[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
Next case is Inre Latcher. Pamela Latcher appearing pro se. Matthew L. Green appearing for Appalese.

[00:00:09] Speaker 02:
Okay. Are both counsel by Zoom? Just so I understand. Okay. Okay. Ms. Latcher, do you want to reserve a little time here?

[00:00:16] Speaker 01:
I like that seven minutes from counsel before.

[00:00:19] Speaker 02:
How long?

[00:00:20] Speaker 01:
Seven.

[00:00:21] Speaker 02:
Seven? Okay. You got seven. Okay. Go ahead.

[00:00:24] Speaker 01:
Okay, Your Honor. So I've been here before. And I've learned a lot from this court. Actually, I think the basis for why I'm here today actually goes back to this court's comment to me back in the first time with the Lasher v. State Bar case, where twofold. One is we were talking about the contempt. And two, we were talking about jurisdiction comes before merits. And I know the court knows that I filed something about the jurisdiction issue. I did file a motion originally to consolidate all my cases.

[00:00:57] Speaker 01:
Right now in the Ninth Circuit is the court's previous ruling in the Lane v. Lasher case. I appealed the court's order. I filed an emergency motion regarding the jurisdiction issue. If the court recalls, there was a footnote by the court that I didn't properly raise the issue, which seems to be subject matter jurisdiction, which brings me here first. that I think we have to get past jurisdiction before we can ever get to the merits.

[00:01:28] Speaker 02:
Can I interrupt you?

[00:01:30] Speaker 02:
It's your appeal. If you want to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction, feel free.

[00:01:34] Speaker 01:
No, that's not what I was suggesting, Your Honor. I was suggesting that there's a divestiture issue. Because the issue, as I understand it under Griggs, is when the issue is exactly the same or the ruling that the court might make impacts the issue that's up in the higher court that the court can't rule on those issues. And so right now, the issue before the Ninth Circuit is whether or not all of these cases rely, as bankruptcy does, on in-ram jurisdiction and on the debt itself.

[00:02:08] Speaker 01:
That same debt is being looked at by the Ninth Circuit, that same debt and the satisfaction of that debt, which is now – I didn't tell the court because there was a ruling a couple days ago and some briefing where the creditors have actually admitted that the underlying base debt was satisfied.

[00:02:23] Speaker 02:
Well, one of the issues we're going to get to today is to what extent this is about a debt versus a whole bunch of other actions the courts have taken. So you can certainly make that argument and you can reserve it. but you've only got 15 minutes, so use it any way you want, okay?

[00:02:39] Speaker 01:
Then I will move on because it sounds like I take the court seat like other counsel did.

[00:02:43] Speaker 02:
No, no, it's your time, and you use it any way you want, but there's some serious stuff to talk about here, and you go ahead.

[00:02:50] Speaker 01:
I'd rather talk about the serious stuff.

[00:02:52] Speaker 02:
Okay, okay.

[00:02:54] Speaker 01:
At this point.

[00:02:54] Speaker 02:
You bet, okay.

[00:02:55] Speaker 01:
It sounds like the court has questions, so rather than me ramble about the serious stuff, I'd like to address what the court would like to hear.

[00:03:04] Speaker 02:
Well, I think what we're struggling with, and I think we've struggled with this in the past, is whether this is solely about a debt. I think that your framing of this, and I use that word with enormous respect because that's, you know, I often say that the question is more important than the answer sometimes because once you get the right question, the answer is right there, right? So in your mind, this is all about a debt. And I think your worthy adversary would say, and I think the trial court, determined it was about more than that, that there were other disciplinary proceedings going on, and those had a purpose that wasn't about making sure that the lanes get their money.

[00:03:44] Speaker 02:
So I know in your mind it's all connected, but what I think you're going to have to convince us is that's right, as opposed to there's a whole other question here about what the State Bar did, what the California Supreme Court did, the timing of that from your mind, and why those things add up to violations of the automatic stay, violations of the discharge injunction, and a 525 violation, when in our view, none of those necessarily turn on the debt. So that's where we need your help, okay?

[00:04:13] Speaker 01:
That's fine, Your Honor, yes.

[00:04:15] Speaker 02:
I'm making sense, right? Because we're talking about the same issue, right?

[00:04:18] Speaker 01:
I believe we are.

[00:04:19] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:04:20] Speaker 01:
In my mind, as you say, my mind, it all relates to the debt. And the reason I say it all relates to the debt is this all started with – Prior to the contempt, which is the subject of this particular proceeding, prior to that there are, and I think it's part of the record, I don't know, six, seven closing letters, a client security fund ruling, all saying that this is a private debt, there's no misconduct, that there's insufficient evidence of misconduct. What turned this into a misconduct case is this contempt judgment, which is what you and I talked about way back the first time.

[00:04:51] Speaker 02:
Oh, yeah.

[00:04:53] Speaker 01:
I'll never forget that. I actually learned a lot from this court.

[00:04:56] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:04:56] Speaker 01:
And so I went back and looked at that. And so what this contempt turned on, for starters, and where I think Ninth Circuit law relating to debt collections assists me, and I didn't get to talk about the first time, is the Yellow Express v. Dingley case. What this case starts out is, is that the creditor alleges that I never satisfied the debt, which now has been completely obliterated in all their briefs, and I think that's attached to my 801-4 notices.

[00:05:22] Speaker 01:
In all their briefing and everything else, they've admitted that the small claims were satisfied 20 million years ago, that the superior court judgment, the base judgment, was satisfied by a cash deposit I made on appeal, which basically meant that I appealed with, I want to say, proper means, and that if I lost, which I did, the money would go to satisfy the debt.

[00:05:45] Speaker 02:
Can I interrupt to ask you a question to make sure I understand something? The question of the dischargeability of the debt between you and the lanes is still being – there's no final judgment on that, right?

[00:05:54] Speaker 01:
That's an issue in the Ninth Circuit relating to the subject matter jurisdiction issue.

[00:05:58] Speaker 02:
The short answer is yes, but the long answer – Well, were you able to – I assume if you think there's no debt, you were arguing there why we worried about A6. There ain't no debt, right? So that can all get decided there. Okay, I got you.

[00:06:11] Speaker 01:
Correct. Okay. And the court knows that Ms. Lane is actually not there anymore, or at least she's removed herself. Okay.

[00:06:18] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:06:19] Speaker 01:
And Mr. Lane is fighting to say that he owns the debt to see if he has constitutional standing, which is why I was talking about that. Okay.

[00:06:26] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:06:26] Speaker 01:
Let's go back to the contempt. That contempt wasn't brought about by the court because I engaged in misconduct. It was a coercive civil contempt specifically brought about by the creditor, and the way I could get out of that contempt would have been to just pay the debt. and provide documents that I didn't have or which violated my ethical duties. For example, one of the orders was for me to turn over my monies in my client trust account to see if the court could look at that money and determine whether the client would get it, I would get it, or creditors would get it. The court ordered me to turn over confidential settlement documents.

[00:07:00] Speaker 01:
Whether I had them or not, if the court looks at the actual orders, which are part of the record, Nobody ever cared whether I had them or not. And creditors counsel is the one that brought this like like Yellow Express. This is a pecuniary ploy brought about by creditors specifically for the purpose of forcing me to pay a debt, which I maintain I not only not only paid already and don't owe. And under the satisfaction, that contempt order would have been void, and I would never have had any duty to obey that order. But let's assume I did have a duty to obey that order.

[00:07:32] Speaker 02:
Okay. I mean, and there's no question, but that order is final, right? The contempt order is final?

[00:07:36] Speaker 01:
That's not true, Your Honor. Under CCP 128B, it's not final unless I was given three-day judicial stay.

[00:07:42] Speaker 02:
Oh, that's an argument. Okay. I remember that.

[00:07:45] Speaker 01:
If I were a lawyer in all this, because if I were a straight debtor and every order is directed at me as a debtor, Not a lawyer. Every single one of them. In fact, the contempt is directed at me as a debtor. If I was a debtor under our rules of professional conduct, business and professions code 6103, Maltiman v. State Bar says I don't violate those court orders because they stay out of my personal business. And that is what the client security fund said is this is a personal debt. This is not something that they would ever pay.

[00:08:15] Speaker 01:
It's a private bill. And so all these orders I'm alleged to have violated, all the contempt and all the orders to pay and turnover documents, one, there's no evidence that I ever did any of this. There's no transcript, no witnesses. It was just by creditors' counsel, who, by the way, if you were to look him up, was disciplined for his fraud on the court and misrepresentations from other people.

[00:08:36] Speaker 02:
Okay. Why don't we pause right about there? You're within your seven minutes, and if counsel is going to move to strike that, now is a good time to let them do it. Okay? Thank you. So let's hear from the appellee.

[00:08:47] Speaker 00:
May it please the court, Matthew Green on behalf of the Superior Court appellees. Just to take a step back here about who we're dealing with. It's the Superior Court, it's Judge Cayetti, and it's the Superior Court's General Counsel. Neither of these appellees, we're not the lanes, we're not the creditor, they're not the state bar. They're completely separate from both of those respective parties.

[00:09:16] Speaker 02:
Yeah, let me, can I just say, I understand. I think I directed Ms. Locker because I thought the fundamental disagreement we had was whether this was all about a debt or not. And I wanted to let her to get, I want to give her a chance to get those arguments out. I agree with everything you're saying. We're going to get to a level where we're talking about who the parties are here, and that does affect things significantly. Go ahead.

[00:09:37] Speaker 00:
Sure. So just the The Superior Court appellees, they have no business being dragged into these bankruptcy proceedings. The only reason that appellant has involved them is she wants them to withdraw the Superior Court's reporting in 2021 to the state part of the contempt judgment against her, which the Superior Court was obligated to do under the California Business Professions Code. Appellant erroneously believes that the Superior Court can somehow rescind this notice to the State Bar, which again occurred five years ago, and that such rescission will somehow unwind the State Bar's disciplinary proceedings against her.

[00:10:17] Speaker 02:
Well, let alone obligate the State Bar to do anything, right?

[00:10:22] Speaker 00:
Correct. Yeah. Correct.

[00:10:25] Speaker 00:
But this theory of rescinding this notice will have absolutely no effect on it. I think it's your point, Judge Lafferty.

[00:10:36] Speaker 00:
The reporting of the contempt judgment to the state bar is completely distinct from the state disciplinary action that was filed against appellant back in 2022. A state bar proceeding is not commenced until the state bar files a notice of disciplinary charges. So it's completely separate from what the Superior Court's appellee's alleged involvement is here.

[00:10:58] Speaker 00:
Withdrawing the notice of the contempt judgment to the state bar will have absolutely no impact whatsoever on the disciplinary action. In other words, it would be an entirely idle act.

[00:11:09] Speaker 00:
The distinction between the reporting of the contempt judgment to the State Bar and the State Bar Disciplinary Act proceedings also undermines all of Ms. Latcher's claims against Superior Court appellees. In her separate proceeding against the State Bar, appellant argued the State Bar's disciplinary action itself violated the automatic stay, violated the discharge injunction, and was discriminatory. Not only did the panel reject all of these arguments in previously, but the panel expressly found them to be frivolous repeatedly.

[00:11:43] Speaker 00:
So the Superior Court appellee's conduct is not just one step removed from the State Bar proceeding, it is multiple steps removed from the State Bar proceeding. Miss, excuse me, appellant's arguments with respect to the Superior Court appellees are therefore even more frivolous than they were when they were made with respect to the State Bar.

[00:12:03] Speaker 00:
So, and just to address Judge Lafferty's comment, Appellant is not being disciplined for the contempt judgment. She's being disciplined for her underlying disobedience of court orders, her failure to report judicial sanctions to the state bar, her prosecution of a marital appeal, and her commingling of client trust funds. Completely separate issues have nothing to do with the debt, and that is spelled out repeatedly in detail in the panel's prior decision. And with that, Your Honors, I submit.

[00:12:36] Speaker 02:
Okay, Judge Neiman, any questions? No questions. Judge Spraker? No, thank you. Okay, we're back to being judges.

[00:12:43] Speaker 02:
I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

[00:12:46] Speaker 02:
Okay, Ms. Locker, you've got a little under seven minutes.

[00:12:49] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor. First of all, I think the misconception is that I've been disciplined. A state bar court recommendation is not a discipline. It is a recommendation just that. It has no judicial findings. It's not afforded collateral estoppel. General counsel has now admitted in the Ninth Circuit that there is no evidence in the record of findings of misconduct by me, by this court. And this court can't make those findings, as general counsel has argued. This court can't usurp the power of the Supreme Court.

[00:13:19] Speaker 02:
Well, this court wouldn't make any findings in any event, right? We wouldn't know. Yeah. What we're here to figure out is, was there a colorable claim before Judge Latham with respect to 362A1 and A6, with respect to 524, with respect to 525, based on what you believe to be the Superior Court and a particular judge's obligation to rescind a report, that she was obligated to make per the California Rules of Court.

[00:13:54] Speaker 02:
And that's your interpretation of 362, 524, and 525. The bankruptcy court didn't agree with any of those arguments. And, you know, that's where you are. So tell us why that was a mistake.

[00:14:09] Speaker 01:
Okay. First, Your Honor, though, I think it's important to make clear that the bankruptcy court's findings and this court's published opinion presumed that I've already been disbarred and that the recommendation, which is now a legal nullity under People v. Ford because of the Supreme Court's remand without affirmance. So all of the findings that say I engaged in all this misconduct, they don't exist anymore on the remand because that is the law when it's remanded without affirmance. So going backwards, all these facts that say I had a duty to report it, under the Business and Professions Code, I had no duty to report something if I was a private litigant And it was purgeable.

[00:14:45] Speaker 01:
And if I had paid it and purged it because I had the ability to pay it and didn't bankrupt it and now satisfied the bankruptcy, I mean, by bankruptcy, satisfied the purge element, there would be nothing to report. Just for starters, in answer to the court's question, the court never applied any standards. The court applied this, that ruling and across the board. The court assumed that the superior court was acting like a judge. She isn't acting like a judge under the business and professions code. if she didn't witness the event, see me do something wrong as a lawyer, and had a duty to report it.

[00:15:19] Speaker 01:
She found the order in the file. She had no personal knowledge of it. The statutes actually say she's not the one with the duty to do so.

[00:15:29] Speaker 02:
Let's pause there. There's a whole bunch of things going on in that statement, okay? I mean, one is that she's not acting as a judicial officer. Does that mean she's acting in an admin capacity? Because I don't see that. How's that an admin capacity?

[00:15:44] Speaker 01:
That's what the case law says. It's a ministerial duty. She's not acting like a judge. But even if we don't have to go there, we have to go there because this court's published opinion says if you are a government unit, which a court is, that you are bound by the same rules that the state bar would be bound by. They're bound by you have to do the 362B4 analysis, which they say doesn't exist.

[00:16:06] Speaker 02:
The court applied... Well, let's go back. Okay, we're talking about what a judge did in the first instance several years ago before bankruptcy was even in your mind, okay?

[00:16:16] Speaker 02:
That couldn't have been a violation of the state, right, by itself?

[00:16:19] Speaker 01:
I'm not arguing that, Your Honor. It would be like a warrant that issued for my arrest because I didn't pay a debt, and I declared bankruptcy. I think it's the Escanos case that says if the person then goes and gets arrested because the person who got the warrant issued didn't rescind the warrant, that's a violation, an affirmative duty to get that back. That's what I'm arguing. I'm arguing Escanos, Inray, Stewart, they apply, not Fulton. This court said a license is not property of the estate. Fulton is a property thing. It applied Fulton. Fulton doesn't exist.

[00:16:49] Speaker 01:
It has nothing to do with this. The question is, is it a continuation of the... Is it a continuation of proceedings? It is a proceeding if it's a judicial act.

[00:17:00] Speaker 02:
Well...

[00:17:03] Speaker 02:
I'll just say I think another way to look at this is if the rules require that a judge make a report, that's all they say. And you don't have to agree – okay, but let's just say for fun that's what was required. How is that a continuation of anything? What's continuing there?

[00:17:18] Speaker 01:
Well, that's the problem is you can't be immune under 362B4 if you're not acting in that capacity and it's a pecuniary interest. Under the dingley, yellow... Well, let's stop for a minute.

[00:17:31] Speaker 02:
What is the Superior Court doing at all? The Superior Court made a report and recommendation. I'm sorry, made a report. I use our bankruptcy concepts here. I shouldn't. At that point, it was in the hands of the State Bar Review Court, and it was in the hands of the California Supreme Court, wasn't it?

[00:17:46] Speaker 01:
I disagree, Your Honor. How come? The Supreme Court, it remanded because there are questions. It was not in the hands of the State Bar. I mean, it is, but the State Bar took A report from a judge who is required to sign under penalty of perjury. I have personal knowledge and I wouldn't could testify. They took 20 years worth of closing letters.

[00:18:03] Speaker 02:
What personal knowledge does she need that an order was issued right contempt?

[00:18:09] Speaker 02:
The order is the order.

[00:18:11] Speaker 02:
But the order is the order, isn't it?

[00:18:13] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry, what?

[00:18:14] Speaker 02:
The order is just the order. She doesn't have to make findings about the order.

[00:18:17] Speaker 01:
It has to.

[00:18:19] Speaker 01:
It has to be supported by evidence, witnesses. I had a right to... None of that happened. It was a critter who brought a proceeding to force me to pay a debt I already paid, turned around to the judge, and then got a contempt order without any of the protections that the law requires. And I was a personal debtor, not a lawyer.

[00:18:38] Speaker 02:
Isn't that a fight you want to have about the contempt order and not about what somebody told the state bar?

[00:18:42] Speaker 01:
Well, I'm not having the fight about what she told the state bar. I'm

[00:18:47] Speaker 02:
Yeah, you are. You're telling the court that it was wrongful in the first place or not excusable in the first place for her to do it and that somehow she had an obligation to rescind it.

[00:18:57] Speaker 01:
I didn't say she had an obligation to rescind it. The self-executing 524 made all the orders void because I have a presumptive discharge. She had a duty to honor that, not set a hearing to discuss it. She had no immunity from that.

[00:19:11] Speaker 01:
She had to comply with the bankruptcy. She had affirmative duty to actually take back the warrant for my arrest. What they did with it would be another story. But they relied on the fact that she had evidence that for 20 years and 57 days before filing charges, they had zero. I got a closing letter. It was her report. And when you read the State Bar Court rec, it actually says it was based on her report that they brought these charges. Absent that, they had none. So this is based on her saying, hi, I can testify under oath.

[00:19:42] Speaker 01:
I would and could because I have personal knowledge of it. And she had to testify that I was acting like a lawyer, and she knew about it. None of this was as a lawyer. And so she basically set the warrant and got me arrested, and I sit in jail right now instead of having a license suspension. And under Hispanos, you wouldn't say that that was correct. You're just saying, well, because it's a state bar, that somehow takes this out of the picture. It's no different than the jail cell. I'm sitting in jail because of a warrant that was issued for my arrest that she refused to rescind, which was an improper warrant because she had no knowledge of it.

[00:20:17] Speaker 01:
And that's a violation of the affirmative duty rule.

[00:20:19] Speaker 02:
And that's probably a good place to stop. We're about a minute over our time. Okay?

[00:20:23] Speaker 02:
Okay. All right. Thank you, Ms. Locker. I appreciate the passion with which you argue your positions. Okay. Thanks to both counsel. Matters submitted. We'll get you a written decision as soon as we can. Okay? Thank you. Thank you, and I think that concludes our calendar. We're adjourned? Okay. Thank you.

[00:20:37] Speaker 00:
Thank you. All rise. The court is in recess.