[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
That takes us to the case of Duraland versus United States.

[00:01:09] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:01:10] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:01:11] Speaker 01:
Good morning.

[00:01:11] Speaker 01:
May it please the court.

[00:01:13] Speaker 01:
Eric Cundi on behalf of the plaintiff appellate, Gregory Duralev.

[00:01:17] Speaker 01:
I would like to reserve four minutes for rebuttal, and I'll try to keep track of my own time.

[00:01:20] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:01:21] Speaker 01:
So this case involves a proper application of FTCA principles and case law.

[00:01:26] Speaker 01:
I want to jump right in and get to the legal error revolving the accrual of the claims that resulted in injury to Mr. Duralev's property.

[00:01:35] Speaker 01:
First, there's a little bit of a dispute about what claims are an issue on appeal, so I would like to clarify that.

[00:01:41] Speaker 01:
The claims that issue on appeal are Mr. Durrell's constitutional claims, as well as the claims that allegedly caused his property damages.

[00:01:48] Speaker 01:
So for clarity, I'd like to just go quickly through the list.

[00:01:52] Speaker 01:
We note this on our prior brief, but the first cause of action for negligent hiring, training, and supervision, third cause of action for Fourth Amendment excessive force.

[00:02:01] Speaker 04:
Why wouldn't the clock start running on the date of his arrest?

[00:02:05] Speaker 01:
I think what's important here is look, so the FTCA specifically delineates between property claims and injury to personal.

[00:02:14] Speaker 04:
But he's alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and then also for the assault that occurred while he was in detention.

[00:02:22] Speaker 01:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:02:23] Speaker 04:
So what additional facts does he need to know before we conclude as a matter of law that those claims have accrued at that point?

[00:02:30] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:02:31] Speaker 01:
I think what's important here is looking at

[00:02:33] Speaker 01:
His injury so his injury it was personal and he raised claims that this court found that that was Properly accrued at the time of his arrest, but he also brought so are you challenging that determination?

[00:02:44] Speaker 04:
Well, I think because it seems to me you've got a strong argument with regard to the one remaining claim of Negligence yeah, but the other ones I'm having a hard time seeing why the court erred in finding that they accrued on the date that he's

[00:03:01] Speaker 03:
The arrest and the assault yeah, I think you have to look at it as false arrest with Injury of property and false arrest was injury a person and that's still just false arrest right Take take a typical State case where somebody is arrested Is held over the weekend held and winds up losing his job because he's been wrongfully detained.

[00:03:26] Speaker 03:
That's a property loss right

[00:03:30] Speaker 03:
It's just additional damages from the same original alleged wrong.

[00:03:34] Speaker 01:
I think you have to look at it.

[00:03:37] Speaker 03:
There's no direct, there's no allegation of direct, of a tort directed at his property.

[00:03:43] Speaker 01:
I think you have to look at it from a question of when the injury to his property occurred.

[00:03:51] Speaker 01:
So district court found that that occurred when he was arrested.

[00:03:55] Speaker 01:
But his main claim is that his property damages, as you called them, occurred when his lease was canceled.

[00:04:08] Speaker 01:
There's no allegations.

[00:04:12] Speaker 01:
It's very improper that it incurred on the day that he was arrested.

[00:04:16] Speaker 01:
And if you think about it, too, Mr. Duralev didn't know how long he was going to be detained.

[00:04:23] Speaker 01:
And he only found out about his damages to yesterday.

[00:04:30] Speaker 03:
Would you agree that all of the property damage he has alleged was caused by the wrongful detention?

[00:04:40] Speaker 01:
I would say it's, yeah, it's an issue of causation but it flows from his false arrest.

[00:04:45] Speaker 03:
All flows from that, right.

[00:04:46] Speaker 03:
Yes, correct.

[00:04:47] Speaker 03:
Yeah.

[00:04:48] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:04:51] Speaker 01:
And again, I would like to say that the FTCA specifically distinguishes between personal injury to property and that is why there are different cruel rules under each.

[00:04:59] Speaker 01:
And to point, Your Honors, I guess.

[00:05:00] Speaker 04:
Why isn't that a consequential damage to the wrongful arrest?

[00:05:05] Speaker 04:
I mean, even though the lease might have been canceled later,

[00:05:09] Speaker 04:
The nexus is the constitutional tort and the damage is not only injury to his person but also injury to his property.

[00:05:22] Speaker 04:
That's why I say I think the strongest claim you have that survives the statute of limitation is the denial of the employment.

[00:05:29] Speaker 01:
Reauthorization and I like to get to that but I just want to try to answer your question again I want to distinguish the case law has said that for property claims brought under the FTCA are claims that involve damage to property but it's not I guess the problem is

[00:05:45] Speaker 04:
It's not a tortious act against the property.

[00:05:50] Speaker 04:
It's the fact that he's saying, I lost the property because the lease got canceled.

[00:05:56] Speaker 04:
I wasn't out to be making money to make the payments.

[00:06:00] Speaker 04:
And that is all as a consequence of the wrongful detention.

[00:06:04] Speaker 01:
And I understand that, Your Honor.

[00:06:05] Speaker 01:
And I understand that the action itself was the rest.

[00:06:10] Speaker 01:
But the case also, Bartleson, which is a Ninth Circuit case we cite, involved the artillery shell bombing

[00:06:15] Speaker 01:
somebody's land that happened years before the plaintiff actually found out about the injury to their property and the court concluded this court concluded that The claim accrued even though the action underlying occurred years before the claim accrued when that was a court Committed against the land right federal federal government mistakenly sends bulldozers into your

[00:06:39] Speaker 03:
property that we get that this is I have trouble seeing why this isn't consequential damages but it may be helpful if you could move on to your negligence claim and it would be helpful to me at least if you could give us some idea of this negligent performance of an operational test that's a pretty abstract concept

[00:07:00] Speaker 03:
I've got a lot of questions about what might be covered by that, but I'd be curious about how you see it.

[00:07:07] Speaker 01:
Yeah, no, I understand.

[00:07:07] Speaker 01:
And I think it goes to how broad you take those like circumstances language.

[00:07:13] Speaker 01:
And the Supreme Court recently has said you're supposed to look far afield.

[00:07:17] Speaker 01:
So again, it's kind of a sliding scale.

[00:07:19] Speaker 01:
There's no precise.

[00:07:19] Speaker 01:
I'd say, yes, very broadly, negligence of performance of operational tasks.

[00:07:25] Speaker 01:
I want to go to what the district court held here, and then I'll kind of illustrate and kind of illuminate, I think.

[00:07:34] Speaker 01:
the negligence that we're alleging.

[00:07:36] Speaker 01:
So the court concluded that there is no private analog for quasi-adjudicative governmental functions.

[00:07:42] Speaker 01:
It cited a district court case, Eagle, and that case relied on two Second Circuit cases from 1987 to 1988.

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
Those cases cited the old law that there can never be analog tort for

[00:07:58] Speaker 01:
unique governmental functions.

[00:08:00] Speaker 01:
More recently, those cases have been disavowed, and that is known in Olson and Indian towing.

[00:08:09] Speaker 01:
So the Supreme Court has said you can't, just because something is a governmental function doesn't necessarily mean that it, that there's no private analog.

[00:08:21] Speaker 01:
So the District Court, everybody relying on that kind of legal conclusion that just because it is quasi,

[00:08:27] Speaker 03:
So let me be more specific here, okay?

[00:08:32] Speaker 03:
With the employment authorization, if I look for analogs, I find things like licensing or permitting decisions by the government.

[00:08:42] Speaker 03:
I find, and I'm just going to go through some examples and my question is going to be whether you think these would be subject to the same kind of conclusion.

[00:08:51] Speaker 03:
Export licenses granted or denied for products that might have military applications FDA drug approvals or denials Bank supervision decisions Visa denials immigration decisions on asylum or other status Licensing a nuclear power plant granting or denying security clearances

[00:09:16] Speaker 03:
or denial of disability insurance or food stamp benefits.

[00:09:24] Speaker 03:
Would your theory reach negligence in those kinds of decisions?

[00:09:30] Speaker 01:
I would say yes.

[00:09:32] Speaker 03:
Okay, if that's true, virtually all of those decisions

[00:09:38] Speaker 03:
If I'm interrupting you, go ahead.

[00:09:40] Speaker 01:
No, I don't want to interrupt you.

[00:09:41] Speaker 01:
I just wanted to say that those, so you're right, those are unique government functions.

[00:09:45] Speaker 01:
But those also, like the Supreme Court has said, just because it is uniquely government does not necessarily mean that there's not an analog torque.

[00:09:53] Speaker 01:
So for example, here it is about eligibility for employment for a work permit.

[00:09:59] Speaker 01:
That theoretically could have been a private company, government could have hired a private company,

[00:10:04] Speaker 01:
to make that initial eligibility determination.

[00:10:06] Speaker 01:
I understand the government might have the only authority to issue a work permit, but eligibility and other considerations can be privatized, and unique government functions can also be privatized.

[00:10:18] Speaker 01:
For example, there's a case we mentioned, Lorenzo talks about federal prisons, which are uniquely governmental, but there's private

[00:10:26] Speaker 01:
running federal prisons.

[00:10:28] Speaker 01:
Indiana Towing, the Supreme Court, that case specifically noted that it was involved a Coast Guard being negligent for not properly maintaining a lighthouse.

[00:10:38] Speaker 01:
At the time, Coast Guards were the only people, or the government was the only one that could run lighthouses.

[00:10:44] Speaker 01:
So there are unique things that government can only do, but those also can have a private

[00:10:49] Speaker 01:
private analog.

[00:10:50] Speaker 03:
Running a lighthouse, I kind of get, okay?

[00:10:55] Speaker 03:
These decision-making, the decision-making by the government is what I'm getting at because that's what we have here.

[00:11:03] Speaker 03:
And I gave you that list of examples.

[00:11:06] Speaker 03:
There's in all of those,

[00:11:09] Speaker 03:
or nearly all of them, there is some sort of administrative review process.

[00:11:14] Speaker 03:
Judicial review is available for most of them.

[00:11:18] Speaker 03:
And what you seem to be arguing is that without the courts ever having recognized it before, the Federal Tort Claims Act opens up a whole new vista of collecting damages if the government made a negligent mistake in making those decisions.

[00:11:39] Speaker 03:
Is that where your logic leads here?

[00:11:43] Speaker 01:
I think that's what the, yeah, I think that's what the Federal Targets Claims Act does.

[00:11:47] Speaker 03:
You think so?

[00:11:47] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:11:49] Speaker 03:
And the precedents, it turns out, I guess, that thousands of lawyers around the country whose clients have been hurt by government mistakes and decisions have been missing this great opportunity to recover damages until now.

[00:12:05] Speaker 01:
Well, I don't think it, like I said, I don't think it has to be as broad as just operational task.

[00:12:10] Speaker 01:
I think you have to find some specific equivalent.

[00:12:13] Speaker 01:
And again, here I mentioned the eligibility determination.

[00:12:16] Speaker 04:
That is- Just as a matter of fact, do you know, was his re-employment authorization denied because of the Interpol red notice on his- No.

[00:12:27] Speaker 01:
Based on the commercial fraud?

[00:12:28] Speaker 01:
The reason it was denied was because he did not meet the threshold 180 days.

[00:12:31] Speaker 01:
So it is a non-discretionary determination of whether or not

[00:12:35] Speaker 01:
you hit 180 days, then you're eligible or not eligible.

[00:12:38] Speaker 01:
There's discretion after, but at the time, it's solely based on eligibility.

[00:12:43] Speaker 01:
And his alleged error is that the person who adjudicated the application miscalculated it because it started at the wrong date.

[00:12:52] Speaker 01:
It started at the defensive asylum application instead of the affirmative asylum application.

[00:13:00] Speaker 03:
For the tort claim,

[00:13:02] Speaker 03:
I assume if you wanted to prove damages, if this is a viable theory, you'd have to prove the mistake.

[00:13:10] Speaker 03:
We'll take that for granted.

[00:13:11] Speaker 03:
Would you also have to prove then that he would, in fact, have been granted the discretionary permission?

[00:13:20] Speaker 01:
I think he would have to

[00:13:37] Speaker 04:
Authorization anyway, so that would have been with the government question if they might be able to point to the Interpol red notice and say we wouldn't have granted it because he was going to be extradited to Russia Yeah, I don't think that that's a reason.

[00:13:51] Speaker 01:
I think it would be he would have to be have charge of the criminal crime so like maybe his subsequent

[00:13:57] Speaker 01:
Proceedings would have been a denial the red notice actually wasn't what he was charged with but I understand your point Whatever happened to that.

[00:14:04] Speaker 01:
Did it just sort of disappear?

[00:14:07] Speaker 01:
He challenged it in that court and that went up.

[00:14:10] Speaker 01:
I'm not sure the exact status currently Yeah, I think but he wasn't extradited to Russia.

[00:14:15] Speaker 01:
He is he's still He's cooperating with the government he did have some conditions and

[00:14:21] Speaker 01:
recently imposed on him by ISAP.

[00:14:23] Speaker 01:
There's been some issues with documentation.

[00:14:25] Speaker 01:
Russia has – he's been – I've been told that Russia hasn't issued documents for him to return, which causes an issue, but that's what I've been – I've been told currently.

[00:14:35] Speaker 01:
Yeah.

[00:14:35] Speaker 01:
I would like to reserve the rest of my time for revival.

[00:14:37] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:14:38] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Councilman.

[00:14:39] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:14:53] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court, Assistant United States, Christina Marquez, on behalf of the United States.

[00:15:00] Speaker 00:
I'm going to start with the negligent employment adjudication, since I know the Court has more concerns on that particular cause of action.

[00:15:09] Speaker 00:
And I do actually want to reach Judge Hamilton's comments about the imposition of liability for that particular type of claim.

[00:15:20] Speaker 00:
And I think Judge Hamilton was alluding to basically opening the doors to potential liability for the government negligently adjudicating certain types of applications.

[00:15:34] Speaker 00:
And I think ultimately this court would be very hard pressed to recognize monetary liability under the FTCA for the adjudication of immigration benefits, given the backlog of millions of applications.

[00:15:48] Speaker 00:
It can be hardly rational to conclude that Congress would have contemplated waiving sovereign immunity in that specific scenario.

[00:15:56] Speaker 00:
And I think we really do need to focus on the fact that

[00:16:00] Speaker 00:
employment authorization documents are coming out of the immigration context, which this court, the Supreme Court, has recognized time and time again that Congress has plenary power over immigration benefits.

[00:16:15] Speaker 00:
With that said, there are alternative remedies that Mr. Duralev could have sought in order to reassess the adjudication of that benefit.

[00:16:25] Speaker 00:
For example, he could have filed a complaint under the Administrative Procedures Act, which could have ultimately redetermined that adjudication.

[00:16:35] Speaker 00:
Also in the denial of that application, he had remedies.

[00:16:38] Speaker 00:
It indicated that he could have challenged that denial via a motion to reopen with USCIS.

[00:16:45] Speaker 03:
So just... Do you think the district courts are open to...

[00:16:50] Speaker 00:
APA challenges to these decisions So because it would have been a final agency action He could have brought a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act in order to challenge the denial of this employment authorization document Why don't?

[00:17:07] Speaker 03:
Do we see those cases?

[00:17:10] Speaker 03:
Are they being litigated?

[00:17:12] Speaker 00:
So they are being litigated in different contexts, for example.

[00:17:16] Speaker 00:
So when there is a denial of, say, some type of immigration benefit with respect to marriage fraud.

[00:17:23] Speaker 03:
Are you talking about employment authorizations in particular?

[00:17:26] Speaker 00:
Sure, I'm not specifically certain whether or not the Ninth Circuit has actually addressed that issue with respect to employment authorization documents, but I do think... I don't see very many appeals from USCIS decisions, which I assume this would be.

[00:17:41] Speaker 04:
I mean, I'm trying to think of the last time I had one.

[00:17:43] Speaker 04:
I've been doing this for 25 years.

[00:17:46] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, and I would just point to certain decisions, for example, in the marriage fraud context when CIS denies a I-130 petition for marriage fraud.

[00:17:59] Speaker 00:
That does go through the district court and has gone up to appeal on certain issues.

[00:18:06] Speaker 00:
But then just kind of taking a step back, I would obviously point to the fact that all of the cases that were cited by Mr. Duralev with respect to the employment authorization document,

[00:18:18] Speaker 00:
and to establish the private analog requirement.

[00:18:22] Speaker 00:
Most, if not all, don't actually directly address the issue of the private analog.

[00:18:28] Speaker 00:
And so I would point the court to Hilton versus Hallmark Cards.

[00:18:32] Speaker 00:
This is a Ninth Circuit decision at 599 F3D 894, which says that an assumption is not a holding.

[00:18:42] Speaker 00:
So the court has not actually specifically addressed that issue.

[00:18:47] Speaker 00:
And then in the certain cases where they may have addressed the private analog issue, it was an entirely distinguishable context.

[00:18:56] Speaker 00:
So I do want to refer the court to Elgamel, which really does address this issue head on.

[00:19:03] Speaker 00:
And in that case, the court denied an I-485 application.

[00:19:09] Speaker 00:
And the court found that FTC liability was not permitted because it was a quasi-adjudicative action.

[00:19:16] Speaker 00:
In that particular case, actually Judge Talman was on that panel.

[00:19:23] Speaker 00:
And I believe he correctly concluded

[00:19:31] Speaker 00:
In that particular case that quasi adjudicative action is not going to be subject to liability under the federal towards claims act And then just moving from the remaining claim the non time bar claim that the district court found I will just briefly touch on the false arrest claims and the time bar issues before you go there Could I ask you?

[00:19:59] Speaker 03:
The district judge dropped a footnote involving the discretionary function exception.

[00:20:06] Speaker 03:
Do you think the government has discretion in how it calculates that 180 day clock for eligibility for employment authorization?

[00:20:14] Speaker 00:
I, in terms of calculating the 180 days, I don't believe that there is discretion for that.

[00:20:21] Speaker 03:
I don't see it either.

[00:20:22] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:20:23] Speaker 00:
But I think the point is that the regulations do contemplate that CIS could have discretion to deny

[00:20:30] Speaker 00:
the employment authorization, regardless of whether or not they have met that 180-day timeline.

[00:20:36] Speaker 03:
But we don't have any indication here that any discretion was actually authorized or exercised, right?

[00:20:43] Speaker 03:
Because they just didn't get to that point.

[00:20:45] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:20:45] Speaker 00:
On this record, it appears it was denied based on the clock issue versus whether or not CIS had denied it because there was an interval.

[00:20:54] Speaker 03:
And all we've got is the complaint, basically, at this point, right?

[00:20:56] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:20:57] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:20:58] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:21:00] Speaker 00:
And so moving to the time barred claims, I think the court correctly points out that what Duralev is essentially asserting is that there is a separate clock for the type of damages asserted, and there is no case authority that supports this.

[00:21:17] Speaker 00:
Also, I think there

[00:21:21] Speaker 00:
In terms of the property damage, and I don't think that this was necessarily addressed in the briefing, but for the false arrest and imprisonment, it ended at the very latest once he appeared before an immigration judge on October 3rd of 2018.

[00:21:39] Speaker 00:
And Wallace V. Cato is very clear that for a false arrest claim, damages for that claim covered the time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment, meaning that he wouldn't even been entitled to these damages that occurred while he was in detention.

[00:21:56] Speaker 00:
So how can a claim accrue based on damages that he wasn't even entitled to?

[00:22:02] Speaker 00:
And I think that just sort of goes to the logic behind Duraliv's argument.

[00:22:07] Speaker 00:
It really just doesn't make sense that you would base claim accrual on damages that he isn't even entitled to.

[00:22:14] Speaker 04:
Did the assault occur in 2018 or 2019 in May?

[00:22:18] Speaker 00:
It occurred in 2018.

[00:22:21] Speaker 04:
So before the October appearance?

[00:22:23] Speaker 00:
So it occurred, yes.

[00:22:26] Speaker 00:
I guess it would have occurred before the October appearance.

[00:22:33] Speaker 03:
And let me... I thought it was May 5th, 2019.

[00:22:36] Speaker 03:
Yes, let me actually double-check that.

[00:22:38] Speaker 03:
That's what I thought too.

[00:22:38] Speaker 03:
I'm confused.

[00:22:39] Speaker 00:
You're correct.

[00:22:40] Speaker 00:
May 5th of 2019.

[00:22:42] Speaker 00:
So the assault and battery claims occurred after.

[00:22:44] Speaker 04:
After he was remanded by the immigration judge.

[00:22:47] Speaker ?:
Yes.

[00:22:47] Speaker 00:
But I think in terms of the property damage claims, Durillo has conceded several times in his briefing that those property damage claims, or he's claiming, arise because of his time in detention.

[00:23:00] Speaker 00:
I don't necessarily see that he's arguing that they have arisen from his assault and battery claim.

[00:23:07] Speaker 04:
No, and that's what I'm saying.

[00:23:08] Speaker 04:
But he was arrested earlier in May.

[00:23:12] Speaker 04:
February, was it?

[00:23:13] Speaker 04:
I can't remember.

[00:23:14] Speaker 00:
September of 2018, he was arrested.

[00:23:17] Speaker 00:
And so in terms of the false arrest claim, the claim would have accrued on that date, and he could have obtained damages between the September arrest date and then his first appearance before the immigration court of October.

[00:23:32] Speaker 00:
And so with that, unless the court has any other questions, the United States would respectfully request that we affirm... So if we decide there's no analog to the quasi-adjudicative function, then I guess we don't need to reach the discretionary function exemption?

[00:23:56] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:23:58] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:23:58] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:23:59] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Counsel.

[00:24:02] Speaker 02:
Counsel, before you begin, on behalf of the court, I would like to thank you for taking this case pro bono.

[00:24:07] Speaker 02:
We really appreciate it.

[00:24:09] Speaker 01:
You're welcome, and thank you for the opportunity.

[00:24:11] Speaker 01:
I'll be quick here.

[00:24:12] Speaker 01:
So Egonal was the case that the government cited that she said the quasi-agitive actions can never be the source of a FTCA claim.

[00:24:22] Speaker 01:
Again, that relied on the second circuit cases that have subsequently been called into question with the Supreme Court's more broader holdings.

[00:24:30] Speaker 01:
that disavowed the idea that government functions by themselves can no longer.

[00:24:35] Speaker 01:
And those are Olson and Indian towing.

[00:24:39] Speaker 01:
I'd also like to quickly address the discretionary function argument as regards to the negligence of operational tasks.

[00:24:47] Speaker 01:
Again, the statute uses shall consistently.

[00:24:50] Speaker 01:
There's no discretionary language.

[00:24:52] Speaker 01:
And then alternatively, we had another argument was that once the government does take some discretionary function, so assuming it is discretionary, which it's not,

[00:25:00] Speaker 01:
Once it does take the discretion, it doesn't have the ability to conduct those operations negligently, and the government did not respond to that.

[00:25:09] Speaker 03:
But you agree it's a two-step process for employment authorization, right?

[00:25:13] Speaker 03:
And there's a non-discretionary determination of calendar eligibility, and then some sort of discretionary judgment

[00:25:22] Speaker 03:
that somebody has to exercise, right?

[00:25:24] Speaker 01:
Correct, yeah, so it's 8 CFR 208.7A1 is the one that directs it.

[00:25:30] Speaker 01:
And I would just like to quickly say, she talked about how the assault claim came after, but I will also say if Mr. Duralev's lease, it's not clear by the record, but if his lease did get canceled after July 2019, it would have been within the two-year bar.

[00:25:46] Speaker 04:
If there's damage to the property, I'm really having a hard time

[00:25:50] Speaker 04:
Following your argument because it seems to me the argument is I was in detention I wasn't able to make the lease payments when the lease came due I lost the lease because I wasn't current and That's not injury to property.

[00:26:05] Speaker 04:
That's a damage that flows from the alleged wrongful detention

[00:26:09] Speaker 01:
Yeah, I understand.

[00:26:10] Speaker 01:
I tried to raise this in the beginning.

[00:26:12] Speaker 01:
No, no, you're doing a great job.

[00:26:14] Speaker 04:
I second Judge Rawlinson's thanks for taking the case, but I just have a hard time getting over that hurdle.

[00:26:22] Speaker 04:
I understand.

[00:26:23] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:26:23] Speaker 04:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:26:24] Speaker 02:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:26:25] Speaker 02:
Thank you to both counsel for your helpful arguments.

[00:26:27] Speaker 02:
The case just argued is submitted for decision by the court.

[00:26:30] Speaker 02:
The final case on calendar United States versus Clarros has been submitted on the briefs.

[00:26:35] Speaker 02:
That completes our calendar for the day.

[00:26:37] Speaker 02:
We are on recess until 9 30 a.m.

[00:26:39] Speaker 02:
tomorrow morning