[00:00:32] Speaker 04:
Next, we have United States versus Dorsey.

[00:00:54] Speaker 04:
And Council, you can take your time, but whenever you're ready.

[00:01:05] Speaker 00:
Good morning and may it please the court.

[00:01:07] Speaker 00:
My name is Stephen Canninger from the Office of the Federal Public Defender.

[00:01:10] Speaker 00:
I represent the appellant Justin Dorsey, who is present in the courtroom today and asked this court to reverse the district court's denial of his motion to suppress because the government failed to prove that the key fob search and vehicle search were authorized by a search condition.

[00:01:25] Speaker 00:
I'd like to reserve two minutes of time for rebuttal, please.

[00:01:29] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:01:29] Speaker 00:
Your Honors, this case is controlled by two established principles of Fourth Amendment law, which together demonstrate that the warrantless searches in this case were not lawful under Mr. Dorsey's parole condition.

[00:01:41] Speaker 04:
I do have a question, though.

[00:01:42] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:01:43] Speaker 04:
The district court here indicated that there's no evidentiary hearing that was necessary.

[00:01:48] Speaker 04:
that regarding the probable cause, you argue that this was error, that it appears that there are two contradictory statements, one from Officer Ochoa and one from Deshaun Davis.

[00:02:05] Speaker 04:
And it would be necessary, of course, to then hear from those and have an evidentiary hearing and make a determination.

[00:02:14] Speaker 04:
Why do you think that's important in this case?

[00:02:17] Speaker 00:
I think it's important because the initial stop to bring the court back, there's an initial stop of a vehicle in which Mr. Dorsey is riding.

[00:02:26] Speaker 01:
Get closer to the microphone.

[00:02:27] Speaker 00:
Yes, Judge Bay, I apologize.

[00:02:28] Speaker 00:
The initial stop was of a vehicle that my client was riding in.

[00:02:32] Speaker 00:
And if that stop was illegal, then everything that flows from that was illegal and tainted by that illegality.

[00:02:37] Speaker 00:
And so the district court remand was required here, Judge Mendoza, as you noted, because there was a material dispute of fact, and the district court

[00:02:47] Speaker 00:
aired by basing its decision on clearly erroneous factual findings.

[00:02:51] Speaker 00:
And so I can address those if you'd like, Your Honor, but for the reason it's important.

[00:02:56] Speaker 01:
Wouldn't that cause you to prevail?

[00:03:00] Speaker 00:
It would require a remand for an evidentiary hearing.

[00:03:03] Speaker 00:
And if the district court credited Mr. Davis, which we believe he should, then yes, we would prevail.

[00:03:08] Speaker 00:
But the issue of the parole searches, however, is independent.

[00:03:12] Speaker 00:
Certainly, we wouldn't get to the parole searches if the district court credited Mr. Davis as it should.

[00:03:18] Speaker 00:
The initial detention would be illegal.

[00:03:21] Speaker 00:
But the parole searches are an independent reason that this court should remand with instructions to grant the motion.

[00:03:26] Speaker 01:
If we remand because an evidentiary hearing should have been provided, then the issue of the parole search is moot, isn't it?

[00:03:37] Speaker 01:
It would be, no, it's not moot, Your Honor, because you can, even if, we can assume, even if the initial detention- What you're asking us to do is to say, if on remand, Judge Breyer finds the same way as he did before, that he doesn't credit Mr. Davis for whatever reason, no tribal issue of fact, then you want us to rule that the parole search, which was illegal.

[00:04:03] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor, what I'm asking is that even assuming the legality of the initial detention, the downstream events that occurred, the parole searches that occurred, were not lawful.

[00:04:14] Speaker 00:
They were not authorized by Mr. Dorsey's call.

[00:04:16] Speaker 01:
But we don't have to reach that issue if we remand on the error in not providing an evidentiary hearing, do we?

[00:04:26] Speaker 00:
We're asking that you do.

[00:04:27] Speaker 00:
We think that if you disagree with me that the parole searches are unlawful,

[00:04:32] Speaker 00:
If you disagree with me that the parole searches are unlawful, remand is absolutely required because there was an evidentiary.

[00:04:37] Speaker 01:
You're asking us to rule on something we don't have to rule on if we rule on the first issue, which is there should have been an evidentiary hearing.

[00:04:45] Speaker 01:
Isn't that correct?

[00:04:48] Speaker 00:
No, because even if, because if the district court, your honor, Judge Bailey, if the district court disagrees and the district court credits the officer, then we have the exact same issues that are present here.

[00:04:58] Speaker 00:
We need to reach these issues here because if the district court disagrees and frankly it indicated some concern about Davis's declaration, which we disagree with.

[00:05:08] Speaker 00:
If the district court were to credit the officer's account, then we're going to be right back here with the exact same issues.

[00:05:13] Speaker 04:
But we would be providing an advisory opinion at that point, though, right?

[00:05:17] Speaker 00:
It would only be advisory if, of course, the court agrees with me and says we need an evidentiary hearing.

[00:05:22] Speaker 00:
I don't mean to be talking in circles.

[00:05:24] Speaker 00:
This is live.

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
This is a live dispute.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
This is an illegal search.

[00:05:28] Speaker 00:
And so the court should not even deal.

[00:05:30] Speaker 00:
Let's put it this way.

[00:05:31] Speaker 00:
In terms of resources, this court doesn't need to remand for an evidentiary hearing.

[00:05:35] Speaker 00:
It can remand with instructions to grant the motion.

[00:05:38] Speaker 00:
on the current record because the searches of Mr. Dorsey's key fob and his vehicle were not lawful under his parole search condition.

[00:05:45] Speaker 00:
So we don't even need to have that evidentiary hearing because those searches were unlawful here.

[00:05:50] Speaker 03:
Counsel, I want to take you in a slightly different direction.

[00:05:53] Speaker 03:
The question of crediting either Officer Ochoa or Mr. Davis deals with the question as to whether Ochoa had probable cause to ask for an investigative stop of the vehicle.

[00:06:04] Speaker 03:
Why wasn't the observation of the traffic violations a sufficient and independent cause for stopping the vehicle?

[00:06:13] Speaker 00:
It was a sufficient and independent cause.

[00:06:14] Speaker 00:
However, Judge Bybee, as the district court noted in its opinion, in its order and was litigated below, the officers then unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop by going to the passengers in the vehicle.

[00:06:26] Speaker 00:
That's this court's opinion in Landeros.

[00:06:28] Speaker 00:
They went beyond the traffic mission.

[00:06:30] Speaker 00:
unlawfully prolonged the stop under the Rodriguez opinion.

[00:06:34] Speaker 00:
And so that would then in turn, arguably turn on whether there was cause to believe that there was a drug transaction, which in itself depends again on Officer Choa's observations.

[00:06:44] Speaker 00:
But the specific answer is, that detention was unlawful under Rodriguez because they went to the passengers in the vehicle, asked for identification, and under this court's opinion in Larrondarros, that is unlawful.

[00:06:56] Speaker 00:
If I might turn to the

[00:06:59] Speaker 00:
to the parole searches themselves.

[00:07:00] Speaker 00:
I'd like to, with the time that I have, I'd like to focus on the search of the Prius.

[00:07:07] Speaker 00:
As my papers lay out, I believe we have an unlawful search of the key fob as well.

[00:07:11] Speaker 00:
under the Jones physical intrusion test.

[00:07:15] Speaker 00:
But the question here is- I'm sorry, counsel, I have one follow-up question.

[00:07:19] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:07:20] Speaker 03:
If they recognized your client and knew that he was under restrictions, can they ask for identification?

[00:07:32] Speaker 03:
That prolongs the traffic stop, but now they've stopped the car and said,

[00:07:37] Speaker 03:
Wait a minute.

[00:07:38] Speaker 00:
We've got somebody in here who's under who's under these search conditions They also if they recognized mr. Dorsey, which they did not if they recognize officer Ochoa said that he had seen him hundreds of times But he didn't recognize him at the scene judge by B and so while officer Ochoa suggests that he's Surveilling this area with binoculars and can see so granularly to see a packet purportedly handed out of a vehicle

[00:08:00] Speaker 00:
Mr. Dorsey is there because he's in that vehicle, and he suddenly can't recognize him, Judge Bybee.

[00:08:05] Speaker 00:
And so I think that's a problem.

[00:08:07] Speaker 00:
But you also have the questioning of Mr. Davis.

[00:08:10] Speaker 00:
The asking of Mr. Davis.

[00:08:11] Speaker 04:
So he didn't recognize him at the scene?

[00:08:13] Speaker 00:
No, he did not, Judge Mendoza.

[00:08:15] Speaker 00:
And he asked the officers to ID the passengers in the vehicle, or Officer Revy asked them to ID the passengers in the vehicle.

[00:08:25] Speaker 00:
This leads to Landeros.

[00:08:26] Speaker 00:
And Judge Bybee, you have the additional question of Mr. Davis.

[00:08:29] Speaker 00:
who is not Mr. Dorsey, not recognized, not under any search conditions, that also prolonged the stop unlawfully vis-a-vis Mr. Dorsey.

[00:08:38] Speaker 00:
If I might briefly address the search of the Prius, because I do think this court should reach that issue, the question is whether it was property under Mr. Dorsey's control at the time of the challenge search.

[00:08:49] Speaker 00:
This is one of the fundamental principles of Fourth Amendment law that governs this case.

[00:08:53] Speaker 00:
It's the totality of the circumstances,

[00:08:56] Speaker 00:
at the time of the search.

[00:08:57] Speaker 00:
And the question is whether there's a sufficient nexus to that vehicle at that time to demonstrate that Mr. Dorsey had control over it.

[00:09:05] Speaker 00:
There was not.

[00:09:06] Speaker 00:
The connection to that Prius was so attenuated at that moment for multiple reasons.

[00:09:12] Speaker 00:
And among the totality of those circumstances, the most salient are the following.

[00:09:16] Speaker 00:
Mr. Dorsey was locked up in jail at the police station.

[00:09:21] Speaker 00:
The officers had sole and exclusive possession of the key to that vehicle.

[00:09:25] Speaker 00:
Those are the two critical circumstances showing an absence of control.

[00:09:30] Speaker 00:
But there's more.

[00:09:31] Speaker 00:
He was never seen driving that vehicle that day, sitting in the vehicle that day, anywhere near the vehicle that day, and not just that.

[00:09:37] Speaker 03:
But they knew that he owned it, right?

[00:09:39] Speaker 00:
He did, Your Honor.

[00:09:40] Speaker 00:
And as my briefing has laid out, ownership is not

[00:09:43] Speaker 00:
the term here.

[00:09:43] Speaker 00:
The term of parole is property under your control.

[00:09:48] Speaker 00:
It's not mere ownership.

[00:09:49] Speaker 00:
It has to be property under your control.

[00:09:51] Speaker 03:
Although ownership does come with certain rights of control.

[00:09:55] Speaker 00:
He can loan it to a friend.

[00:09:56] Speaker 00:
It is an indicia of control, I agree, but there's also a code.

[00:10:00] Speaker 03:
And they found it parked and nobody else was behind the wheel.

[00:10:03] Speaker 03:
It didn't appear that it had been loaned, in fact.

[00:10:05] Speaker 00:
They found it parked, which is an occurrence after the initial detention.

[00:10:10] Speaker 00:
But they also, at that time, he was locked up in a jail cell.

[00:10:13] Speaker 00:
They had the key to his vehicle.

[00:10:15] Speaker 00:
They had never seen him in the vehicle that day.

[00:10:18] Speaker 00:
They don't know how the vehicle got there that day.

[00:10:20] Speaker 00:
I would allow that there is at least a small inference that he was there in the vehicle, but there's no actual evidence of that.

[00:10:27] Speaker 00:
I see that I have about a minute left, and I'd like to reserve that time.

[00:10:29] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:10:30] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:10:45] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honor, and may it please the Court.

[00:10:47] Speaker 02:
My name is Ross Mazur, and I represent the United States.

[00:10:51] Speaker 02:
The search of the Prius in this case was a valid parole search, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in resolving the motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing.

[00:11:05] Speaker 02:
Starting with some of the Court's questions about the evidentiary hearing, the District Court made a factual finding

[00:11:11] Speaker 02:
that he could credit both Officer Ochoa's declaration and the declaration submitted by Mr. Davis and determine that they were not inconsistent, that these were not dueling declarations, and so that even crediting.

[00:11:26] Speaker 01:
But wait a minute.

[00:11:27] Speaker 01:
Ochoa said he saw a hand-to-hand transaction with a packet.

[00:11:31] Speaker 01:
Davis was there and said he saw no transaction.

[00:11:35] Speaker 01:
Isn't that a conflict?

[00:11:37] Speaker 02:
I don't think so, Your Honor.

[00:11:38] Speaker 02:
I mean, was Davis blind?

[00:11:41] Speaker 02:
Davis wasn't blind, but what the district court found was that he wasn't in a position to... But that's a factual finding.

[00:11:47] Speaker 01:
Davis said he was parked next door to the Explorer during the whole time there, and finally got in the Explorer and drove off in the Explorer.

[00:11:58] Speaker 01:
So he's there the whole time.

[00:12:00] Speaker 01:
And he says, I didn't see anybody do a hand-to-hand transaction.

[00:12:05] Speaker 01:
Ochoa says, I was watching.

[00:12:07] Speaker 01:
I saw the hand-to-hand transaction.

[00:12:08] Speaker 01:
It's a conflict.

[00:12:10] Speaker 02:
Well, Your Honor, I think there were any number of bystanders who could have supplied a deposition or declaration stating that they didn't see a hand-to-hand transaction, but that wouldn't be enough to warrant an evidentiary.

[00:12:24] Speaker 03:
Except that he was right there.

[00:12:25] Speaker 03:
He was parked side by side.

[00:12:27] Speaker 03:
Ochoa was, he said, 20 to 30 yards away.

[00:12:30] Speaker 02:
Yeah, he was 20 to 30 yards away.

[00:12:32] Speaker 03:
I think the most disturbing thing about the transcript of the hearing is that the court said he lied then.

[00:12:43] Speaker 03:
And that's a credibility determination.

[00:12:46] Speaker 03:
You can't determine from a declaration.

[00:12:49] Speaker 02:
The court made remarks in the hearing, but that was not a... Mr. LaRouche, okay.

[00:12:57] Speaker 03:
It does say, Your Honor, Mr. Davis was there during the time the Explorer was parked, there when Officer Ochoa was observing it, and at no time did he see or was he part of the transaction.

[00:13:08] Speaker 03:
The court, he lied then.

[00:13:10] Speaker 03:
I don't know.

[00:13:11] Speaker 03:
He may not have been.

[00:13:12] Speaker 03:
He may be in the back seat of the car.

[00:13:16] Speaker 03:
One, he lied, and two, he's speculating.

[00:13:20] Speaker 03:
I see that in his written order, he says, well, there doesn't necessarily have to be a conflict because Davis may not have seen everything that Ochoa saw.

[00:13:29] Speaker 03:
But that's a pretty big leap, and it's a little disturbing when the court speculates that he lied.

[00:13:35] Speaker 02:
The court was talking through the issues at the hearing.

[00:13:40] Speaker 02:
It's an infelicitous comment, at the very least, for your side, right, counsel?

[00:13:44] Speaker 02:
That's fair, your honor.

[00:13:45] Speaker 02:
But it wasn't a finding of fact that made it into the written order and the court's findings of fact that are entitled to deference.

[00:13:53] Speaker 02:
It's also true the court made findings about being able to see through the windows.

[00:13:58] Speaker 02:
And I think the court was entitled to credit

[00:14:00] Speaker 02:
the detailed nature of Officer Ochoa's declaration compared to that of Mr. Davis, who didn't even mention the undisputed fact that there were multiple people coming in and out of the car, going inside the car, coming out, congregating around the car.

[00:14:16] Speaker 01:
A good basis to cross-examine Mr. Davis when you have the opportunity to do so.

[00:14:21] Speaker 02:
I'm concerned, Your Honor, that if the paltry declaration by Mr. Davis was enough to establish an evidentiary hearing, enough to establish a disputed issue of fact, then

[00:14:36] Speaker 02:
hearings could be too readily obtained based on declarations without much detail, just an assertion that I did not see anything.

[00:14:46] Speaker 02:
Presumably, there would be lots of bystanders in the immediate vicinity who could have said, well, I didn't see anything either.

[00:14:52] Speaker 02:
In this case, Mr. Davis, he was there at the scene.

[00:14:57] Speaker 02:
He was close to the car.

[00:14:59] Speaker 02:
But he wasn't observing the hand-to-hand transaction.

[00:15:02] Speaker 02:
Wait a minute.

[00:15:03] Speaker 02:
Davis was parked.

[00:15:05] Speaker 01:
The explorer was to Davis's left in the parked car.

[00:15:09] Speaker 01:
Davis gets out of his car and goes and talks to the explorer, passenger, and driver, Mr. Slaughter.

[00:15:16] Speaker 01:
He's standing there.

[00:15:18] Speaker 01:
Ochoa says he saw a packet going out.

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
Davis is within three feet of that supposed packet.

[00:15:29] Speaker 01:
He's not an important witness.

[00:15:34] Speaker 02:
Well, he's certainly at an important place.

[00:15:37] Speaker 01:
Of course.

[00:15:38] Speaker 02:
Yeah.

[00:15:39] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:15:40] Speaker 02:
I agree with Your Honor.

[00:15:42] Speaker 01:
Do you want to go on to the probation search?

[00:15:46] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry?

[00:15:46] Speaker 01:
Do you want to go on to the validity of the Keefob search?

[00:15:51] Speaker 02:
Certainly, Your Honor.

[00:15:53] Speaker 02:
So it is true that courts look to the present ability to access or control property.

[00:16:02] Speaker 02:
but only in situations where ownership or registration is otherwise in doubt.

[00:16:11] Speaker 02:
And I think some of the key cases illustrate this point.

[00:16:15] Speaker 02:
In the Cervantes case, for example, in 2017, that was a legitimately close case because it involved all of the standard facts that make

[00:16:27] Speaker 02:
possession difficult to determine.

[00:16:29] Speaker 02:
We had a hotel room, not a residence, jointly rented by a couple.

[00:16:34] Speaker 02:
It was rented in not the defendant's name, but the woman's name who paid with a credit card, but the defendant had a key.

[00:16:46] Speaker 02:
And so it was very difficult to determine possession.

[00:16:49] Speaker 02:
That's not true here.

[00:16:50] Speaker 02:
This isn't a hotel room or a rental car.

[00:16:53] Speaker 02:
This is a car that's registered to the defendant.

[00:16:57] Speaker 02:
He owns the car.

[00:16:58] Speaker 02:
This is his car.

[00:17:00] Speaker 02:
And so his immediate proximity at the time of the search is not material when ownership of the car is already established.

[00:17:09] Speaker 02:
Now, the defense also relies on the Casterline case.

[00:17:13] Speaker 02:
But Casterline was concerned with extreme situations where a defendant is divested of property in all but name.

[00:17:21] Speaker 02:
An example they gave would be when the defendant pawned a gun but retained title to it.

[00:17:30] Speaker 02:
In that case, he had title in all but name.

[00:17:32] Speaker 02:
And so in those kinds of extreme situations only, ownership would not be dispositive.

[00:17:39] Speaker 02:
But it's worth noting that even in that case, which involved the sufficiency of the evidence and whether the defendant possessed the gun on a particular date named in the indictment, where the defendant had been in prison for seven months before that date, and not just the defendant was in prison, but the guns also were in government custody, the court even there said,

[00:18:00] Speaker 02:
that it would have upheld the convictions had there been any evidence from which any reasonable juror could have inferred the defendant's access to the firearms on a date reasonably near the date charged.

[00:18:13] Speaker 02:
And in this case, the officer saw the defendant in the immediate vicinity of his own car on the date of the events.

[00:18:25] Speaker 02:
So the phrase in the search condition under his control is meant to broaden the condition beyond mere ownership, not to constrict it.

[00:18:36] Speaker 01:
Because his residence would be searchable whether he was in control or not.

[00:18:41] Speaker 02:
His residence would be searchable whether he was incarcerated or halfway around the world.

[00:18:45] Speaker 01:
So you're saying that the way to read that phrase is his residence and any property is searchable, regardless whether it was under his control.

[00:18:54] Speaker 02:
Well, the vehicle was under his control in the sense of constructive possession.

[00:18:59] Speaker 01:
He was in jail.

[00:19:00] Speaker 01:
How could it be under his control?

[00:19:01] Speaker 01:
He couldn't drive it.

[00:19:04] Speaker 02:
Well, he could get out of prison the next day, and then he would be able to drive the car again.

[00:19:11] Speaker 02:
But not at the time of the search.

[00:19:14] Speaker 02:
Well, no, not at the exact time of the search.

[00:19:16] Speaker 02:
That's true.

[00:19:17] Speaker 02:
But constructive possession has never been limited to that situation.

[00:19:22] Speaker 02:
And like I said, the court only really looks to questions about immediate proximity or ability to control property when ownership or registration, as in this case, are otherwise in doubt.

[00:19:34] Speaker 02:
And so the court has to turn to those other factors.

[00:19:37] Speaker 02:
When they're established, as in this case,

[00:19:39] Speaker 02:
There's no question.

[00:19:42] Speaker 02:
And I think a key point here is that as Judge Breyer found, the officers had ample probable cause to believe that the defendant owned and controlled the Prius even without pressing the key fob.

[00:19:57] Speaker 02:
The key fob was only to open the door, not to confirm the defendant's possession and control of the car, which they already knew.

[00:20:06] Speaker 02:
And I think in Dixon, the court really made that point where it remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the officers had probable cause before unlocking inserting the key into the car door.

[00:20:19] Speaker 02:
The implication was that if they did have probable cause before inserting the key, then the fact that inserting the key might have added to that probable cause would have made no difference.

[00:20:34] Speaker 02:
Unless the court has any further questions, the government would ask you to affirm.

[00:20:38] Speaker 04:
Any additional questions?

[00:20:41] Speaker 04:
No.

[00:20:41] Speaker 04:
No questions?

[00:20:41] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:20:48] Speaker 00:
Thank you briefly, your honor.

[00:20:49] Speaker 00:
I think I heard counsel, and I don't want to put words in his mouth, concede that Mr. Dorsey could not drive that car because he was locked up, that he could not control it.

[00:20:56] Speaker 00:
And the issue is whether, at the time of the search, he could control the vehicle.

[00:21:00] Speaker 00:
That's the bellwether for purposes of his parole condition.

[00:21:03] Speaker 01:
If we were manned for an evidentiary hearing on whether there was a conflict between Ochoa and Davis,

[00:21:11] Speaker 01:
If we remand on an evidentiary hearing because there was a conflict between our Joe and Davis, do you propose to present any further evidence on the second issue on whether this was property under his control?

[00:21:26] Speaker 00:
I can't speak to that, Your Honor.

[00:21:27] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry I wasn't trial counsel.

[00:21:29] Speaker 00:
I just don't have an answer to that.

[00:21:31] Speaker 00:
I do want to quickly point to the Castorland opinion, which I've relied on.

[00:21:35] Speaker 00:
The fact that he was in custody for seven months was only relevant because the indictment had alleged a specific date, and the court was determining whether there was evidence

[00:21:44] Speaker 00:
around the date alleged in the indictment.

[00:21:46] Speaker 00:
The seven months is not, the duration of custodial of being in jail is irrelevant to the question of control.

[00:21:54] Speaker 00:
The court in Kasterline made the point that both

[00:21:56] Speaker 00:
The defendant and the property at issue were entirely within the control of the government, of the police.

[00:22:02] Speaker 00:
That's exactly what we have here, entirely within the control, such that it's impossible.

[00:22:07] Speaker 00:
It was impossible for the defendant there to possess the guns at issue.

[00:22:13] Speaker 00:
And of course, in the constructive possession context, control is the determinant factor.

[00:22:19] Speaker 00:
And that was the determinant factor in Castor Line.

[00:22:22] Speaker 00:
I'd like to ask the court to please reverse the district court on behalf of Mr. Dorsey.

[00:22:27] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:22:27] Speaker 04:
Any additional questions?

[00:22:30] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:22:30] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:22:33] Speaker 04:
The matter of United States versus Dorsey is submitted.

[00:22:37] Speaker 04:
I want to thank both counsel for your arguments today.