[00:00:00] Speaker 01:
And we'll hear first from Mr. Srinivasan.

[00:00:06] Speaker 01:
Did I pronounce that correctly?

[00:00:07] Speaker 03:
You did, Your Honor.

[00:00:08] Speaker 01:
All right, great.

[00:00:08] Speaker 01:
You may proceed.

[00:00:10] Speaker 03:
Good morning, and may it please the court.

[00:00:12] Speaker 03:
Rajesh Srinivasan for the United States.

[00:00:15] Speaker 03:
I plan to reserve two minutes for rebuttal, and I will watch my clock.

[00:00:19] Speaker 03:
This appeal presents one narrow issue, whether defendants can waive the protections of Rule 410 in a plea agreement.

[00:00:28] Speaker 03:
Mezanato answers this question.

[00:00:30] Speaker 03:
Defendants' knowing and voluntary waivers of Rule 410 are enforceable, including when they appear in proper agreements made during the course of plea negotiations.

[00:00:41] Speaker 03:
As seven other circuits have recognized, these waivers are equally enforceable when they appear in plea agreements.

[00:00:48] Speaker 03:
This court should join those circuits and reverse the district court's contrary ruling.

[00:00:53] Speaker 03:
Mezanato's reasoning and holding control the result here.

[00:00:56] Speaker 01:
Well, I mean, certainly, Mesonado controls the issue whether you can voluntarily waive.

[00:01:01] Speaker 01:
But here, this isn't some sort of freestanding separate agreement.

[00:01:06] Speaker 01:
It's embedded in a plea agreement and tied to the obligation to plead guilty.

[00:01:11] Speaker 01:
That's the alleged breach here.

[00:01:13] Speaker 01:
So why doesn't our case law that says that plea agreements are not valid and enforceable until they're approved by the court control this case?

[00:01:25] Speaker 03:
Two responses, Your Honor.

[00:01:27] Speaker 03:
First, the court's prior decisions on unrelated issues do not control the result here.

[00:01:33] Speaker 03:
This court has recognized that when an issue is not squarely presented before it and relevant case law is not cited, that those decisions will not control results in different cases.

[00:01:43] Speaker 03:
And none of the cases cited by the defendant is a discussion of Mesonado present or Puckett or Revy, the three main cases that the government relies on.

[00:01:53] Speaker 03:
Second, even though

[00:01:55] Speaker 03:
Plea agreements obligate the defendant to plead guilty.

[00:01:59] Speaker 03:
They're not tied to the taking of the guilty plea.

[00:02:03] Speaker 03:
They are private agreements between a defendant and the government.

[00:02:07] Speaker 03:
One of the duties of those agreements is to plead guilty.

[00:02:10] Speaker 01:
Are you aware that there's a substantial number of cases in which the government has successfully persuaded courts of appeals that the government isn't bound by plea agreements and can change its mind and walk away?

[00:02:24] Speaker 01:
So is it your position that we should reject those cases as wrongly decided?

[00:02:30] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:02:31] Speaker 03:
Those cases, to the extent that those decisions are precedent of this court, we believe that Mesonado and Puckett make clear that plea agreements should be treated like any other contracts, and the government should also be held to those plea agreements before the acceptance of a guilty plea.

[00:02:49] Speaker 01:
So it sounds then like we're going to create a circuit split, which either

[00:02:54] Speaker 01:
Whichever way we go, because there are several cases in other circuits that have allowed the government to back out of plea agreements before court approval on precisely the ground that they're not enforceable until they're accepted.

[00:03:07] Speaker 01:
But now you're telling us it's going to be the same for both sides.

[00:03:11] Speaker 01:
That's the position you're advocating in this circuit.

[00:03:13] Speaker 03:
That is our position.

[00:03:16] Speaker 03:
It would at least not create a circuit split with the decisions that were discussed in the party's brief.

[00:03:22] Speaker 03:
At least three of those decisions, and arguably four, involved plea agreements that were enforced before the taking of any guilty plea.

[00:03:30] Speaker 03:
In those decisions, either the defendant's factual basis or statements made in the course of plea negotiations were accepted as evidence at trial.

[00:03:39] Speaker 02:
Mr. Srinivasan, isn't the converse also true with respect to the 410 issue?

[00:03:43] Speaker 02:
So in the cases involving the enforcement of the 410 issue, even though the procedural posture might have been within the context of a plea agreement, the court never discussed authority with respect to the enforceability of a plea agreement before the plea's been accepted.

[00:04:00] Speaker 02:
Those cases that seem to be in tension on the 410 issue don't really address in any detail the question we're addressing.

[00:04:12] Speaker 03:
At least Washburn from the Eighth Circuit addresses precisely this issue.

[00:04:15] Speaker 03:
In that case, the defendant made the same argument that the defendant is making here, that before a court accepts a guilty plea, there is no binding plea agreement, and it's not enforceable.

[00:04:26] Speaker 03:
The Eighth Circuit correctly rejected that argument.

[00:04:29] Speaker 03:
and said that a plea agreement is binding upon the signature of the parties.

[00:04:34] Speaker 03:
And that is true in this case as well.

[00:04:36] Speaker 04:
So my issue with the citations to the cases from other circuits is that I don't see those other circuits as having anything similar to our Kaczynski line of cases.

[00:04:46] Speaker 04:
I mean, do they?

[00:04:47] Speaker 03:
I'm not familiar with those circuits having

[00:04:52] Speaker 03:
precedent familiar, similar to Kaczynski.

[00:04:55] Speaker 03:
But to the extent that Kaczynski, this court feels that Kaczynski is in tension with Mezzanato or with Puckett, this court has recognized that when a Supreme Court decision's holding or reasoning undermine this court's precedent, that it is bound by the Supreme Court's.

[00:05:15] Speaker 04:
I think it's that it needs to be clearly irreconcilable with our

[00:05:19] Speaker 04:
with our precedent.

[00:05:20] Speaker 04:
So why don't you tell me why Kuczynski is irreconcilable with Mezanato?

[00:05:25] Speaker 04:
Because I don't read it that way, but why don't you tell me why you see it that way?

[00:05:31] Speaker 03:
It's irreconcilable with Mezanato and Puckett together.

[00:05:34] Speaker 03:
Puckett recognizes that plea agreements are contracts, and the breach of a plea agreement entitles a party to a remedy.

[00:05:42] Speaker 03:
So that decision teaches us that plea agreements should be treated just like proper agreements, like any other contract.

[00:05:49] Speaker 03:
Bezonato recognizes that defendants can voluntarily waive their Rule 410 rights in private contracts.

[00:05:56] Speaker 03:
So if a plea agreement is a private contract,

[00:05:58] Speaker 03:
which this court has recognized and the Supreme Court has recognized, then it should be treated the same as a proper agreement.

[00:06:04] Speaker 03:
A conditioned precedent to the enforcement of the plea agreement was not the taking of a guilty plea.

[00:06:10] Speaker 03:
The plea agreements explicitly told the defendant that it would be effective upon his signature, his attorney's signature, and the signature of an Assistant United States Attorney.

[00:06:20] Speaker 02:
What happens if the court rejects the plea?

[00:06:23] Speaker 03:
If the court rejects the plea, this particular provision waiving rule 410 would not be triggered, because the defendant will not have breached the plea agreement in that case.

[00:06:33] Speaker 03:
The defendant would have gone through with their obligation to attempt to plead guilty, and only because of legal impossibility will they have not been able to.

[00:06:42] Speaker 03:
And basic contract law recognizes that when a duty is legally impossible, that duty is discharged, and the party does not have to follow through with it.

[00:06:53] Speaker 01:
In addition to the- Doesn't rule 11 give a defendant an absolute unconditional right to decline to plead guilty in advance of actually pleading guilty?

[00:07:06] Speaker 03:
That's correct, Judge Collins.

[00:07:08] Speaker 03:
But there's a difference between a plea agreement and a plea.

[00:07:12] Speaker 03:
A defendant can agree to plead guilty and then exercise their constitutional right not to plead guilty, just as any party to a contract can decide to breach their obligations in that contract.

[00:07:24] Speaker 03:
But just like any other party, when a defendant breaches their obligation to plead guilty, it triggers breach consequences.

[00:07:31] Speaker 03:
And this agreement laid out those consequences.

[00:07:33] Speaker 01:
But doesn't that suggest, I mean, rule 11 essentially says that it's unenforceable

[00:07:38] Speaker 01:
to have an obligation to plead guilty in advance of the court accepting it?

[00:07:44] Speaker 03:
That's not how I read rule 11.

[00:07:47] Speaker 03:
Rule 11 says that a defendant can choose not to plead guilty before a plea is taken.

[00:07:53] Speaker 03:
But it doesn't say anything about limiting a defendant's ability to negotiate for benefits with the government by entering into a private agreement.

[00:08:02] Speaker 03:
In fact, Rule 11 compels different treatment of pleas on the one hand and plea agreements on the other by addressing them in separate subsections.

[00:08:10] Speaker 03:
So the conflation of pleas and plea agreements that the defendant is proposing is incorrect under Rule 11.

[00:08:17] Speaker 01:
Is it the policy of the US Attorney's Office to insert this language in every plea agreement in the office?

[00:08:25] Speaker 03:
Typically, this language is in at least our offices' plea agreements.

[00:08:29] Speaker 03:
And if I'm correct, it is in other offices' plea agreements as well, both within the circuit and outside of the circuit.

[00:08:38] Speaker 03:
That's how we have cases like Washburn, where the defendant decided not to plead guilty and their factual basis was still admissible at trial.

[00:08:46] Speaker 01:
Are you familiar with the Norris case, the Ambank-Norris decision in the Eighth Circuit or the First Circuit's decision in Vizcarrando-Casanova?

[00:08:58] Speaker 03:
I'm not familiar with that case.

[00:08:59] Speaker 01:
And those are some of the cases that I was referencing.

[00:09:03] Speaker 01:
where the government and other circuits has been able to renege on plea agreements that were not accepted on exactly the rationale we're hearing from the other side today, which is why I raise this concern.

[00:09:17] Speaker 01:
Are we going to create a circuit split whichever way we go in this case?

[00:09:22] Speaker 03:
To the extent that those decisions say that the government is not bound by plea agreements,

[00:09:26] Speaker 03:
we would disagree with those cases.

[00:09:29] Speaker 03:
And that's important, because defendants should be able to depend on the government's promises.

[00:09:34] Speaker 03:
And the change of a US attorney or the change of an AUSA on the case should not dictate whether a plea agreement they have signed is enforced.

[00:09:43] Speaker 01:
We've taken you over your time, or chewed up most of your time.

[00:09:46] Speaker 01:
I'll give you two minutes and rebuttal.

[00:09:47] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:09:48] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:09:54] Speaker 01:
Now, from Mr. Averett.

[00:09:58] Speaker 00:
A long A, Your Honor.

[00:09:59] Speaker 00:
Averett.

[00:09:59] Speaker 00:
Averett.

[00:10:00] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:10:00] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:10:00] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:10:04] Speaker 00:
Elliot Averett for Defendant Appellee Yasiel Pouille.

[00:10:08] Speaker 00:
Your Honors, for decades, this Court has held that a Pouille agreement that has not yet been entered and accepted in the District Court does not bind the government or the defendant.

[00:10:19] Speaker 00:
because Mr Puig's rule 410 waiver was part of his plea agreement that had not been entered or accepted by the district court.

[00:10:25] Speaker 00:
It was not enforceable.

[00:10:27] Speaker 00:
Even if

[00:10:28] Speaker 00:
it was possible to contract around that rule.

[00:10:31] Speaker 00:
Here, the district court found that Mr. Puig's Rule 410 waiver never unambiguously stated that it was enforceable prior to entry and acceptance of the plea.

[00:10:41] Speaker 00:
And that is yet another independent reason why this court should affirm.

[00:10:43] Speaker 01:
But the plea agreement says right on its face that it's effective upon the last of the signatures specified.

[00:10:52] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, it does say that, but if you take a close look at the language at ER 32, I think really what the plea says is, or the agreement says is, it's effective when signed.

[00:11:02] Speaker 00:
And I don't think that really differentiates it from any other agreement that we kind of signed throughout our day-to-day lives.

[00:11:06] Speaker 00:
We go through our lives, we sign agreements.

[00:11:10] Speaker 00:
But, you know, by contrast, I would point the Court to the decisions and circuits that have enforced these agreements in the Eighth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, particularly

[00:11:20] Speaker 00:
In the El Boblawi and Washburn cases, the language of the waivers there, and I'm happy to quote it for the court at length, but it's at 780 in Washburn and 935 in El Boblawi, was much, much more explicit than what we have in this plea agreement.

[00:11:36] Speaker 00:
It was very clear about the fact that the Rule 410 waiver was enforceable, notwithstanding the fact that the plea had not been entered or accepted.

[00:11:46] Speaker 00:
I wanted to address Mr. Srivastava's point about the Puckett decision, because I think this court has a really clear rule.

[00:11:55] Speaker 00:
Judge Thomas was mentioning it.

[00:11:58] Speaker 00:
Miller versus Gammie, I think, doesn't allow for what the government is asking the court to do here.

[00:12:04] Speaker 00:
The only case they have that is even arguably intervening authority is Puckett, because it's the only case cited in their brief that post-dates Kuczynski in 2006.

[00:12:13] Speaker 00:
Hyde, this court specifically said in Alvarez-Tautimas that Hyde does not overrule this line of cases.

[00:12:20] Speaker 00:
Masnado's decided I think in 1995, so it is by definition not intervening authority.

[00:12:25] Speaker 00:
And in Puckett, Justice Scalia specifically stated that while there is a general rule that we treat plea agreements as analogous to contracts, that is an analogy.

[00:12:36] Speaker 00:
And Justice Scalia even said that analogy may not hold in all respects.

[00:12:43] Speaker 00:
I think that's especially applicable here because we're talking about an agreement that is not just a bilateral agreement.

[00:12:52] Speaker 00:
It's a charge bargaining agreement.

[00:12:54] Speaker 00:
The district court can reject it for a number of reasons.

[00:12:57] Speaker 00:
Failure to go through the colloquy under 11B.

[00:13:00] Speaker 00:
It can be rejected under, I think, 11C.

[00:13:04] Speaker 00:
And so it's not just a bilateral agreement between two parties.

[00:13:08] Speaker 00:
It's something that is contingent upon

[00:13:10] Speaker 00:
acceptance and approval by the district court, which never occurred.

[00:13:13] Speaker 02:
Mr. Aber, what do you make of the, if we take the contract framing, the impossibility defense?

[00:13:20] Speaker 02:
I mean, what's the best contract frame for a district court's refusal to accept a plea in this instance?

[00:13:29] Speaker 00:
I'm not sure what the exact contractual analogy would be, but I do want to point, I don't think realistically that what the government is suggesting here is possible.

[00:13:39] Speaker 00:
And I would really encourage the court to look at exactly what happened below, SCR four through eight, because Mr. Puig's trial counsel came into court and said, your honor, I can't go through with the rule 11 colloquy today.

[00:13:52] Speaker 00:
I haven't fully advised my client about all of his possible legal defenses and the court will not be able to accept the plea.

[00:13:58] Speaker 02:
But that's something that hopefully is relatively rare.

[00:14:03] Speaker 02:
But that's part of the allocation of risk that the parties took on when they signed the agreement, is it not?

[00:14:08] Speaker 00:
I disagree with that, Your Honor, for the simple reason that, again, the agreement itself is contingent upon acceptance by the district court.

[00:14:14] Speaker 00:
And this court's line of cases, long line of cases.

[00:14:17] Speaker 02:
But you focused us on the text.

[00:14:20] Speaker 02:
And if we follow the text, where in the plea agreement does it say that it's contingent on acceptance by the district court?

[00:14:25] Speaker 00:
It doesn't say that explicitly, but what we don't have is a clear statement.

[00:14:29] Speaker 00:
And I think at a minimum, given the background rule of the Fagan, Savage, and Kuchinski line of cases, that there has to at least be a clear statement that those cases don't apply.

[00:14:39] Speaker 00:
Because just like if you're talking about, for example, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that's implied in every contract, right?

[00:14:46] Speaker 00:
This is a background principle against which the parties are bargaining.

[00:14:50] Speaker 00:
and absent some clear statement, I don't think that it falls out of the agreement.

[00:14:54] Speaker 00:
And again, I would point to the decisions of Elbow Lowy, Washburn decisions from circuits that do enforce these agreements, which again, we disagree with those decisions, and we think that, as Your Honor pointed out,

[00:15:04] Speaker 00:
They don't really address the key question here in any depth.

[00:15:07] Speaker 00:
But to the extent that these agreements are enforceable, we think there has to be, in light of this court's case law, a clear statement that the agreement is enforceable prior to entry and acceptance.

[00:15:18] Speaker 00:
And those circuits recognize waivers that were much, much more explicit than what we have.

[00:15:23] Speaker 02:
So your view, it would be consistent with Rule 11 if the U.S.

[00:15:27] Speaker 02:
Attorney's Office decided to contract around that, if it were an express term, there'd be no conflict with the rule?

[00:15:33] Speaker 00:
We actually don't agree with that, Your Honor, and I wanted to mention, I think Judge Collins had asked about Rule 11, because in Floyd, at 1F, 3rd, 870, the Floyd case is cited in our brief, this court recognized that the Fagan-Savage-Kuczynski rule is actually derived from the plain text of Rule 11.

[00:15:50] Speaker 00:
I know that the government would like to draw a distinction there.

[00:15:53] Speaker 00:
but it specifically stated the court stated in Floyd that rule 11 requires the district judge in open court to determine that the agreement is voluntary and not the result of threats or promises apart from the plea agreement without such a hearing Floyd was deprived of the safeguards rule 11 was enacted to impose so this court has already read rule 11 in the way that we're arguing in our brief and we don't think rule 11

[00:16:18] Speaker 00:
allows the parties to contract around like this.

[00:16:20] Speaker 00:
But we also think that as an alternative grounds for affirmance, this court could look at what the First Circuit did in Newbert and say, you know, regardless of whether, and I hear Judge Collins concern about, you know, maybe a circuit split everywhere you go, I think one way out of that is to look at what the First Circuit did in Newbert and say, whether or not these waivers are enforceable generally, in this specific case, there had to be a clear statement.

[00:16:47] Speaker 00:
that the waiver was enforceable prior to entry and acceptance in light of this court's past case law at a minimum.

[00:16:53] Speaker 01:
It's awfully clear when you say that the contract is effective upon these set of signatures, and it very clearly says what the defendant's obligations are.

[00:17:03] Speaker 01:
And the first one is to actually enter a plea of guilty, and then it has here are the remedies for breach.

[00:17:10] Speaker 01:
You put those three pieces together, and it seems very clear.

[00:17:14] Speaker 01:
Why is it like Newburgh?

[00:17:17] Speaker 00:
I think it's like Newbert because of the background principle.

[00:17:21] Speaker 00:
And Newbert, the plea agreement, Newbert did say that the defendant was obligated to plead guilty.

[00:17:25] Speaker 00:
Now it's a little bit different because he withdrew for fair and just reason.

[00:17:29] Speaker 00:
But I think the difference is, and you don't see this in the other circuit cases that either party cites, is that this court does have this background rule.

[00:17:37] Speaker 00:
So again, that's not our primary argument.

[00:17:39] Speaker 00:
We think that this is a really easy case to resolve just based on Feig and Savage and Kuczynski because what the government's essentially asking you to do here

[00:17:46] Speaker 00:
is for some reason carve these rule 410 waivers out of the plea agreement and treat them differently from the way that this court has treated these agreements as a whole.

[00:17:55] Speaker 00:
And Judge Collins, with respect to your point about the government relying on this rule many times, they got out of these agreements in Savage and Kuczynski based on these rules.

[00:18:05] Speaker 00:
And most recently in the District of Idaho, the Welch case that's cited in our brief, the government actually relied on the Kuczynski rule to get out of a plea agreement that it didn't like anymore.

[00:18:16] Speaker 00:
And so again, we think this is something that cuts both ways.

[00:18:20] Speaker 00:
And it's the most straightforward way to resolve this case.

[00:18:25] Speaker 02:
Looking at Kuczynski, I've picked up some confusion in the use of whether the court is accepting the plea or the plea agreement.

[00:18:34] Speaker 02:
I'm not sure whether that.

[00:18:36] Speaker 02:
matters too much, but of course, hide is clear that there's a separation.

[00:18:40] Speaker 02:
Rule 11 appears clear that there's a separation between the plea, a term of the plea agreement and the court's acceptance of the plea agreement, which may not be accepted until later.

[00:18:48] Speaker 02:
Does it matter whether we're discussing in this case the court's acceptance or non-acceptance of a plea or a plea agreement?

[00:18:59] Speaker 00:
I don't think it matters, Your Honor.

[00:19:01] Speaker 00:
I mean, I think

[00:19:02] Speaker 00:
I think there is a policy that Rule 11 reflects, and the text of Rule 11 reflects it, and it's what this Court was recognizing in Floyd.

[00:19:10] Speaker 00:
And the policy is that it's

[00:19:12] Speaker 00:
the district court should be determining on the record in open court that the plea agreement is actually knowing intelligently and voluntarily entered.

[00:19:20] Speaker 00:
And with respect to what Judge Collins asked about other U.S.

[00:19:23] Speaker 00:
attorney's offices, I know there are districts where the U.S.

[00:19:27] Speaker 00:
attorneys actually bring a pen to the plea hearing and sign the plea agreement in front of the court, right?

[00:19:33] Speaker 00:
I don't think that's what happens in the central district of California, but there are districts where these waivers aren't enforced like this.

[00:19:40] Speaker 00:
With respect to the distinction between Rule 11, you know, pleas and plea agreements, I think what Rule 11 reflects is a policy, right?

[00:19:50] Speaker 00:
And the specific facts of this case in terms of Mr. Puig's not being able to consult with counsel in person, not speaking English as a first language, really limited education, those, I'm sorry, I'm over time.

[00:20:05] Speaker 00:
We think that that's all the more reason to require an on-the-record Rule 11 colloquy before holding that the agreement is enforceable.

[00:20:14] Speaker 00:
Unless the court has further questions.

[00:20:17] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:20:26] Speaker 01:
All right, we'll hear rebuttal now.

[00:20:28] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:20:29] Speaker 03:
The defendant's argument rests on a false premise, that if he had tried to plead guilty and the court had rejected his guilty plea, or he had later withdrawn his guilty plea, that the same Rule 410 waiver would have been triggered.

[00:20:43] Speaker 03:
That is not clear.

[00:20:44] Speaker 03:
Newbert is not inconsistent with the government's argument, because there, the First Circuit recognized that when the defendant doesn't breach and the 410 waiver is based on a breach, the Rule 410 waiver is not triggered.

[00:20:58] Speaker 03:
So too here, if the defendant had not breached the agreement, either by trying to plead guilty and not having his plea accepted or successfully withdrawing the plea for fair and just reason, then we wouldn't be here today.

[00:21:12] Speaker 03:
Second, the agreement unambiguously states, as you pointed out, that the signature is what makes the agreement effective, not the acceptance of the agreement by the court.

[00:21:24] Speaker 03:
That's on ER 32.

[00:21:26] Speaker 03:
And the court can look at that language, and I think it's exactly as clear as the language and the decisions that the defense tried to distinguish.

[00:21:35] Speaker 03:
Finally, the one way that the Puckett analogy definitely holds, regardless of what other distinctions are there, is that a breach of a plea agreement triggers a remedy.

[00:21:47] Speaker 03:
And that's what we have here.

[00:21:49] Speaker 03:
The plea agreement was breached by the defendant, and the government was entitled to the remedy stated in the plea agreement.

[00:21:55] Speaker 03:
And Hyde also recognizes this.

[00:21:57] Speaker 03:
Hyde says that a condition subsequent of rejection of the plea agreement might terminate the plea agreement.

[00:22:03] Speaker 03:
That can only be true if the plea agreement is a contract

[00:22:07] Speaker 03:
before it's accepted or rejected by the court.

[00:22:10] Speaker 03:
Finally, to the extent that defendants want to negotiate around Rule 410, they can try to do so.

[00:22:17] Speaker 03:
The defendant didn't do so here.

[00:22:18] Speaker 03:
Instead, he agreed to not follow the background principle that plea agreements must be accepted before effective, and instead agreed that it would be effective upon signing.

[00:22:31] Speaker 03:
Unless the court has further questions, we ask that the court reverse.

[00:22:34] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:22:35] Speaker 01:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:22:37] Speaker 01:
The case just argued will be submitted.