[00:00:00] Speaker 03: to suggest we should do. [00:00:02] Speaker 03: So with that, I think we're ready to start, and we can call the first case. I know that we see Ms. Stone. [00:00:39] Speaker 03: Okay. [00:00:41] Speaker 03: Before we get going, I want to make a note of something because it's a little bit unusual. When you folks were writing your briefs about this issue, which touches on something that the Baptist cited a couple of years ago, you probably couldn't have anticipated that you're going to be lucky enough to have two of the judges on the Erdogan panel in front of you today. [00:01:04] Speaker 03: So for what it's worth, you have the author of the opinion, And you have noted panel mate, Judge Brand. And I can tell you we talked a lot about it before issuing that opinion. And to the extent that there are arguments about your going back and forth, we look forward to them and we look forward to your other good arguments about the Taggart issues. So just get that a little bit out of the way. Okay, Ms. Stone, are you ready to go? Go ahead and make your appearance. [00:01:33] Speaker 00: Yes, good morning, Your Honors. Barbara Stone, can you hear me? [00:01:37] Speaker 03: I can hear you. And can you tell us how long you want to reserve for rebuttal? [00:01:41] Speaker 00: Yes, please. I'd like to reserve 10 minutes for rebuttal. [00:01:44] Speaker 03: Okay. 10 minutes it is. [00:01:46] Speaker 00: And, yeah, with the panel's permission, I have a very brief opening, first on discharge error and then a little on how that error affected the Taggart ruling. [00:01:56] Speaker 03: You may proceed. [00:01:57] Speaker 00: Thank you, sir. The legal error, which is reviewed de novo, is that the court found that my loan satisfied the seven-year rule. but then refused to give that finding effect because I had not first obtained an adversary judgment. The bankruptcy court found that my 1980s-era student loan satisfied the seven-year timing requirement for discharge, so that finding is not before this panel on appeal. What is before the panel is whether the December 1994 discharge protected me when it was entered or whether it would become effective only after I bring another lawsuit 30 years later. [00:02:34] Speaker 03: Can I stop you? Can I pull something apart a little bit here? [00:02:39] Speaker 03: I think there's two questions within that, and maybe you think there's one. That's why I'm stopping you right away, okay? [00:02:45] Speaker 03: If we're inclined to agree with you or to sort of talk with you about the effect of Uruguayan and whether or notwithstanding Uruguayan, you were obligated to bring an action here, if we were to agree that that's not necessarily the case, are you telling us that we automatically get to Taggart, or would there be other Taggart defenses available? [00:03:06] Speaker 00: Well, the Taggart ruling was infected by the first legal error. So we still need to get to Taggart, I think, if I understand your question correctly. But it's different once we get there, once the original error. [00:03:20] Speaker 03: Okay. What I think I hear you saying and what you can elaborate on is because of that error, the Taggart aspect of this more or less just follows. Is that right or not? [00:03:32] Speaker 00: With the bankruptcy court? [00:03:34] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:03:34] Speaker 00: Yes. Okay. Yes. [00:03:36] Speaker 03: That's where you're going to have to help us out a bit, okay? [00:03:39] Speaker 00: Okay. Okay. [00:03:41] Speaker 03: Go ahead. [00:03:42] Speaker 00: Go ahead. Okay. [00:03:43] Speaker 03: Yeah. [00:03:43] Speaker 00: All right. So just to back up a little bit, the bankruptcy court found that my 1980s-era student loan satisfied that timing requirement for discharge, and that's not what is before the panel on appeal. But what is before the panel is whether the December 1994 discharge was protected me when it was entered, or whether it's effective only after I bring another lawsuit. That position directly conflicts with education's own historical collections guide. And in that, it states that a loan satisfying the seven-year rule was discharged by entry of the general discharge order. [00:04:21] Speaker 00: So education told the bankruptcy court that the adversary requirement was not a procedural nicety, but a mechanism important to the department. [00:04:31] Speaker 00: the Department of Education. Education has gone on the record several times saying that even if I obtained an adversary judgment, then the loans would be discharged only on the date of the new order, not the date of my 1994 discharge order. [00:04:46] Speaker 00: So under that theory, a discharge entered in 1994 would be converted into prospective relief effective only upon a later adversary judgment. 30 years of collection would fall outside the discharge injunction education would be shielded from contempt, and I would be left without a contempt remedy for the Treasury offsets that they took through those years. [00:05:07] Speaker 03: Can I stop you for one more point? I'm sorry. [00:05:09] Speaker 00: Yes, sir. [00:05:10] Speaker 03: What's in front of us, we're not going to make any fact findings here, right? We're an appellate court. So to the extent that there was some activity that predated the DOE, that's not something we can do anything about today. You understand that, right? [00:05:23] Speaker 00: Well, when you say, I'm sorry. [00:05:25] Speaker 00: When you say predated the DOE, I'm not sure I understand what you're saying. [00:05:29] Speaker 03: Well, if you have an issue with the activities of some, and whoever was collecting this loan before the Department of Education took an assignment, that's not in front of us today. Okay? [00:05:41] Speaker 00: I would respectfully disagree with that point. [00:05:45] Speaker 03: You can respectfully disagree all you want, but go ahead. [00:05:49] Speaker 00: And I can tell you the reasoning why. [00:05:50] Speaker 03: Okay. [00:05:51] Speaker 00: Is because that collection chain was directly under the authority of the Department of Education and the system that they put in place. So everything that they inherited when they did take assignment, and I know that they keep bringing up that. [00:06:04] Speaker 03: Well, did you look at their assignment agreement? [00:06:07] Speaker 00: No, sir, I didn't. [00:06:08] Speaker 03: Okay. I'm not sure we know. If I were you, I would make your better points. Okay. [00:06:16] Speaker 00: Okay. All right. [00:06:22] Speaker 00: So forgive me for one second. I lost my time. [00:06:26] Speaker 03: No, I think what you were telling us is that with respect to what the Department of Education did, they have well-understood policies that, you know, they follow and that if one looks at those, one would come to the conclusion you'd like us to about the collection activities, right? Okay. [00:06:41] Speaker 00: Yes, because they agreed with the statute. Okay. And their rules followed the statute as it was intended in pre-1998 bankruptcy. Got it. [00:06:51] Speaker 00: So if they had followed their own guidance based on the actual facts of the statute, probably wouldn't be where we are today. [00:07:01] Speaker 03: Okay. [00:07:02] Speaker 00: The 30 years wouldn't have been, nothing like that would have happened. So, all right. So should I move on to the Taggart aspect of it? Yes. [00:07:10] Speaker 03: Now you're within your 10 minutes, but you go right ahead. Okay. [00:07:13] Speaker 00: Okay. All right. [00:07:16] Speaker 00: So, and I can talk a little bit about Irigoyen. [00:07:20] Speaker 03: It's your time. You go ahead. [00:07:22] Speaker 00: All right. Well, Erdogan confirms the proper sequence. I mean, you both, the panel knows this, where a debt is accepted only if it actually falls within Section 523A8. Otherwise, it's discharged by the general discharge order. And my loans did not fall within 523A8's exception as of the petition date. So what the bankruptcy court replaced that statutory sequence with an adversary first rule. And so that is the legal error. So I just wanted to be clear about that because I know you wanted me to state that right up front. [00:07:53] Speaker 00: So then as far as Taggart is concerned, that same adversary error infected that contempt analysis. The bankruptcy court treated the absence of an adversary as education's fairground of doubt for continuing to collect. And once that error is corrected, then the question is whether they had a reasonable basis to keep collecting. And I do see that I'm well into my time. I think I will. [00:08:19] Speaker 03: It's up to you. [00:08:20] Speaker 00: OK, well, I'll go ahead and continue. [00:08:25] Speaker 00: So going to the sworn evidence and what is kind of obviously called or obviously can be referred to as the Lowry Declaration. [00:08:37] Speaker 00: Education chose to submit a declaration to support its claim that it lacked knowledge. and had a reasonable basis to keep collecting. [00:08:45] Speaker 00: I know that they didn't bear the burden of disproving knowledge, but once education put that declaration forward, Taggart and Zilog required consideration of what they said, what they didn't say, and what they omitted from their own records. And on those central questions, the only sworn evidence education submitted was that two-page Lowry Declaration, and all the rest was attorney argument. And the omissions in that declaration were very significant. It didn't deny knowledge of the bankruptcy or identify when education first learned of it. [00:09:17] Speaker 00: It didn't state education searched its records for the bankruptcy information or explain whether the NSLDS or the ECMC transfer contained bankruptcy information. And those central questions remained unanswered. [00:09:31] Speaker 00: I think because I'm going so far into my time, I will reserve the rest for rebuttal and go ahead and pass it back over to you. [00:09:38] Speaker 03: Okay. Thank you very much. Let's turn to the app, Hilly. [00:09:43] Speaker 01: Good morning. May it please the court. My name is Glenn Dorg, and I represent the Department of Education. [00:09:49] Speaker 01: I'd like to emphasize two matters up front, Your Honor, and I welcome questions. The first is that the court's decision was stated, the court found that there was a requirement that Miss Stone proceed with an adversary action and that Irigoyen didn't apply. But turning to Taggart, the court considered the alternative argument, that is, that it was wrong. that in fact no adversary action was required by Ms. Stone, and that Irigoyen did find that it was discharged as of the general discharge order, and that went on to consider the Taggart factors to include no evidence of notice of the bankruptcy to the Department of Education, the fact that the department took assignment in 2013, the fact that when it took assignment, the records that it had suggested that the loans were in fact first becoming due within the seven-year period. [00:10:45] Speaker 02: Does that mean, counsel, that I know everybody is focused on AA, but your arguments pertain to much more than just student loans and the discharge generally. So when lenders assign a note, then the lender that gets it doesn't have to worry if there's a bankruptcy filed and then go ahead and try and collect it? [00:11:05] Speaker 01: I don't know that that – I wouldn't offer such a sweeping argument, Your Honor. Your question actually dovetails into my second point, which is that I want this panel to appreciate the procedural history of this case. [00:11:17] Speaker 03: Well, can I interrupt you for one second and I think see if I got your first argument right. It's even if Judge Merrim mistakenly cabined Irigoyen under Taggart, you would win anyway. Is that fair? That's what I thought you were saying. Okay. Okay. By the way, I think you did an excellent job of listening to the questions we had for Ms. Stone. I think you realize that we think there's two separate issues here, too. But you go ahead now. [00:11:44] Speaker 01: And I wanted to touch base quickly on the procedural history of this case. And bear with me briefly. I think this is relevant. [00:11:52] Speaker 01: When this motion was filed, there was a government shutdown. The transcript from October 9, 2025 demonstrates that I had not yet made contact with the The transcript from October 23 demonstrates that I had made contact but hadn't had an agent assigned to it and would not talk to that individual for another week. [00:12:13] Speaker 01: November 13 transcript demonstrates that I had breached that contact, had secured the debt detail, which shows the reference to the loans being due within the seven-year period, not outside, and that we filed our opposition brief on November 24th. [00:12:33] Speaker 01: I emphasize this because I cannot answer, forgive me, Judge Spraker's question fully because I'm limited to the information that I had within that less than a month of investigation into this matter. And so what the relationship of the assignment was, I don't know. What the assignment terms were, I don't know. [00:12:59] Speaker 01: What investigation was conducted in 2013 when the assignment was taken? I don't know. [00:13:07] Speaker 01: Because this case was presented as a contempt motion on such a truncated schedule, I can't answer those questions because it's not in the record. Well, can I make two quick points, too? [00:13:18] Speaker 03: It's hardly unusual to have a motion for contempt in these circumstances. So if you think there's an AP necessary, maybe there is, maybe there isn't. That's hardly anomalous. If your broader point is if we're taking an intelligent look at Taggart, a standard as open-ended as no fair ground of doubt really ought to be mindful of all the circumstances and should not create a particular per se gating rule. If you didn't do X, you could have no fair ground of doubt. Is that a fair synopsis? [00:13:45] Speaker 01: I think that's a fair synopsis. [00:13:47] Speaker 03: That's what I think we're hearing you say, right, that you took this in this fashion and we can't assume you had any other duties. Whether we agree with it or not, that's the idea. [00:13:55] Speaker 01: That's the idea, Your Honor. Okay, I got it. You know, as a general matter, the department tried to be a responsible creditor in this situation. We received notice of a bankruptcy 30 years after it was filed, and we acted aggressively. We repaid the $877. We closed out the loans. [00:14:16] Speaker 01: What more could we do within one month's time to the extent that To the extent Ms. Stone is critical of our failure, though, to have exhausted all the issues in that declaration, I simply want to remind the court that we acted as quickly as we could within that limited time frame. I would conclude by emphasizing that just given the debt detail alone, I think we had a fair ground of doubt. [00:14:48] Speaker 01: Given Hoxie, I believe we had a fair ground of doubt. And Irigoyen, forgive me, I think the court was correct in noting that this case is analogous to the Albert Sheridan case. If Irigoyen should be construed more broadly such that Hoxie was bad law, it factors into whether or not we acted with a fair ground of doubt. In other words, this court need not decide whether Ms. [00:15:22] Speaker 01: Stone was required to file an adversary action. This court need not decide whether Irigoyen means that the loan in this case was discharged in 1994 because we have fair ground of doubt and that's the issue before this case. It's an abuse of discretion issue and we submit that the court should affirm. [00:15:39] Speaker 01: I welcome questions. [00:15:42] Speaker 03: Well, let me ask you this. There are two issues identified on appeal, right? I mean, there is the question of whether the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the debtor was obligated to obtain a judgment of nondischargeability. That's one. And number two is the Taggart issue, which you've told us really is the important issue here. And it's, you know, it's conceivable, at least, that we could agree with you on the second one and disagree with you on the first. [00:16:13] Speaker 03: To the extent that in Uruguay, what we were trying to say is, in the view of that court, and I'm happy to explore with you now, Nothing in the statute indicates that either side is obligated to obtain a judgment. [00:16:29] Speaker 03: That was the point of Uruguay was there's no safe harbor here. [00:16:34] Speaker 03: That's not an intelligent reading of the statute and that to the extent the Supreme Court said something different in Hood, it was logically limited to those situations in which, you know, the facts change. The circumstances are not, as we said, an Uruguayan static. And it's really on the debtor to say, well, now I have another argument for why I should get a discharge. That's got to be on the debtor. But in our view, that's what Hood addressed, and it didn't address anything else. So I think, speaking for two-thirds of the here going panel here, there are some ways in which we didn't think it was particularly revolutionary. [00:17:08] Speaker 03: And I do think that we had some reasons why, from a policy standpoint and a 523 and 727 standpoint, it made the better sense to clarify that, you know, when a situation is static, the loan's either discharged or the debt's either discharged or it isn't, and either party has the ability to bring an action if they would like to to get clarification, many times it's not going to be all that hard to figure it out. [00:17:32] Speaker 03: And arguably, in Uruguay, it wasn't all that hard to figure it out, but we remanded, and I don't remember what Judge Wansley did with that. So the first point to us – We believe it's relatively important. I think Ms. Stone believes it's relatively important. So if there's anything you want to add about that, feel free. If you don't, that's okay. You know, you might prevail just on the Taggart issue if you convince us. But if you want to talk about it any further, we're all ears. [00:17:59] Speaker 01: The only additional argument I would submit as it relates to Irigoyen and its effect on this case is the question of whether it's static. And I'm sure the panel saw that I referenced that – The argument that the department believes it still wouldn't be static in this case because there's a question about who has the obligation of providing the information as to when the loans or when the transcripts demonstrated that the loan. And that could have been litigated before Judge Merriman, right? [00:18:32] Speaker 01: That could have been litigated. Hypothetically, it wasn't possible in the context of this truncated proceeding. [00:18:41] Speaker 03: Well, wait a minute. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. [00:18:45] Speaker 03: We invoke the federal rules of civil procedure and contest the matters all the time, don't we? [00:18:49] Speaker 01: We do. [00:18:50] Speaker 03: We do, Your Honor. [00:18:51] Speaker 01: All right. [00:18:54] Speaker 03: And by the way, I mean, no good deed goes unpunished. I very well recognize that you guys acted immediately to cancel the debt, give her the money back. So that's very much in your favor. [00:19:05] Speaker 01: I appreciate that, Your Honor. [00:19:08] Speaker 02: Isn't there also a sense here that, you know, I understand it's the Department of Education. But it's Department of Education acting as a lender, taking an assignment. You took a loan. Generally, the lender knows when something came due. [00:19:24] Speaker 01: I understand. That's a fair argument, Your Honor. And my expectation would be that they knew. But I couldn't evaluate that and figure that out after 30 years in the context of the shutdown where I had two weeks to file an opposition. [00:19:39] Speaker 02: I think that's what Judge Lafferty is saying. Within the balance, okay, that goes into the factors. [00:19:45] Speaker 02: But a lender is generally thought to know when something comes due, even if it's 30 years ago, because you're continuing to enforce it. And part of it is when you get the assignment, you get the loan as it sits. [00:20:00] Speaker 01: Right. And Your Honor, had this been an adversary action, or had it been an action in which I had an opportunity. [00:20:09] Speaker 00: You could have asked for that opportunity. [00:20:14] Speaker 01: That's understood and recognized, and I appreciate that, Your Honor. I did not ask for an opportunity to put this out over for, say, three or four months so that I could collect the servicer records, so that I could try to find somebody with institutional knowledge at the department who understood what those records meant 30 years ago. I could have done all those things. I didn't because the tenor of the proceedings were such that I, quite honestly, in addition to refunding the money and zeroing out the loans, we thought we were acting responsibly as a creditor to get this issue in front of the judge as quickly as possible. [00:20:58] Speaker 02: It's a little more complicated than that, right? Because I get your point, but we're trying... It seems like you would like to force that within the initial question, which is, is there technically contempt? But there's the next question. What's the consequence if there was? And what I'm hearing from you is we did everything could within the time we did. That may go to the second question rather than was there a violation if we accept this, right? I mean, you still have to get around the point that you convinced a bankruptcy judge that you were right. [00:21:32] Speaker 02: that would seem to indicate, wouldn't it, that there was some ground of doubt? [00:21:40] Speaker 01: Your Honor, that's my position here today is that this case is about whether there was a fair ground of doubt. [00:21:47] Speaker 02: But that gets back to the first point you were making, trying to avoid the question of the adversary. It seems like the doubt may well be whether an adversary was required. [00:21:58] Speaker 01: That was part of the fair ground of doubt is whether there was an adversary required, Your Honor. And this panel may decide that as it relates to the seven-year rule, shoot, the five-year rule, what have you, that those are automatically discharged as of the general discharge. It may find that that is consistent with Irigoyen, but it does not affect this Judge Merrim's underlying decision that we acted with a fair ground of doubt. [00:22:24] Speaker 03: Yeah, the language that you accurately quoted from Uruguayan, Ray, a qualified student loan would ordinarily require a debtor to get a determination, assumes a couple things. First of all, that what we're talking about there in the context of the statute that was relevant in Uruguayan was purely hardship discharge versus whether it really was a debt qualifying under student loan. But a question for us is whether if Uruguayan came to the concept that a static situation provides nobody a safe harbor, is there any reason to look at that differently when the question is merely was this within seven years or not? [00:23:07] Speaker 03: I mean, it's equally – I take your point that you might have had some factual issues you would have developed, but as a principle, the question is why wouldn't Uruguayan apply the same way if the matters – if it were static and it were determinable? [00:23:21] Speaker 01: I agree with your, your honor at, at a principle, you're going in the, in the hypothetical or in the, or given the framework of the questions that, that would be standard and, and, uh, would be discharged at the time of the general discharge. Okay. Okay. [00:23:38] Speaker 01: We don't, we don't, I don't dispute that. Nor did I dispute that in front of, uh, judge Merrim except to note that, uh, that, uh, I would have liked an opportunity to evaluate those static issues. I got it. I got it. Recognizing that I did not ask for more time to do that. Right. Right. Right. Okay. I'll submit on that, Your Honor. [00:23:58] Speaker 03: Judge Brandt. Judge Brandt. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you. [00:24:04] Speaker 03: Okay. Ms. Stone, you've got a little over seven minutes. [00:24:08] Speaker 00: Thank you very much, Your Honor. There was a lot in that. I would like to say right off the bat, that the whole concept of it being a really condensed and speedy case, event, motion, I mean, all the, you know, the fact that it went so fast that the department didn't have, or education didn't have an opportunity to explore all the things that it would have if it had been in an adversary, they themselves sped the process up. And moved one of the hearings sooner and had also fully participated in the entire contempt proceeding from beginning to end, which I think Mr. Dorgan also acknowledged that. [00:24:52] Speaker 00: I would say that as far as education itself told the bankruptcy court that it was prepared to waive adversary proceeding due process rights. if the court resolved the discharge question. So if a party can waive a procedural right, I mean, a party can waive a procedural right, but it can't waive a substantive statutory requirement. And the very fact that he offered that proves the adversary proceeding was procedural and not a condition of the discharge. [00:25:32] Speaker 00: I think one of the things that was brought up was can DOE's own guidance really defeat the fairground of doubt by itself? And, I mean, it goes back to their own FSA collections guide. If it had been followed, when it followed the statute, we would not be where we are right now. Because they would have followed it. They would have done the math. It was a static issue. It was not 30 years later. It was all information that was available at that time. And it was in part the information. [00:26:02] Speaker 00: The guarantee agency was under the auspices of working within the machine created by the Department of Education. [00:26:11] Speaker 00: So. [00:26:14] Speaker 03: Can I ask you a question? Yes. When was the information available, given that you yourself were frustrated in 2002 when you tried to get it, right? That's one of the points you made. [00:26:23] Speaker 00: Well, the information. Oh, I'm so sorry. [00:26:25] Speaker 03: No, you go ahead. No, you can tell me. Tell me what you think. [00:26:27] Speaker 00: So you're talking about the information of the day. Yes. [00:26:31] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:26:32] Speaker 00: I knew that contemporaneously at the time of my discharge just because of the fact that it hadn't happened that long ago. I was not able to, and I, over the course of the time, reiterated that they're using the wrong date first due. [00:26:49] Speaker 00: Every person whose hand touched this on the other side was told back. I did not have my transcript to provide it because it was withheld from me. Because my loans were categorized as in default. So the very evidence I would have needed was withheld for me. Now, that doesn't mean the evidence that education or CSAC or ECMC needed was withheld from them because they were required by law to keep track of all of those things within their systems. [00:27:25] Speaker 00: So the failure of their system, if that's what they're relying on, saying that they didn't know because it wasn't in the paperwork, I have no control over that. I didn't withhold anything from them. The first opportunity, when I got a hold of my transcript, I gave that to them before I even filed the motion for contempt. But that was the only time I had the physical proof through the verified transcript that I could show them. But the information should have been available to them. [00:27:54] Speaker 03: If they had information that even if erroneous was contradictory to that and would have indicated the loans came due within that period, how do we judge their reliance on that? [00:28:05] Speaker 03: If they're telling us, well, we relied on this other information that said the loans first came due in 89. [00:28:11] Speaker 03: How do we look at that and evaluate whether that's fair ground of doubt in your mind? [00:28:16] Speaker 00: Well, I would say that that That 1989 graduation date that they were using, that's what they were using was a graduation date, and that was never the legal requirement for that. [00:28:30] Speaker 03: Well, then let me play it back. Does that mean that's so inherently unreasonable we should find that doesn't create a fair ground of doubt? Is that the argument? [00:28:38] Speaker 00: Yes, sir. I think that they are taking on collection of a debt, and whether it's collectible – They needed to do their due diligence. They had everything, or they at least should have had everything, more than I had to prove it. I could say it all I wanted, but if they wanted actual proof, look within their own system. And going back 30 years, yeah, it's 30 years ago. But at that point in time, contemporaneously, before they ever ran down that road of collection, they should have been able to make a better determination or any determination rather than just say, She graduated in 1989. [00:29:15] Speaker 00: Boom. [00:29:15] Speaker 03: That's the date we're going to use. [00:29:17] Speaker 00: It wasn't reasonable for them to use that. [00:29:19] Speaker 03: I'm sorry. No, that's okay. I think it's fair to say that fair ground of doubt doesn't exactly require perfection, right? It allows for human error. [00:29:28] Speaker 03: So where should the line be? I mean, you sound like you want a really strict line here, and I'm not sure where we're supposed to draw it. [00:29:35] Speaker 00: I think that when you're talking about a government agency that's overseeing this massive machine they have an obligation to be as accurate and thorough as they possibly can when they're talking about collecting on a debt, especially when there is a bankruptcy involved. And they are required to keep the documents until the loan is paid. That's one of the requirements. It's not like, oh, it's so long we lost things or they were deleted. [00:30:09] Speaker 00: That's not anything to do with I mean, that is their legal responsibility is to keep all of that until the loan is satisfied or discharged or, you know, whatever it may be. [00:30:21] Speaker 00: The fact that they can't put their hands on something now, they still didn't stop them from trying to garnish my wages, take my offsets. You know, all of those things were deliberate acts that they did, collection acts, without any due diligence and without acknowledging that even just I mean, in my mind, Your Honor, me telling them they're using the wrong date for a stew should have at least prompted some kind of an investigation before they just kept collecting. [00:30:55] Speaker 00: I don't believe that they have reasonable doubt when they didn't do what they should have done and what the law requires them to do, and that's keep accurate documentation. Their lack of documentation isn't preventing them from trying to get it back from me. [00:31:14] Speaker 00: I think that what they call their good faith effort really isn't mitigating. They only gave me back one of the amounts, and they didn't need an adversary to do that. They rolled that back without an adversary. That's an acknowledgment that the loans were discharged. They coded them in bankruptcy. The problem is there's nothing that is enforceable. [00:31:41] Speaker 00: Just them doing it out of the goodness of their heart is great, but it's not something that's enforceable for me. It's not something that I can take if they decide later to come after me again. I have no protection that I should have had from that 1994 discharge. And the whole thing, I really want, and the whole fact is saying, even if I had done an adversary, it wouldn't even count as being discharged until that date. [00:32:12] Speaker 00: Not 1994, but that date. So I don't have any way without a contempt finding to get back money that was taken. [00:32:21] Speaker 03: You're about a minute over your time. I think you've made very good arguments. Thank you very much for the matters submitted. Thank you. We'll do our best to get your written decision as soon as we can. Thank you both for your excellent arguments. This was very well done. Thank you. [00:32:37] Speaker 03: Okay. Call the next matter.