[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
resumes this session. Please be seated.

[00:00:07] Speaker 00:
All right. We'll proceed to hear argument in the next case on calendar for argument this morning, which is 24-7774, Melinda Rex versus Ty Falwell. And we will hear first from Mr. Silvey.

[00:00:27] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Greg Silvey. I represent Mindy Rex.

[00:00:34] Speaker 03:
And may it please the court. Sorry. I'm going to overpower this microphone with my voice if I'm not careful.

[00:00:45] Speaker 03:
May it please the court. We have a lot going on in this case. We have a procedural summary judgment issue. We have a substantive summary judgment issue. And we have an implied contract issue. So court's choice to where I start.

[00:00:58] Speaker 00:
It's your argument. You may proceed.

[00:01:00] Speaker 03:
Okay, I'll start at the beginning. I'll start with the procedural issue. So this case should stand for the proposition that if the defendant is going to move for summary judgment on an issue, they should actually recite the elements and apply the law to the elements. And Clayton did not do this in this case.

[00:01:18] Speaker 02:
May I jump you, counsel, to where we are now? We can affirm for any basis supported in the record. Our review of summary judgment is de novo. And you all in this appellate briefing have briefed the issue. So why shouldn't we just look at it de novo and perhaps affirm because it's supported by the record?

[00:01:39] Speaker 03:
Well, the reason I would like to give is because that's worse for me.

[00:01:43] Speaker 02:
Appreciate your candor.

[00:01:48] Speaker 00:
I mean, would you have put additional facts into the summary judgment record if you had been given formal notice? that the claim was at issue in the distinct way you pleaded it?

[00:02:05] Speaker 03:
Well, that's the exact problem here, is the way, you know, the way cases, civil cases evolve is a complaint is notice-plating. You say some things, and then there's some discovery, and then there's motion practice. And in the case of motion practice, the defendant brings a motion for summary judgment and says, no...

[00:02:27] Speaker 03:
and you say yes, and you develop these facts, and then a judge makes a ruling, and then on appeal you take that judge's ruling and you say blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And the plaintiff didn't get to do that because Clayton did not challenge the cancellation part of this case. And so we have, you know, on appeal I have the defendant saying, well, you know, we didn't do this, the court didn't do this, you didn't say this.

[00:02:58] Speaker 03:
kind of this, you're saying this first on appeal, and that's because of the procedural problem of how this came up. So I guess that's the answer of why you just shouldn't jump to the merits.

[00:03:11] Speaker 03:
And beside the fact that I prefer it, that we should, you know, take things in turn.

[00:03:16] Speaker 00:
But would the factual record change? I mean, you're asking for a remand so that, you know, the separate issue can be done under the standard in the Morris case. But would the factual record change if it were remanded? Would it look different from what we see now?

[00:03:38] Speaker 03:
Well, I guess it's what do you see now?

[00:03:42] Speaker 03:
You know, so we have, okay, so certainly we have the, you know, canceling a contract, canceling the contract, depriving the handicap of housing. And we have the cancellation of the contract. I mean, this is always going to be a circumstantial case. I mean, the defendants were smart enough to not say, and we're canceling this contract because of Mindy and her crazy relatives. So they were that smart that they didn't say that.

[00:04:13] Speaker 00:
So what's the protected conduct for purposes of this claim?

[00:04:18] Speaker 03:
So the protected conduct is obtaining housing for the handicapped. and that's what you enjoy as the handicap.

[00:04:30] Speaker 03:
So back to the circumstantial part.

[00:04:34] Speaker 03:
So the defendants weren't dumb enough to say, we're not, you know, selling to Mindy and your crazy relatives.

[00:04:43] Speaker 00:
So when in the causal... So if it is interfering with the right for housing for the handicapped, when does...

[00:04:55] Speaker 00:
Ms. Rex first engage in the protected conduct that is the basis for this claim?

[00:05:03] Speaker 03:
As it's all falling apart on February 4th.

[00:05:06] Speaker 00:
So, I mean, because the district court analyzed it, you know, in terms of two pieces, but the district court seemed to focus on pieces that preceded the protected conduct, which struck me as confusing.

[00:05:21] Speaker 03:
Right, and that's, again, part of this. We never had a defendant arguing this in summary judgment. But back to the, I mean, so Ms. Rex is just, I mean, she's arguing the Fair Housing Act, you know, from the inception of the collapse, you know, in that morning of February 4th. And she's saying, and you're depriving, you know, handicapped people of their fair housing, and I have a fair housing attorney. I mean, she's on it. You know, and that's so all of a sudden bringing that up and they, you know, cancel and continue to cancel and won't reconsider.

[00:05:56] Speaker 00:
So is it really an issue on this claim of whether the refusal to recommence the transaction was, you know, fits within 3617, that that's the conduct that...

[00:06:21] Speaker 00:
you know, interferes with the exercise of her rights?

[00:06:25] Speaker 03:
Well, I don't think there's any question that the failure to reinstate does, but also... You're arguing that that was done on protectual grounds? Yes, right.

[00:06:37] Speaker 00:
But the district court didn't seem to analyze that piece of it.

[00:06:40] Speaker 03:
No.

[00:06:42] Speaker 03:
And again, it wasn't argued below, so there's nothing for the plaintiff to respond to below... Because this argument is never being made by the defendant, so the plaintiff doesn't have anything to respond to. And so in oral argument, you know, plaintiff, sorry about overpowering the mic.

[00:07:02] Speaker 03:
So the plaintiff never has anything to respond to in oral argument. He kind of says a couple sentences about it, and that's it. And I mean, the plaintiff gives fair warning to the defendant. You are not moving for summary judgment on this. And on appeal, they pretend they were, but they're not.

[00:07:17] Speaker 00:
Well, you were kind of talking past each other because their motion clearly says they were moving on all counts, but they lumped counts one and two together as if they said the same thing. And you came back and said that you're not moving on the 36-7 team, which is different. And you just sort of were talking past each other.

[00:07:36] Speaker 03:
But if I was the defendant, I'd I'd give some reasons why I've included 3617, including perhaps using the elements of the claim. I mean, the complaint said two different things.

[00:07:49] Speaker 00:
Had the Morris case been decided at the time of this summary judgment briefing?

[00:07:54] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry, I don't know.

[00:08:02] Speaker 02:
Had you been given notice that you maintain you should have received, what would you have done differently

[00:08:08] Speaker 03:
in the district court that you're not doing now before us uh... i wouldn't the arguments in the evidence be the same as what yours presenting on appeal i guess i'm i wasn't trial counsel i don't i don't want to make it make a concession i'm gonna gonna regret since i was not trial counsel fair enough uh... but it certainly would have been teed up to the district court uh... which which did not rule on what we are talking about here.

[00:08:41] Speaker 01:
Did you, was summer judgment motion filed, I assume, after the closure discovery or was it filed while discovery was still open? Do you recall?

[00:08:50] Speaker 00:
Again, I'm... The district court said it was after the closure. That was one of the reasons the district court gave for reaching it. Exactly.

[00:08:56] Speaker 03:
And in the brief, opposing counsel's brief said it was after as well. So yes, it would have been after.

[00:09:04] Speaker 03:
So back to somewhere where I was in the middle of this.

[00:09:09] Speaker 03:
back to the, it's a circumstantial case, and part of it is, while, I've started this sentence a few times, while the defendants weren't stupid enough to say, yeah, we're doing it because of Mindy and her stupid, or in her crazy relatives that we never want to deal with again, they also weren't smart enough to deny it. I mean, she directly says, you know, you're depriving handicapped people of housing in one of those first emails on February 8th or 4th, and they don't say no or not.

[00:09:44] Speaker 03:
And she accuses everybody. You know, when she's telling Tom Brenner, the manager, this is what's happening, this is what I'm trying to do, nobody says a no or not. I mean, if this was a criminal case in a non-custodial interrogation, that prosecutor would be saying, this is huge evidence of intent.

[00:10:06] Speaker 03:
That gets to go to the jury.

[00:10:08] Speaker 03:
This district judge should not have granted summary judgment on this case.

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
I think I'll save the rest for rebuttal.

[00:10:20] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:10:20] Speaker 03:
I have a feeling I'm going to have a lot to say.

[00:10:22] Speaker 00:
All right. Thank you, counsel. We'll hear now from Mr. Weber.

[00:10:31] Speaker 04:
May it please the court, Daniel Weber for the Epley's defendant, CMH Homes, Inc., and its two employees.

[00:10:37] Speaker 04:
Appellant's briefing and its arguments to this court confirms without a doubt what the district court already correctly held under the exact same factual record before this court now, and that's that there is no evidence of any sort of discriminatory intent on CMH's behalf that is necessary to support a Section 3617 interference claim under the Fair Housing Act. The evidence in this case is undisputed, and it's taken almost entirely from from the appellant Mindy Rex's 190-paragraph declaration to the district court with 46 exhibits attached, outlining every discussion she had with any interested party in this case.

[00:11:15] Speaker 00:
But, you know, Rule 56 expressly states in the provision on sua sponte motions, it says, after giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may grant summary judgment for a non-movement. So by its terms, it says that the court must give notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.

[00:11:47] Speaker 00:
That was not done here. This was a... Wasn't this a flagrant violation of Rule 56F?

[00:11:54] Speaker 04:
No, Your Honor. The rule states that notice is required, but the holdings of the Supreme Court in Salatex and this court's holdings a state that notice is only the opportunity to notice that the non-moving party's claims are at issue and that they have the opportunity to develop facts. And that was absolutely present here.

[00:12:16] Speaker 00:
How is that present? Because the district court didn't even seem to correctly understand the claim. The district court thought that the complaint had pleaded them as basically parasitic of one another, but that just doesn't seem to be correct with, if you look at the complaint, because the second cause of action in paragraph 132, you know, and I'm going to skip over alternative language and just read the relevant part. Defendants canceled plaintiff's purchase transactions after plaintiff Melinda Rex's statement of her belief that defendant's conduct was a violation of fair housing laws.

[00:12:58] Speaker 00:
That allegation is completely independent of whether there was a violation of 3604.

[00:13:05] Speaker 00:
And the district court totally missed that. The opening summary judgment motion totally missed that. And the Morris case was decided before this briefing was done, where we had absolutely made clear that you could lose your 3604 and still have a 3617, which is what the majority ended up holding in that case.

[00:13:26] Speaker 00:
And so this just seems to have been completely botched by the district court. So I don't understand why we would try and sort this out ourselves rather than just send it back and do it right.

[00:13:37] Speaker 04:
Well, Your Honor, respectfully, paragraph 132 also refers back to the reasonable accommodation.

[00:13:42] Speaker 00:
Correct, but that's why I said there's two theories as to how it was violated. And I skipped over the other one, which is the parallel one.

[00:13:53] Speaker 00:
But it had this other element here, which the district court just missed. And we've said that it's legally distinct. So this whole idea that it was the plaintiff's fault that, you know, it was how you pleaded it. And so you deserve this sua sponte that I'm giving you was just wrong. The alternative theory is in the complaint. It's a distinct theory. And the district court missed it.

[00:14:19] Speaker 00:
So it's a violation of the rule. And a misreading of the complaint just seems like it needs to go back.

[00:14:29] Speaker 04:
Well, Your Honor, we respectfully disagree. The Morris case did hold that the claims can be distinct, but it also held in the same breath as in other cases before this court that a 3617 claim and a 3604 claim are often coextensive and, in fact, can be. And the appellants, importantly, the district court specifically held in its order that it was reasonable to read the complaint the way that the appellees did, and moved for summary judgment in the way that they did. And the appellants have not disputed that characterization of the second amended complaint.

[00:15:00] Speaker 00:
What about the fact that, you know, the district court on page 26 of its order, when it focuses on the retaliation claim, it focuses on two acts as being, you know, the basis of the retaliation claim. And the first is to require Mindy to choose between paying cash or financing when purchasing the homes rather than accepting or hold money proposal.

[00:15:32] Speaker 00:
And two, terminating the negotiations after Mindy told Tellez de Souza, I'm extremely dissatisfied. Both of those actions occurred prior to the protected conduct. So it just makes no sense because conduct that preceded the protected conduct can't be the retaliation. If there's a retaliation claim here, it has to be the refusal to recommence.

[00:16:03] Speaker 00:
And that draws in the whole long letter, which suddenly hauls out a lot of alternative grounds that we're hearing for the first time. And maybe raises a tribal issue of pretext, because now you're bringing up stuff that didn't come up before, and so maybe there is something here.

[00:16:23] Speaker 04:
Well, Your Honor, we respectfully disagree on that front as well. The entire case was postured and stems from the first request, which Ms. Rex couched as a reasonable accommodation request, which was to hold money, Clayton Holmes, to hold money and try to move up the delivery of the home, which CMH did not. If it was after all of that behavior, that is when Ms. Rex, who is not in a protected class, that is perfectly undisputed, became very upset. She expressed her extreme dissatisfaction in an email to Clayton Holmes and then had an aggressive phone call with Clayton Holmes' manager.

[00:16:59] Speaker 00:
But suppose we agree with you that there's just no triable issue that that was retaliatory, that, you know, they put in the expert, they had really good reasons for not wanting to do this whole money thing, which just... create a lot of trouble. No tribal issue that that was pretextual. All right, set that aside. Why isn't the recommence issue, because she ultimately said, I'll do it your way. Give me the cash, just give me the home. And she really wanted to get this back on track.

[00:17:32] Speaker 00:
And they actually say in the letter that one of the reasons why they don't want to go forward is because you're engaged in protected conduct. They didn't put it that way, but They've referred to the conduct that is the protected conduct.

[00:17:45] Speaker 04:
Well, Your Honor, the first request was sort of the linchpin of the case. It's not on appeal under the reasonable accommodation claim. But all of these future issues grow from that initial contact. It was Ms. Rex's reaction to what is now a justified reason for refusing what she characterized as a reasonable accommodation. Everything after that is Ms. Rex asking to undo... the termination, which all reverts back to the first conduct, which was the reasonable accommodation, which further denotes why the appellees moved and paired those two claims together.

[00:18:21] Speaker 04:
And importantly, Your Honor, in the briefing, the appellants did not uncouple the analysis. They continued down the same road that the appellees moved. They paired the claims together, and in fact, they talked about the two different activities, the hold money, which was denied, and undoing the termination. and held that they were both reasonable accommodations. They didn't say anything that would suggest to anyone, most notably the District Court, that, hold on, coupling those two claims together is not appropriate. They are different claims.

[00:18:52] Speaker 04:
They stand on their own. They went down the same path. So they're not raising a Morris claim, in your view?

[00:18:57] Speaker 00:
They seem clearly to be doing that.

[00:19:00] Speaker 04:
They do that now, Your Honor.

[00:19:02] Speaker 04:
But for the very first time, they stated that there was an interference separate and apart from the reasonable accommodation. The very first time where? at oral argument. And under cellotex and Rule 56, that is notice, and it was worth noting that was completely unprompted by the district court. The appellants came out at oral argument and said for the very first time, these are different claims. Here is my basis for the 3617 claim.

[00:19:27] Speaker 00:
Well, they had said in the opposition, we don't read the motion as extending to the 3617 claim because it's different, and they didn't say anything about that claim.

[00:19:38] Speaker 04:
What? It didn't say that latter part, Your Honor. It just, in our judgment, misread the motion for summary judgment as simply not moving. But clearly, the claims were considered together in the motion for summary judgment as they frequently are as held by this court, and the appellant's never clarified that.

[00:19:55] Speaker 00:
Why wouldn't the letter create a triable issue of pretext as to retaliation under 3617 with respect to the protected conduct of her invoking her FHA rights.

[00:20:13] Speaker 04:
Because there is no evidence that there is a discriminatory motive in any of those reasons. As Your Honor correctly referred to, each one of those reasons set forth in that letter is supported by unrebutted expert testimony from a manufactured home.

[00:20:28] Speaker 00:
Well, it is as to the, if she wanted to recommence the transaction based on the, you know, whole money idea but there were other issues here I mean it raises this issue about well now we've decided the modification which came out of nowhere that that that's actually a grounds for not recommencing and they refer to the protected conduct in the letter.

[00:21:02] Speaker 00:
Our concerns are exacerbated by the fact that you have already threatened legal action against CMH prior to entering into any written contracts. These threats alone aren't reason enough to part ways. I mean, that's admitting that her engaging in the protected conduct is the basis for the decision. So why isn't this just A triable issue of a 3617 violation right there.

[00:21:32] Speaker 04:
Well, we don't agree, Your Honor, that the statement about the history with respect to the hold money request and the denial and Ms. Rex's escalation is the protected activity. The protected activity started with the hold money request and then was escalated by Ms. Rex with respect to her response to it. And to answer one of Your Honor's previous questions, This is a very unique type of transaction.

[00:21:57] Speaker 00:
But the request for the whole money, I understand they have the accommodation claim, which they abandoned. You know, that was for her convenience financially. It's nothing to do with the disability, which is why we don't have that claim here in front of us.

[00:22:14] Speaker 00:
So that's not really the protected conduct. The only thing that is potentially triable as protected conduct is she says, hey, these are bogus, you know, this is I folded and agreed to your terms and you're canceling the contract anyway. And this is really going to deprive these two disabled people of their housing. And, you know, if you're going to go forward with that, then, you know, I'm going to talk to my lawyer and now lawyers are going to need to talk. And then they send a letter that says, you know, because you said that.

[00:22:47] Speaker 00:
That alone is enough not to do the transaction. We will retaliate against you for invoking your FHA rights. It's kind of right there in the letter.

[00:22:56] Speaker 04:
We do not agree with that, Your Honor. As stated previously, the reasons in the letter are additional reasons.

[00:23:03] Speaker 04:
The true reason why negotiations were terminated was because of Ms. Rex's escalation and response to the denial of the hold money request. The reasoning set forth, the additional reasons in the letter were also supported by unrebutted expert testimony as valid and legitimate and are further evidence that CMH was willing to overlook some of the other difficulties in the transaction, you have to understand getting into a manufactured housing transaction denotes at least another year of working with the customer.

[00:23:33] Speaker 04:
And here, as stated in the original reason and again in the February 12th letter, this is all the reasons why we have an unsuccessful relationship already We can't just undo the termination. We are going to have a terrible relationship. You've already expressed your extreme dissatisfaction. Unrebutted expert testimony in this case is when that happens, it is reasonable and in fact expected to simply walk away. And again, there's no causal connection, but every fact in this case is CMH did not want to do business with Ms.

[00:24:07] Speaker 04:
Rex. There is not one iota of evidence that CMH had any discriminatory motive towards the relatives. It is pure speculation. My colleague said that this is an entirely circumstantial evidence case. We would submit there's no evidence of CMH's intent whatsoever, but this court holds that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and it must be substantial. That's held in the Bergeen case and in the Brown case. And Judge Collins, I'm sort of reminded of your partial dissent, partial concurrence in Morris.

[00:24:39] Speaker 04:
where you used the word linchpin, I believe. And there was a letter in that case as well.

[00:24:45] Speaker 04:
But there was a whole lot of evidence that a jury could find. That's a linchpin. That's a bridge between what we said we were doing and why it's not true. But the fact remains that everything that CMH did was because of Ms. Rex's response. And she already admitted she was extremely dissatisfied. And there is no evidence in the record, and all the evidence states that a reasonable retailer in this situation, would simply walk away. And you can't just undo a termination when you already have an extremely dissatisfied customer.

[00:25:19] Speaker 04:
My colleague basically asked the court to lay down a bright-line rule that a moving party must recite the elements of every claim, but that is contrary to Selatex and Rule 56. There's no such rule, and it's important to note that the court granting sua sponte is judged on an abuse of discretion standard. That's the amount of time in the court.

[00:25:39] Speaker 00:
Thank you, counsel. We'll hear rebuttal now.

[00:25:46] Speaker 03:
Hello again. To start where he left off, actually, you do have to cite the elements. I mean, we all went to law school. We know what claims are. We know how to apply facts to the law. And even in opposing counsels, the entire presentation was just denying that a claim could exist outside of the original reasonable accommodation claim.

[00:26:19] Speaker 03:
And the defendant's position is, if that's not right, then nothing can flow to it.

[00:26:24] Speaker 00:
But our discussion that we've been having here... I think what he was saying was that even if you get past all of this and you get to whether there's a triable issue of retaliation, his point is that This relationship, by the time she engages in the, you know, the real protected activity, which is I'm going to call my lawyer FHA lawyer, the relationship was so obviously poisoned, they were so definitive in terminating this, that it's not triable, that it was pretext.

[00:26:55] Speaker 00:
They just, before they even knew she was going to do that, they wanted nothing to do with her, so it's not triable. What's your response to that?

[00:27:03] Speaker 03:
My response to that is, I mean... That's one thing that he argues to the jury. And it needs to go to the jury. Because the other side of that, the circumstantial evidence, is, again, they didn't... That doesn't seem good.

[00:27:19] Speaker 03:
The circumstantial evidence is they didn't deny the direct accusation of depriving handicapped people of housing. The jury gets to consider that. So was it just Mindy that they didn't want anything to do with? Because there's a year warranty and such. Or was it Mindy... and her mentally handicapped relatives that they didn't want anything to do with. And then, again, the incredible disingenuineness of the letter and some of the pretexts, I mean, the more that they make things up in that letter also shows that they're, you know, they're trying everything they can to get out of this.

[00:27:59] Speaker 00:
Is there any evidence that Tellez D'Souza knew that These units or these homes were for handicapped persons?

[00:28:12] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:28:12] Speaker 00:
At the time that she said, you're not a happy customer, go somewhere else.

[00:28:20] Speaker 00:
On February 4th.

[00:28:22] Speaker 03:
On February 4th, she knows it. Because I know it's in an email on February 4th.

[00:28:27] Speaker 03:
So I know she knows it on that day.

[00:28:30] Speaker 00:
I mean, because it's not mentioned in the conversation. So Ms. Rex sends something, says, I want to do this.

[00:28:37] Speaker 00:
You know, she had been raising this whole idea of wanting to do the whole money. And then tell us, D'Souza sends us something, you know, we're going to do it one way or the other, and tell me what you want to do. And then she says, all right, I'll do it your way, but I want you to know I'm really not happy. And then tell us, D'Souza just says, we're done. we're done, you're going to be that cranky with me, we are done. And did she know at that point, there's no mention in that whole discussion of anything about handicapped or the FHA or rights, did she know that these units that she was then canceling summarily were for disabled persons?

[00:29:19] Speaker 03:
Well, her manager, Falwell was the salesperson she was dealing with who certainly knew Because that was the whole thing from the premise.

[00:29:27] Speaker 00:
But the person who's canceling this transaction, the causal one is Teller's decision. She makes the decision that she's done.

[00:29:35] Speaker 03:
Right. So we know the salesperson did. And we know that there were e-mails between them beforehand, before the 4th. And I know that there was e-mails from Mindy.

[00:29:50] Speaker 03:
I don't know.

[00:29:53] Speaker 03:
It's all in.

[00:29:55] Speaker 03:
In my brief, it says exactly what was said by who. So I know it came up with them on the 4th.

[00:30:05] Speaker 00:
It comes up later. I didn't see anywhere in the exchanges with Tellez de Souza leading up to Tellez de Souza's pulling the plug. I didn't see any reference to Tellez.

[00:30:17] Speaker 03:
The one that I can see in my head is just on the morning of the 4th. I know it's in there.

[00:30:23] Speaker 00:
Right away it comes up.

[00:30:24] Speaker 03:
Right away.

[00:30:25] Speaker 00:
But, you know, she's burned the bridge at that point, tell us, D'Souza. And so does that create a problem for you in terms of causation on a retaliation claim?

[00:30:36] Speaker 03:
Well, I mean, is it imputed from the salesperson? For months they've been doing this to put handicapped people in because, you know, defendant was also Falwell in this case.

[00:30:48] Speaker 00:
I know, but then, you know, she goes up the chain, and, you know, the fellow at the next level, I don't remember his name, he basically says, oh, well, the salespeople get their commissions based on the customer rating, and so we give them a lot of discretion to pull the plug. And so he basically was just saying it was Teller D'Souza's call.

[00:31:08] Speaker 03:
Right. But, yeah, so, well.

[00:31:11] Speaker 00:
But there's no taint in Teller D'Souza's decision because she's not – doesn't look like there's a tribal issue that she did this based on anything retaliation she just she just doesn't want to deal with difficult people well and then and as she sees it right i mean she's still the employee clayton is the defendant we're talking about she's clayton's employee agent slash um manager could answer just maybe a basic question i'm just uh completely missed but

[00:31:43] Speaker 01:
CMH Homes just builds the homes. It's not in their own mobile park homes, right? It's a separate? Correct. They're a retailer, and then the home goes to a trailer park. So the theory here is they just don't want to build a home for someone who's handicapped? I mean, there seems a stronger inference if it's in the community. Maybe they don't want that.

[00:32:05] Speaker 03:
So what the defendants, the various ones said in their depositions and so forth, Buying a mobile home is not like buying a pair of shoes. It's like a long-term relationship, that they're servicing this home for at least a year afterwards. So that was the ostensible grounds that we do not want to deal with Mindy for this year afterwards. They just want out of this thing.

[00:32:31] Speaker 03:
Did that answer your question?

[00:32:33] Speaker 03:
Okay. So back to the, yes, I cannot tell you from this podium that when the first handicapped to Katie, when it happened for her. But certainly the salesperson knew it beforehand. She knew it at the morning of the 4th.

[00:32:53] Speaker 00:
You've gone over your time, but I have actually one question on the state law claim, which is, you know, you complain about the delay from the asserted decision in October until the carrying out of the decision in December, and that this was somehow unfair and deprived her of the... Never mind, I'm sorry. We'll just... No, I'm sorry.

[00:33:24] Speaker 00:
All right. I'm mixing things up. It's been a long week. So, okay, all right.