[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
May I please the court?

[00:00:01] Speaker 00:
My name is Kwok Pham.

[00:00:03] Speaker 00:
I represent the appellants, DR who is in care of Contra Costa DCFS.

[00:00:12] Speaker 00:
The mom is here sitting at the side bench and the father cannot be here because he's out of state on a work assignment.

[00:00:23] Speaker 00:
May I start now?

[00:00:25] Speaker 03:
Please.

[00:00:25] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:00:25] Speaker 00:
So this case arose from a dependency case in

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
in Contra Costa County.

[00:00:31] Speaker 00:
The county seized the child from the grandma, whom the mom asked to take care of the child because the mother could not take care of the child because she was indigent and homeless.

[00:00:50] Speaker 00:
The county seized the child without a warrant, then put

[00:00:53] Speaker 00:
the chai in the first, actually two foster homes, the first foster home very briefly, and then in the second foster home, which turned out to be a very dangerous environment for the child.

[00:01:08] Speaker 00:
The foster parents used a, the daka tot, and engaged, she's done a swatting practice, even though the chai could turn over on her own.

[00:01:22] Speaker 03:
Let me ask you this council first of all, let me let me say I'm sure I speak for my colleagues as well This is a very tragic tragic case and certainly our sympathies are with the loved ones as to the incident But we're here on legal issues and this is a third amended complaint, right?

[00:01:39] Speaker 03:
So you've had a couple of opportunities to amend here, correct?

[00:01:43] Speaker 03:
Yes, and the complaint

[00:01:47] Speaker 03:
is really internally inconsistent.

[00:01:50] Speaker 03:
So on the one hand, there are allegations that Ms.

[00:01:55] Speaker 03:
L knew of the danger of the docketot and knew that the baby had managed to roll over.

[00:02:01] Speaker 03:
And I suppose the argument is that there's an indication that you put those facts together that the danger would be known or anticipated to

[00:02:14] Speaker 03:
and that that might lead to a deliberate indifference claim.

[00:02:20] Speaker 03:
But on the other hand, there's also allegations that defendant Mizzell, and I'm looking now at paragraph 96, ER0795 of the complaint, that Mizzell failed to notice that there was a Dr. Todd in the home.

[00:02:35] Speaker 03:
And there's also allegations that

[00:02:39] Speaker 03:
she could have noticed, not that she did notice.

[00:02:43] Speaker 03:
So what do we do with all of those internally inconsistent and very, very conclusory allegations in the complaint in light of the plausibility pleading standard under Twombly and Iqbal?

[00:02:57] Speaker 00:
Yes, I mentioned the underlying case because

[00:03:02] Speaker 00:
I think the court should know that it is very difficult to know what's going on in the, what happens in the Penalty Court because of welfare institution code.

[00:03:15] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry, that is very difficult to know.

[00:03:17] Speaker 00:
To figure out what's going on during the dependency case because everything is shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality.

[00:03:26] Speaker 00:
Okay, so at the state of bidding we have certain evidence that

[00:03:33] Speaker 00:
point to a possibility of deliberate indifference?

[00:03:36] Speaker 00:
We do not have... No, I understand.

[00:03:39] Speaker 03:
I appreciate that, but we still have to apply the standard that there has to be facts to plausibly support the claim, right?

[00:03:48] Speaker 03:
And so on the one hand, there's some conclusory allegations that may support that, at least for purposes of 12b6, but then there are contradictory, like flat-out contradictory facts alleged as well

[00:04:02] Speaker 03:
How do we reconcile that and reach the conclusion that these are plausible claims?

[00:04:07] Speaker 00:
Yes, it's not totally contradictory.

[00:04:10] Speaker 00:
You mentioned that the Ms.

[00:04:11] Speaker 00:
Meiser failed to notice and you have the coordinator understand that because of the vulnerability of infant baby, the social worker has a heightened duty to inspect the home, okay, and every corner of the home

[00:04:31] Speaker 00:
every room.

[00:04:33] Speaker 00:
In this case, she just went to one room.

[00:04:37] Speaker 03:
So that's grossly negligent behavior, right?

[00:04:40] Speaker 03:
She should have inspected every room but didn't and didn't go into the room where the doctor taught was.

[00:04:46] Speaker 03:
Is that what you're saying?

[00:04:47] Speaker 00:
I think it's more than gross negligence.

[00:04:51] Speaker 00:
Later on, we found out that there was spoliation evidence that's very, very disturbing.

[00:05:00] Speaker 00:
Of course, the defendants will never admit that they deliberately ignored the danger.

[00:05:08] Speaker 00:
But in this case, they went in and then modified the record for the first-time inspections.

[00:05:17] Speaker 00:
And we believe that it was very strange, because usually the social court, it's like a better medical record.

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
So counsel, I want to follow up on Christian Nguyen's question.

[00:05:26] Speaker 01:
And I'm going to be asking the same question to your friend.

[00:05:29] Speaker 01:
And I'm going to highlight some of the same paragraphs that Judge Nguyen did.

[00:05:34] Speaker 01:
In paragraph 96, you say, defendant Maisel, as the case social worker, failed to notice that Franich had a docketot.

[00:05:49] Speaker 01:
232 you allege Maisel knew knew one month before the death that The docotot was used at the foster home.

[00:06:00] Speaker 01:
You're here as an officer of the court.

[00:06:03] Speaker 01:
Are you?

[00:06:03] Speaker 01:
Telling us that you are alleging in the complaint that Ms.

[00:06:08] Speaker 01:
Maisel knew before the death that a docotot was being used that the child was being swaddled in the docotot or are you saying no and

[00:06:18] Speaker 01:
She should have known, but she didn't.

[00:06:20] Speaker 00:
No, that's probably a mistake that the statement that she knew a month ahead of time that the doctor taught.

[00:06:29] Speaker 00:
We want to allege, our intention to allege that about a month before the death, she knew that the baby was swaddled and could turn over.

[00:06:38] Speaker 00:
That by itself indicate a danger.

[00:06:42] Speaker 03:
But she didn't know that there was a doctor taught at the home?

[00:06:47] Speaker 03:
Or you don't have any information?

[00:06:48] Speaker 00:
I don't have any information at that time.

[00:06:49] Speaker 00:
And it took quite a while to figure that one out.

[00:06:54] Speaker 04:
I'll also say in paragraph 231, alternatively, Maisel knew of but recklessly disregarded the danger of the docketot, of the tight swaddling of her unsupervised sleep in the docketot while being swaddled tightly.

[00:07:10] Speaker 04:
So you seem to be alleging that

[00:07:12] Speaker 04:
Maisel knew that the baby was swaddled and was sleeping in the docketot.

[00:07:18] Speaker 00:
Yes, that was speculation, yeah.

[00:07:20] Speaker 04:
It's speculation?

[00:07:22] Speaker 00:
Well, from the... We don't have the full picture.

[00:07:27] Speaker 00:
From the coronary report, we knew that the docketot was involved.

[00:07:33] Speaker 00:
And from the report to the dependency court, we knew that swaddling was all the time.

[00:07:39] Speaker 00:
So we put things together and...

[00:07:42] Speaker 00:
Although she may or may not know the doctor thought, I think we have evidence that point to that she knew of the doctor thought, but the evidence was spoliated.

[00:07:51] Speaker 00:
or conceal, or cover up, or destroy.

[00:07:54] Speaker 00:
We knew for sure that she knew that sweating was used.

[00:07:58] Speaker 01:
What evidence, even if, why don't you tell us, what evidence do you have, and we can look at whether it's in the record or not, what evidence do you have that Maizel knew there was a docketot in the foster home?

[00:08:11] Speaker 00:
We don't have evidence at the time that she knew of the docketot.

[00:08:16] Speaker 04:
Well, don't you have to prove that the actor was aware of a substantial risk of harm and then placed the injured person into that risk?

[00:08:27] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:08:27] Speaker 04:
In order to sustain your Eighth Amendment claim?

[00:08:30] Speaker 00:
Okay, we made the inference because the docker top was used a lot of time at the home and the social worker is supposed to inspect the home.

[00:08:40] Speaker 03:
At this particular home?

[00:08:42] Speaker 00:
Yes, yes, and I think we have, I believe we have a picture of, they even used Dr. Todd when they took the child out on a park.

[00:08:51] Speaker 00:
Did Ms.

[00:08:53] Speaker 01:
Maisel ever visit the home herself?

[00:08:56] Speaker 00:
Yes, as a duty, as a casual shocker, she was supposed to visit the case.

[00:09:00] Speaker 01:
I'm not asking you if she was supposed to.

[00:09:02] Speaker 01:
Do you have any knowledge that she actually did visit the home?

[00:09:07] Speaker 00:
Yes, she did three times as a duty.

[00:09:09] Speaker 01:
Three times went in the home at a time when you're alleging that Dakotat was there.

[00:09:14] Speaker 00:
That's right, yeah.

[00:09:15] Speaker 04:
But you also allege at 2.30 of your complaint that Maisel and other DCFS defendants failed to inspect the foster home and the sleeping arrangements for DR as required by state law at three regular monthly visits to the foster family home.

[00:09:33] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:09:36] Speaker 00:
Yes, there was actually three visits by Ms.

[00:09:39] Speaker 00:
Meisler.

[00:09:40] Speaker 00:
Before that, by other social workers who screen the foster home for placement.

[00:09:47] Speaker 00:
But we know definitely that Ms.

[00:09:49] Speaker 00:
Meisler visited the home three times.

[00:09:51] Speaker 01:
But what you're saying, as I understand it, in 230 is she was there three times, but she didn't do what was required by state law when she was there.

[00:09:59] Speaker 00:
That's right.

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
And there is very strong evidence of guilt

[00:10:06] Speaker 00:
because of all sorts of cover-ups in the dependency state court.

[00:10:12] Speaker 00:
Three days after the death, Maisel knew that we received a report that the child turned over and found death face down.

[00:10:22] Speaker 00:
And there were five continuations and six hearings where Contra Costa County and Maisel hid that from the court.

[00:10:30] Speaker 00:
And at the very last moment when the coroner report came out,

[00:10:35] Speaker 00:
The county council actually tried to hide the evidence, hide, conceal the coroner report by, made that confidential on the 827.

[00:10:46] Speaker 01:
Council, I should know the answer to this question, and I apologize for not being 100% sure, but were you allowed any discovery in this case?

[00:10:54] Speaker 00:
Yes, but we have run into a lot of trouble because of the 827.

[00:10:57] Speaker 01:
What discovery were you allowed in this civil case?

[00:11:04] Speaker 00:
Before reaching the allowed to look at the record, I have to file a motion called welfare institution code 827 with the court for permission to

[00:11:18] Speaker 00:
take a look at the record and for permission for Contra Costa account to release the record.

[00:11:23] Speaker 03:
But eventually you caught the discovery.

[00:11:25] Speaker 00:
Yes, and I took three tries and I believe at least like a year and a half.

[00:11:32] Speaker 00:
The first try is like partial record, like it's not usable.

[00:11:37] Speaker 00:
And then the second time... Right, but at the end of the day you got additional discovery.

[00:11:41] Speaker 03:
Yes, and finally... And is there additional discovery that you think you would seek that you didn't receive?

[00:11:47] Speaker 00:
No, we received everything, but the county engaged in some kind of tactic, delay tactic.

[00:11:53] Speaker 03:
I understand that.

[00:11:55] Speaker 03:
Your time is short, so I just want to make sure that I understand that eventually you got everything that you were seeking.

[00:12:00] Speaker 00:
Yes, and then it takes some while to go to the record and figure out the strain occurrence.

[00:12:05] Speaker 01:
Do you try to take any depositions?

[00:12:07] Speaker 00:
Yes, we did, yes.

[00:12:08] Speaker 01:
Did you take Ms.

[00:12:09] Speaker 01:
Maizel's deposition?

[00:12:10] Speaker 00:
Yes, we had to do that before we got all the record because the court imposed a certain deadline.

[00:12:16] Speaker 03:
Right, because it went to summary judgment, so by then discovery had closed and you got what you wanted.

[00:12:21] Speaker 00:
Yes, but it took us a while, sometimes, to figure out the dispoliations of evidence.

[00:12:26] Speaker 04:
Right.

[00:12:27] Speaker 04:
Your theory is that the baby suffocated because she was tightly swaddled and was able to flip over and the docketot was too soft and caused her suffocation.

[00:12:42] Speaker 04:
And then at paragraph 111, you cite the autopsy report

[00:12:47] Speaker 04:
that she had internal bleeding in her abdominal cavity and bruises to her internal organs and on the back of her head.

[00:12:54] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:12:55] Speaker 04:
Is that consistent with your theory of suffocation?

[00:13:00] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:13:01] Speaker 00:
At that time, we had sketchy evidence.

[00:13:06] Speaker 00:
We didn't even know who has the record, which was the Concord Police Department.

[00:13:11] Speaker 00:
Even with the Concord Police Department, I had to pull teeth to get the information from them.

[00:13:18] Speaker 00:
They had all the photograph of the scene of death stored somewhere, and they lost it.

[00:13:23] Speaker 00:
And I had some expertise in computer, so I had to help them retrieve the record.

[00:13:27] Speaker 00:
And once I see the scene of that, it was damning.

[00:13:34] Speaker 00:
It was horrific.

[00:13:35] Speaker 00:
It looked like a death trap.

[00:13:37] Speaker 00:
It's a tiny bassinet.

[00:13:39] Speaker 00:
the doctor thought, I'm sure you see the picture, and all the blankets, and then from a report we figure out through the help of Dr. Omalu, he's a former forensic examiner.

[00:13:52] Speaker 00:
that there was indication of suffocations.

[00:14:00] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry, I forgot to ask you, did you want to save any time for rebuttal?

[00:14:02] Speaker 00:
Yes, I have five minutes for the rebuttal, if I still have.

[00:14:06] Speaker 03:
All right, you've got a minute and a half or so, so let's save that for rebuttal then.

[00:14:23] Speaker 02:
Good morning.

[00:14:24] Speaker 02:
Excuse me.

[00:14:26] Speaker 02:
Good morning, and may it please the court.

[00:14:27] Speaker 02:
Jason Malk on behalf of Contra Costa County and Defendant Tasha Mazzal.

[00:14:33] Speaker 02:
The court was interested in the issues related to the allegations on the failure to protect.

[00:14:39] Speaker 02:
So we can start there.

[00:14:41] Speaker 02:
And as the court astutely pointed out, the allegations in the complaint are internally inconsistent, and they don't

[00:14:50] Speaker 02:
really amount to showing or even a plausible showing of knowledge on behalf of Tosh Mizel as to the potential dangers that might befall DR at the foster home.

[00:15:01] Speaker 01:
Let me push back on that.

[00:15:04] Speaker 01:
So Ms.

[00:15:06] Speaker 01:
Mizel is trained, she's a social worker?

[00:15:11] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:15:11] Speaker 01:
So she's a trained social worker and part of her job is the safety of children placed in a foster home, right?

[00:15:20] Speaker 01:
Is to inspect the home and to ensure that the foster mother is providing a safe environment Yes, and she she went to the home on several occasions at least three occasions and the complaint although again There are some inconsistencies the complaint clearly alleges to me at least that she knew that there was a docketot in the I'm looking at tooth 231 and 232 she knew of the danger of the docketot and

[00:15:44] Speaker 01:
She knew of the tight swaddling, she knew of the baby's unsupervised sleep in the docketot while being swaddled tightly.

[00:15:52] Speaker 01:
And she was in the home three times and the docketot was there and there was publicity about the docketot being unsafe that someone in her position

[00:16:04] Speaker 01:
might be expected to know.

[00:16:05] Speaker 01:
So why is all that conclusory for deliberate indifference of allowing not doing anything about the baby sleeping in something that is known even by the manufacturer to be dangerous?

[00:16:20] Speaker 02:
I don't want to recall the timing of when those issues came up, but I believe it was always prior to this incident.

[00:16:27] Speaker 02:
But I would say that the

[00:16:29] Speaker 02:
What is conclusory about this, and then does not amount to the deliberate indifference on the behalf of Tashmazal, is not only the internal inconsistencies, but we don't actually know the context of the child rolling over.

[00:16:44] Speaker 02:
The only time that this complaint mentions that the child rolls over is in paragraph 232.

[00:16:52] Speaker 02:
And so we don't know if that was in the child was awake.

[00:16:54] Speaker 02:
We don't know if the child was asleep.

[00:16:55] Speaker 02:
We don't know if it was the child was swaddled.

[00:16:57] Speaker 02:
In fact, if we look at paragraph 156 of the complaint, it says that it's difficult for a child to turn over when they're tightly swaddled.

[00:17:04] Speaker 02:
So if the child is tightly swaddled, it's difficult for them to turn over.

[00:17:07] Speaker 02:
Isn't it difficult for them to roll over and to suffocate inside the device?

[00:17:11] Speaker 02:
And then how are we supposed to put all that?

[00:17:12] Speaker 01:
But at this stage of the case where this is on a motion to dismiss, right?

[00:17:20] Speaker 01:
Yeah.

[00:17:20] Speaker 01:
aren't we required to construe the relevant complaint, in this case if I have the number right, the third amended complaint, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff?

[00:17:34] Speaker 01:
Isn't that what our case law requires?

[00:17:35] Speaker 01:
Now we obviously have to look at Twombly and Iqbal, but don't we have to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff?

[00:17:41] Speaker 02:
That's correct Your Honor, you do have to.

[00:17:43] Speaker 01:
So doing that, why isn't

[00:17:47] Speaker 01:
We know what the autopsy report said.

[00:17:49] Speaker 01:
There's a known danger out in the community from this instrumentality.

[00:17:55] Speaker 01:
We know the instrumentality was there.

[00:17:57] Speaker 01:
We know Ms.

[00:17:58] Speaker 01:
Maizel is a trained social worker, and we know she was there three times.

[00:18:02] Speaker 01:
And they've alleged that this is what caused the death.

[00:18:06] Speaker 01:
I mean, they may not be able to prove any of that, but why isn't that plausible?

[00:18:11] Speaker 01:
It seems to me that it's plausible.

[00:18:13] Speaker 02:
Well, we have to look at the other allegations in the complaint, specifically paragraph 96, where she does not see the docketot.

[00:18:19] Speaker 01:
Well, if we were, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but wouldn't we, on paragraph 96, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, couldn't we interpret paragraph 96 as being at that one time?

[00:18:31] Speaker 01:
She failed to notice as opposed to she always failed to notice, especially given 231 and 232, which says that she did notice.

[00:18:40] Speaker 01:
If I had to believe the paragraph is not as,

[00:18:44] Speaker 02:
It's not specific as to any instances.

[00:18:47] Speaker 01:
It isn't.

[00:18:47] Speaker 01:
It isn't.

[00:18:48] Speaker 01:
But in the light most favorable to plaintiff, shouldn't 231 and 232 control?

[00:18:54] Speaker 02:
Well, the 231 and 232 are in the general cause of action.

[00:18:57] Speaker 02:
The general factual allegations are contained in the front, and I think that would have precedent over what would be contained in the causes of action.

[00:19:03] Speaker 01:
Well, everything's incorporated.

[00:19:05] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:19:10] Speaker 02:
Even if Tasha Mazzella did not see the docket taught during her inspections, that is a violation of state law, which is only amounts to negligence, as the district court pointed out.

[00:19:22] Speaker 01:
I agree with you on that point.

[00:19:24] Speaker 01:
But again, it says in 231 and 232 that she did know that the docket taught was being used.

[00:19:34] Speaker 02:
The use of a docketot on its own is not a dangerous condition.

[00:19:38] Speaker 02:
I would put that forth.

[00:19:40] Speaker 01:
But with the swaddling and having the baby sleep in it, it is, right?

[00:19:44] Speaker 02:
Well, according to the complaint, if you look at page, paragraph 156, it's difficult for the baby to turn over when it's tightly swaddled.

[00:19:51] Speaker 02:
So is that created danger if a tightly swaddled baby is sleeping in a docketot?

[00:19:55] Speaker 02:
Is that the sort of objective risk of substantial harm that is required for pleading a deliberate indifference case against a social worker?

[00:20:06] Speaker 03:
Let me play this out procedurally just to make sure that I understand this.

[00:20:09] Speaker 03:
So now the discovery has been completed because on other claims, discovery went forward, it's closed, summary judgment happened.

[00:20:17] Speaker 03:
So I'm not saying that we will do, but if we were to remand the deliberate indifference claim as to the allegations on Ms.

[00:20:30] Speaker 03:
I suppose there will be another round of summary judgment on the evidence that we have, and we don't have the benefit of doing the discovery.

[00:20:37] Speaker 03:
We don't know what's going to happen, but is that procedurally what would happen?

[00:20:40] Speaker 03:
You'd go back, and then you'd run another summary judgment motion?

[00:20:44] Speaker 02:
This court would remand, and then he would have to... Yes, I would file a summary judgment motion based on either qualified immunity, and the facts of this case, as taken by the plaintiff,

[00:20:55] Speaker 02:
of the deposition of Ms.

[00:20:56] Speaker 02:
Maizel, of the deposition of Ms.

[00:20:58] Speaker 02:
Frenish.

[00:20:58] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:20:58] Speaker 01:
So you would take all of those facts, like for example, in I guess the Herrera case, which everybody cites where I sat on the panel of, and look at the evidence and decide whether the facts support delivered indifference, and then even if theoretically they did, whether there was any case at other than a high level of generality that would have put Ms.

[00:21:22] Speaker 01:
Maizel on notice that she was violating the Constitution.

[00:21:27] Speaker 02:
At a summary judgment stage, yes, that would be the standard, I imagine, but I don't think we have to get there because I don't think the complaint is adequate enough.

[00:21:34] Speaker 02:
When we say rolled over, what's the danger?

[00:21:37] Speaker 02:
All we know is that all that's pled is that Ms.

[00:21:39] Speaker 02:
Menzel knew that DR could roll over.

[00:21:42] Speaker 02:
It doesn't say that when she was asleep or when she was tightly swaddled or when she was in the docket.

[00:21:47] Speaker 01:
Myzel knew of the danger of the docket taught in 231 of the tight swaddling of the baby's Unsupervised sleep in the docket taught while being swaddled tightly so it does say that well It doesn't say and it just throws a number of clauses together.

[00:22:04] Speaker 00:
Well.

[00:22:04] Speaker 01:
It's supposed to new of

[00:22:07] Speaker 01:
the danger of the docketot of the type swaddling of her unsupervised sleep.

[00:22:12] Speaker 01:
I mean, the fact that the paragraph doesn't have a connector in it, I don't think, detracts from looking at it in the light most favorable.

[00:22:21] Speaker 01:
It's alleging she knew all those things.

[00:22:23] Speaker 02:
Boyd.

[00:22:24] Speaker 02:
So, yeah, this paragraph, number 231, does not mention the danger

[00:22:32] Speaker 02:
Associated with rolling over which seems to be the crux of the claim regarding the dangers of using a docket hot But that's elsewhere.

[00:22:40] Speaker 02:
I think 232 I believe a state managed to roll over on stomach saw tightly and that the doctor was used in the foster home But we don't know if that rollover incident was when she was awake when she was asleep how many times she had done it if it was a one-half event that maybe happened while she was awake and

[00:22:57] Speaker 02:
The parents were playing with her and they just called it a rollover event that was told by, and then those facts were told to Ms.

[00:23:03] Speaker 02:
Mizzell.

[00:23:04] Speaker 02:
Was Ms.

[00:23:04] Speaker 03:
Mizzell's deposition taken?

[00:23:06] Speaker 02:
Yes, it was.

[00:23:08] Speaker 04:
Is it appropriate for us to consider the arguments of plaintiff's counsel regarding the length of time it took for the autopsy report and the very rapid

[00:23:20] Speaker 04:
submission of the babies To the to the cremation within three days of death.

[00:23:28] Speaker 02:
I don't believe that is in Those matters were resolved on summary judgment.

[00:23:33] Speaker 02:
They're not in front of this court I don't believe that there was any Malfeasance on the part of the coroner or any investigative body and in fact the record will reflect that if this goes forward that miss miss all got consent from the parents as stated in the summary judge motion

[00:23:48] Speaker 01:
But the facts are alleged in the complaint and you chose to proceed on these counts on a motion to dismiss the complaint.

[00:24:01] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry.

[00:24:03] Speaker 01:
We have to take the facts in the complaint as to the autopsy, et cetera, and the speed or lack of speed, et cetera, as set forth in the complaint as opposed to later discovery when the complaint was dismissed, right?

[00:24:22] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:24:23] Speaker 02:
Yeah.

[00:24:27] Speaker 02:
The issue is, with the deliberate difference claim, is that what Ms.

[00:24:30] Speaker 02:
Mizel knew prior to allegedly putting the child into a known dangerous condition where harm was likely to happen.

[00:24:39] Speaker 02:
And I don't believe that the coroner's report of what happened after that fact would pertain to Ms.

[00:24:43] Speaker 02:
Mizel's knowledge before the event.

[00:24:49] Speaker 03:
Anything further, counsel?

[00:24:50] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:24:51] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:24:51] Speaker 02:
I'll send it.

[00:24:51] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:24:59] Speaker 00:
Yes, I would like to clarify the fact the child was found face down and from the record we found that her leg got loose and she was able to use the leg to flip over and that is a danger of swelling when the child could turn over.

[00:25:11] Speaker 00:
In closing, I would like to draw the attention to the court that this is a very special case because of the 827 confidentiality and

[00:25:23] Speaker 03:
Right, but it is a deliberate indifference claim, and if I understand your responses today correctly, you don't have information that Ms.

[00:25:33] Speaker 03:
Mazzel knew Adaka Todd was at the home.

[00:25:36] Speaker 03:
Yes, yes, the stand is... She was negligent, grossly negligent, perhaps not noticing that there was one, right?

[00:25:44] Speaker 00:
We plead an alternative because there's a good chance that she knew about it, that she knew anything about it.

[00:25:51] Speaker 00:
And evidence later shown that because of spoliation evidence and the standard practices that the social core must visit every home.

[00:26:03] Speaker 00:
It is a standard practice.

[00:26:04] Speaker 00:
And she said there's only one home and she gave up on that.

[00:26:08] Speaker 00:
I think there's a strong indication of a perjury right there during depositions and also in one submission

[00:26:13] Speaker 00:
to the federal court in the summary judgment stage.

[00:26:18] Speaker 00:
Yeah.

[00:26:18] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:26:18] Speaker 03:
But we're focusing on her knowledge because it's a claim of deliberate indifference.

[00:26:22] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:26:23] Speaker 03:
It requires a certain level of knowledge.

[00:26:25] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:26:26] Speaker 03:
Yeah.

[00:26:27] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:26:27] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:26:27] Speaker 03:
Do my colleagues have any additional questions?

[00:26:29] Speaker 03:
I want to make sure that all of their questions are answered in this difficult case.

[00:26:34] Speaker 03:
Yeah.

[00:26:34] Speaker 03:
It doesn't appear that we do.

[00:26:35] Speaker 03:
Thank you very much for your argument.

[00:26:37] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Yara.

[00:26:39] Speaker 03:
And thank you to the Deputy AG as well.

[00:26:40] Speaker 03:
The matter is submitted.