[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court.

[00:00:03] Speaker 00:
Today we are asking that this Court find that ineffective assistance of counsel in certain instances when it interferes with the availability of administrative review can satisfy all three prongs of 1326D.

[00:00:17] Speaker 00:
The crux of the issue before the Court today, I believe, is whether ineffective assistance of counsel

[00:00:25] Speaker 00:
and render administrative and then judicial review unavailable under Ross versus Blake.

[00:00:31] Speaker 02:
So could I stop you there?

[00:00:33] Speaker 02:
What limiting principle would there be?

[00:00:35] Speaker 02:
I've been thinking with my clerk all week about different hypotheticals, different kinds of IAC.

[00:00:41] Speaker 02:
What would we look for?

[00:00:42] Speaker 00:
Well, I think the limiting principle is in 1326D itself.

[00:00:47] Speaker 00:
In order to establish that a removal order was fundamentally unfair, you have to show prejudice.

[00:00:53] Speaker 00:
So I think prejudice is a limiting component here.

[00:00:56] Speaker 02:
OK.

[00:00:57] Speaker 02:
That could be.

[00:00:58] Speaker 02:
But what about our case law in Portillo, Gonzales, when we talked about the type of error?

[00:01:04] Speaker 02:
We expanded there about what kinds of errors Ross was really talking about.

[00:01:09] Speaker 00:
Yeah, so I think, I mean, it's hard in the abstract, I think, to come up with a limiting principle.

[00:01:15] Speaker 00:
I think the issue here is that when we have, I mean, looking at this court's recent opinion in Valdivia Soto, we can see that errors relating to counsel specifically can give rise to situations where 1326D, all three prongs are satisfied.

[00:01:30] Speaker 03:
And I think- Was Valdivia a counsel error?

[00:01:32] Speaker 03:
I thought it was an IJ error.

[00:01:34] Speaker 00:
An IJ error relating to the availability of counsel.

[00:01:38] Speaker 00:
So I'm kind of grouping them together because I think- Can I stop you right there?

[00:01:41] Speaker 00:
Of course.

[00:01:41] Speaker 02:
Because I think Judge Sung's going right to it for me.

[00:01:43] Speaker 02:
Why do we group those together?

[00:01:45] Speaker 02:
Isn't an error made by somebody sitting on the bench qualitatively different than IAC?

[00:01:50] Speaker 00:
Yes, yes, I think so.

[00:01:51] Speaker 00:
I think it's helpful to look at them in the same sort of category, though, because they're both dealing with the same right, having counsel and effective, competent counsel.

[00:02:01] Speaker 00:
And if we look at Valdivia Soto, where the IJ's error on that part, failing to fully apprise a non-citizen of their right to counsel, if that was significant enough of an error,

[00:02:12] Speaker 00:
to lead to satisfaction of these three prongs, then I think it almost necessarily follows that when you have incompetent counsel, ineffective counsel, you've gone far past getting advice about it, you've gotten counsel, and their error, when it rises to a certain level that causes prejudice, I think can satisfy all three of these prongs.

[00:02:35] Speaker 00:
I don't know if I've answered your question.

[00:02:37] Speaker 03:
And then categorically, any ineffective assistance at council that rises to the level, I mean, in the immigration context, essentially, the standard itself for ineffective assistance at council incorporates, I believe, prejudice prong and has to be quite serious.

[00:02:53] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:02:55] Speaker 03:
So it would have to meet that standard.

[00:02:56] Speaker 03:
But if it met that standard, I think what you're saying is all ineffective assistance at council in the immigration context

[00:03:04] Speaker 03:
would then essentially be the equivalent of the type of IJ error that made the administrative remedy unavailable?

[00:03:14] Speaker 00:
If I understand the court correctly, yes.

[00:03:16] Speaker 00:
I think that's my point.

[00:03:16] Speaker 02:
Any IAC?

[00:03:18] Speaker 00:
As long as there is prejudice, as long as they can prove prejudice, which is not a given.

[00:03:22] Speaker 02:
If that's your answer, then what about this description we had in Portillo Gonzalez?

[00:03:28] Speaker 02:
What do you do with that?

[00:03:29] Speaker 02:
because that doesn't say any error.

[00:03:31] Speaker 02:
That's talking about a really specific kind of error.

[00:03:33] Speaker 00:
If you could pinpoint a little bit more accurately.

[00:03:37] Speaker 00:
Yes, thank you.

[00:03:37] Speaker 02:
So it's talking about the type of mistake was a misrepresentation about the availability of a procedure.

[00:03:42] Speaker 02:
In other words, if there was a merits ruling, if your lawyer was wrong about

[00:03:46] Speaker 02:
this qualifies as a CIMT and that one doesn't qualify as a CIMT.

[00:03:50] Speaker 02:
That's the kind of thing that gets washed out or corrected by exhausting by D1.

[00:03:56] Speaker 02:
Quite different than somebody telling you you can't appeal this issue or you can't, which goes back to Ross's fact pattern in a PLRA context where they've got a procedure on the books but they're not making the form available to access it or they're intentionally stymieing the person trying to access it.

[00:04:14] Speaker 02:
It seems to be qualitatively different.

[00:04:16] Speaker 00:
Yes, I think where we can differentiate mr. Flores Bustos his case here is that so this court has made clear and in Lynn versus Ashcroft that although there's no right to have appointed counsel when you get counsel you're entitled to competent counsel and when your counsel like we have in mr. Flores Bustos cases is so clearly ineffective when they are not staying abreast of major changes in their main

[00:04:40] Speaker 00:
practice area of immigration law and they fail to discuss a clear error on the part of the IJ.

[00:04:47] Speaker 00:
I think you've reached that level where they have become so wholly ineffective that just like in Ross, it's now been misrepresented to you about your availability of relief.

[00:04:57] Speaker 00:
You should be entitled, when you retain an attorney, to rely on them to give you competent advice.

[00:05:02] Speaker 00:
They have confidence.

[00:05:03] Speaker 02:
So for the facts in this case, can you do the D1 analysis for me?

[00:05:06] Speaker 02:
What's your strongest argument for satisfying?

[00:05:10] Speaker 02:
I appreciate you're not trying to excuse.

[00:05:12] Speaker 02:
What's the strongest argument that the facts here satisfy D1?

[00:05:16] Speaker 00:
Well, so I think Mr. Flores Bustos' case is unique because he appealed.

[00:05:21] Speaker 00:
He appealed the IJ's error on two issues.

[00:05:24] Speaker 00:
cancellation of removal and voluntary departure.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
So I think very clearly we demonstrated here that he was interested in doing whatever he could possible to stay in this country seeking avenues for relief.

[00:05:35] Speaker 00:
And those are discretionary decisions by the IJ.

[00:05:39] Speaker 00:
And if his attorney discussed that with him and he decided to take the sort of difficult task of appealing a discretionary determination, I think it stands to reason that if he had been counseled

[00:05:49] Speaker 00:
on this glaring error by the IJ, he would have pursued that as well.

[00:05:53] Speaker 00:
And so the failure of his attorney to bring that to his attention, and this court has talked many times about the substantive complexity of an issue in immigration court doesn't rise to the level necessary.

[00:06:04] Speaker 00:
I'm not saying that it does for a non-attorney, a lay person, but for an attorney to fail to recognize such a glaring error and then fail to discuss that with his counsel, I think has put us in a similar position to Ross, where there has been

[00:06:19] Speaker 00:
Maybe not intentional, but certainly a blatant misrepresentation of the law.

[00:06:24] Speaker 02:
If we agree with you, would we be in a position where adopting one rule for the satisfaction of 1326D133 for people who are represented and a different standard for people who are not?

[00:06:36] Speaker 00:
I had a feeling this question was coming, Your Honor.

[00:06:38] Speaker 00:
As in you did.

[00:06:39] Speaker 00:
I think, unfortunately, the answer at this point would perhaps be yes.

[00:06:44] Speaker 00:
I think, you know, obviously there's separate case law about knowing an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.

[00:06:50] Speaker 00:
But I think if you make that choice to retain an attorney, based on the current case law in this circuit, there appear to be different

[00:06:59] Speaker 00:
rights.

[00:07:00] Speaker 00:
You have, it's clear, a right to competent counsel.

[00:07:04] Speaker 00:
I think opinions may differ, but it's hard for a lay person to advocate for themselves in any court, let alone immigration court that is so complex.

[00:07:13] Speaker 00:
And so looking at this court's case law, I think right now the answer to that question has to be yes.

[00:07:18] Speaker 00:
When looking at Valdivia Soto and Lynn versus Ashcroft and the other cases dealing with the responsibilities of immigration counsel once retained.

[00:07:27] Speaker 02:
Judge Song, do you have more questions?

[00:07:29] Speaker 02:
Do you want to reserve the rest of your time?

[00:07:33] Speaker 00:
Yes, thank you.

[00:07:33] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:07:34] Speaker 00:
We've covered, you know, many of the points I was hoping to get to, but I think it's important to note that the error that occurred here by Mr. Flores-Bustos Immigration Council, how glaring it was.

[00:07:46] Speaker 00:
It came after Nyjuan v. Holder, where the Supreme Court said pretty clearly the modified categorical approach is only to be applied

[00:07:55] Speaker 00:
to divisible statutes.

[00:07:57] Speaker 00:
And the immigration judge pretty clearly says it's indivisible and I'm going to apply it anyway.

[00:08:00] Speaker 00:
And he should have been aware of that.

[00:08:02] Speaker 00:
We discussed that he certainly wanted to appeal Mr. Flores-Bustos because he did.

[00:08:07] Speaker 00:
And I think the only logical conclusion is that he would have sought any relief possible.

[00:08:12] Speaker 00:
But because of that blatant misrepresentation, the failure to discuss that appeal issue with his clients

[00:08:18] Speaker 00:
That avenue of relief was foreclosed to him.

[00:08:20] Speaker 00:
And then that rendered the judicial relief also unavailable.

[00:08:24] Speaker 00:
I think looking at this court's opinion in Lopez Chavez, the similarities are striking to Mr. Flores Bustos and to Mr. Lopez Chavez.

[00:08:32] Speaker 00:
In that case, in Lopez Chavez, the court was easily able to conclude that that was ineffective assistance, that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case due to his immigration attorney's failure to stay abreast of changes in the law.

[00:08:44] Speaker 00:
So I think this court is in a position where it can, on facts in the record, make a determination that Mr. Flores' Bustos Immigration Council was blatantly ineffective for failing to not even discuss that issue with Mr. Flores Bustos.

[00:08:59] Speaker 00:
And then looking at this court's opinion in Valdivia Soto, we can see that these types of errors, when they relate to the availability of counsel, can satisfy all three prongs of 1326D.

[00:09:11] Speaker 02:
Counsel, did you want to reserve some time?

[00:09:14] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor, I did not.

[00:09:15] Speaker 02:
Oh, I thought you said you do want to reserve time.

[00:09:17] Speaker 00:
Oh, no, I was not planning on a rebuttal.

[00:09:20] Speaker 00:
I apologize.

[00:09:20] Speaker 02:
Go right ahead.

[00:09:21] Speaker 00:
No, and so in terms of Valdivia Soto, like I mentioned, I think the error we have here is more significant.

[00:09:28] Speaker 02:
Can you explain why?

[00:09:30] Speaker 00:
If the immigration judges mere failure to properly apprise a non-citizen of the right to counsel, which is important, but if that can satisfy all three prongs of 1326D, then I think when a non-citizen makes the decision to retain counsel and that counsel is, I think,

[00:09:49] Speaker 00:
pretty clearly, wildly ineffective.

[00:09:52] Speaker 00:
If that doesn't rise to the level of just a mere failure to understand your rights, I think we're in an awkward position where you can make a decision to retain counsel, and then through no fault of your own, have incompetent counsel.

[00:10:05] Speaker 00:
So I request the same amount of time, but the court find that all three prongs of 132060 can be satisfied by this type of error.

[00:10:13] Speaker 02:
Don't go away yet.

[00:10:14] Speaker 02:
Do you have additional questions, either one of you?

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
um... thank you

[00:10:28] Speaker 01:
Morning, Your Honor.

[00:10:29] Speaker 01:
Ian Gerricks for the United States.

[00:10:31] Speaker 01:
If I could just address one of the first questions the court had for appellants counsel, any limiting principle that applies in this case.

[00:10:40] Speaker 01:
And the government would submit, well, that's Palomar Santiago.

[00:10:42] Speaker 01:
And all of this court's post-Palomar precedent, up to a month ago, interpreting Palomar Santiago as mandatory.

[00:10:51] Speaker 01:
All three prongs must be satisfied.

[00:10:54] Speaker 02:
Satisfaction of one prong the third prong often I don't think that's disputed by opposing counsel though He his argument is there could be an an event or an occurrence that satisfies all three Why is he wrong about they certainly can't excuse them?

[00:11:09] Speaker 02:
For sure, but what about something that satisfies all three?

[00:11:11] Speaker 02:
That's his argument

[00:11:13] Speaker 01:
Well, that is not the case in this court in most recent... Well, in Portillo, this court reaffirmed the principle that all three prongs are mandatory.

[00:11:26] Speaker 02:
I'm not contesting that point.

[00:11:29] Speaker 02:
I fully appreciate, and for purposes of this question, that they're mandatory.

[00:11:32] Speaker 02:
The question is, couldn't there be a... That's what he's arguing.

[00:11:36] Speaker 02:
There could be a circumstance that satisfies all three.

[00:11:39] Speaker 01:
And that's where Ross comes up.

[00:11:43] Speaker 01:
And the government's position on Ross is that's the defense or the aliens attempt to parry the Palomar Santiago's conclusion, because Ross was dealt with the Prison and Litigation Reform Act.

[00:12:00] Speaker 01:
And there were certain mandatory provisions, yet there's some

[00:12:04] Speaker 01:
similar language about that were available, which also is similar in the 1326 D1 exhaustion.

[00:12:13] Speaker 01:
And in that context in Ross, the aliens, as well as in Portillo and also in Valdivia, keep raising Ross for this proposition.

[00:12:23] Speaker 01:
And the Supreme Court in Palomar, this court in Portillo was not saying that Ross applied.

[00:12:30] Speaker 01:
In fact, in Portillo, the court said,

[00:12:34] Speaker 01:
Assuming Ross applies.

[00:12:36] Speaker 03:
Well, we have currently a night Valdivius, which says it does apply, which brings us to Valdivius.

[00:12:43] Speaker 01:
And that's currently under review.

[00:12:46] Speaker 01:
And it does put the precedent in tension about whether or not one issue can satisfy the other prongs.

[00:12:55] Speaker 01:
And that's subject to review in the government's

[00:13:00] Speaker 01:
motion for any rehearing is due next month and the government believes as the as appellants council noted even though that valdivius deals with the misadvisal of right to counsel at immigration proceeding this issue here deals with ineffective assistance of immigration council it's relevant but not the same and particularly as the the government

[00:13:24] Speaker 01:
filed its 28-J letter yesterday in which the district court specifically noted the First Circuit.

[00:13:32] Speaker 01:
And if the court were to hold otherwise an extent of all divvies, it would create this circuit conflict because D1 provides that they must exhaust.

[00:13:42] Speaker 01:
And there is a provision in immigration courts for an alien to

[00:13:48] Speaker 01:
exhaust the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

[00:13:52] Speaker 01:
And that's exactly what the Supreme Court is expecting of petitioners in the prison litigation context and the immigration context that has done in the First Circuit.

[00:14:03] Speaker 01:
The First Circuit is held and the district court here that Palomar precludes that because they haven't exhausted.

[00:14:11] Speaker 01:
And this court has essentially held that

[00:14:15] Speaker 01:
the Palomar, Portillo, and even in Valdivius that did away with Gonzalez Villalobos, which supports appellant's argument about the Lopez Chavez, which is a decision of Judge Reinhart extending that saying that one prong can satisfy the two.

[00:14:36] Speaker 01:
And that's exactly what

[00:14:39] Speaker 01:
the court, the two-judge panel in Valdivius does, saying it can satisfy all three, whereas Judge Akuta says, no, in the dissent, that you can't do that.

[00:14:49] Speaker 01:
You have to administratively exhaust.

[00:14:52] Speaker 01:
And here, in this particular context, this is distinct because there was a remedy that was available, and Appellant has never shown or asserted that there is some mention in the record about him maybe having filed a motion to reopen, but there's no assertion

[00:15:09] Speaker 01:
that it was deemed ineffective by the BIA or then the judicial deprivation of judicial review, which means if the BIA said, no, there was no ineffective assistance on this claim, he would be required under D2 to take that claim up to this court.

[00:15:27] Speaker 01:
And he hasn't done either of those.

[00:15:29] Speaker 01:
all these precedents, including that case of Castillo Martinez out of the First Circuit, it's clear that he hasn't exhausted his administrative remedies to challenge any effective and effective assistance of counsel.

[00:15:45] Speaker 01:
And the Supreme Court said that Judge Christian referred to whether or not it deals with substance or procedure

[00:15:56] Speaker 01:
Does it matter?

[00:15:57] Speaker 01:
And the Supreme Court and Palomar rejected the argument that because non-citizens won't recognize the substantive basis for the appeal, that they should be excused from pursuing it.

[00:16:08] Speaker 01:
So the Supreme Court and as Judge Ikuta notes in her dissent,

[00:16:13] Speaker 01:
and Valdivius, they still have an option to pursue that appeal independent of counsel.

[00:16:19] Speaker 01:
And in this context, he could have administratively challenged and filed a motion to reopen.

[00:16:26] Speaker 01:
He was ordered deported in approximately 2010.

[00:16:30] Speaker 01:
Ten years passed.

[00:16:32] Speaker 01:
He's charged in 2020.

[00:16:33] Speaker 01:
Well, what's he doing in all this time?

[00:16:37] Speaker 01:
seeking to have this ineffective, if he really wanted to be in the United States lawfully after he had been deported, he only raises that argument once he gets prosecuted.

[00:16:48] Speaker 01:
And that's why the Congress enacted 1326D, because they have to exhaust.

[00:16:55] Speaker 01:
Those remedies so the government's position.

[00:16:58] Speaker 02:
I don't think I've heard an answer to the question But I'm gonna ask it again because I think it might Differ and I don't know if it if it is going to change anything in this particular case But my question wasn't intended to be a trick question Does it matter what kind of mistake is made if it's a it seems to me if it's a merits ruling them that the authorities you were deciding talk about the importance of

[00:17:19] Speaker 02:
seeking review because that's where merits rulings are gonna get ironed out, right?

[00:17:24] Speaker 02:
As opposed to a D1 mistake.

[00:17:30] Speaker 02:
And I haven't heard you answer the question about whether it would be possible for something to occur that could satisfy D1 through D3.

[00:17:40] Speaker 02:
You know, one occurrence that satisfies all three.

[00:17:45] Speaker 02:
Is it your position categorically that could not happen?

[00:17:48] Speaker 02:
Was that that that is foreclosed by Palomar Santiago or what is your position exactly?

[00:17:53] Speaker 01:
The government believes it's that each is independent.

[00:17:57] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:17:58] Speaker 01:
And mandatory.

[00:18:00] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:18:02] Speaker 01:
There may be circumstances, but in reviewing the facts of this case, I don't think we have to hypothesize of whether or not there are circumstances out there that may satisfy because he didn't exhaust.

[00:18:16] Speaker 01:
So,

[00:18:17] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:18:17] Speaker 02:
And what is your position on whether we should wait for the outcome of the Valdivia-Soto case?

[00:18:23] Speaker 01:
Well, as I stated earlier, the government believes that puts the circuit's post-Palomar precedent in a bit of tension, and it's not final.

[00:18:34] Speaker 01:
The mandate hasn't issued.

[00:18:36] Speaker 01:
It may be prudent for the court to wait to see what happens in Valdivia and then reconcile that.

[00:18:43] Speaker 01:
determine whether Valdivius applies.

[00:18:45] Speaker 01:
And even if Valdivius stays the law of the land, or maybe it goes en banc and Judge Ukuta's decision becomes the law of the land, and then we wouldn't be here.

[00:18:56] Speaker 01:
But if it remains, the government would submit, as Your Honor referenced, it's not on point.

[00:19:04] Speaker 01:
with this particular case, because that dealt with the immigration court's misadvisal or mistranslation of the right to appeal.

[00:19:13] Speaker 01:
Whereas here, and as Judge Akuta pointed out in her dissent, the aliens keep relying on Ross about the prison, the PLRA.

[00:19:28] Speaker 01:
And as Judge Akuta points out in her dissent, there was no thwarting of

[00:19:34] Speaker 01:
the administrative process by a state actor, so to speak.

[00:19:38] Speaker 01:
And I think it was already addressed with Appellants Council.

[00:19:41] Speaker 01:
You don't have a state actor, the government, as in the PLRA, Ross context, where you have prison officials that are thwarting or not.

[00:19:52] Speaker 01:
They're just receiving appeals, tossing them, not dealing with them.

[00:19:56] Speaker 01:
And that's a different

[00:19:58] Speaker 01:
standard.

[00:19:58] Speaker 01:
So the government believes that Valdivius is not on point, whereas the first surrogate's decision in Castillo Martinez does appear to be more on point to the fact that he didn't exhaust those administrative remedies to challenge ineffective assistance.

[00:20:15] Speaker 03:
I did have a question on just going back to first principles for a second, because 1326 was enacted after the Supreme Court decided U.S.

[00:20:29] Speaker 03:
versus Mendoza-Lopez.

[00:20:31] Speaker 03:
And I think Mendoza-Lopez stands for the proposition that there is sort of a due process, constitutional due process,

[00:20:38] Speaker 03:
requirement that the initial deportation proceedings can't be so violative of the aliens' rights.

[00:20:48] Speaker 03:
If it is, then you just can't base a criminal conviction on that prior deportation proceeding.

[00:20:55] Speaker 03:
Would you at least concede that if enforcement of that exhaustion requirement

[00:21:03] Speaker 03:
meant that you would be allowing a criminal conviction on a deportation proceeding that was so violative of due process that we'd have to go back to Mendoza-Lopez, basically, that the statute can't override Mendoza-Lopez.

[00:21:22] Speaker 03:
I'm not saying that this case meets that standard, but there is a circumstance.

[00:21:27] Speaker 01:
I understand, and there's discussion in the case law about 1326D being in response to Mendoza-Lopez.

[00:21:33] Speaker 01:
But I think the standard is that when you look at Ross, when the Supreme Court decides that, basically Ross says the courts, and it was dealing with a particular circuit that kept creating extra statutory exceptions, just like

[00:21:47] Speaker 01:
this circuit with regard to 1326D in the Supreme Court said, no, you have to look exactly at the statute.

[00:21:53] Speaker 01:
But it did parry the argument about the PLRA saying, mentioning the definition of what may be available in that context.

[00:22:05] Speaker 01:
But to the point here is that there was an administrative remedy.

[00:22:11] Speaker 01:
It was not used.

[00:22:13] Speaker 01:
It could have been available.

[00:22:15] Speaker 01:
It's not shown that it wasn't available.

[00:22:18] Speaker 01:
And in addition, even under Valdivia Soto, it certainly wasn't made available based on the government's conduct here.

[00:22:25] Speaker 01:
So therefore, it's not violative so much as to due process and the prejudice issues that were under prior precedent that it would warrant reversal here.

[00:22:36] Speaker 03:
But if a, putting aside the facts here for the moment, if a constitutional due process violation caused the failure to exhaust, would we still be able to enforce that statutory exhaustion requirement, not withstanding Mendoza-Lopez?

[00:22:57] Speaker 01:
I think that would rest on this decision if Aldivia Soto stands in this application of Ross and what the definition of

[00:23:06] Speaker 01:
what is available, and then strictly looking, like Judge Akutas says in her sentence, what does that mean, what is available?

[00:23:15] Speaker 01:
And there were three prongs in there, and one of them was thwarting that.

[00:23:21] Speaker 01:
So there could be context, for example, in the PLRA, where that could happen, hypothetically, but that's certainly not

[00:23:31] Speaker 03:
And part of the problem with the PLRA is prisoners aren't normally represented by counsel when they're going through the prison administrative process.

[00:23:39] Speaker 03:
So it's not easy to find an analogous case dealing with counsel representation in the PLRA context.

[00:23:48] Speaker 03:
So that's part of the difficulty, I think, of figuring out what to do in this case when it's about effective assistance of counsel.

[00:23:55] Speaker 03:
But I understand your argument.

[00:23:57] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:23:59] Speaker 02:
We've taken you well over your time, but we appreciate your argument from both counsels very much.

[00:24:05] Speaker 02:
It's very helpful.

[00:24:06] Speaker 02:
We will take this case under advisement and move on to the next case on the calendar, which is United