that, to make the argument that under the utmost liberality standard

[00:16:57] Speaker 02:
NTA Wireless got notice, and she exhausted her administrative remedies against them.

[00:17:03] Speaker 02:
The first one is Wengler v. Hawaiian Electric Company.

[00:17:06] Speaker 02:
Another one is, of course, SOSA, which sets the standard that we're working under.

[00:17:10] Speaker 02:
But in both of those cases, there is a fact pattern that's completely different from here.

[00:17:14] Speaker 02:
In both of those cases, the plaintiff appellant identified their employer correctly.

[00:17:19] Speaker 02:
They weren't specific as to the identities of the individuals that allegedly discriminated against them, but in Wengler,

[00:17:27] Speaker 02:
She just said that she had been sexually harassed and when she filed, and I was in the charge, the charge proceeded against the employer at the administrative stage.

[00:17:38] Speaker 02:
There was an investigation and conciliation.

[00:17:42] Speaker 02:
Then when she filed the complaint, she identified the same employer and then the supervisors that harmed her by name.

[00:17:48] Speaker 02:
Same thing happened in SOSA.

[00:17:50] Speaker 02:
The charge named the State Center Community College District an alleged harm by its administrators.

[00:17:55] Speaker 02:
Didn't name them individually.

[00:17:57] Speaker 02:
Then when she filed her complaint, she named that same employer and named the administrators by name.

[00:18:04] Speaker 02:
So in both those cases, when the defendant moved to dismiss for exhaustion of administrative remedies, their only argument was, hey, you didn't name our employees specifically by name.

[00:18:12] Speaker 02:
And the Ninth Circuit appropriately reversed that dismissal when the district court granted it.

[00:18:17] Speaker 02:
Slightly different situation in Eggleston.

[00:18:18] Speaker 02:
This shows going to the fifth factor, the substantial overlap between the charged party and the party that was sued.

[00:18:26] Speaker 02:
In that case,

[00:18:28] Speaker 02:
Local 130 was a union, a local union was named in the charge, but not the Joint Apprenticeship Committee that actually was later alleged to cause the harm.

[00:18:38] Speaker 02:
In that case, five of the ten people on the board of the committee were serving as officers of the local union.

[00:18:43] Speaker 02:
The coordinator for the committee had been an officer of Local 130 for 15 years.

[00:18:48] Speaker 02:
There was a record of conciliation and a close relationship between the parties.

[00:18:53] Speaker 02:
Nothing like that is here or has been alleged here.

[00:18:55] Speaker 02:
Now, I'm not saying it has to be alleged in the first instance, but when a party makes an appropriate motion to dismiss and uses as evidence the complaint and the charge and the right to sue that demonstrate that defense, there is an obligation to make some kind of response.

[00:19:13] Speaker 03:
I see my time is up.

[00:19:14] Speaker 03:
Let me ask my colleague whether either has additional questions.

[00:19:17] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:19:17] Speaker 03:
I think not.

[00:19:18] Speaker 03:
Thank you very much.

[00:19:19] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:19:20] Speaker 03:
So Mr. Jordan, you have a little rebuttal time.

[00:19:24] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:19:26] Speaker 01:
So the fundamental flaw in Appelli's argument is that we do not have a duty in the complaint to anticipate and negate every possible affirmative defense.

[00:19:34] Speaker 01:
That's just not the way pleadings work.

[00:19:37] Speaker 01:
In an affirmative defense, the burden of proof falls on the defense to establish the affirmative defense that they're establishing.

[00:19:43] Speaker 01:
They never even filed any answer in this case.

[00:19:45] Speaker 01:
Had they gone to that proceeding, and you're honored to address your question directly, they would have found out that choice wireless board of directors were sitting at the table and watched the assault take place.

[00:19:58] Speaker 01:
Your statement that everybody knows each other, this is a small group, is absolutely spot on.

[00:20:05] Speaker 01:
They watched the assault.

[00:20:07] Speaker 01:
They knew that the assault happened.

[00:20:08] Speaker 01:
They knew who Walter Haas was when he was engaging in the assault.

[00:20:12] Speaker 01:
They knew that this matter was going on.

[00:20:14] Speaker 01:
So, Your Honor, our position in this case is you're dead on.

[00:20:18] Speaker 01:
The Navajo Nation is a small group of people.

[00:20:21] Speaker 01:
They all know each other.

[00:20:23] Speaker 01:
Walter Haas has been in this position for at least a decade, to my best recollection.

[00:20:29] Speaker 01:
And so in this case, their position seems to be, when we told them we were going to file a motion to dismiss, they had a duty to amend their complaint, to allege every possible fact to negate our affirmative defense in their complaint.

[00:20:42] Speaker 03:
Let me ask you this, counsel, at the time of the motion on their part, did the defendants indicate the names of the proper defendants from their perspective?

[00:20:57] Speaker 01:
Did the defendants indicate the name of the proper?

[00:21:00] Speaker 03:
In other words, they said you alleged X. Right.

[00:21:03] Speaker 03:
They said no, it's Y. Did they do that at the time of the hearing?

[00:21:08] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:21:09] Speaker 01:
If I understand your question correctly, yes, I think they did.

[00:21:12] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:21:12] Speaker 03:
And so if they did, did the court give you a chance to amend your complaint to allege Y rather than X?

[00:21:21] Speaker 01:
I guess I'm just not understanding your questions.

[00:21:23] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:21:23] Speaker 03:
In other words, what I'm trying to find out is your opponent is saying you sued the wrong people.

[00:21:32] Speaker 03:
But at the time of the motion, the district court heard

[00:21:37] Speaker 03:
I guess you just confirmed that the defendant said you named X, it should have been Y. So my question is if that were the case, did you have an opportunity to amend your complaint to allege that in fact the correct party was Y?

[00:21:54] Speaker 01:
So to the question did we have the opportunity to amend, the answer is yes.

[00:21:59] Speaker 01:
But more directly... No, it goes back to the EOC, but I'm just... Right.

[00:22:02] Speaker 01:
It goes back to the EOC.

[00:22:03] Speaker 01:
The EOC charge at that point was static.

[00:22:05] Speaker 01:
It was... Right.

[00:22:06] Speaker 01:
I mean, we couldn't change how the EOC complained.

[00:22:09] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:22:09] Speaker 01:
So our position was the EOC adequately put them on notice that these were going to be the parties in the case.

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:22:17] Speaker 03:
Throughout the time, let me ask my colleagues additional questions.

[00:22:20] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:22:20] Speaker 03:
Thank you both for your argument in the case.

[00:22:22] Speaker 03:
Just heard Trucey versus NTUA Wireless.

[00:22:26] Speaker 03:
That case is now submitted.