[00:00:02] Speaker 00:
Inre Rodriguez, Larry Rothman, Council for APOLI Local Management Group, M. Jonathan Hayes, Council for APOLI, Bianca Nicole Rodriguez.

[00:00:48] Speaker 04:
Want to go ahead?

[00:00:49] Speaker 02:
Good morning, your honors.

[00:00:52] Speaker 02:
I'd like to reserve five minutes.

[00:00:57] Speaker 02:
Tell us who you are.

[00:00:58] Speaker 02:
Oh, I'm sorry.

[00:00:59] Speaker 02:
I should.

[00:01:00] Speaker 02:
May misses you may otherwise be.

[00:01:02] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:01:03] Speaker 02:
I'm Larry Rothman.

[00:01:05] Speaker 02:
OK, nice to see you.

[00:01:06] Speaker 02:
Nice to see all of you.

[00:01:07] Speaker 02:
Five minutes.

[00:01:10] Speaker 02:
You're reserving five?

[00:01:10] Speaker 02:
I'm reserving five minutes, and I represent low Cali.

[00:01:14] Speaker 04:
OK, thank you.

[00:01:16] Speaker 02:
May it please?

[00:01:19] Speaker 02:
May I please the court?

[00:01:20] Speaker 02:
This appeal turns on a single legal error that shaped the bankruptcy court's ruling.

[00:01:26] Speaker 02:
The court applied the wrong definition of finality under California law when it interpreted section 362B22.

[00:01:36] Speaker 02:
The unlawful detainer judgment was final under California law.

[00:01:42] Speaker 03:
Can... Mr. Rothman, let me just go through the chronology and make sure that we're on the same page.

[00:01:48] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:01:48] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:01:49] Speaker 03:
Let me go through these points.

[00:01:50] Speaker 03:
March 14, 2025, the state court issued the writ of possession.

[00:01:55] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:01:56] Speaker 03:
On March 26, 2025, the state court ordered the lockout stayed until it issued another order.

[00:02:05] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:02:06] Speaker 03:
On April 2, 2025, Ms.

[00:02:09] Speaker 03:
Rodriguez filed her bankruptcy petition.

[00:02:15] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:02:16] Speaker 03:
On April 3, 2025,

[00:02:19] Speaker 03:
The state court entered an order lifting its stay.

[00:02:23] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:02:26] Speaker 03:
The landlord filed a motion for retroactive relief from the stay in June of 2025.

[00:02:34] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:02:36] Speaker 03:
The motion for retroactive relief from stay was denied by the bankruptcy court.

[00:02:41] Speaker 02:
That's also correct.

[00:02:42] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:02:44] Speaker 03:
With that factual situation, on April 2,

[00:02:49] Speaker 03:
2025, did the landlord have a judgment that it could use on that day to take possession of the property?

[00:03:00] Speaker 03:
Yes, it had finality and... Well, okay, what I'm concerned about is that that judgment was staged.

[00:03:07] Speaker 03:
So on that day, was there a judgment that would allow the landlord to take possession of the property?

[00:03:16] Speaker 02:
Yes, even though it was stayed, it was a final judgment.

[00:03:22] Speaker 02:
It was a final judgment because she had, let me explain the reason it was a final judgment.

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The only way

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that it would not be a final judgment would be if a writ would be taken up as I've explained in my brief.

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And the writ in fact was taken up and then denied as it was explained in the brief under California law.

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And because of that, the judgment is final under California law.

[00:03:56] Speaker 03:
Okay, so the distinction here is that,

[00:03:59] Speaker 03:
It was final but it was not enforceable on that day.

[00:04:02] Speaker 02:
It was final and enforceable.

[00:04:04] Speaker 03:
But how could it be enforced if it was stayed?

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Again, I'm talking about on April 2nd because the state court didn't release its stay until April 3rd.

[00:04:24] Speaker 02:
It was a fine.

[00:04:27] Speaker 02:
I see what you're saying but,

[00:04:30] Speaker 02:
under, okay.

[00:04:36] Speaker 04:
Can I, I'm sorry, you finish and I have a question for you.

[00:04:40] Speaker 04:
Finish your sentence and I have a question for you too.

[00:04:42] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:04:43] Speaker 02:
The judgment is final to, for enforceability purposes on a, on at the time that the judgment for possession is entered.

[00:04:57] Speaker 02:
It can be,

[00:04:58] Speaker 04:
enforceable for purposes of possession at that time well let me ask it let me ask a question the judge stayed that order for some reason right correct and I could be Judge Corbett has the timeline way better than I do so you're about to correct me or I suspect there was an argument by the debtor that she had not received papers and therefore the default was erroneous right and

[00:05:29] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:05:29] Speaker 04:
Okay, was that the basis for the stay or was there some other basis for the stay?

[00:05:33] Speaker 02:
No, you're correct.

[00:05:35] Speaker 04:
So the basis for the stay was I may change my mind, right?

[00:05:38] Speaker 04:
The judge, I mean the judge stayed the order on the theory that if I agree with the debtor here, maybe we need to have another hearing.

[00:05:46] Speaker 04:
Is that fair or not?

[00:05:47] Speaker 02:
That is fair.

[00:05:48] Speaker 04:
But it's wrong somehow.

[00:05:49] Speaker 04:
You're about to tell me why it's wrong.

[00:05:51] Speaker 02:
No, no, I'm saying you are correct and that is fair.

[00:05:55] Speaker 04:
Okay, but I'll give you the counter example.

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We've actually talked about this.

[00:05:58] Speaker 04:
It's one thing if the judge says, you know, it's Christmas Eve, I'm going to stay this order for a couple of days, not because I'm wrong, because I don't want to make you move out.

[00:06:05] Speaker 04:
But when a judge says, I'm staying this order because I may be convinced I made a mistake, isn't that, I mean, that has a lot of consequences, doesn't it?

[00:06:14] Speaker 02:
It has a lot of consequences, but still reverts back to the original date of the order being final.

[00:06:21] Speaker 02:
It still reverts back to the original order, because that order is final at the time of the judgment for possession.

[00:06:28] Speaker 04:
Okay, so is this analogous to a rule in California that finality is determined by the issuance of a judgment and that changes the status quo, which might be a different rule in the federal system?

[00:06:37] Speaker 04:
Is that what you're saying?

[00:06:38] Speaker 04:
Absolutely.

[00:06:39] Speaker 04:
Okay, I get it.

[00:06:40] Speaker 02:
I mean, I don't... I tell you, I don't...

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I don't like to say, well, I feel very strongly about a particular argument.

[00:06:47] Speaker 04:
You can.

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But I do feel very strongly about this.

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And I go by Inray Pearl.

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That's what I really base my argument on.

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And interestingly enough, Inray Smith, which my

[00:07:03] Speaker 02:
the attorney in Inray Smith just happened to be coincidentally the same attorney who was representing my client in this case, who was the attorney in Inray Smith also, and followed Inray Smith, which he probably shouldn't have done.

[00:07:20] Speaker 02:
But it's a small family.

[00:07:25] Speaker 02:
And, but anyway, but I think the law is very clear and I try to, maybe not as eloquently as I could have, but I try to make as specifically as clear and as precise as I could to show clearly that under California law, the data possession is final and the only thing that could interrupt that at all, the only thing,

[00:07:50] Speaker 02:
is a successful writ of mandate and that was denied.

[00:07:55] Speaker 04:
Can I suggest something else?

[00:07:58] Speaker 04:
I mean the writ would be a different remedy and a quicker remedy than just proceeding up an appellate ladder, right?

[00:08:04] Speaker 04:
The whole point of this is that we want fairly expeditious relief for landlords, right?

[00:08:09] Speaker 04:
Why isn't the judge saying, well, wait a minute, I'm going to pause all this.

[00:08:12] Speaker 04:
I might take a day or two or three to figure out if I made a mistake.

[00:08:15] Speaker 04:
I mean, that's not, that doesn't raise the same problem, does it?

[00:08:19] Speaker 04:
What you're trying to argue is a writ is better than an appeal because at least it's quick and expeditious, right, and it directs the court to do a thing.

[00:08:25] Speaker 04:
as opposed to we'll take it under submission for a few years.

[00:08:28] Speaker 04:
But if the judge himself or herself says, well, I'm not so sure I didn't make a mistake here.

[00:08:32] Speaker 04:
I want to think about it for a day or two.

[00:08:34] Speaker 04:
Why is that?

[00:08:35] Speaker 04:
I mean, why doesn't that vitiate finality?

[00:08:39] Speaker 02:
Your suggestions are very logical, but that's contrary to the way the statutory California law make up this.

[00:08:50] Speaker 02:
Under statutory California law, they only, and I try to put that as clearly, and I probably failed at it, but I try to show clearly under the statutory

[00:09:04] Speaker 02:
Rules of judgments for possession under the brief once a judgment for possession is final It's final upon that the clerk Signing the judgment and the only thing that can stop possession is that writ.

[00:09:19] Speaker 03:
That's it It would have been it would have been better if we had a little more clarity from the state court on this, but you know I agree with you that I totally agree with you Judge Lafferty

[00:09:31] Speaker 03:
talked about the situation is the Christmas Eve relief from stay motion.

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The order says, I'm granting relief from stay, you can proceed with your foreclosure, however, I don't want you to be able to do it until January 2nd, okay.

[00:09:46] Speaker 03:
That order, the judge is not inviting anybody to come back and look at it, okay.

[00:09:52] Speaker 03:
If you had a judgment for possession that the state court vacated and said, I'm vacating that so that,

[00:10:00] Speaker 03:
You know, it's null and void, it's no longer there, I'm going to have a hearing.

[00:10:05] Speaker 03:
Then you would have a problem, correct?

[00:10:08] Speaker 02:
No, no problem.

[00:10:10] Speaker 02:
And the reason I would have no problem would be this.

[00:10:13] Speaker 02:
Whenever I do relief from stays,

[00:10:15] Speaker 03:
Okay, now I'm talking about the state court.

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
I'm thinking distinguishing it between the position where, yes, you're going to be able to take possession.

[00:10:23] Speaker 03:
Let's go back to the state court.

[00:10:25] Speaker 03:
The order is you're going to be able to take possession, but I don't, I'm going to stay it for a week to give them time to move out, okay?

[00:10:31] Speaker 03:
That's one.

[00:10:32] Speaker 03:
Another over here in the timeline, one saying, okay, I issued a judgment for possession, but I want to revisit this thing, so I'm vacating it.

[00:10:46] Speaker 03:
And so that's a different one.

[00:10:49] Speaker 03:
What we have here with this state court, they didn't make it clear that they're vacating it.

[00:10:55] Speaker 03:
They didn't make it clear that the landlord could, in fact, proceed with the writ of possession.

[00:11:02] Speaker 02:
These are apples and oranges.

[00:11:05] Speaker 02:
It's a combination of apples and oranges because a state judge has the right to, under 1179, I think that's 1179 of the CCP, to go ahead and alter a lockout date.

[00:11:22] Speaker 02:
That's different.

[00:11:23] Speaker 02:
Altering a lockout date under 1179 is different than the statutory precision of when a judgment is final.

[00:11:33] Speaker 03:
But did the state court also have the ability to vacate the order?

[00:11:38] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:11:40] Speaker 02:
Unless there's a defect and unless there's a motion to set aside the judgment, which is granted, but that didn't happen in this case.

[00:11:54] Speaker 02:
And also, I want to go back to Judge Lafferty's example, if I could.

[00:11:58] Speaker 02:
May I go back to, because I like his example.

[00:12:02] Speaker 02:
I think it's important.

[00:12:03] Speaker 02:
In fact, I really like his example.

[00:12:06] Speaker 02:
In a relief from stay- Well, now we have to publish this, right?

[00:12:10] Speaker 02:
Okay, yeah.

[00:12:12] Speaker 02:
I really like your example for this reason.

[00:12:15] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:12:17] Speaker 02:
In a relief from stay, and

[00:12:19] Speaker 02:
I guess maybe luckily I haven't had too many of these, but in the release from state, the court has a discretion of saying, okay, I grant the release from state, but I'm going to put in there that there's no lockout.

[00:12:33] Speaker 04:
Or I just won't waive the 14 days, right?

[00:12:36] Speaker 04:
For one thing.

[00:12:36] Speaker 02:
Or, not only denying the waiving lockout, but they want an extra five days, I'll put that in.

[00:12:43] Speaker 02:
I have my discretion to do that, okay?

[00:12:46] Speaker 02:
That doesn't even touch upon the finality argument, because the bankruptcy has a specific right to do that.

[00:12:55] Speaker 02:
The bankruptcy court has a specific right under the law to use its own discretion in circumcision, based upon the equities.

[00:13:07] Speaker 04:
By the way, I'll just point out you're well within your five.

[00:13:09] Speaker 04:
I mean, this is a very good discussion, but just

[00:13:11] Speaker 02:
Oh, I'm sorry.

[00:13:13] Speaker 04:
I just I just like this discussion totally up to you.

[00:13:16] Speaker 04:
I like this wherever you want to pause you feel free Okay, if you want to say I just had so much more to talk all right.

[00:13:21] Speaker 04:
I no doubt okay.

[00:13:23] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry no no doubt no doubt okay, okay, I I also want to okay, let me let me let me talk a little faster I

[00:13:33] Speaker 02:
The judgment for possession is final and enforceable upon entry, subject only to the five-day redemption period.

[00:13:41] Speaker 02:
The rule comes from almost a century of California Supreme Court authority.

[00:13:45] Speaker 02:
The Aguary versus Plummer, Broome-Quest versus Halley, Jack versus Chimur, and is codified in 1174.

[00:13:54] Speaker 02:
Damages are severable.

[00:13:55] Speaker 02:
Appealability is irrelevant.

[00:13:57] Speaker 02:
And the question on a 362B-22 is whether the landlord has a final enforceable judgment for possession.

[00:14:04] Speaker 02:
Here he did.

[00:14:06] Speaker 03:
Is the word enforceable in there as well?

[00:14:09] Speaker 03:
So it has to be final and enforceable?

[00:14:11] Speaker 02:
Yeah.

[00:14:11] Speaker 02:
It's a final enforceable judgment for possession.

[00:14:14] Speaker 02:
And it has to be enforceable.

[00:14:16] Speaker 03:
So how is it enforceable if the Superior Court says that it stayed?

[00:14:21] Speaker 02:
Because the law says that a judgment's enforceable the minute the possession is entered, unless the writ is granted.

[00:14:33] Speaker 02:
And my brief goes into that.

[00:14:35] Speaker 00:
Can you just repeat that code section?

[00:14:38] Speaker 02:
Okay, it's 1174.

[00:14:46] Speaker 02:
And I also, and at that point there's no,

[00:14:52] Speaker 02:
I have only a short period left, so may I just talk about punitive damages a little bit as part of my argument?

[00:15:00] Speaker 02:
Okay, punitive damages were unsupported by the record, and I quoted in Ray Dyer, 322F.

[00:15:11] Speaker 02:
The record shows none.

[00:15:22] Speaker 02:
Locally relied on

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
Bocaille believed the petition was filed after the judgment.

[00:15:27] Speaker 02:
The court itself found Mr. Polis generally forthright.

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
That's on malice.

[00:15:32] Speaker 02:
That's a legal mistake.

[00:15:33] Speaker 02:
Under in Ray Roman, 283, BR 1, 9th Circuit, BAP 2002, punitive damages require reckless or callous disregard.

[00:15:43] Speaker 02:
The record doesn't support the file.

[00:15:45] Speaker 02:
And last, reconsideration should have been granted.

[00:15:50] Speaker 02:
Rule 59E allows reconsideration for clear error.

[00:15:54] Speaker 02:
The bankruptcy court overlooked controlling California authority on finality.

[00:15:58] Speaker 02:
The textbook definition of clear error under McDonald versus Calderon, Kona Enterprises versus Bishop, Carroll versus Nakatani.

[00:16:07] Speaker 02:
Correcting the error requires reversal.

[00:16:09] Speaker 02:
And with that, Your Honor, I hope I have maybe a minute left.

[00:16:14] Speaker 05:
You're a negative 25.

[00:16:16] Speaker 05:
Oh, I blew it.

[00:16:18] Speaker 02:
Anyway, I thank you very much for at least listening to my arguments.

[00:16:23] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:16:24] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:16:24] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:16:25] Speaker 05:
Morning, Your Honor.

[00:16:33] Speaker 05:
Morning.

[00:16:34] Speaker 05:
John Hayes appearing for the Appellee of Bonanca Rodriguez.

[00:16:41] Speaker 05:
I brought my own chronology to make sure I could remember it.

[00:16:47] Speaker 05:
And a lot of what I was prepared to say didn't come up, so I'm not sure that I'm going to have a lot to say.

[00:17:00] Speaker 05:
But I mean, I agree completely that at the moment when the clerk's stamp filed on that petition, there was an unenforceable judgment.

[00:17:12] Speaker 05:
that violated the stay by proceeding on an unenforceable judgment.

[00:17:21] Speaker 04:
Your worthy adversary here suggests that the state court lacked the ability to affect finality

[00:17:29] Speaker 04:
when he basically said, well, I'm going to hold off on the lockout because I might want to hear an argument about why the default wasn't appropriately taken.

[00:17:39] Speaker 04:
I find that an extraordinary answer to what's normally a pretty simple question.

[00:17:45] Speaker 04:
It's the judge's order and the judges usually allow a lot of discretion to understand, interpret, enforce or not or stay their orders.

[00:17:54] Speaker 04:
And if the California legislature told the California state judge can't do that,

[00:17:59] Speaker 05:
Not the obvious answer to me, so I don't know if you have any if you have any thoughts about that by all means I was going to point out that the It's in a minute order the stay It's in a minute order and what the minute order did was and set a hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment and

[00:18:18] Speaker 05:
And basically the next sentence is, and the writ of execution has stayed also until that hearing.

[00:18:29] Speaker 05:
And the sheriff is instructed, the sheriff shall be notified not to execute on the, it's right in the same main one, two paragraph minute order.

[00:18:44] Speaker 05:
So there's no doubt.

[00:18:46] Speaker 05:
that the judge had looked at the motion to vacate the judgment.

[00:18:51] Speaker 04:
And there was some merits-based reason to ask the question again.

[00:18:53] Speaker 05:
Yeah, maybe there's something there.

[00:18:54] Speaker 05:
Right.

[00:18:54] Speaker 05:
Let's set it for a hearing.

[00:18:56] Speaker 05:
And the hearing, I think, was about a week later.

[00:19:04] Speaker 05:
And apparently, there was some possibility that they could have been thrown out within that week since the writ had been issued.

[00:19:13] Speaker 05:
a couple weeks before that, that the writ was outstanding.

[00:19:17] Speaker 05:
It was at the sheriff's office.

[00:19:19] Speaker 05:
We don't want her thrown out until we can take a look at this.

[00:19:23] Speaker 05:
So I mean, I agree.

[00:19:26] Speaker 05:
And all the rest of the issues that were discussed in our brief, at least, if the court wants to affirm because on that basis, I agree completely.

[00:19:37] Speaker 03:
Well, let me ask you a question.

[00:19:39] Speaker 03:
Do we have to add words to Pearl?

[00:19:41] Speaker 03:
I mean, if I think the Pearl case from the Ninth Circuit basically says that under California law, a debtor has no legal interest in the remaining property after issuance of the unlawful detainer judgment and a writ of possession in state court.

[00:19:58] Speaker 03:
Do we have to add to that sentence after the issue of an enforceable unlawful detainer judgment?

[00:20:06] Speaker 03:
and enforceable writ of possession?

[00:20:13] Speaker 05:
I don't think so.

[00:20:15] Speaker 05:
And Pearl is, I was prepared to discuss Pearl.

[00:20:20] Speaker 05:
I did a moot court last week and we talked about Pearl a lot.

[00:20:25] Speaker 05:
So I went back and studied it.

[00:20:27] Speaker 05:
And Judge Clarkson basically ignored it.

[00:20:31] Speaker 05:
I mean, he just put it in a footnote that it didn't apply.

[00:20:35] Speaker 05:
And I think he's right about that.

[00:20:37] Speaker 04:
Because of the unique circumstances of Pearl, the foreclosure aspects?

[00:20:42] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:20:42] Speaker 05:
Well, and others, actually.

[00:20:45] Speaker 05:
Mr. Rossman's brief, the landlord's brief said nothing about Pearl, even in the reply brief.

[00:20:56] Speaker 05:
But the thing about Pearl is,

[00:20:58] Speaker 05:
It was a foreclosure sale.

[00:21:00] Speaker 05:
It started with a foreclosure sale.

[00:21:02] Speaker 05:
And I'm sure that the Ninth Circuit, I'm sure they were thinking, how in the world can there be any rights of a debtor to remain in possession on the petition date after a foreclosure sale?

[00:21:19] Speaker 05:
How could there be any possible thing for a trustee to do with respect to the property or the debtor

[00:21:28] Speaker 04:
With respect to the property How anyway, I think that I really think that they They sort of left it at that you know this I think I don't want to waste too much time here, but I reread pearl to it I was reminded that there were you know other legal issues percolating about the sale and and Judge Basin commented on that judge Rawlinson from the Ninth Circuit commented the basin commented on then ignored it

[00:21:56] Speaker 04:
So one way to read Pearl is whatever else your rights are, possessory, you're out.

[00:22:01] Speaker 04:
And we're just going to think of possessory differently.

[00:22:03] Speaker 04:
And if you have other rights, you may have damages in a year or two, fine.

[00:22:07] Speaker 04:
But for now, the possessor interest has cut off.

[00:22:09] Speaker 05:
You know, I would even add to that that the judge based and called it equitable right to possession.

[00:22:15] Speaker 05:
Yeah.

[00:22:16] Speaker 05:
Yeah.

[00:22:16] Speaker 05:
And I think they were saying, no, there's no such thing as equitable right to possession.

[00:22:20] Speaker 05:
That's not a property asset.

[00:22:22] Speaker 05:
Yeah.

[00:22:23] Speaker 05:
That's protected by the automatic state.

[00:22:26] Speaker 03:
Well, let's look at the B-22 exception a little bit.

[00:22:31] Speaker 03:
You know, B-22 talks about 362, B-22.

[00:22:38] Speaker 03:
Talks about a judgment for possession, okay.

[00:22:41] Speaker 03:
If before the date of the filing of the petition, a judgment of possession for such property against the debtor.

[00:22:47] Speaker 03:
If you have a judgment of possession, then the stay, there's an exception to the stay.

[00:22:54] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:22:55] Speaker 03:
Do we have to add their words because there was a judgment of possession at one point.

[00:23:01] Speaker 03:
It may not be enforceable because of the stay.

[00:23:04] Speaker 03:
Do we have to add words to 362,

[00:23:07] Speaker 03:
B-22 to say an enforceable judgment for possession.

[00:23:13] Speaker 03:
Are we changing the statute?

[00:23:15] Speaker 05:
I don't think you have to add a word that says enforceable, but I do think we're adding a word that says final.

[00:23:22] Speaker 03:
Okay, I think that, I guess the Nicholson case, I think I'm looking at that.

[00:23:26] Speaker 03:
The court says that the courts that have reviewed this issue mean a final, non-appealable judgment.

[00:23:34] Speaker 03:
So you're saying we don't have

[00:23:37] Speaker 03:
A final judgment.

[00:23:39] Speaker 05:
Well, we don't under California law.

[00:23:41] Speaker 05:
I mean, it's final for enforceability.

[00:23:45] Speaker 05:
Any judgment is final for enforceability.

[00:23:47] Speaker 05:
Absolute estate.

[00:23:49] Speaker 05:
Yes.

[00:23:50] Speaker 05:
Yeah.

[00:23:50] Speaker 05:
Yeah.

[00:23:51] Speaker 05:
A judgment for money.

[00:23:52] Speaker 05:
It's enforceable immediately unless there's some stay.

[00:23:57] Speaker 05:
And California law says it's a CCP 1049 says that the action

[00:24:06] Speaker 05:
is pending until all the appellate periods run.

[00:24:10] Speaker 05:
So the action doesn't end until the appellate period ends.

[00:24:16] Speaker 05:
And that comes up a ton in preclusion cases.

[00:24:24] Speaker 03:
If someone wanted to appeal the judgment for possession here with the stay in place, they'd have to wait until the Superior Court had their subsequent hearing, correct?

[00:24:35] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:24:36] Speaker 03:
So is that how you define final, that it wasn't a final judgment because you couldn't execute on it right now, you couldn't do something until there was another hearing and we shouldn't appeal it until we have that other hearing?

[00:24:49] Speaker 05:
You know, I'm not positive I understand that but the word final is a little bit weird because you can execute immediately on the judgment.

[00:24:59] Speaker 05:
It's final for that purpose, right?

[00:25:01] Speaker 05:
But California said for preclusion,

[00:25:04] Speaker 05:
purposes especially that the subsequent court, the bankruptcy court can't use the judgment for preclusion purposes until it's final, right?

[00:25:18] Speaker 05:
So the general, I mean the way I've always thought of it is the general idea is that a judgment in California is not final until the appeal period runs.

[00:25:31] Speaker 05:
And that's different if you're talking about enforceability.

[00:25:34] Speaker 05:
You know, it is final for enforceability.

[00:25:37] Speaker 05:
It's not final under California law until the appeal period runs.

[00:25:42] Speaker 03:
Well, but would the appeal period even run if the court says, I haven't made my final decision.

[00:25:49] Speaker 03:
I want to look at this again.

[00:25:51] Speaker 03:
I want to look at this again.

[00:25:55] Speaker 03:
So I haven't told you whether you can repossess the property or not.

[00:26:01] Speaker 03:
I said it once, but now I want to look at it again.

[00:26:04] Speaker 03:
So at that point, for somebody to appeal, wouldn't they have had to wait till that for that second hearing?

[00:26:10] Speaker 04:
Well, I agree, yes.

[00:26:11] Speaker 04:
And not to guilt the lily here, but especially if the argument was, hey, wait a minute, this was a default.

[00:26:17] Speaker 04:
You know, I ought to be heard.

[00:26:19] Speaker 04:
That's, you know, better than many.

[00:26:21] Speaker 04:
That's very sympathetic to a judge.

[00:26:25] Speaker 04:
Even if you ultimately determine, well, I'm sorry, I can't rule for you.

[00:26:28] Speaker 04:
I mean, ruling on the merits is... I agree completely.

[00:26:32] Speaker 05:
Yeah.

[00:26:32] Speaker 05:
Yeah, I did want to comment and I want to make sure I don't forget, as Mr. Rothman said in his brief and he just commented again, that the writ of mandate

[00:26:43] Speaker 05:
that the debtor, you know, she did all this stuff on her own.

[00:26:47] Speaker 05:
She found me long after all of this happened.

[00:26:50] Speaker 05:
But she filed a writ of mandate, and that was denied the same day.

[00:26:56] Speaker 05:
But it was denied without prejudice.

[00:26:59] Speaker 05:
And there's no doubt in my, it says right on there that it's denied without prejudice.

[00:27:04] Speaker 05:
And there's no doubt in my mind that that was because she filed the motion to vacate the judgment on the same day.

[00:27:12] Speaker 05:
So the Court of Appeals said, well, let's see.

[00:27:14] Speaker 05:
I mean, basically what we've been talking about.

[00:27:16] Speaker 05:
Let's see what happens, whether the judge decides to redo this or not, then we'll consider.

[00:27:24] Speaker 05:
So the debtor's right to appeal, there's no doubt that it existed on the petition day.

[00:27:30] Speaker 05:
Actually, I hadn't thought of that.

[00:27:32] Speaker 05:
But actually, she couldn't have appealed the same day that she filed the bankruptcy petition, because at that point, it wasn't final.

[00:27:42] Speaker 05:
I mean, I don't know if you have to say, well, it wasn't even a final judgment just because there was a stay.

[00:27:51] Speaker 05:
But it certainly wasn't final for purposes of appeal.

[00:27:56] Speaker 05:
And the Court of Appeals had said, well, we have to say what the judge is going to say.

[00:28:00] Speaker 05:
And all of that is as of the moment of the petition.

[00:28:02] Speaker 04:
Yeah, I mean, that goes back to the stay was on the merits, for lack of a better word, as opposed to just we don't want you to have to move out on Christmas Eve.

[00:28:09] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:28:09] Speaker 04:
Those are two different things.

[00:28:12] Speaker ?:
Yes.

[00:28:12] Speaker 04:
I don't think this came up, but I was somewhat struck by the fact that one way to look at the measure of emotional distress damages was really through the lens of the kids, which I know was very sympathetic, but they're not debtors.

[00:28:40] Speaker 04:
And I was struggling to see how Judge Clarkson was really, if there were findings that would really tile that back to the debtor.

[00:28:48] Speaker 04:
Now, I know she's the mom and she could be affected by what she observes in the kids.

[00:28:54] Speaker 04:
But it struck me that that was, I wasn't really getting the findings through there.

[00:28:59] Speaker 04:
And if the measure is what would one year's tuition at this level of university be, that kind of sounds like it's more kid-centric than mom-centric.

[00:29:07] Speaker 04:
Nobody's raised it, and I don't know if we're going to do anything with it, but did you have any any reaction to that I?

[00:29:14] Speaker 05:
Thought it was creative when I was reading no doubt I did I did think I remember thinking how how would I?

[00:29:24] Speaker 04:
But if the measure of this is the harm to the child Charles not the debtor I

[00:29:28] Speaker 04:
So is that a problem here?

[00:29:30] Speaker 04:
Or do you think there's something in the record that suggests he really sifted that through and said the mother observing this was emotionally harmed?

[00:29:37] Speaker 05:
I don't remember, but he might have commented that it was emotional.

[00:29:42] Speaker 05:
I think he did.

[00:29:43] Speaker 04:
Oh, I think he did, yeah.

[00:29:45] Speaker 04:
I'm just worried about what he was measuring.

[00:29:48] Speaker 03:
Now, I've looked at the record and I didn't see that specific

[00:29:52] Speaker 03:
Objection made.

[00:29:54] Speaker 03:
Is that correct?

[00:29:55] Speaker 03:
I don't think it was.

[00:29:56] Speaker 05:
Right.

[00:29:57] Speaker 05:
I thought there was almost no argument from the landlord about it.

[00:30:03] Speaker 04:
About the emotional distress.

[00:30:04] Speaker 04:
And therefore I didn't spend much time either.

[00:30:06] Speaker 04:
Then you answer my question.

[00:30:07] Speaker 05:
And especially the punitive damages.

[00:30:11] Speaker 05:
I mean all the cases that the landlord seemed to be arguing that the court doesn't have the power to grant punitive damages.

[00:30:21] Speaker 05:
But anyway, I'll leave it at that.

[00:30:26] Speaker 00:
You said you were going to make another point about Pearl or do you not want to do that?

[00:30:34] Speaker 05:
that relief from forfeiture.

[00:30:36] Speaker 05:
But the thing about Perl is that there isn't a word in there about 362B22.

[00:30:44] Speaker 05:
And they reversed the BAP.

[00:30:45] Speaker 05:
Perl reversed the BAP, which it did talk about, B22.

[00:30:52] Speaker 05:
There wasn't a word in the Perl case about final.

[00:30:57] Speaker 05:
Is this order final?

[00:30:58] Speaker 05:
I mean, they use that word final.

[00:31:00] Speaker 05:
And again, it is final for enforcement purposes, but not under California laws, it's final.

[00:31:08] Speaker 05:
There's also no discussion about the forfeiture, the debtor's right to ask for relief from forfeiture.

[00:31:18] Speaker 05:
You know, I looked at 362L.

[00:31:23] Speaker 05:
is the section that says the debtor.

[00:31:25] Speaker 05:
That's the protective section of the debtor, yeah.

[00:31:27] Speaker 05:
Yeah, if the debtor does this and this and this, I didn't realize what it says is if the debtor does this and this and this, B-22 doesn't apply.

[00:31:36] Speaker 05:
And I think that the court that Congress was considering when they said judgment, that it really wasn't the absolute end.

[00:31:48] Speaker 05:
Just because there's a piece of paper that says judgment on it doesn't mean that there's absolutely nothing for the bankruptcy court to do, nothing for the court to consider or look at.

[00:32:01] Speaker 05:
And certainly, Pearl didn't do any of that.

[00:32:05] Speaker 00:
You're over your time too.

[00:32:06] Speaker 00:
Oh, thank you.

[00:32:08] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:32:09] Speaker 04:
Thank you so much.

[00:32:09] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:32:11] Speaker 04:
Thank you for your good arguments.

[00:32:12] Speaker 04:
The matter is submitted.

[00:32:13] Speaker 04:
We'll get you a decision as soon as we can.

[00:32:15] Speaker 04:
Okay, thank you.

[00:32:16] Speaker 04:
This is really interesting.

[00:32:18] Speaker 04:
You've done us a lot of good today.

[00:32:20] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:32:21] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:32:22] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:32:26] Speaker 04:
Should we go back and watch the video?

[00:32:32] Speaker 04:
Okay, thank you.

[00:32:33] Speaker 04:
Nice to see both of you.