[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
We have a number of submitted cases, but otherwise we'll take up the cases for oral argument in the order they appear on the calendar, starting with Carlson versus Chauvin. Counsel, whenever you're ready.

[00:00:17] Speaker 00:
May it please the court, counsel, and my friend, Mr. Phelps.

[00:00:21] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I'd like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal, if possible.

[00:00:26] Speaker 00:
I'm This case presents a unique set of circumstances as a factual matter. We have a local law enforcement agency that's asked to respond to a DV call, but only in a supporting capacity, while another remote law enforcement agency is going to be tasked with the primary assignment for investigating the crime, all against the backdrop of an officer from the law enforcement agency, City of Ritzville, That would normally investigate, but their officer is not just a family member of people involved in the domestic violence incident, but actually responded to the scene, didn't tell his chief, and actually denied the response.

[00:01:12] Speaker 01:
Counsel, I think we're familiar with the factual background, and I'd like to ask you the following question. Just speaking for myself, it does appear to me that there was probable cause to believe that an assault had occurred and possibly also a criminal failure to report on the part of Officer Carlson. But where is the exigency and why wouldn't it have been sufficient to simply watch the house while getting a telephonic warrant or otherwise working to get a warrant.

[00:01:53] Speaker 01:
There just seems to me to be no exigency, which is you either need consent or exigency in addition to probable cause. And that's where I get stuck.

[00:02:07] Speaker 00:
I appreciate that, Judge. I think the exigency arises from the fact that, or at least the reason of belief, of the exigency arises for our responding officers and the defendants in this case from the knowledge that Officer Matt Carlson of the Ritzville Police Department had responded to the scene at the request of the mother of the victim, removed the husband who's the alleged perpetrator from the home.

[00:02:37] Speaker 00:
And then Carlson Officer Matt Carlson denies that that happened.

[00:02:43] Speaker 01:
What does that have to do with exigency? They know at the time they seized the house and the phone that neither the victim nor the perpetrator is there. Correct? Correct. Okay. So what they have is somebody assaulted somebody allegedly in the house and they both left. So where's the exigency?

[00:03:07] Speaker 00:
Sorry, Judge, I should have started with the legal prong for it. So there's certainly exigency when you're concerned about either the safety of the officers or folks in the home, that's not present here because they do know everybody's been separated, or at least that's the report. And we have Officer Chavez going in the home with consent.

[00:03:24] Speaker 01:
With consent, and they see neither of them there.

[00:03:28] Speaker 00:
But the other way you can establish exigency is when you're worried about the destruction of evidence.

[00:03:33] Speaker 01:
And what other than absolute sheer guesswork caused them to think that There would be destruction of evidence. There was originally consent to go into the house. The phone is just kind of sitting there. Why would they think that there would be destruction of evidence?

[00:03:54] Speaker 00:
So the tie for the destruction of evidence is the conduct that I've already been repeating that I know the court is aware of, and it's those evidence. acts that were taken that would give our officers a reasonable inference?

[00:04:06] Speaker 02:
But what of those acts did the officers actually know, right? I mean, there's, and we're on summary judgment, so we're drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiffs, right? So at this point, all we have is that they know that the suspect and the alleged victim are not in the house, and that I understand that Mrs. Carlson or Tana Carlson is married to the suspect, but she's also the mother of the alleged victim. Is that correct?

[00:04:35] Speaker 00:
Correct.

[00:04:36] Speaker 02:
Right. So I don't know why there's an attribution, a motive to cover up anything here. And she seems like she allowed the officers to come in the one time to make sure everyone was out. But at that point, I mean, based on case law, I don't think just the fact that she's a family member there's a reason to believe she's been going in and destroying evidence.

[00:05:04] Speaker 00:
And judge the way that those facts are repeated. I would agree like that in and of itself certainly wouldn't be enough, but here you have her involvement in the conduct that looks to be at least reasonable inference for our officers who are responding of covering up that an incident occurred. And it's not just her texting officer, Matt Carlson to come to the home. It's also her coming out and trying to minimize the event as, hey, this is just an argument, but then she also admits, I was expecting somebody to come.

[00:05:37] Speaker 00:
So our officers who are coming in the role in which they're coming, which, I mean, frankly, is a bit hamstrung. They're not coming as the investigating officers. They can't. They're coming to secure the scene. They're confronted with a situation where they know that there have been steps, or at least they can draw reasonable inferences from that, of a cover-up of what happened. And that is the evidentiary tie that we point to.

[00:06:05] Speaker 01:
Well, counsel, the recitation that you've just given might conceivably deal with the phone because there was a text. What sort of evidence did they expect to find in the house where one person allegedly hit another and they're both gone? What justifies seizing the house?

[00:06:29] Speaker 00:
The securing of the house while another agency decides whether or not they get to a warrant came from the information that the DV incident happened within the house and Sergeant Garcia's education and training that when you have DV incidents, there's typically physical evidence left. And that's the tie that we would point to for the exigency as it relates to the house.

[00:06:51] Speaker 01:
That's basically a guess.

[00:06:54] Speaker 00:
And I understand. And if that's where the court is going to come down on whether or not this crosses the threshold for something beyond guess, then that doesn't bode well for my clients.

[00:07:09] Speaker 00:
Our position, however, is there was enough based upon the misconduct of Officer Carlson, Ms. Carlson's complicit conduct, and the education and training experience that Sergeant Garcia had about responding to DV incidents, knowing that it happened in the home, that that's enough to at least create that reasonable interest.

[00:07:30] Speaker 02:
But if the officer, I mean, it's clearly established that the officers at least have to try to get a warrant. They have to show that it was not possible to get a warrant. If they want to go in to secure, if they have probable cause to believe a crime occurred and probable cause to believe there is evidence of that crime in the house and they think it's in danger, unless it's imminently being destroyed, which at some point I think Ms. Carlson just leaves for 15 minutes. Why in that whole time there was not a call to say, can we get a warrant to secure the house?

[00:08:05] Speaker 00:
I don't think that our record reveals on summary judgment what the alternative law enforcement agency was doing.

[00:08:14] Speaker 00:
But what's happening for our officers who are on the scene is they understand they're not in the position to investigate or go get the warrant. Their job is simply secure the scene let Grant County, that was the remote agency, conduct the investigation. And that had to happen because Officer Matt Carlson was running against the sheriff for Adams County.

[00:08:36] Speaker 02:
Right. But at the same time, I mean, they still have to have probable cause, right, to enter someone's home.

[00:08:46] Speaker 00:
Agreed, Your Honor.

[00:08:47] Speaker 02:
Yes. And even if their purpose is to secure the scene, If they're entering the home and walking around, they're effectively conducting a search, right? If they happen to see something in plain view, we'd be arguing about suppression, right? So I think there's, you know, there's just seems to me it's, you know.

[00:09:07] Speaker 04:
Well, after the initial consensual entry, was there any entry other than to follow Ms. Carlson into the home when she entered the home? I mean, as I read the record and read the district court's order, Every entry after that was because she entered and they were following her.

[00:09:25] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honor. And I think that does go to answer.

[00:09:30] Speaker 00:
It's Justice Sung. Judge. Judge Sung.

[00:09:32] Speaker 04:
Yeah, we're just judges here. No justice in the Ninth Circuit.

[00:09:36] Speaker 00:
Well, I'm willing to promote you if you're willing to promote me.

[00:09:40] Speaker 00:
And I think it does answer Judge Sung's question about the entry. When they're following Ms. Carlson in, it's because they've already told her, hey, we need to secure the scene. And now the person that they're concerned about potentially damaging evidence or destroying evidence is walking back into the scene.

[00:09:56] Speaker 01:
So all of this relies on it being plausible to think that she was planning to destroy evidence and that there was any such evidence to destroy. Right. Because you can't just follow somebody into their house if they say you can't enter.

[00:10:16] Speaker 00:
Agreed.

[00:10:17] Speaker 01:
Right. So it all hinges on whether it's reasonable for them to have believed that there was evidence in the house, and secondly, that she would have destroyed it. And both of those, to me, just – I will tell you, I just have a hard time seeing the connection.

[00:10:37] Speaker 00:
I agree with the analysis you just laid out, Judge. And if you don't find that these facts that are presented support those conclusions – your analysis is correct, then you have to say there's no PC or you have to say there's no exigent circumstances. We just take a different view of what should be given.

[00:10:55] Speaker 00:
But that really doesn't resolve the appeal because there's a second element to qualified immunity, which is what brings us all together. And that's whether or not the law is so clearly established that these officers, sorry, not these officers, every reasonable officer would have understood what they were about to do was unconstitutional.

[00:11:18] Speaker 02:
So here I'm looking at Vail. It's a Supreme Court case where the Supreme Court said, overturned Louisiana Supreme Court, had said there were exigent circumstances to search a house for drugs when they had arrested the defendant just outside the home. The police entered the home. And then the defendant's mother and brother arrived at home. And then the police went ahead and conducted a warrantless search of the home.

[00:11:51] Speaker 02:
And in that case, the presence of mother and brother were related to the defendant who would have motive to destroy evidence. And the Supreme Court said they still didn't have exigent circumstances to conduct a search, even though drugs are easily hidden, removed and destroyed. So I think in those circumstances. It's clearly established the police cannot conduct a warrantless search of the home. I'm not sure why just, you know, Mrs. Carlson's relationship to the suspect and the victim means she has to be followed around her own home.

[00:12:28] Speaker 00:
Understood, Your Honor. I see my time that I asked to reserve for rebuttal is up. Is it okay if I answer? Thank you. The difference here really lies in the core principles of what makes something clearly established, Your Honor. The key of which in your question and what would distinguish Vail is for our officers who are on the scene, it has to be developed in a factually concrete way. And here, as I started, we have officers who are in a unique situation of the supporting role.

[00:12:59] Speaker 00:
They can't investigate because they're conflicted out. They have to secure the scene. They think reasonably that another officer is engaging in misconduct. that case hasn't arisen before, whether it defines probable cause or exigent circumstances, Your Honor. And so for that reason, we would say that at least as to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the district court should be reversed.

[00:13:25] Speaker 02:
Okay. Thank you.

[00:13:25] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, Doug Phelps on behalf of the plaintiffs.

[00:13:40] Speaker 03:
Good to be in front of you today with my esteemed colleague here, who I'm arguing against. We know each other well.

[00:13:50] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, an unusual case in that Sheriff Wagner said they had a conflict and therefore they couldn't investigate the case. But nevertheless, they go to the scene and they say, quote-unquote, secure the scene and go onto the porch, part of the curtilage of the house, where they seized the phone that was left on a small table that they had out there on the porch.

[00:14:30] Speaker 03:
I think what works against the exigency is that she doesn't took them into the house they walked through the house at least one of the officers they didn't didn't see anything in plain sight at least if they did they don't talk about it in their reports or in this case they verify that the other two children were okay and then they go back out and at that point the phone is seized and my Mrs. Carlson, Shauna Carlson challenges the officer, like, do you have a warrant to take my phone?

[00:15:09] Speaker 03:
I want my phone back. And he refuses to give it to her.

[00:15:13] Speaker 03:
There was never a request, at least as documented in the record, from Grant County, the investigating agency, for anyone to secure the home.

[00:15:24] Speaker 03:
There was never a request for anyone to seize the cell phone. And indeed, after they completed their investigation, They told them to give the phone back, and they never went out and went through the home. So the investigating agency apparently didn't have any interest in the phone or in going through the house, and they're the agency that was conducting the investigation.

[00:15:55] Speaker 03:
All officers involved in this case said they couldn't handle it, and Shauna Carlson, calls it an argument rather than a crime.

[00:16:07] Speaker 04:
And there was some reason for the officers to be concerned. I mean, they were sent based on a report of domestic violence. The report came reluctantly, but did come from, I'll use first names just because it's hard to keep track of the characters. Officer Matt first denied to his boss, the chief of police, but then ultimately acknowledged he'd received this text message from, uh, Shauna to get his brother, Andrew, out of the house.

[00:16:39] Speaker 04:
Andrew being the alleged perpetrator of the assault on his daughter.

[00:16:46] Speaker 04:
And in the meantime. Shauna's brother calls.

[00:16:52] Speaker 04:
It's a small town. I'm not surprised everybody knows everybody else calls the chief of police and a personal call to say, I'm going over there. because Andrew just assaulted his daughter and I'm going over to assault Andrew.

[00:17:09] Speaker 04:
So the chief of police has reason to think something bad's happening. And the best inference is that the brother of Shauna got that information from Shauna. So there is reason for their concern that something has happened. Do you disagree with that?

[00:17:27] Speaker 03:
I think that the record is unclear. Uh, There's an assertion at one point that the phone call came from Kelsey.

[00:17:37] Speaker 04:
Matt told his boss he received a text from Shauna.

[00:17:44] Speaker 03:
I think there's also.

[00:17:46] Speaker 04:
So there's reason to at least have some suspicion that there's on that phone evidence of this text message to Matt.

[00:17:53] Speaker 03:
Well, I think it would. I don't know that rises to a level of suspicion that.

[00:17:58] Speaker 04:
How could there not be suspicion if Matt told his boss reluctantly but did tell him, I received a text from her telling me to get Andrew out of the house?

[00:18:10] Speaker 03:
That would be a contact with her earlier in the day saying that they had him removed. But remember, after that, they walked through the house.

[00:18:24] Speaker 04:
Well, no, actually, they didn't. They followed her, and the initial consent search was just the entryway. And then one officer went back to check on the other kids. There was not anything that seems to me to resemble a search of the house, and I read both the district court order and the opening brief carefully, or the answering brief carefully. It never alleges a search. It constantly talks about seizure, that is, preserve the crime scene.

[00:18:51] Speaker 03:
Well, they...

[00:18:52] Speaker 03:
There's no doubt that they entered the house. I don't think that's really in this.

[00:18:56] Speaker 04:
And in the first instance with consent. And after that, is there any indication they entered a house except to follow her for a limited purpose of checking on the children? And that was the first one after that. They only entered again when she entered, and they went to follow her.

[00:19:15] Speaker 03:
That's correct, but she didn't agree necessarily for them to enter.

[00:19:19] Speaker 04:
No, they could have been consensual. Nobody's really making that argument. The concern is if they're trying to preserve the scene for the neighboring sheriff's office that has responsibility to investigate, they can't really preserve the scene if she keeps going back in unaccompanied, so they follow her.

[00:19:41] Speaker 03:
Well, certainly, once she's no longer there or once she's outside the house, they could have secured the outside.

[00:19:49] Speaker 04:
Well, and that, in fact, is what they did. Once she stayed outside and once she left, there's no allegation even, let alone evidence, that they entered the house again.

[00:19:59] Speaker 03:
But there was no suspicion that would have left them to the point where they could have obtained a warrant. Well, wait, wait. They never tried to get a warrant.

[00:20:07] Speaker 04:
And why didn't they? Because they weren't conducting a search, and they weren't making the decision as to whether a search should be conducted. They didn't need a warrant simply to preserve the scene. Well, they need a warrant to seize the home. Well, do they? I believe they do, and I think the Fourth Amendment is very clear on that. Well, if you've entered a crime scene, I mean, if you're on a crime scene, what law says you have to get a warrant to simply secure the scene.

[00:20:38] Speaker 03:
Well, you have to have some expectation that you're going to find evidence in that home. They went into the home and didn't see any evidence.

[00:20:47] Speaker 04:
Well, maybe there were bloody towels in the bathroom. They weren't searching, so they wouldn't have encountered it. They're simply trying to preserve the scene. But we're not dealing with what may have been there. We're dealing with a scene of... So what case authority can you point us to that made it clearly established that in these very unusual circumstances... What the officers did was unlawful.

[00:21:09] Speaker 03:
Well, they acted beyond the scope.

[00:21:11] Speaker 04:
No, no, no, no, no. What case can you point me? I mean, the whole point of this is the clearly established wrong. And you've got to point to cases. And the Supreme Court's been very clear, certainly with our court, that you can't simply operate from very general principles. You have to have something more specific than that.

[00:21:29] Speaker 04:
What is there remotely close to these facts?

[00:21:33] Speaker 03:
Well, I don't believe there are any cases where they take them home.

[00:21:39] Speaker 04:
Isn't that the problem? How could it be clearly established that there are no cases that are remotely similar to these facts?

[00:21:45] Speaker 03:
We know that there has to be exigent circumstances, and there wasn't.

[00:21:50] Speaker 04:
You know based on what? Point to me to a case that says these circumstances don't justify preserving the scene Well, we don't have a case exactly on point. Not even remotely close is what I found in the opening brief.

[00:22:05] Speaker 03:
Well, that's because normally when they do this, it's a drug case or something, perhaps where they believe that people are flushing drugs down the toilet or something. But even in that case, the Supreme Court has said in Vail that that's not a good enough basis for an exigent circumstance.

[00:22:25] Speaker 04:
Or a search. Vail was very much about search. There's a difference between a search and a seizure. Indeed, I'll point to your client's answering brief, which cites to the Supreme Court's case, Riley v. California, a well-known cell phone case.

[00:22:42] Speaker 04:
And there was a lawful seizure of a cell phone, seized incident to arrest. But the point made by the Supreme Court is they couldn't search the phone that had been seized without getting a warrant. But that doesn't help your client's case here because, in fact, there is no allegation, let alone proof, that there ever was a search of the phone or, for that matter, of the residence. There was a seizure to preserve the scene. That's a very different situation.

[00:23:13] Speaker 03:
Well, they seized the phone claiming that they believed they were going to find some evidence.

[00:23:19] Speaker 04:
And, in fact, they had reason to have that belief because Officer Matt told his bot that he received a text message from Shauna to the effect of get Andrew out of the house. So that seems to me to be a pretty good reason to think there might be something on that phone.

[00:23:36] Speaker 04:
I don't know that that arises. You give me a case that's remotely close to that, that clearly establishes that that's unlawful.

[00:23:43] Speaker 03:
I believe, well, I don't have a case.

[00:23:46] Speaker 04:
I think the answer to that question is no. There have been no cases cited in the answering brief that supports that proposition.

[00:23:56] Speaker 03:
There was no arrest made, no exigent circumstances, and no reasonable suspicion.

[00:24:02] Speaker 04:
Bob, you say there's no exigent circumstances. Point me to the case that clearly establishes that the facts of this case do not provide exigent circumstances to preserve the scene.

[00:24:13] Speaker 04:
There probably aren't. I don't know of any. See, as long as you say there probably aren't any, that's sort of a problem because the standard for qualified immunity is very tough.

[00:24:26] Speaker 04:
Indeed, it says, a clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.

[00:24:40] Speaker 04:
Qualified immunity protects, quote, all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law, close quote. Those are Supreme Court quotations.

[00:24:50] Speaker 04:
What do we have here that makes it so clear? Frankly, I've been on this court a long time.

[00:24:55] Speaker 04:
Seems to me that's a pretty good case for them saying we've got to preserve this scene until the odd situation of the neighboring county being responsible for the investigation.

[00:25:04] Speaker 03:
Well, there wasn't anything on the scene to preserve. They'd walked through the house. They'd been in the house.

[00:25:10] Speaker 04:
You know if they'd gone to the bathroom and found any bloody towels?

[00:25:14] Speaker 03:
No, you don't. They went into the house, and we know they entered the house.

[00:25:18] Speaker 04:
They entered the house, and they searched the house. Is there any evidence of a search of the house or simply entry following her and talking to the younger children.

[00:25:27] Speaker 03:
The entry into the house is a search.

[00:25:31] Speaker 04:
Well, how was that? That entry was done with consent. So what unlawful search was conducted? Any evidence that anybody looked into a bathroom?

[00:25:41] Speaker 03:
There's no evidence of what all they did while they were in there. So you don't know whether a search was conducted or not? We know that they entered the home and they talked to the children in the home.

[00:25:53] Speaker 04:
You don't know if they ever checked to see if there might be evidence someplace, such as a bloody towel.

[00:25:58] Speaker 03:
I don't know how thorough the search was.

[00:26:01] Speaker 04:
But you're willing to label it a search that's unlawful without knowing whether there might have been evidence and without pointing me to any case that in anything remotely like these circumstances clearly establishes that it's unlawful. So how does that satisfy the qualified immunity requirement, that it be clearly established that only somebody truly incompetent or deliberately violating the law doesn't get qualified immunity.

[00:26:27] Speaker 03:
They weren't investigating it.

[00:26:29] Speaker 04:
Well, that's sort of the point. They weren't investigating, and they told her that from the very beginning. They were simply trying to preserve the scene.

[00:26:38] Speaker 04:
So how was there evidence or even allegation of a search if all they were trying to do was lock down the scene?

[00:26:45] Speaker 03:
The investigating agency never told them to preserve the scene.

[00:26:50] Speaker 04:
Well, but they don't know what they're supposed to do. They're the first officers there. The neighboring county is like an hour away. So they're doing the best they can in a bad situation. What tells them that they can't act independently to try to preserve the scene until the people responsible for the investigation show up?

[00:27:09] Speaker 03:
Well, the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendment tell them that.

[00:27:12] Speaker 04:
Well, that's a pretty general statement, and the Supreme Court has made it real clear that You can't have a real high level of generality. You've got to get something more specific to the facts. And I found nothing that remotely resembles these facts.

[00:27:27] Speaker 04:
And you tell me that you don't know of anything that does either.

[00:27:31] Speaker 03:
Not right on point. I don't have anything right on point.

[00:27:34] Speaker 04:
Well, isn't that a problem? Because how can we deny qualified immunity if the law hadn't been clearly established?

[00:27:40] Speaker 03:
Well, it doesn't meet the three exceptions. There was not probable cause.

[00:27:47] Speaker 03:
There was no one present in the home. They knew that.

[00:27:51] Speaker 03:
Neither the victim nor the alleged perpetrator were in the home. They knew that.

[00:27:57] Speaker 04:
But the concern they professed was not to protect against further violence. It was to preserve the scene.

[00:28:05] Speaker 03:
They could have done that without entering the home.

[00:28:10] Speaker 04:
Not if she kept going back into it. And as you've acknowledged, all their subsequent entries, came because she went back into the house. They weren't trying to go back into the house themselves. Well, she wanted to get her medication and other... And that's fine. And they followed to make sure that that's all she was doing. There's no allegation they did anything else. Well, there's... Okay. The facts are... Okay is a problem. You've got to point to something that clearly establishes what they did was unlawful so that unless they're truly incompetent or deliberately violating the law...

[00:28:43] Speaker 04:
They are entitled to qualified immunity, and you haven't given me any case that remotely resembles this situation, so. Well, thank you.

[00:28:51] Speaker 03:
Anything?

[00:28:56] Speaker 01:
No questions.

[00:28:56] Speaker 03:
All right. Thank you.

[00:29:03] Speaker 00:
Just one point on rebuttal, and it really does focus on the qualified immunity analysis more generally.

[00:29:09] Speaker 00:
The first test is whether or not There's a constitutional violation, and I understand from questions from the court that there's at least members of the panel who are concerned about whether the PC is established or whether exigent circumstances are established. Of course, we point to the district court's rendition of what the court thought were the undisputed facts. That's at the excerpts of the record of 30 or 37. We do think there's the factual support that even if thin. there is enough for the reasonable inferences to exist.

[00:29:43] Speaker 02:
But we're not reviewing the district court's factual findings, correct? We don't have jurisdiction on this interlocutory review to second guess her factual determination.

[00:29:52] Speaker 00:
Agreed, Judge. And if I misspoke, I apologize. I wasn't trying to suggest you're going to go back and parse that out. I'm saying that's the part of the record where those facts were made. So we accept what the judge said.

[00:30:04] Speaker 01:
And you do agree that in the posture of this case, we must take all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

[00:30:15] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:30:18] Speaker 00:
With the one exception of we do have the video in the record and under Scott v. Harris, a court doesn't have to take a plaintiff's perspective of, oh, this is what happened if the video evidence conclusively shows that that's false. I don't think that is true.

[00:30:34] Speaker 01:
I was going to say, is there anything that you think the video shows that makes other things in the record false?

[00:30:42] Speaker 00:
Not for the analysis we need to do for QI, Your Honor.

[00:30:45] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:30:46] Speaker 00:
I think I just got a little extra time.

[00:30:49] Speaker 00:
My second point, oh, I'm sorry, I'm over time.

[00:30:52] Speaker 02:
You can make your point.

[00:30:53] Speaker 00:
The final point was really as to the second element of the clearly or of qualified immunity or the clearly established prong.

[00:31:01] Speaker 00:
And I know there is some tension in the case law between the ideas of, you know, how close did the facts have to be versus is the principle so well established? In this case, we submit to the court that what makes this so unique is from other cases is why we really need a case if we're going to deny qualified immunity, that's factually similar, not just well-established legal principles. And in this case, it truly is a unique circumstance where three different agencies are trying to coordinate about what's going to happen next.

[00:31:40] Speaker 00:
And if you take a look at the excerpts of the record at page 53, You're going to see a reflection of that from the different district court where the judge was dismissing the outrage claim. And she actually acknowledges in this case, the officers were acting with good faith.

[00:32:02] Speaker 00:
She acknowledges they in good faith believed that they had probable cause and exigent circumstances based upon the misconduct of the family member. And I think it's that acknowledgement that really exposes why this court should reverse the district court and grant both officers qualified immunity. Thank you.

[00:32:22] Speaker 02:
Thank you, counsel. This matter is submitted.