[00:00:04] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:00:06] Speaker 04:
Good morning, Counsel.

[00:00:07] Speaker 01:
Nina Papachristou, Federal Defenders, for Mr. Villegas.

[00:00:10] Speaker 01:
I'd like to reserve two minutes for a rebuttal, if I may, and I'll keep an eye on the clock.

[00:00:15] Speaker 04:
Thank you, Counsel.

[00:00:16] Speaker 01:
Under Duarte Higuereda and Bailon Santana, a district court must conduct an in-depth colloquy with a criminal defendant who does not speak English before accepting their waiver of a jury trial.

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
Ms.

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
Papakrissou, we do have a long line of cases here.

[00:00:35] Speaker 00:
Is there any material difference in the fact that Mr. Villegas entered into a fact stipulation that basically practically mooted the question of whether there was a jury trial or not?

[00:00:48] Speaker 01:
No, the fact that he entered into a fact stipulation does not matter because this court reviews the error de novo.

[00:00:56] Speaker 01:
It would matter if the court applied plain error, but as I briefed, the court has never applied plain error to this issue.

[00:01:05] Speaker 03:
What about invited error?

[00:01:08] Speaker 03:
What about invited error?

[00:01:09] Speaker 03:
It was a novel situation.

[00:01:11] Speaker 03:
The judge sort of, we've all read the transcript, of course said, what is this?

[00:01:15] Speaker 03:
What is it you want me to do?

[00:01:17] Speaker 03:
And he proceeded in the way that the defendant requested.

[00:01:21] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:01:22] Speaker 01:
Well, actually, the Second Circuit has looked at that specifically and held that even where there is invited error, it should still be reviewed de novo and it still is a structural error.

[00:01:33] Speaker 03:
And a fact pattern like this one where they came in and said, we're stipulating to all of the elements of the offense and we want you to still do a trial to preserve an issue for the defendant?

[00:01:44] Speaker 01:
I'm not sure if the second circuit case had a back stipulation, but I did want to also say that the Laney case in this circuit, there was a partial back stipulation.

[00:01:54] Speaker 04:
This wasn't a partial back stipulation.

[00:01:56] Speaker 04:
This was a stipulation of everything pretty much that had to be presented to the judge.

[00:02:04] Speaker 03:
Is the end game here to get re-sentenced?

[00:02:08] Speaker 01:
I think the end game is to reverse the conviction because the district court didn't fulfill its responsibility.

[00:02:15] Speaker 01:
And then what happened?

[00:02:16] Speaker 03:
And then what?

[00:02:17] Speaker 01:
Well, Mr. Vegas is not in custody right now.

[00:02:20] Speaker 01:
He's on supervised release.

[00:02:24] Speaker 01:
So in the event that he would appear before the court again on supervised release, then I think, yes, there would have to be a retrial.

[00:02:33] Speaker 04:
Has he been deported?

[00:02:35] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:02:36] Speaker 00:
Did he knowingly and voluntarily enter the fact stipulation?

[00:02:43] Speaker 01:
Well, that's the question I think that the district court did not answer.

[00:02:47] Speaker 04:
Was there any suggestion that he did not enter into the fact stipulation knowingly and voluntarily?

[00:02:56] Speaker 01:
No, but the fact stipulation didn't contain anything about whether or not it was translated to him by a court-certified interpreter.

[00:03:05] Speaker 04:
But there was no objection to it.

[00:03:06] Speaker 04:
There was no insinuation that it was involuntary or unknowing.

[00:03:12] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:03:12] Speaker 01:
And in other cases where this court has reversed for structural error on the same issue, there were also no objections.

[00:03:20] Speaker 04:
These facts are so unique to this case.

[00:03:23] Speaker 04:
We don't, I don't think there's a similar case where the facts have been stipulated into so that there really is no reason for a trial.

[00:03:34] Speaker 04:
So that's what makes this case a little bit different in my view is that you don't have any deprivation of a trial in essence because all of the evidence was stipulated to.

[00:03:48] Speaker 01:
I understand your honor's point.

[00:03:51] Speaker 01:
Here there was absolutely no colloquy, however, and this court has reversed even where there is, the district court does conduct some colloquy.

[00:03:58] Speaker 00:
For example, in the Bailong Santana case, the defendant- Well, you rest on, I guess, the idea that it's structural error and it's not clear.

[00:04:07] Speaker 00:
Our cases sometimes say that, sometimes don't.

[00:04:11] Speaker 00:
But the idea of structural error is that once the error occurs, there's no way for a reviewing court to determine whether there's harm or not.

[00:04:23] Speaker 00:
What is the, I guess the upside and downside that we should imagine that would be missed in a structural error here for this denial of a jury trial, given that he'd stipulated the facts?

[00:04:38] Speaker 00:
And what's the harm?

[00:04:39] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:04:40] Speaker 01:
The harm is that this court set out a very clear rule and the district court didn't follow it.

[00:04:45] Speaker 00:
Structural error exists for a purpose, and that purpose is that we can't imagine what the harm would be downstream from the structural error.

[00:04:56] Speaker 00:
What is downstream of this that prejudices Mr. Villegas, given the stipulation of the facts, it's unchallenged?

[00:05:04] Speaker 01:
We don't know what would have happened if the district court had conducted any colloquy at all with Mr. Vegas.

[00:05:09] Speaker 01:
We can't reconstruct that retrospectively.

[00:05:11] Speaker 00:
Well, there are two things that could happen or they're not.

[00:05:13] Speaker 00:
Either he waves or he doesn't wave the jury trial.

[00:05:17] Speaker 00:
If it goes to the jury, what's the harm?

[00:05:21] Speaker 00:
Or what's the benefit to him?

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
If it goes to the jury, we don't know what the jury would do.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
On stipulated facts?

[00:05:27] Speaker 00:
Could the jury do anything other than rely on the stipulated facts?

[00:05:30] Speaker 01:
I'm not sure because it didn't happen.

[00:05:33] Speaker 00:
Is there any case that you can, I mean, we're trying to, I get that the cases on the face of them are quite supportive of your position, but none of them, as Judge Rollinson has said, none of them address this situation.

[00:05:48] Speaker 00:
What's your closest case we should be looking at where the trial, you're going into the question of a jury trial or not with everything stipulated?

[00:05:58] Speaker 01:
Well, in other cases, there was actually even more of a colloquy, and it was reversed.

[00:06:03] Speaker 03:
So I don't have another case where there was- The structural error by definition is like Batson, right?

[00:06:09] Speaker 03:
That's the classic example where we just can't tell what would have happened from the very get-go.

[00:06:13] Speaker 03:
That is not this case.

[00:06:15] Speaker 03:
Hence my question about invited error, because your client went into the courtroom asking the court to do this very thing, right?

[00:06:22] Speaker 03:
And so I struggle for the same reason Judge Johnstone does, I think.

[00:06:26] Speaker 03:
Maybe we come at this a little bit differently.

[00:06:28] Speaker 03:
This is not a case where it's difficult for me to understand what would have happened if somebody said, you know, you understand you have a right to a jury.

[00:06:35] Speaker 03:
He's just stipulated to the entire offense.

[00:06:39] Speaker 03:
I know you know these facts, but you see why we're grappling with this.

[00:06:42] Speaker 03:
We're not fans of busy work to just remand something back to the district court.

[00:06:46] Speaker 03:
Again, I'm not trying to be flippant.

[00:06:47] Speaker 03:
But right at the get-go, right at the top of the gate here, this is not the kind of case where I struggle to figure out, gee, what would have happened, like I would with a Batson or something like that.

[00:06:56] Speaker 03:
So when Judge Johnson says, you've got authority on your side, there's a few places where we've said structural error.

[00:07:03] Speaker 03:
There's other places where I think that the briefing stretches and tries to suggest that we said this is structural error.

[00:07:10] Speaker 03:
There's certainly places where I think we have, and I'll grant you that.

[00:07:13] Speaker 03:
I'm trying to figure out why this is analogous to those.

[00:07:17] Speaker 03:
situations because I don't think we've ever done this where the judge was doing exactly what counsel requested.

[00:07:23] Speaker 01:
The judge was doing exactly what counsel requested but the district court also did not speak to Mr. Villegas at all so I think

[00:07:31] Speaker 01:
There's many different rationales for why something is a structural error.

[00:07:35] Speaker 01:
And one of them is the inability, as your honors have said, to reconstruct what would have happened.

[00:07:39] Speaker 03:
Isn't that always the rationale for structural error?

[00:07:42] Speaker 01:
When is it not?

[00:07:43] Speaker 01:
As I understand it, in the Weaver case, the Supreme Court case that I cited in my briefing, there can be several rationales for why an error is structural.

[00:07:51] Speaker 01:
And one of them that's perhaps the most important here is when the right at issue protects some other interests besides avoiding erroneous conviction.

[00:07:59] Speaker 01:
So this isn't about avoiding, you know, convicting Mr. Villegas inappropriately or on facts that, you know, don't lend themselves to a conviction.

[00:08:10] Speaker 01:
It's about the district court's responsibility to ensure that he understands the right to a jury when he waives it.

[00:08:19] Speaker 01:
And I'm running low on time, so I can come back.

[00:08:23] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:08:23] Speaker 01:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:08:31] Speaker 02:
May it please the court, Daniel Zip, on behalf of the United States.

[00:08:35] Speaker 02:
Your Honor, I think the most straightforward way to address this case is just to look at the original language from Duarte Higuereda, which established this colloquy requirement.

[00:08:45] Speaker 02:
And that court, the court did not reverse on structural error.

[00:08:49] Speaker 02:
explicitly it just said that that the adequacy of the jury waiver affected the basic framework of the trial and We cannot determine whether the effect was harmless.

[00:08:58] Speaker 03:
Well, you have to admit that rhymes with structural error I mean that that's based that isn't that just what structural error is certainly but but I don't think that case actually necessarily says that it's structural error, but I think we have sense then it gets invoked right it becomes this

[00:09:13] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:09:13] Speaker 02:
But I'm saying, without addressing whether structural error is clearly irreconcilable in this context, if you go back to the very first case, this Duarte Higa Reda, even that case recognized that it was reversing because they could not tell whether it was harmless or not.

[00:09:27] Speaker 02:
In this case, based on these highly unique facts, we can tell if it's harmless.

[00:09:31] Speaker 03:
No, but now you're really making me nervous.

[00:09:32] Speaker 03:
If you want us to say that we're blowing through precedent,

[00:09:36] Speaker 03:
Are you trying to tell us that this satisfies Miller versus Gamley?

[00:09:44] Speaker 03:
Surely not.

[00:09:45] Speaker 02:
I'm saying even under the first case that- What about the subsequent cases?

[00:09:49] Speaker 03:
Because of the first case is the one I think I agree with you on.

[00:09:52] Speaker 03:
It doesn't really say that necessarily this is structural error.

[00:09:55] Speaker 02:
Yes, I think to the extent that later cases have sort of deemed that a structural error, in this context that would be clearly irreconcilable with what the Supreme Court held.

[00:10:04] Speaker 02:
and Dominguez Benitez.

[00:10:05] Speaker 04:
That's a tough argument.

[00:10:07] Speaker 02:
It is.

[00:10:07] Speaker 02:
I mean, it is.

[00:10:07] Speaker 04:
But is that your, that's what you're basing your bill of teachers survive this appeal on?

[00:10:16] Speaker 03:
It's Miller versus Gammie.

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
No, well, the first argument is- A couple of very skeptical faces looking back at your calendar.

[00:10:22] Speaker 00:
Really?

[00:10:22] Speaker 00:
I think you saw how precedent fared in the last argument.

[00:10:27] Speaker 00:
You were here for that.

[00:10:28] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:10:28] Speaker 02:
And it's fairly rare for us to make a middle D gaming argument.

[00:10:31] Speaker 03:
Well, there's a reason the standards are really high.

[00:10:32] Speaker 03:
And we're not trying to make jokes here, but we take that very seriously.

[00:10:35] Speaker 03:
And we wouldn't want to undermine important precedent about a really important right.

[00:10:38] Speaker 03:
It's just that in this case, we don't have a very hard time figuring out what would have happened or whether anyone's

[00:10:44] Speaker 03:
substantial rights were really affected here.

[00:10:46] Speaker 03:
That's the problem.

[00:10:46] Speaker 03:
That's a bitter argument, frankly.

[00:10:49] Speaker 00:
But you can see that there's error in its plain.

[00:10:51] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:10:52] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:10:52] Speaker 00:
So how, what is the, I guess in terms of maybe the standard review doesn't do any work here.

[00:11:00] Speaker 00:
The problem with assigning the plain error analysis to a waiver error is that cases are unclear.

[00:11:11] Speaker 00:
Let me know if I'm missing something.

[00:11:13] Speaker 00:
But the nature of the waiver is to not contain the objection.

[00:11:20] Speaker 00:
But if the underlying waiver is

[00:11:21] Speaker 00:
not knowing or voluntary to the client, the objection or not is irrelevant, is it not?

[00:11:29] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor.

[00:11:29] Speaker 00:
Okay, so where would we look for a case where we would do plain error review on a failure to object, I'm not even sure what this would look like, a failure to object while also knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right.

[00:11:50] Speaker 02:
Right, I think it would be the Supreme Court's case in Dominguez Benitez, which is in the Rule 11 context.

[00:11:55] Speaker 00:
Okay, but that's in the constitutional, right, we're dealing with the constitutional question here.

[00:12:01] Speaker 02:
Well, the ultimate purpose of Rule 11 is to determine whether the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.

[00:12:07] Speaker 02:
It's the same issue here.

[00:12:09] Speaker 02:
And what the court held there is Rule 11 itself includes a requirement that the court asks the defendant whether he understands that he's giving up the right to a jury trial.

[00:12:18] Speaker 02:
Failure to object, if the court doesn't do that in that case, is subject to plain error review.

[00:12:22] Speaker 02:
It can't be the case that that's plain error, and failure to object to the exact same advisal in this context is somehow subject to no- Why can't it be?

[00:12:31] Speaker 00:
One, we're trying to follow Congress's directions, and the other, we're trying to follow the Constitution's directions.

[00:12:36] Speaker 02:
I think both the rule 11 distinction between Dominguez and Benitez in this case, both discuss rule 11 and rule 52, which is sort of the general harmlessness standard.

[00:12:49] Speaker 02:
And like I said, the ultimate reason for rule 11 and for rule 23 in this context is to determine that the defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary.

[00:12:59] Speaker 02:
The facts of the cases don't have to be identical, just closely related, and it's our position that that sort of, that rule 11 errors are- Then why haven't we applied plain error in any of these prior cases?

[00:13:11] Speaker 02:
I don't have a great answer for that.

[00:13:13] Speaker 02:
I think the decisions are ultimately shaped by what arguments and issues the parties raise.

[00:13:19] Speaker 00:
And you agree that it has been raised before.

[00:13:21] Speaker 00:
The government has raised it in at least one of these cases.

[00:13:23] Speaker 00:
In the Laney case, yes.

[00:13:24] Speaker 03:
What about invited error?

[00:13:27] Speaker 02:
I think that we didn't take that position below that this was an invited error.

[00:13:31] Speaker 02:
I think the courts expressly asked both parties, is there anything I'm missing here?

[00:13:35] Speaker 02:
At that point, neither party said anything.

[00:13:39] Speaker 02:
The defense counsel explained why they were going down this route to preserve their appellate rights.

[00:13:44] Speaker 03:
And then requested an adjustment, I think, a downward departure.

[00:13:47] Speaker 03:
Or I guess I should say downward, yeah.

[00:13:51] Speaker 03:
Because he accepted responsibility by stipulating to the facts.

[00:13:56] Speaker 03:
Here's why I'm asking about invited error.

[00:14:00] Speaker 03:
It does seem to me to be the case that the judge was doing exactly what the parties asked him to do in a novel situation.

[00:14:06] Speaker 03:
And as I read our authorities, I'm looking at Magdalena, the showing required for invited error is what did the defendant invite the error and has defendant relinquished unknown right?

[00:14:18] Speaker 03:
It doesn't seem to be quite as rigorous a standard as what we require for waiver.

[00:14:25] Speaker 03:
And I think it would be at the top of the decision tree.

[00:14:28] Speaker 03:
Because what we're grappling with, of course, is we shouldn't be talking about prejudice at all if this is really structural error.

[00:14:36] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:14:37] Speaker 02:
And I suppose that if this court were to deem this an invited error as opposed to a plain error, then that would eliminate the need to go through the remaining steps of plain error.

[00:14:45] Speaker 03:
Answer my question.

[00:14:47] Speaker 03:
Can you think of a reason why that wouldn't work?

[00:14:51] Speaker 03:
The government didn't argument.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
I think typically we invited error would be, you know, that the defense counsel themselves proposed a certain instruction or explicitly asked the court to do something.

[00:15:03] Speaker 02:
This seems more like the court asking, am I missing anything, and no one raising an objection.

[00:15:07] Speaker 02:
So that's why we took the position that it's plain error, but certainly if the court were

[00:15:14] Speaker 00:
Well, and that also says nothing about Mr. Vegas' voluntary waiver of the rights underneath.

[00:15:21] Speaker 00:
Invited error is something that happens between the counsel and the court.

[00:15:24] Speaker 00:
We're kind of, I guess the concern would be maybe, and this is maybe why the government didn't raise it, is if you're asking whether the waiver is involuntary at the client's level, the client doesn't have a say in that.

[00:15:36] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:15:36] Speaker 03:
I think if the defense counsel had called before- Except the defense counsel presented the signed waiver.

[00:15:41] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:15:41] Speaker 02:
And if the defense counsel had said to the court, you don't need to do a colloquy with my client at this point, then that would be an invited error.

[00:15:47] Speaker 03:
And now you're saying it's not invited error.

[00:15:50] Speaker 02:
That's why we took the position below that this seems more like a failure to object than an actual invitation.

[00:15:57] Speaker 02:
But again, that would be an important point.

[00:15:59] Speaker 00:
What would it look like?

[00:16:01] Speaker 00:
We've got the transcript here.

[00:16:03] Speaker 00:
What would it have looked like to properly object to the lack of a colloquy?

[00:16:10] Speaker 02:
I think when the court said, I'm not familiar with this process, is there anything I'm missing, defense counsel would have said, Your Honor, under

[00:16:19] Speaker 02:
Duarte, you're required to engage with my client individually because he's a Spanish speaker.

[00:16:25] Speaker 02:
And that would have, and if the court said no, then that would have preserved the objection.

[00:16:31] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:16:31] Speaker 00:
But we've, I guess it depends on how you characterize the underlying right.

[00:16:34] Speaker 00:
And the district court was put in a very difficult position here.

[00:16:41] Speaker 00:
But if the underlying, as we've discussed in some of the cases, is in fact a duty of the district court to do this, why would Mr. Vegas' counsel have a duty to sua sponte raise it in order for it to be preserved?

[00:16:56] Speaker 02:
I think the same way that, as the court outlined in Dominguez Benitez, that there are reasons to encourage timely objections, that there's the waste of resources and engaging in the hundreds of hours of briefing that it took in this case, that there has to be

[00:17:12] Speaker 02:
the burden is on the defense to raise an objection on procedural grounds like this in order to to preserve even you know again that's in the rule 11 context but it's it's the same issue of whether properly advising in your view is that that's an open question before our court is

[00:17:31] Speaker 02:
It's our view that the sort of automatic reversal rule, if that's what it is in Duarte, is not reconcilable with the later Supreme Court decision.

[00:17:44] Speaker 02:
But even if this court doesn't address whether it's plain error, whether it's structural, just going back to sort of the original case, this court, on these unique facts, this court can find that this was harmless,

[00:17:58] Speaker 02:
and that the same result would have occurred if it was before a jury or before a judge, and even under the holding of Duarte, this does not require reversal.

[00:18:10] Speaker 00:
Where should we look to find that we can do, if our cases do say it's structural error at the wholesale level, that we can do a retail-level analysis of not here?

[00:18:22] Speaker 00:
Have we or the Supreme Court ever discussed structural error on that kind of case-by-case basis?

[00:18:29] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:18:30] Speaker 02:
Again, I think it would be just going, all of the cases that have said structural error in this context all trace back to this Duarte case.

[00:18:39] Speaker 02:
So to the extent what it was describing did allow some window of harmless error review on these unique facts.

[00:18:48] Speaker 02:
The fact that later courts use the word structural, I don't think would prevent this court from applying that case to the unique facts of this case.

[00:18:55] Speaker 00:
And then we're back to Miller v. Gammie.

[00:18:58] Speaker 04:
Not, well, not necessarily if it's... You're trying to distinguish that case.

[00:19:03] Speaker 04:
not say it should be overruled, but you're saying that the rationale of that case.

[00:19:08] Speaker 02:
Right, exactly.

[00:19:09] Speaker 02:
I'm saying that that case left at least a window for this court to find harmlessness.

[00:19:15] Speaker 02:
In the rare case where you can actually tell that the result would be the same before a judge or a jury, which would be, as the Seventh Circuit said, a dubious proposition.

[00:19:25] Speaker 03:
I agree with you on that case.

[00:19:26] Speaker 03:
The problem is the subsequent authority is pretty tough for you.

[00:19:29] Speaker 03:
What you're really arguing is those subsequent cases weren't very well supported because Duarte didn't say this categorically in the first place.

[00:19:37] Speaker 03:
Subsequent cases, some of them have no analysis at all.

[00:19:39] Speaker 02:
Correct.

[00:19:39] Speaker 02:
And even Duarte, if you look at its reasoning for finding structural error, it was based on a Ninth Circuit case that has been subsequently reversed.

[00:19:48] Speaker 03:
I don't think it found structural error.

[00:19:49] Speaker 03:
I don't think it found structural error.

[00:19:52] Speaker 03:
But anyway, I appreciate your argument.

[00:19:54] Speaker 04:
All right, counsel.

[00:19:55] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:19:57] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:20:05] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:20:05] Speaker 01:
In the Duarte case, this court wrote, when the record reveals a special disadvantage or disability bearing upon the defendant's understanding of the waiver and the district court is on notice, it must conduct an in-depth colloquy before accepting a jury trial waiver.

[00:20:21] Speaker 01:
And I understand the court's concerns about the fact stipulation here.

[00:20:25] Speaker 01:
But the purpose of the Duarte case, the purpose of crafting the rule, was to make sure that the district court always fulfilled this duty towards defendants with special disadvantages in all circumstances.

[00:20:37] Speaker 01:
So I think that does include when there is a fact stipulation.

[00:20:42] Speaker 01:
And this court is as bound as it's indicated by the subsequent authority to Duarte

[00:20:49] Speaker 01:
to characterize it as structural error and to apply de novo review.

[00:20:53] Speaker 03:
The concern I have to be honest with you is I think that's a really important principle and cases like this threaten it to be candid.

[00:21:06] Speaker 03:
But I appreciate your argument.

[00:21:07] Speaker 03:
I appreciate your advocacy on behalf of your client.

[00:21:10] Speaker 03:
It just puts us in a really tough spot.

[00:21:12] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:21:13] Speaker 01:
I think the British court did not address Mr. Vegas directly at all.

[00:21:18] Speaker 01:
And before accepting his waiver, and that's the bottom line, I understand the court's position and that he signed a written waiver in English that did not speak to translation.

[00:21:28] Speaker 04:
And he signed a fact stipulation.

[00:21:30] Speaker 04:
That, more importantly, that's the part that, to me, takes this case outside

[00:21:36] Speaker 04:
the analysis that was done in Duarte-Higuereda, because he stipulated to all of the evidence that would be used to convict him.

[00:21:46] Speaker 04:
And so to say then that his waiver was involuntary, that's a reach for me.

[00:21:53] Speaker 04:
But I understand.

[00:21:54] Speaker 01:
I think only under plain error would you get to the facts of evolution in the court.

[00:21:58] Speaker 00:
And you don't contend, again, that the stipulation itself was entered involuntarily?

[00:22:05] Speaker 00:
No, I do not.

[00:22:06] Speaker 00:
Or there's no record one way or the other, but you don't assert that because it wasn't translated that there's anything wrong with the stipulation?

[00:22:12] Speaker 00:
Correct.

[00:22:12] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:22:12] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:22:13] Speaker 04:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:22:14] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:22:14] Speaker 04:
Thank you to both counsel for your helpful arguments in this case.

[00:22:18] Speaker 04:
The case just argued is submitted for decision by the court.