[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
I will start over.

[00:00:02] Speaker 00:
My name is Casey Stamm, and I'm here on behalf of Mohamed Tillesi, the appellant in this matter.

[00:00:07] Speaker 00:
I would ask to reserve three minutes of my time for rebuttal.

[00:00:10] Speaker 04:
Very well.

[00:00:12] Speaker 00:
The primary question in this case is, when the federal government has primary jurisdiction over a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment and committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, can the US Marshal unilaterally delay service of that sentence?

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
The government has also raised up for the first time on appeal issues concerning jurisdiction and exhaustion.

[00:00:34] Speaker 00:
I'm prepared and planning to discuss all of those issues today, but I'm happy to start wherever the court would like or wherever the court has questions.

[00:00:43] Speaker 04:
Well, your argument, what do you think we should hear about first?

[00:00:46] Speaker 00:
Well, I think one way to start with this case is to talk about what I think should have happened in this case.

[00:00:53] Speaker 00:
By statute, that's USC 183585 case law, the primary jurisdiction case law, and even BOP policy, Mr. Tillis's federal sentence should have commenced on the day that they were imposed.

[00:01:06] Speaker 00:
This is consistent with what the AUSA said they expected to happen when those sentences were imposed.

[00:01:13] Speaker 00:
It's consistent with the language of the sentences themselves, the language of the judgment, and it's also consistent with what probation said at the time they expected to happen.

[00:01:23] Speaker 00:
Mr. Tillacy should have begun serving those sentences immediately.

[00:01:28] Speaker 00:
He should have received credit for the time

[00:01:30] Speaker 00:
that he spent in federal custody prior to that.

[00:01:33] Speaker 00:
And it's only when he finished serving those sentences that he should have been sent to the state to start serving those sentences.

[00:01:42] Speaker 00:
And in this case, the order of that, the order of what he did first and what he did second under all these laws and policies does matter.

[00:01:52] Speaker 00:
Because the state court judgment in the first state case, this is the one where he got the longest sentence in state court, 120 months, that judgment said that that court, the state court, intended that he would receive credit for time spent in federal custody against that state court judgment.

[00:02:17] Speaker 00:
So when the marshals made the decision in this case to send him to state custody first, it was effectively, well, the arguments that we've made first are that the marshal doesn't have authority to cede jurisdiction.

[00:02:32] Speaker 00:
But even if

[00:02:34] Speaker 00:
But when we think about what that is, when one sovereign cedes jurisdiction to another, it's supposed to be an exercise of comedy, an exercise of respect, one court respecting the judgment of the other.

[00:02:47] Speaker 00:
What the US Marshal did in this case, by contrast, is the opposite.

[00:02:51] Speaker 00:
What the US Marshal did is ensure that that first state court judgment, the one that said that the state court intended Mr. Tillisie, would get credit for time he spent in federal custody

[00:03:03] Speaker 00:
would not be respected.

[00:03:06] Speaker 00:
And that is, we think, the fundamental problem in this case.

[00:03:10] Speaker 04:
So, counsel, let me jump in here for a second.

[00:03:11] Speaker 04:
I have in front of me ER 219, which is the judgment and commitment order for the federal case.

[00:03:17] Speaker 04:
This is federal case 13 CR 31, or maybe 310, I should say.

[00:03:24] Speaker 04:
And it's one of the more detailed JNCs I've ever seen.

[00:03:27] Speaker 04:
It says that the total term of imprisonment for all counts

[00:03:32] Speaker 04:
of 84 months shall run consecutively with the sentences imposed by the County Superior Court in case, they actually list the case numbers, 12-01574 and 13-310, and consecutively to the sentence imposed on September 17, 2013 in this federal case.

[00:03:52] Speaker 04:
How is the sentence that you say should have been imposed consistent with the JNC in this case?

[00:03:58] Speaker 00:
Because the judge who issued that JNC knew, because of knowledge of the law and because of what probation in the AUSA told him, that Mr. Tillisie would be getting credit on his state sentence.

[00:04:12] Speaker 00:
So the state sentence is already entered at that point.

[00:04:15] Speaker 00:
When the district court sentences Mr. Tillisie, there's discussion about this issue.

[00:04:19] Speaker 00:
What's going to happen to him?

[00:04:20] Speaker 00:
How is all of this going to be calculated?

[00:04:22] Speaker 00:
And what the government tells him is that by the terms of the state judgment, the defendant is getting state credit for time spent both while he's in custody and here.

[00:04:34] Speaker 00:
That's at ER 391.

[00:04:36] Speaker 00:
So when the district court enters that consecutive sentence, the court already knows this is what the state is going to do.

[00:04:43] Speaker 00:
This is how they're going to handle their sentence.

[00:04:46] Speaker 00:
And so the federal judgment doesn't have the power to change that state judgment in any way.

[00:04:55] Speaker 00:
He's saying,

[00:04:56] Speaker 00:
OK, with that understanding and with the understanding that we have primary jurisdiction, meaning he's going to serve our sentences first, this is how I want it to go.

[00:05:07] Speaker 00:
Does that answer the court's question?

[00:05:09] Speaker 04:
Well, I guess, as I read it, the sentence that was imposed is consistent with this, because I read this to say that the federal sentences will run only once the state sentences are over.

[00:05:23] Speaker 04:
So I'm trying to square this with what you just said.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
Well, I don't read the judgment that way, because in this circumstance, there's nothing in the judgment that says, well, we go first or they go first.

[00:05:36] Speaker 04:
But if it says consecutively, that means after.

[00:05:39] Speaker 00:
Not in this case, because the government had primary jurisdiction.

[00:05:44] Speaker 00:
And primary jurisdiction is the method of determining priority of all kinds of things, including service of sentence.

[00:05:52] Speaker 00:
And the district court knew that.

[00:05:54] Speaker 00:
And we know the district court knew that, because there was this discussion about it at sentence.

[00:05:59] Speaker 00:
Probation chimed in on that and said, yes, Your Honor, we have spoken with the government.

[00:06:04] Speaker 00:
We are the primary holder.

[00:06:06] Speaker 00:
everyone understood that the federal government at that time, even though the government now argues something different, did have primary jurisdiction.

[00:06:15] Speaker 00:
And so if there's no indication on the record that someone thought that that law wouldn't be followed or wouldn't apply for some reason.

[00:06:26] Speaker 01:
But so if this form at ER 219 that Judge Owens is asking about had said that the 84 months shall run concurrently, if that word consecutively said concurrently,

[00:06:36] Speaker 01:
Would that change what you think should have happened here?

[00:06:40] Speaker 01:
I mean, it seems like you're writing that word out of this form, or am I missing something?

[00:06:44] Speaker 00:
Well, if it had said concurrently, I don't think that addresses the issue of who goes first at all.

[00:06:51] Speaker 01:
But you also don't think consecutively addresses it.

[00:06:53] Speaker 01:
So what work is this word consecutively doing on this form?

[00:06:58] Speaker 00:
It's saying that we're not giving him, we, the federal government, are not giving him any credit for time that he's spent in state court or on his state court cases.

[00:07:11] Speaker 00:
It doesn't say and could never say, here's how the state court has to calculate their sentence.

[00:07:17] Speaker 00:
Here's what they have to do when he's transferred to them and they calculate how much he's done and what he's getting credit for.

[00:07:24] Speaker 00:
That's the problem with what the U.S.

[00:07:27] Speaker 00:
Marshal did in this case, because that's the effect that it has.

[00:07:31] Speaker 01:
And you can see... So, once the U.S.

[00:07:35] Speaker 01:
Marshal does that though, I mean, I think in your view it's the Attorney General, not the U.S.

[00:07:39] Speaker 01:
Marshal, but...

[00:07:40] Speaker 01:
he's been sent back to the state and no one does anything, no one objects, the Attorney General doesn't send the Marshal to go get him back or anything, so why don't we think there's some sort of implied consent from that?

[00:07:51] Speaker 00:
Because that's not what the law says is good enough.

[00:07:55] Speaker 00:
What the law says is that if the only thing you have on the record is what the US Marshal did, which is what we have here,

[00:08:04] Speaker 00:
Then that's not enough.

[00:08:06] Speaker 00:
And there are two cases that say that Smith versus Swope, which is cited in our briefs.

[00:08:12] Speaker 00:
That is an admittedly very old case.

[00:08:14] Speaker 00:
It's 1937.

[00:08:15] Speaker 00:
But the exact language in that case about, let's see, what is it, that the actions of mere subordinate administrative officials such as the federal marshal aren't enough, that's quoted in Johnson versus Gill, a 2018 case.

[00:08:33] Speaker 00:
So the idea that you look at the record,

[00:08:37] Speaker 00:
and you point to the absence of a subsequent objection or whatever.

[00:08:42] Speaker 01:
Sometimes it's clear that everyone thinks they've made a mistake though, and so that's one thing if the Marshals have made a mistake, but here I don't know that there's any reason to think anyone thought they made a mistake.

[00:08:52] Speaker 01:
Sorry, I didn't hear the last one.

[00:08:54] Speaker 01:
If the Marshals have made a mistake, I mean if it's clear that they like did something that they were not supposed to do, they read the wrong piece of paper, they did something that's clearly a mistake.

[00:09:03] Speaker 01:
Maybe that gets put aside.

[00:09:05] Speaker 01:
But here, what shows that this was a mistake?

[00:09:09] Speaker 00:
Well, we can look at what happened before this.

[00:09:12] Speaker 00:
So when Mr. Tillisi is released from state custody and picked up then on the federal warrant, the US Marshals could have just taken him to state officials.

[00:09:22] Speaker 00:
They could have said, no, we don't want primary jurisdiction of this guy.

[00:09:26] Speaker 00:
He has a warrant out in state court.

[00:09:28] Speaker 00:
We'll just take him to them, and then we'll get a writ later.

[00:09:32] Speaker 00:
And I shouldn't say the US Marshals could have said that.

[00:09:35] Speaker 00:
The government could have said that.

[00:09:36] Speaker 00:
The executive branch could have said that.

[00:09:38] Speaker 00:
No one made that determination.

[00:09:40] Speaker 00:
Over and over and over again, they made the determination to retain primary jurisdiction, to keep remanding him to custody, and not to make some sort of agreement with the state to the contrary.

[00:09:53] Speaker 00:
Instead, what they did was very clear.

[00:09:54] Speaker 00:
They made the state get a writ to secure his appearance.

[00:09:59] Speaker 01:
I actually agree with you that the federal government had primary jurisdiction between 2013 and 2016, and I'm wondering whether he got credit toward his state sentence for that time.

[00:10:13] Speaker 00:
Between 2013 and 2016, I believe that he did, although I don't believe that that's reflected in this record.

[00:10:20] Speaker 01:
I couldn't figure it out from this record, but it seems like the magistrate judge in Minnesota thought he did.

[00:10:25] Speaker 01:
get credit toward the state sentence for that time?

[00:10:28] Speaker 00:
It seems like that was the expectation.

[00:10:32] Speaker 00:
And I'm basing that on what was said at the sentencing.

[00:10:37] Speaker 00:
The government said, yes, he'll be getting credit for the federal time that he does against one of his state judgments.

[00:10:44] Speaker 00:
So not against the whole thing, but against part of it.

[00:10:46] Speaker 04:
Did you want to talk about that other case that the government just filed the 28-J letter on?

[00:10:51] Speaker 00:
I didn't see the 28-J letter.

[00:10:53] Speaker 00:
When was that filed?

[00:10:54] Speaker 01:
Yesterday, we got a letter with an order from a magistrate judge in Minnesota addressing these same arguments.

[00:11:00] Speaker 01:
Oh, I have not seen that.

[00:11:02] Speaker 04:
Well, maybe what we can do is, after argument, take a look at it.

[00:11:06] Speaker 04:
And maybe you want to file a 28-J on that.

[00:11:08] Speaker 04:
Because I was going to ask you, what do we do with this?

[00:11:12] Speaker 04:
Apparently, there's another case that there's been an order issued recommending that it be rejected, the argument you're making now, for your client.

[00:11:23] Speaker 01:
In a 2241 out of Minnesota?

[00:11:26] Speaker 04:
Yeah.

[00:11:27] Speaker 04:
That must be a pro se case.

[00:11:29] Speaker 04:
I don't know, actually.

[00:11:30] Speaker 04:
I don't want to waste any more of your time.

[00:11:32] Speaker 04:
Do you want to reserve the rest of your time?

[00:11:33] Speaker 03:
Can I just ask one question?

[00:11:34] Speaker 03:
Oh, sure.

[00:11:35] Speaker 03:
You said that at the sentencing, the sentencing judge said with that understanding being the understanding that he's going to get credit in state court, I'm going to sentence him now and he'll get this credit.

[00:11:48] Speaker 03:
Is that in the record?

[00:11:50] Speaker 00:
What's in the record is the government telling him that's what is going to happen.

[00:11:54] Speaker 03:
Did he say with that understanding, that's why I'm sentencing him this way?

[00:11:58] Speaker 00:
He does not.

[00:11:58] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:12:00] Speaker 00:
But there's no dispute about that understanding, that he's going to do this first, and he's going to get this credit in the state court.

[00:12:07] Speaker 00:
And that's primarily addressed in the experts excerpts at 390 and 391.

[00:12:11] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:12:13] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:12:26] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:12:26] Speaker 02:
May it please the Court, Michael Morgan for the United States.

[00:12:31] Speaker 02:
To address just some of the questions that have been raised.

[00:12:34] Speaker 02:
One, yes, he

[00:12:35] Speaker 02:
In the Minnesota case, the sentence computation reflects that he did indeed get full credit against his state sentences for the period from 2013 to 2016.

[00:12:48] Speaker 02:
You can actually just do the math.

[00:12:50] Speaker 02:
He spent about 10 years and a month in state custody from

[00:12:56] Speaker 02:
May 2012 until July 2022 And he was sentenced to 163 months, which means he got about three and a half years give or take So it's very clear that he did in fact get full credit against his state time for the his time in pretrial federal detention So that I think addresses your question With respect to the pending 2241 in Minnesota that actually shows why

[00:13:26] Speaker 02:
There's just a jurisdictional problem here.

[00:13:29] Speaker 02:
The district court simply could not grant any of the relief that the defendant sought.

[00:13:34] Speaker 02:
None.

[00:13:36] Speaker 02:
The main thrust of what the defendant was asking for was a nonquotug designation.

[00:13:41] Speaker 02:
That's the only claim he said he exhausted.

[00:13:44] Speaker 01:
This kind of claim has been addressed in 2241 petitions and the Minnesota case is a 2241 and as I understand it he was in that jurisdiction when he filed that petition and then he was in Washington when he filed this petition.

[00:13:57] Speaker 01:
So I don't understand why this can't be a 2241.

[00:14:00] Speaker 02:
The wrong respondent has been named.

[00:14:02] Speaker 02:
The BOP was never named.

[00:14:03] Speaker 02:
So even if the district court wanted to convert this to a 2241, it couldn't.

[00:14:08] Speaker 02:
The proper respondent was not before the court.

[00:14:12] Speaker 02:
The person who's responsible for the computation is BOP.

[00:14:16] Speaker 01:
But wouldn't a 2241 be against the warden?

[00:14:19] Speaker 02:
It would be against the warden, but this was filed in the criminal case.

[00:14:23] Speaker 02:
The respondent was the United States.

[00:14:25] Speaker 02:
not the warden.

[00:14:27] Speaker 02:
To bring up 2241, jurisdictionally, you have to name the warden.

[00:14:31] Speaker 02:
And that makes perfect sense because it is the warden, or BOP, who is responsible for the computation, not the district court.

[00:14:38] Speaker 02:
The district court cannot, in the first instance, by statute, do a sentencing computation.

[00:14:44] Speaker 02:
That is a function of BOP.

[00:14:46] Speaker 02:
The district court can review that computation in a 2241 after exhaustion of administrative remedies, but that didn't happen here.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
So you just couldn't convert this to a 2241 to raise a computational claim.

[00:15:00] Speaker 01:
I would argue you- Even though he's pro se and it's the government, so he knows, I mean the government knows you're here defending-

[00:15:08] Speaker 02:
Two things.

[00:15:09] Speaker 02:
One, the district court didn't read it that way.

[00:15:12] Speaker 02:
So the district court didn't read this as an attempt to raise a 2241.

[00:15:16] Speaker 02:
The district court, and in fairness, the government below, didn't raise the jurisdictional problems that exist.

[00:15:23] Speaker 02:
And we should have, and I apologize for that.

[00:15:26] Speaker 02:
The reality is is that conversion to a 2241 would have been improper he could have refiled and filed against the proper Respondent and shown that he had exhausted and then it would be before the district court properly, but that's not what happened and then You haven't raised exhaustion then he doesn't have to deal with it So it seems like both sides have kind of messed up here and I'm not sure why as a pro se I

[00:15:50] Speaker 01:
petitioner plaintiff, whatever we're going to call him, that we can't construe this ourselves.

[00:15:54] Speaker 01:
I'm not sure why it matters that the district court didn't do what could be done.

[00:15:58] Speaker 02:
Well, it matters because of the relief this court could grant.

[00:16:02] Speaker 02:
This court could not, you could not compel the district court to deem his sentence to commence as of a certain date, because that's not the district court's function.

[00:16:11] Speaker 02:
The district court lacks statutory jurisdiction to do that.

[00:16:15] Speaker 02:
And you can't compel BOP to make that computational claim because, one, that claim was premature at the time this was filed.

[00:16:23] Speaker 02:
So it would have been subject to dismissal for that reason.

[00:16:26] Speaker 02:
And two, BOP is not before this court.

[00:16:30] Speaker 02:
I mean, any remedy that you would want to give, you just can't give against the parties that are before the court on this appeal.

[00:16:38] Speaker 02:
That's the problem.

[00:16:39] Speaker 02:
That's like, procedurally, this was just all

[00:16:41] Speaker 02:
I understand the defendant was pro se, but he just filed the wrong pleading and he filed the wrong respondents, and so the relief he sought was just not obtainable from the parties before the court.

[00:16:54] Speaker 01:
So we could remand and have them give him a chance to fix it?

[00:16:56] Speaker 01:
Is that what you want us to do?

[00:16:58] Speaker 02:
Well, he's already, I mean, you could, except that he couldn't do it now here because he's no longer in custody here.

[00:17:04] Speaker 02:
He has done a procedurally proper 2241 in the District of Minnesota where he was incarcerated.

[00:17:11] Speaker 02:
So there has been a procedurally proper method for challenging BOP's computation.

[00:17:17] Speaker 01:
Oh, I thought he was here after Minnesota.

[00:17:21] Speaker 01:
Was he in Minnesota after he was here?

[00:17:22] Speaker 02:
No, no.

[00:17:23] Speaker 02:
The Minnesota case happened well after the Washington case.

[00:17:28] Speaker 01:
Oh.

[00:17:28] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:17:29] Speaker 01:
So... So he's in Minnesota now?

[00:17:31] Speaker 02:
No, he's actually now in Butler.

[00:17:32] Speaker 02:
But he was... He's moving between medical facilities, but yes.

[00:17:37] Speaker 02:
He filed... This is why backing up.

[00:17:40] Speaker 02:
He filed all his pleadings here before he was even in federal custody.

[00:17:45] Speaker 02:
He was in state custody when he was filing these pleadings in the district court.

[00:17:49] Speaker 02:
That's why BOP never made a computation in this case because he wasn't in BOP custody.

[00:17:54] Speaker 02:
BOP doesn't make a computation until he's in BOP custody.

[00:17:57] Speaker 02:
And this court's cases make clear that any 2241 challenging a computation is premature until BOP actually makes a computation.

[00:18:06] Speaker 02:
That's why, to the extent that the defendant is challenging, is trying to challenge the computation when his sentence commenced, this is just not the right vehicle.

[00:18:14] Speaker 02:
It was premature.

[00:18:16] Speaker 02:
It wasn't filed in the right forum.

[00:18:18] Speaker 02:
It's just not a vehicle for doing that.

[00:18:21] Speaker 02:
And to the extent he wanted the district judge

[00:18:23] Speaker 02:
to just make that computation, well, that was precluded by statute and by the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson.

[00:18:30] Speaker 02:
So the district court just couldn't do that.

[00:18:32] Speaker 02:
The only relief that the district court theoretically could have granted would have been to modify its judgment to say that my concurrent, my consecutive sentence really runs concurrently, but the district court lacked jurisdiction to do that too.

[00:18:45] Speaker 02:
So that's sort of the problem procedurally, and I have burned a lot of time talking about this, but I think it's important because ultimately,

[00:18:53] Speaker 04:
The district court was powerless to grant any relief to the defendant that he sought So if you were if you were writing the opinion this case or the memdisp or whatever this case is going to be What would it say?

[00:19:04] Speaker 02:
I've thought about this at length.

[00:19:07] Speaker 02:
I appreciate that I think technically

[00:19:13] Speaker 02:
the District Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the Nunk Potunk designation, which I also note has been abandoned on appeal, so it's kind of an esoteric issue, but that was the main thrust of the relief sought in the District Court.

[00:19:27] Speaker 02:
That should have been denied for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust, to the extent that the District Court was being asked to modify its judgment

[00:19:36] Speaker 02:
It theoretically had jurisdiction under 3582 to consider that application, but lacked authority under the statute to grant that relief.

[00:19:44] Speaker 02:
So you would affirm for lack of jurisdiction for part and affirm for lack of authority on the other.

[00:19:57] Speaker 02:
That would be doctrinally the most logical way to do it.

[00:20:01] Speaker 02:
The simplest way to do it would be to say, well, even if the court had jurisdiction, what the district judge did was obviously correct, because the judgments are unambiguous in this case.

[00:20:11] Speaker 02:
And I think that's sort of the issue that

[00:20:15] Speaker 02:
my friend has sort of been ignoring is that all this talk about primary jurisdiction and who has primary jurisdiction, well, even if the federal court had primary jurisdiction when it imposed its sentence, that didn't prevent the court from ordering a consecutive sentence.

[00:20:32] Speaker 02:
I mean, that's permissible by statute, by common law.

[00:20:37] Speaker 02:
The court was entitled to order its sentence to run consecutively to the antecedent state sentences.

[00:20:43] Speaker 02:
And case law dating back a century makes clear the consecutive has a definite meaning.

[00:20:49] Speaker 02:
It means after, sequentially.

[00:20:52] Speaker 02:
So the terms of the judgment are unambiguous.

[00:20:55] Speaker 02:
The federal sentence runs after completion of the state sentence.

[00:21:00] Speaker 02:
So as far as the marshals,

[00:21:03] Speaker 02:
The marshals did everything completely proper.

[00:21:06] Speaker 02:
They had a judgment that told them he'd been sentenced to a federal term that was to run after an antecedent state term that had been previously imposed.

[00:21:16] Speaker 02:
So to effect that judgment, you return the prisoner to state custody to serve his state sentence and then take him back once that's done to do his federal sentence.

[00:21:26] Speaker 02:
That's exactly what happened here.

[00:21:27] Speaker 02:
There was no impropriety at all by the marshals.

[00:21:30] Speaker 02:
So whoever had primary jurisdiction is ultimately an irrelevance here.

[00:21:38] Speaker 02:
The result here is just dictated by the judgments.

[00:21:41] Speaker 02:
And that point aside, as I think Judge Freeland pointed out, no one's objected to this.

[00:21:49] Speaker 02:
This court actually does have a case, it's the Ramsey case, it's cited in our briefs, that says that if a sovereign doesn't object, that's deemed to be consent.

[00:21:58] Speaker 02:
So even if somehow there was some problem with the court ordering this consecutive sentence, which again, there was not,

[00:22:08] Speaker 02:
The attorney general's failure to object to this is a consent, and Mr. Tillisi has no standing to object to that.

[00:22:15] Speaker 02:
So for that reason, too, he's not entitled to any relief.

[00:22:18] Speaker 02:
But I think that the simplest resolution of the case is the text of the judgments.

[00:22:23] Speaker 02:
If the court has no further questions, then I would ask for an affirmance.

[00:22:29] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:22:31] Speaker 04:
And it was a pro se.

[00:22:35] Speaker 00:
I figured as much.

[00:22:37] Speaker 00:
Mr. Tillacy has not done a great job of keeping me informed about such matters.

[00:22:43] Speaker 00:
And I apologize.

[00:22:44] Speaker 00:
I'm not sure how I didn't see that yesterday.

[00:22:46] Speaker 00:
I've been on hotel Wi-Fi.

[00:22:49] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:22:51] Speaker 00:
And I will address it in subsequent pleadings.

[00:22:54] Speaker 00:
I would just say, with regard to the government's arguments, if those arguments were correct, if it was true that the Marshall's act of transporting Mr. Tillisi and the lack of any objection on the record were sufficient to establish ceding of primary jurisdiction in this case,

[00:23:13] Speaker 00:
The cases of Smith v. Swope and Johnson v. Gill would make no sense whatsoever because those are exactly the same situation, situation where the marshal did a transport and there was no further objection on the record.

[00:23:28] Speaker 00:
And in those cases, the court said, that's just not enough.

[00:23:32] Speaker 00:
The main thrust of the arguments made by Mr. Tillesee below was that the federal court had primary jurisdiction at the time that he was sentenced.

[00:23:42] Speaker 00:
I would be the first to admit that those arguments were not made particularly clearly or articulately.

[00:23:51] Speaker 00:
And one of the problems is that Mr. Tillis, he filed a lot of different things separately.

[00:23:56] Speaker 00:
The government has it correct when they say that at some point he was filing too early.

[00:24:02] Speaker 00:
He was filing things before he was in federal custody.

[00:24:06] Speaker 00:
But I did want to correct the record.

[00:24:07] Speaker 00:
He also was filing after he was in federal custody.

[00:24:11] Speaker 00:
When he came back from the state, the first place that he went was SeaTac Washington, the federal detention center there.

[00:24:16] Speaker 00:
And because he was pro se, you can see that in the record because his pleadings after that point, the ones that are the most recent in this case,

[00:24:26] Speaker 00:
and the ones that are on appeal now have the envelopes with them and are postmarked from CTAC.

[00:24:32] Speaker 00:
So he was in that correct spot when he filed this.

[00:24:36] Speaker 00:
And if you look at his pleadings carefully, and I know it's somewhat painful to do so, you can see very clearly that he is making arguments about federal primary jurisdiction.

[00:24:47] Speaker 00:
He talks about

[00:24:48] Speaker 01:
So can I just ask, I did think that this could be construed as a 2241 that would have jurisdiction, but how do you respond to this argument that he sued the wrong party then?

[00:24:59] Speaker 00:
I would say the government should have raised that below.

[00:25:02] Speaker 00:
It makes no difference in terms of the issues that are before the court now.

[00:25:08] Speaker 00:
That would have been a simple fix in the district court below.

[00:25:12] Speaker 00:
It doesn't change the fact that the court does have subject matter jurisdiction to determine under 2241.

[00:25:19] Speaker 00:
when a person's federal sentence commenced.

[00:25:22] Speaker 00:
That's very clear from the case law.

[00:25:24] Speaker 00:
So we would argue that that's not a sufficient basis to reject all of Mr. Tillis's arguments herein.

[00:25:34] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:25:36] Speaker 04:
Thank you both for your briefing and argument.

[00:25:37] Speaker 04:
And Ms.

[00:25:38] Speaker 04:
Stamm, especially, thank you for taking on a challenging case and the excellent briefing that you filed.

[00:25:42] Speaker 04:
We appreciate it very much.

[00:25:45] Speaker 04:
This matter is submitted.