[00:00:08] Speaker 04:
Do you say Rohan?

[00:00:09] Speaker 04:
Rajan.

[00:00:12] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the court.

[00:00:14] Speaker 01:
Ruth Rogin on behalf of Appellant Michael Rivers.

[00:00:17] Speaker 01:
I'd like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:20] Speaker 01:
I'll watch my clock.

[00:00:21] Speaker 04:
I'll watch the clock, please.

[00:00:23] Speaker 01:
This case involves a straightforward application of this court's case law prohibiting artificial limitations on defendants seeking early termination of supervised release.

[00:00:32] Speaker 01:
The district court applied a requirement squarely rejected by this court's case law, and the government standard also violates governing precedent.

[00:00:41] Speaker 01:
Because the district court did not properly appreciate its discretion in deciding Mr. River's early termination request, relief is required.

[00:00:49] Speaker 01:
This court has twice admonished district courts for applying prerequisites to the availability of early termination that are not found in the applicable statutes.

[00:00:58] Speaker 01:
In United States versus Emmett, this court said that a defendant does not need to show undue hardship to qualify for early termination.

[00:01:06] Speaker 01:
So counsel.

[00:01:09] Speaker 02:
With your argument here, what work do the words and the interests of justice do in 3583E1?

[00:01:20] Speaker 01:
So to start answering your question, Your Honor, I think this Court has already interpreted the phrase conduct of defendant and interest of justice together in Emmett.

[00:01:30] Speaker 01:
And in that case, the Court said that these are broad consideration, expansive phrases that are meant to promote a wide range of circumstances that a district court

[00:01:38] Speaker 01:
can consider.

[00:01:39] Speaker 01:
So I think the interest of justice is meant to capture things like undue hardship, which the court in Emmett said that's not required for a defendant to show, but the interest of justice allow the district court to consider, for instance, if supervision makes it hard for a person to find employment or a place to live or something like that.

[00:01:56] Speaker 02:
But am I correctly understanding your argument that excellent compliance by your client here, that's enough?

[00:02:06] Speaker 02:
That's all that is required here and there is nothing else more.

[00:02:12] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor, with a couple of caveats.

[00:02:14] Speaker 01:
So first, we're not trying to make a holistic or broad claim about what satisfies the requirement for early termination in every case, rather the statute by using expensive phrases

[00:02:23] Speaker 01:
is meant to promote a holistic case-by-case inquiry.

[00:02:26] Speaker 01:
So there could be some cases in which mere compliance with supervision is enough to terminate supervised release.

[00:02:33] Speaker 01:
And I want to give you an example of that.

[00:02:36] Speaker 04:
Forgive me.

[00:02:37] Speaker 04:
Are you saying that this case meets that requirement?

[00:02:39] Speaker 01:
I would first dispute whether Mr. Rivers has only shown mere compliance with supervision.

[00:02:45] Speaker 01:
But here, even if this court construes the conduct that he's displayed on supervised release as mere compliance, we believe that's enough.

[00:02:52] Speaker 01:
So for instance, while he was in custody, he took advantage of Unicor and ARDAP.

[00:02:57] Speaker 04:
I mean, basically, what I'm reading, and I think my colleague is here, that your client said, hey, I complied.

[00:03:05] Speaker 04:
I want out of here.

[00:03:06] Speaker 04:
I don't see any way to construe it any other way.

[00:03:09] Speaker 04:
What are you pointing to other than that he just complied with what he's supposed to do?

[00:03:14] Speaker 01:
It's more than mere compliance with supervision conditions.

[00:03:16] Speaker 01:
So he took advantage of programming in prison that are beyond what are prescribed by his conditions of supervised release.

[00:03:22] Speaker 04:
And that's to get out of jail free?

[00:03:25] Speaker 01:
I don't think that's a get out of jail free, but those are circumstances that a district court can consider holistic.

[00:03:30] Speaker 04:
How do you know the district court didn't consider that here?

[00:03:33] Speaker 01:
Because if you look at excerpts of record, page 5, if you look at where the district court described Mr. Rivers conduct, it applauded him for the progress that he's made on supervisor.

[00:03:42] Speaker 04:
The district court was clearly aware of what you're talking about, but nonetheless concluded that

[00:03:48] Speaker 04:
In this case, it was appropriate for him not to be released early.

[00:03:52] Speaker 01:
Awareness is insufficient under our reading of the statute because the district court thought that it couldn't consider all of the progress he had on supervision because it didn't amount to more than mere compliance.

[00:04:02] Speaker 01:
And we say that sort of artificial requirement.

[00:04:04] Speaker 03:
That's a judgment call.

[00:04:06] Speaker 03:
I mean, he said the court applauds defendants' progress.

[00:04:10] Speaker 03:
But defendant has provided nothing more than compliance as evidence in support of early termination.

[00:04:15] Speaker 03:
You view it as more than compliance, but it was within his discretion to say, I don't really think it amounts to much more than that.

[00:04:23] Speaker 01:
Couple responses, Your Honor.

[00:04:24] Speaker 01:
So first, if you look at the way the district court described the applicable legal standard, it consistently conflated

[00:04:30] Speaker 01:
mere compliance with some sort of requirement for extraordinary or unusual circumstances that we know from Ponce is not an accurate statement of what the legal standard is for early termination.

[00:04:42] Speaker 01:
But even if you look at excerpts of record, if you look at excerpts of record, page five, the way the district court describes it, it seems to tie its hands in terms of the way it's exercising its discretion in deciding these motions.

[00:04:53] Speaker 04:
But you're implying that, I mean, again,

[00:04:56] Speaker 04:
I feel sorry for the district judges in these situations, because he described, complimented your client.

[00:05:01] Speaker 04:
Hey, great.

[00:05:01] Speaker 04:
Good job.

[00:05:02] Speaker 04:
We're really happy with what you've done.

[00:05:04] Speaker 04:
And given the crimes that it committed, he said, I'm not going to terminate this.

[00:05:10] Speaker 01:
But the way that the district court applauded our client in this case then immediately followed by a constraint on the judge's own discretion, thinking that it couldn't give more weight to this because it didn't qualify.

[00:05:20] Speaker 04:
But that's not what the record says.

[00:05:21] Speaker 04:
You're just implying that, are you not?

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
No, Your Honor.

[00:05:24] Speaker 01:
So I think another piece of evidence that makes this clear is at footnote three of our opening brief, we cite a subsequent decision by the same district court judge in United States versus Buchanan.

[00:05:34] Speaker 01:
And in that case, the district court entirely changes its statement of the legal standards, the way it conflates mere compliance with extraordinary circumstances, and finally cites this court's decision in pwns.

[00:05:44] Speaker 01:
And in making that sort of statement, the district court granted the defendant in that case early termination.

[00:05:50] Speaker 03:
He has the block quote from Etheridge and that's where the extraordinary, you know, or exceptional language is from.

[00:05:59] Speaker 03:
But when he describes the standard in his own words, he says he must present a material change in circumstances and that that has not been done.

[00:06:12] Speaker 03:
Is that standard legally erroneous?

[00:06:14] Speaker 01:
Material change in circumstances is legally erroneous.

[00:06:17] Speaker 01:
And we know this for a couple of reasons.

[00:06:19] Speaker 01:
So first, if you look at this court's decision in the United States versus Bainbridge, there this court said that a defendant does not.

[00:06:25] Speaker 03:
Bainbridge is a modification case.

[00:06:27] Speaker 03:
This is a termination case.

[00:06:29] Speaker 01:
Absolutely, Your Honor.

[00:06:31] Speaker 01:
And we don't dispute that, but we think the legal principles and the logic of Bainbridge is persuasive in this context, because the wording of the provisions are somewhat similar.

[00:06:39] Speaker 01:
There is the additional language about conduct of defendant, interest of justice.

[00:06:43] Speaker 03:
But to terminate all supervision, as opposed to making even the slightest tinkerings, we might say under Bainbridge, even the slightest tinkering, we're not going to insist that you have changed circumstances.

[00:06:54] Speaker 03:
There might be a minor mistake, et cetera.

[00:06:57] Speaker 03:
But to terminate is basically to just change your mind on having any supervision.

[00:07:02] Speaker 03:
And in your view, the statute allows district judges, whenever they feel like it, to just say, you know, nothing's changed, but I've changed my mind, and now you're off supervised release.

[00:07:12] Speaker 01:
That's what the regime Congress created?

[00:07:15] Speaker 01:
That's what's required under this court's precedent.

[00:07:17] Speaker 01:
So Emmett says that district courts have broad discretion under the phrases conduct of defendant and interest of justice.

[00:07:23] Speaker 03:
But in your view, you can terminate supervisor lease just because the district judge has changed his or her mind and nothing more.

[00:07:32] Speaker 01:
I would respectfully disagree that a simple change in mind is insufficient.

[00:07:36] Speaker 03:
Well, you said no change in circumstances is required.

[00:07:39] Speaker 03:
So the facts are the same.

[00:07:41] Speaker 03:
The only thing that's changed, I take it, is the district judge's view of what justice requires.

[00:07:46] Speaker 01:
So we disagree with that characterization.

[00:07:49] Speaker 01:
So our position is that a material change in circumstances, which is what the language that the court uses in quoting, that's not something that's required.

[00:07:56] Speaker 01:
Because by the very nature and the passage of time, the defendant that comes before.

[00:08:01] Speaker 03:
If that's not part of the standard, doesn't that in escapably, logically lead to the conclusion that district judges can terminate supervised release whenever they feel like it?

[00:08:12] Speaker 03:
And just with no change, just because they've changed their mind.

[00:08:15] Speaker 01:
They can terminate supervised release whenever the sentencing factors, the interest of justice,

[00:08:19] Speaker 01:
and the conduct of defendant promoted.

[00:08:22] Speaker 01:
And to go back to your point about change circumstances, if you look at the Second Court's decision in the United States versus Parisi and the Third Circuit's decision in the United States versus Melvin, in both circumstances, the Third Circuit specifically says that a defendant does not need to show new or changed circumstances because the district court enjoys the ultimate discretion in making the decision to terminate supervised release.

[00:08:44] Speaker 01:
And I think here it's just very hard to disentangle

[00:08:47] Speaker 01:
the block quote from a case that the district court acknowledges inaccurately states the law from the rest of the analysis made here.

[00:08:54] Speaker 01:
So all we're asking for is vacater, not reversal, and then remand for consideration under the proper legal standard.

[00:09:00] Speaker 04:
Do you want to save any of your time?

[00:09:01] Speaker 04:
Yes, thank you.

[00:09:02] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:09:04] Speaker 04:
All right, let's hear from the government.

[00:09:11] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:09:13] Speaker 00:
May it please the Court.

[00:09:14] Speaker 00:
I am AOSA Jim Feng, and I represent the United States of America.

[00:09:18] Speaker 00:
This is a simple case.

[00:09:20] Speaker 00:
Mr. Defendant and Mr. Rivers filed a motion for early termination of a supervised release.

[00:09:25] Speaker 00:
The District Court considered it and denied it.

[00:09:28] Speaker 00:
In denying, the District Court made three findings.

[00:09:31] Speaker 00:
First, it made a factual determination that all the evidence that Mr. Rivers has submitted before the District Court amounted to nothing more than mere compliance.

[00:09:41] Speaker 00:
Second, it held that the 3553A factors, which the district was required to consider under the statute, did not weigh against early termination, given the fact that defendants' criminal history, which he's a career offender, as well as the egregious nature of his crime for which he was convicted in this case.

[00:10:04] Speaker 00:
And dare I say, they're not just egregious.

[00:10:06] Speaker 00:
They shock the conscience.

[00:10:08] Speaker 00:
Defendant essentially directed a 12-year-old minor to go into a bank with a real firearm that defendant provided to the minor and have him rob the bank while defendant waited outside safe from danger and safe from identification.

[00:10:25] Speaker 00:
And third, the district court found that the circumstance hasn't changed.

[00:10:29] Speaker 00:
The circumstances let the district court impose a 3-year term of supervisor's release at the initial sentencing is exactly the same as is when the defendant filed his motion.

[00:10:40] Speaker 00:
Therefore, the term of supervision remains appropriate and warranted.

[00:10:45] Speaker 00:
There's nothing unusual.

[00:10:46] Speaker 00:
There's nothing unreasonable.

[00:10:48] Speaker 00:
There's nothing controversial.

[00:10:50] Speaker 00:
Nothing illogical and certainly nothing that rise to the abuse of discretion standard that's required to reverse the district court's decision.

[00:11:02] Speaker 00:
Defendant will have you believe that the district court did more than it did.

[00:11:08] Speaker 00:
For example, the defendant argues that the district court announced a new standard.

[00:11:12] Speaker 00:
The district court did not.

[00:11:14] Speaker 00:
The document agrees that this court's decision in pounds is the standard.

[00:11:18] Speaker 00:
And I don't think the district court

[00:11:20] Speaker 00:
deviated from that.

[00:11:23] Speaker 00:
This court held that in pounds.

[00:11:25] Speaker 03:
You just have the block quote from the Etheridge case that has language that would describe a standard that's inconsistent with Ponce.

[00:11:36] Speaker 00:
I agree, Your Honor.

[00:11:37] Speaker 00:
The block quote, it's clear that it uses a different standard.

[00:11:41] Speaker 00:
But that's a standard that district court nowhere else in its own opinion repeated.

[00:11:45] Speaker 00:
It has not once said in the rest of the opinion that it was adopting an extraordinary circumstances test that was in Earthridge.

[00:11:53] Speaker 00:
Because if it did, then it didn't have to go through the entire analysis that I just explained to you.

[00:11:58] Speaker 03:
Because then police say, well, I found that the facts that you that to the extent that that's articulated in there, that that quote occurs, that that's harmless error.

[00:12:07] Speaker 00:
It's not harmless, sir.

[00:12:08] Speaker 00:
I believe what the district court was doing was giving the defendant an example, which this court in Pounce also endorsed that here's a situation where I probably would have granted relief if you show me this.

[00:12:23] Speaker 00:
And Pounce said explicitly, exceptional circumstances can be aground the district court.

[00:12:29] Speaker 00:
can provide relief, but it can't be the only ground.

[00:12:34] Speaker 00:
And the district court, at no point in its decision, said that that was the only ground under which it can provide relief.

[00:12:41] Speaker 00:
It simply used it as an example, saying, if you show me exceptional circumstances, then sure, I will definitely grant relief.

[00:12:48] Speaker 00:
But in this case, not only did you not do that, you also only showed me mayor compliance.

[00:12:52] Speaker 00:
And exercising my broad discretion under pounds, because of the seriousness of your offense and your criminal history,

[00:12:58] Speaker 00:
And the fact that you only show mayor compliance, relief is not warranted in this particular case.

[00:13:05] Speaker 00:
And I also want to quickly address defendant's argument about whether or not a court can grant

[00:13:14] Speaker 00:
relief solely on mayor compliance.

[00:13:20] Speaker 00:
And I don't know whether or not this court's decision in pounds allows a district court to do that.

[00:13:26] Speaker 00:
But it doesn't matter, because that's not what we have here.

[00:13:30] Speaker 00:
Because the district court held that mayor compliance is not enough to grant relief here because of defendant's criminal history, because of defendant's egregious or defendant's crime.

[00:13:42] Speaker 00:
Would the district court have granted relief if the defendant had no criminal history and was convicted of a less serious offense?

[00:13:52] Speaker 00:
I don't know.

[00:13:53] Speaker 00:
But in this particular case, the district court found.

[00:13:56] Speaker 04:
Let's say hypothetically that the judge in this case, taking into account the offense that was committed, which you've described, said, you know, I really think this first made enormous progress.

[00:14:10] Speaker 04:
And I think in the interest of justice, it's appropriate to end supervised release.

[00:14:17] Speaker 04:
Would that have been permissible?

[00:14:20] Speaker 00:
Well, that's not what occurred here.

[00:14:22] Speaker 00:
I understand that.

[00:14:22] Speaker 04:
I'm asking hypothetically.

[00:14:24] Speaker 00:
Like I said before, I admit, I don't know under this court's precedent in pounds whether or not, if this court had done that, whether or not that would have been appropriate.

[00:14:33] Speaker 00:
But that's not what the defendant's arguing here.

[00:14:35] Speaker 00:
Our defendants are not just arguing that mayoral compliance can be a reason

[00:14:39] Speaker 00:
to grant relief is arguing essentially that once the defendant satisfy the mayor compliance, then the district court must grant relief.

[00:14:49] Speaker 04:
That seems to be their argument, right?

[00:14:50] Speaker 00:
Right.

[00:14:50] Speaker 00:
And then, of course, this court's decision impounds obliterated that argument because it found that district court has broad discretion.

[00:15:00] Speaker 00:
And that argument essentially takes that discretion away from the district court.

[00:15:05] Speaker 00:
And then that's not what the Pounce stands for.

[00:15:09] Speaker 00:
Essentially, under Pounce's broad discretion standard, the district court has broad discretion, really, to use whatever methodology and whatever reasoning that it thinks appropriate to deny relief, or grant relief, as long as it's consistent with the statutory language.

[00:15:30] Speaker 00:
of the early termination statute.

[00:15:34] Speaker 00:
Does this describe any other questions that you have?

[00:15:36] Speaker 04:
I think not.

[00:15:37] Speaker 04:
Thank you very much.

[00:15:38] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:15:39] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:15:41] Speaker 04:
Appellant has some rebuttal time.

[00:15:46] Speaker 01:
Judge Collins, I want to first go to your point about harmless error.

[00:15:49] Speaker 01:
The block quote is not harmless error in this case.

[00:15:52] Speaker 01:
It constitutes almost a half of the district court's discussion section as part of its order.

[00:15:57] Speaker 01:
And it also formulates a gloss on how it understands compliance in this context.

[00:16:02] Speaker 01:
Looking at excerpts of record five, the district court from the block quote says, even perfect compliance with conditions of supervised release does not qualify as exceptionally good behavior, warranting early termination.

[00:16:14] Speaker 01:
This sort of understanding of mere compliance with extraordinary circumstances is exactly what this court

[00:16:20] Speaker 01:
rejected in Ponce.

[00:16:22] Speaker 01:
And I think for this reason, it's tough to know whether the district court's later reference to providing nothing more than mere compliance is, again, a reference back to this understanding of extraordinary circumstances.

[00:16:33] Speaker 01:
Now, we're not asking that this court say mere compliance in every case leads to the result of early termination or that it's required here.

[00:16:40] Speaker 01:
We're not asking for reversal.

[00:16:42] Speaker 01:
We're asking for vacater and remand because the district court did not broadly appreciate the discretion it had

[00:16:49] Speaker 01:
But how do we cabin that?

[00:16:51] Speaker 04:
You seem to be asking for the very thing you say you're not asking for, which is mere compliance is enough.

[00:16:56] Speaker 04:
So if we took your point, how would you write that?

[00:16:59] Speaker 01:
The narrowest opinion this court can write is the district court block quoted from a case that says that extraordinary circumstances are required.

[00:17:06] Speaker 01:
Under this court's decision in Pones, where we're unsure about the application of the legal standard, we remand so that the district court can clarify in the first instance what legal standard it applied.

[00:17:16] Speaker 01:
That's the narrowest decision this court can write, and it's a way that the district court can then again provide consideration to Mr. River's motion.

[00:17:23] Speaker 01:
So for these reasons, we ask.

[00:17:25] Speaker 04:
I think not.

[00:17:26] Speaker 04:
Thank you both, gentlemen.

[00:17:27] Speaker 04:
The case just argued is submitted.