[00:00:11] Speaker 03:
The final case for argument today is Schilling versus County of San Diego.

[00:00:42] Speaker 03:
Yes, yes.

[00:00:45] Speaker 03:
Mr. Gorski, I think, again, as I mentioned at the first argument, if you want to save time for rebuttal, please watch the clock.

[00:00:53] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, I will.

[00:00:56] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honors, and it may please the Court. My name is Gary Gorski, and I represent the appellant, Mr. Schilling, in this case. And from the start, I think this case is relatively simple. And to straightforward, first of all, we have a Rule 8 issue on the initial pleading. We submit that that pleading on its face provided a cognizable claim under the First Amendment for penalizing Mr. Shillen's right to associate freely.

[00:01:32] Speaker 01:
The lower court used the wrong legal lens and framed it as an association issue when in actuality the word penalized was used twice in the first calls of action spelling out that he's being penalized for association, not that he was being prevented from association. And if I can direct the court to the record on that, it would be at ER 38, paragraph 34 of the first claim for relief states that individuals cannot be penalized for their association.

[00:02:12] Speaker 01:
Paragraph 35 says the freedom of association, penalizing him for his lawful association.

[00:02:20] Speaker 01:
Then at ER 39, which is the complaint, paragraph 36, it states the cognizable claim for damages. Plaintiff has suffered an injury, in fact, That injury, in fact, was a revocation of his CCW.

[00:02:39] Speaker 01:
The letter of revocation was identified in the complaint at ER 36 at paragraph 22. After Bruin, the sheriff issued a policy that association with the bruise fighters is good cause to have your CCW revoked. And context is important here, Your Honors.

[00:03:03] Speaker 01:
When Mr. Schilling was first issued a CCW, it was like within four or five days after Bruin, the sheriff at that time issued a policy, shall issue, and he obtained a CCW. An election happens, a new sheriff comes into town, changes the policy, and says, well, we're going to look at your associations, which was not the prior sheriff's policy. And I think that's important because that rolls into 11th Amendment immunity policy. which the lower court was looking at the function of just issuing a CCW, not how the state's involvement in the issue of CCWs and policies regarding that issuance are affected.

[00:03:48] Speaker 01:
And so we submit that. Had the lower court followed the cone factors, it's easy to determine that this was strictly a local policy that had no state control, that had No state funding for it. In fact, looking at the supplemental extract of record for the appellees, even at SER-4, when it talks about fees, the policy statement of the San Diego Sheriff's Department is the Department of Justice and San Diego County Sheriff's Department are both involved in the issuance of CCWs.

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
It's not saying state only. It's saying the county's involved in this. I think that's important because when they change their policy, which is SER-5, you'll notice under the application process that they talk about this company. It's an online company for CCWs and it's called Permitium. And That is a local contract with a company, not a third-party contractor, to process CCW applications.

[00:05:02] Speaker 01:
That's not a state agency. It's not a state contract. It's a local contract with a vendor.

[00:05:17] Speaker 02:
Can I ask you about this? On the mootness question, The statute has been amended, correct? Correct. So are you still asking for an injunction against the old statute?

[00:05:34] Speaker 01:
There was no request for an injunction. We were not challenging the statute on its face. We were challenging the way it was applied by the County of Sacramento.

[00:05:44] Speaker 02:
So it's just an applied challenge to your client?

[00:05:47] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor. Got it. And the second thing is we're also seeking monetary damages against and also the stigma because on a CCW application, one of the questions they ask you is, have you ever had a CCW before? And by checking yes and it was revoked, that's a stigma that follows him in any state. And the irony of this, too, and I'm kind of getting off base here, but the irony is people from outside the state of California can go to any county out of the 58, and apply for a CCW, okay?

[00:06:25] Speaker 01:
Most people go to Riverside County because it's the fastest processing time. It's kind of like just obtaining a driver's license in Riverside.

[00:06:35] Speaker 01:
Mr. Schilling can't even do that. He's stuck with San Diego County, and he did reapply, and it was rejected because of his prior revocation. So he has an ongoing injury here as well.

[00:06:47] Speaker 02:
So he applied under the new regime and was rejected?

[00:06:49] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:06:51] Speaker 00:
And that's not in the record yet, correct?

[00:06:55] Speaker 01:
No, that is not in the record. It was in my brief. I pointed that out.

[00:06:59] Speaker 00:
And the reason given, though, your proffers, the reason given was because of the prior revocation? I'm sorry, Your Honor? The reason given for rejecting the new application was because of the prior revocation?

[00:07:09] Speaker 01:
Correct, Your Honor, because of his association with the boost fighters.

[00:07:14] Speaker 00:
still because of the association or just because of the prior revocation? I mean, I understand the prior revocation. I guess I'm just trying to – the new denial, did it refer to his association?

[00:07:25] Speaker 01:
It did not refer to anything.

[00:07:27] Speaker 00:
Just the prior revocation.

[00:07:28] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor. Okay.

[00:07:37] Speaker 02:
And on your fee association claim, is there any cases that show – What are the elements of that type of claim are?

[00:07:48] Speaker 01:
For the First Amendment?

[00:07:49] Speaker 02:
Yeah, for your free association claim.

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
I think First Choice lays that out clearly because one of the issues they point out in there, it's – being punished for association. They cite some cases in that decision, but in the general context, first choice lays out that once the association is the target of the governmental action, it gives Article III standing because even in that case, it was only a subpoena being issued. It wasn't even being enforced or anything yet.

[00:08:23] Speaker 01:
But here you have a concrete injury in fact, the actual revocation of a CCW, which is a taking away a Second Amendment right, there's no point of having a firearm in your house if you can't take it outside the house and protect yourself. So we're talking about a fundamental right here, so it's much higher than the issue of first choice, which was a subpoena just being issued.

[00:08:52] Speaker 01:
And one of the key issues of this case also is that the policy was never state-directed.

[00:08:59] Speaker 01:
The Attorney General's Office always issues opinions on matters of enforcement, gang enforcement. There's no general policy statement or memorandum to all 58 sheriffs saying that the Booze Fighters are an organization that has criminal propensity and that anyone belonging to that association should be denied a CCW.

[00:09:28] Speaker 01:
I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal. Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:09:31] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:09:33] Speaker 03:
Mr. Stotland, whenever you're ready.

[00:09:42] Speaker 04:
Good morning, and may it please the court, I am Deputy County Counsel David Stotland, appearing on behalf of the appellees here, the county and the sheriff. And I'd like to start by saying something that also is not in the record, which is it is my understanding that approximately a month ago, Mr. Schilling has been issued a CCW permit by the Sheriff's Department.

[00:10:08] Speaker 04:
With that in mind, I think the biggest question before the court today is whether or not The state has involved itself enough in the CCW process that when the sheriffs are processing these, the sheriff, the state is essentially the main policymaker rather than the sheriff. And I think in looking at that, under the McMillan test, we look at the function or issue.

[00:10:37] Speaker 02:
Yeah, but does McMillan survive Cone?

[00:10:41] Speaker 04:
McMillan is a totally separate case. piece of analysis from Cohen. As I think the concurrence, Judge Bumate, that you and Judge Sung, the concurring and dissenting opinion points out, when we're looking at whether or not how to treat a state-created entity, it's either an arm of the state for 11th Amendment purposes, in which case it's all or nothing, or it's a municipality.

[00:11:14] Speaker 04:
and i'll point out that no matter how well researched all of the opinions in cone are they don't even mention mcmillan and because mcmillan looks at a different phase what if you're dealing with municipality what if you're dealing with in mcmillan it was a sheriff's a county sheriff's department and when you're dealing with a municipality whether it's as 11th Amendment or who's the policymaker for 1983 purposes, what you're looking at is whether or not the state, it is essentially the state policy that is being implemented.

[00:11:56] Speaker 04:
And in this case, and I think when figuring that out, one thing you look at is what's the appropriate level of generality you look at this for.

[00:12:07] Speaker 04:
And I would submit that the The proper level of generality is CCW licensure.

[00:12:14] Speaker 02:
Before you get there, I just don't understand why Cohen would not apply. You're suggesting that that's limited to what?

[00:12:24] Speaker 04:
I'm saying Cohen determines whether something is an arm of the state. Correct. And if it's an arm of the state, in whatever it does, it gets 11th Amendment immunity. Yes.

[00:12:35] Speaker 04:
Cone does not apply to municipalities. Why not?

[00:12:43] Speaker 04:
Or, alternatively, you could say municipalities are not arms of the state under its 11th Amendment analysis. I also don't understand how Cone, an NBank Ninth Circuit case, could overturn McMillan, a U.S. Supreme Court case.

[00:13:04] Speaker 02:
And so I think the right way to square that is – Well, I mean I think what Cohen recognizes is that 11th Amendment immunity doctrine has changed in the Supreme Court tremendously before – since we've last visited. That's why we had to take it en banc to overrule our past precedent, which is based off of the older Supreme Court precedent.

[00:13:25] Speaker 04:
That is true.

[00:13:27] Speaker 04:
But it also did not determine who is a policymaker for 1983 purposes as well, and McMillan is primarily a policy for 1983 purposes type of case.

[00:13:39] Speaker 04:
Some of the courts that have interpreted it, SCOCA, for instance, talks about it in 11th Amendment terms, but it is also true that if the state is the policymaker, the local government under McMillan, is not the local government, and the local government officials are not the proper defendants.

[00:14:01] Speaker 02:
So that doesn't pose the biggest problem, is that you're talking about 1983, not sovereign immunity.

[00:14:07] Speaker 02:
They're very intertwined. One's statutory, one's constitutional. I don't know why they would be intertwined.

[00:14:14] Speaker 04:
Because if 1983 were amended to allow states to be sued under it, it would run into the buzzsaw of 11th Amendment immunity, because the states would... because Congress can't simply by statute say states are subject to federal judgments.

[00:14:33] Speaker 04:
But when a local government is acting as part of the state and when the state's actions are so pervasive, when the state's involvement is so pervasive that the local government is essentially acting as a part of the state, then the state is the policymaker, not the local government.

[00:15:00] Speaker 04:
And I think this court has all sorts of precedents to support that, many of which involve sheriffs.

[00:15:08] Speaker 04:
I'd point out this court's decision in Brewster, again, also not discussed in the Cohn case.

[00:15:17] Speaker 04:
When this court decided Brewster, it said that for general law enforcement purposes, but not for all purposes, sheriffs are considered to be local officials.

[00:15:27] Speaker 04:
It distinguished Weiner v. County of San Diego, where district attorneys were considered state officials for their general law enforcement functions.

[00:15:39] Speaker 04:
But...

[00:15:41] Speaker 04:
In doing so, it said it was something of a close case. It was more or less one factor that led to the difference. Here you have not just general law enforcement. You have a very specific state statute that goes even down to the detail of in 26.160, you will pass a policy that states what this state law says.

[00:16:08] Speaker 02:
And when the state tells you what— He just alleges that it was a change in sheriff that required—that changed his CCW status.

[00:16:18] Speaker 02:
So it doesn't sound like that's state-enforced. It depends on the personnel who's enforcing it, correct?

[00:16:25] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor. It's because it's state-mandated. Well, but one sheriff found that it wasn't mandated in this case, and another sheriff did, so therefore it doesn't seem like state— policy governs this? Was there a change in state law that required this? The state statute says what the state statute did, what the state statute does.

[00:16:46] Speaker 04:
Whether an individual sheriff interprets it one way or interprets it another way, and whether the state decides to take action to enforce the implementation that it likes doesn't change the fact that the state mandates it. And the level of generality is not down to

[00:17:06] Speaker 02:
It sounds like you're making the same argument from before. It's like any time the state passes a law and entities have to follow it, they become a function of the state. No. That can't be right.

[00:17:16] Speaker 04:
I very much do not agree with that because the state regulates everything in California.

[00:17:21] Speaker 02:
Correct. Exactly. So pointing to a statute doesn't really help prove that you're an arm of the state.

[00:17:27] Speaker 04:
What I will point to is your precedent and the Supreme Court precedent in McMillan that talks about the need to balance and look at how pervasive the state law is.

[00:17:38] Speaker 00:
If I understand your argument correctly, I just want to make sure I'm understanding it correctly, even if you're saying the entity of the county of San Diego or the sheriff's entity department was not an arm of the state in this instance the sheriff was acting as an officer of the state in implementing state law is that your is that a fair way to characterize your argument that is and that's consistent with the outcome this court reached in the buffett case where the sheriff was simply implementing state law when enforcing the bail schedule mandated by the state That's the case.

[00:18:23] Speaker 00:
I think there would still be a claim for injunctive relief that that would not affect. Is that correct?

[00:18:30] Speaker 04:
If the injunctive relief claim were not moot, then that's correct because I would think that would still be subject to ex parte young because that would be sort of an ex parte young style exception.

[00:18:44] Speaker 04:
So, yes, I agree. If there was a basis for an injunction, which Between the legislation changing, the CCW expiring, and Mr. Schilling having a new CCW license from the sheriff, I don't think he can show that this is – I don't think this is – Couldn't we still – couldn't the district court still order expungement of the prior revocation?

[00:19:12] Speaker 04:
Could the district court technically order expungement of the prior revocation –

[00:19:16] Speaker 02:
Yes. Okay, so how does that not make this case moot? Not moot.

[00:19:21] Speaker 04:
So the authority cited for expungement of the prior revocation is this court's decision in comprehensive testing. And comprehensive testing was a criminal case involving federal rule of criminal procedure 41 where the government seems to have misled people that misled the magistrate when obtaining a warrant and then did not comply with the restrictions on the warrant about what documents it took, kept, and used.

[00:19:59] Speaker 04:
And in that case, this court said, you can order the government to destroy its records. If this court was saying, it is quite a stretch to say, here where there's no allegation that the government came by any evidence unlawfully and where the evidence is all over the public record uh in mr shillings in this case here it's hard to see what meaningful relief expunging the prior revocation would accomplish well it would remove it as a basis to deny him in the future except it doesn't seem like that, except since he has a CCW, that's not necessary.

[00:20:42] Speaker 02:
But, I mean, we just don't know what happens in the future, right? Or what if he moves to another state or another county? They could see that it was revoked and then deny him based off of that, correct?

[00:20:53] Speaker 04:
That's hard to imagine, considering that he subsequently obtained one from the same entity that revoked it.

[00:21:01] Speaker 02:
Yeah, but I mean, our standard for mootness is pretty high. We have to say you have to be absolutely certain that no relief can be granted.

[00:21:11] Speaker 04:
But the standard is high, but it is a standard. There has to be some actual demonstratable injury. And if he has a CCW, it's hard for him to demonstrate he really has an actual injury. from a revocation when the same entity later granted it to him.

[00:21:32] Speaker 03:
But this kind of dovetails with the problem with the statute of being very vague and ambiguous of dangerous propensities. So another county might say, since the state didn't define what that means and local sheriffs can determine what that means, maybe another local sheriff will say, well, dangerous propensity means it was revoked at one point. Sure, it was granted later, but you know what, that's a potential dangerous propensity and I'm going to deny it. So

[00:21:56] Speaker 04:
I think the phrasing of the statute on some levels is the state trying to have it a little bit both ways.

[00:22:05] Speaker 04:
And what I mean by that is the state is saying there's dangerousness and here's some factors for dangerousness and there's a little bit of wiggle room that is not quite as broad as good moral character.

[00:22:22] Speaker 04:
And puts the burden on the state or the local government. But the definitions of terms are in a state statute for a license that's supposed to apply throughout California. So the idea that that is supposed to be something defined at the local level under the state structure doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. It seems to me that this is a state standard that's supposed to be the same whether you're in San Diego or whether you're in Shasta.

[00:22:53] Speaker 04:
based on the language in the state statute than making it applicable throughout California. They're trying to state a unified, a uniform approach to how to handle CCW licensing.

[00:23:06] Speaker 04:
The state is really trying to say this is a uniform state-mandated process.

[00:23:12] Speaker 02:
Can I ask a question? I'm a little confused about what the district court did with the qualified sovereign immunity issue with the county Because if you read the district court's opinion, it's looking at what the sheriff – whether or not the sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity. I'm sorry, not qualified immunity. Sovereign immunity. Yes. And then it just says – and so therefore it concludes that she does or I guess he now or – anyway. And then concludes – and then dismisses the county. There's an analytical leap there that makes no sense to me because aren't we just supposed to do Monel or something of that nature?

[00:23:46] Speaker 02:
Yeah. I don't believe so.

[00:23:49] Speaker 04:
And I don't believe so, again, because you have McMillan and then and Skoka, the main decisions that the district court relied on.

[00:23:56] Speaker 02:
But those are just about sheriffs, correct?

[00:24:00] Speaker 04:
No, no. In fact, specifically, Skoka talks not just about sheriffs. It talks about a county defendant and it specifically talks about how the county of Santa Clara in that case. should not be held liable because CCW licensing is really a state function.

[00:24:20] Speaker 02:
So you're saying that the same analysis that applies to the sheriff applies to the county?

[00:24:25] Speaker 02:
Yes. And therefore?

[00:24:27] Speaker 04:
Because the sheriff is being sued in her official capacity. She is essentially an official capacity defendant under Kentucky v. Garner. This is essentially a stand-in for the county.

[00:24:43] Speaker 04:
And what this case – what Skoka is saying and what McMillan says is you have to look at whether it's safe.

[00:24:50] Speaker 02:
How do we square that before? Because I thought you were saying earlier that the county is not an arm of the state, but the sheriff was acting as an officer of the state for the specific purpose of this CCW regime. But then how does that apply to the county? Is the county now an officer of the state?

[00:25:11] Speaker 04:
What is going on, I think, Your Honor, is that the state is the policymaker. And so the county is the wrong defendant because it's not the county that's the policymaker. It's the state that's the policymaker.

[00:25:23] Speaker 02:
Well, that's irrelevant for the sovereign immunity question. I mean, that's a merits question.

[00:25:27] Speaker 04:
It is relevant for – it is relevant to determine whether it's –

[00:25:37] Speaker 02:
The county is not an arm of the state. Okay, then how is it entitled to any sovereign immunity? Because the sheriff is implementing a state policy. So then the county is an officer of the state? Because I understood that your point was the sheriff is an officer of the state.

[00:25:54] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:25:55] Speaker 04:
In this case, the county really has no particular role in it. The county is not the policymaker. It is the sheriff implementing the state policy.

[00:26:05] Speaker 02:
Okay, then that's true. Then it's not entitled to any sovereign immunity because if it has no role in implementing CCW, then how is it entitled to any sovereign immunity?

[00:26:17] Speaker 04:
Because it's entitled to immunity because it's not the policymaker. The county is being sued because the county is under allegations that the county is the policymaker.

[00:26:26] Speaker 02:
That's a merits question, though. You're just saying it's not liable.

[00:26:29] Speaker 04:
It's not purely a merits question, Your Honor, because with the pervasiveness of the state legislation covering CCWs, the function of CCWs under McMillan is a state function.

[00:26:45] Speaker 02:
And you're saying that the county has no function, relevant function in that, and so therefore why would it be entitled to the state's immunity?

[00:26:55] Speaker 04:
I'm saying that the county is being sued as the policymaker, and the statutes show that the county is not the policymaker.

[00:27:02] Speaker 02:
Right. So maybe you're not liable for any of these things, but I just don't understand how that cloaks you in sovereign immunity.

[00:27:10] Speaker 04:
Because when the state is the policymaker, even if it's a county person who's implementing it because states – decide what they're going to have their cities and counties do and how much discretion to leave to cities and counties. If the state is the policymaker, the county is simply not liable.

[00:27:33] Speaker 02:
Yes, okay. But that's a separate question. But you have to get to me how the counties are now immune.

[00:27:41] Speaker 04:
Because the statutes make clear that in the area of when it comes to CCW licensing, The sheriff is implementing state policies. And so if you can look at the statutes and say the county is implementing state – the sheriff is implementing state policies, then it's not the county policy. And it is obvious on the face of the complaint and the face of the laws out there that the county is not the policymaker.

[00:28:12] Speaker 04:
Again, this is the – this is what this court led to in Buffett. when it found that the sheriff there was not, that the sheriff and the county were not, you know, the sheriff was not responsible for the bail schedule.

[00:28:29] Speaker 04:
And so, because the sheriff was implementing a state policy. And so why the sheriff's employer, the county, would be liable when the sheriff's implementing a state policy rather than the county policy when that is evident in the complaint and evident in the state of the case law and evidence in the state of the statutory law, that's the problem.

[00:29:00] Speaker 04:
As for mootness, again, I think the court has heard what it needs to hear about mootness.

[00:29:11] Speaker 04:
As for opportunities to amend or add the state as the defendant, certainly agree the state would have been the right defendant in the first place.

[00:29:21] Speaker 04:
But the district court really, but the district court explained that, yes, there's 11th Amendment immunity.

[00:29:29] Speaker 04:
And I also want to point out that standing and mootness apply at pretty much every step, apply at every step of the procedure, no matter what.

[00:29:40] Speaker 04:
What happens before or after throughout the proceedings, it has to be an active cause of action. And when the district court denied the motion to reconsider, Mr. Schilling's license had expired.

[00:29:55] Speaker 04:
There had not been any reapplication, and that was moot. If Mr. Schilling has complaints about how things were implemented after SB2, and it sounds like he may, But if he has complaints about how things were implemented after SB2, it seems to me those are things that belong in the complaint so that the court can actually adjudicate those matters. Those were not in the complaint here, and they were not in front of the district court because they were not in the complaint.

[00:30:28] Speaker 04:
So the district court was right to dismiss this complaint and was right to deny leave to amend this complaint. It sounds like Mr. Schilling may have a complaint about other stuff. And if he has a complaint about other stuff, he should file that complaint and allow the courts to consider that complaint. Because right now we're dealing with him saying he was denied, him saying he was denied for a particular reason, me saying that he has a license, and we don't have any evidence.

[00:31:02] Speaker 04:
accurate record of all of that to look at. That is better brought up within the context of Mr. Schilling filing a complaint addressing his post-SB2 issues rather than this complaint addressing his pre-SB2 issues when that license expired and that law has been changed.

[00:31:24] Speaker 04:
Great. Thank you. As far as more questions, I'll submit.

[00:31:26] Speaker 03:
Great. Thank you.

[00:31:36] Speaker 01:
Addressing the Cohn factors as applicable to this case, Cohn asked for three things. Who owns the policy, who controls the policy, and who pays for that policy? And all three of those questions point to the county of San Diego and the sheriff, not the state of California. The state of California had no involvement whatsoever in this policy, did not tell the San Diego County Sheriff's Department to implement this policy. There was no directive for the policy.

[00:32:06] Speaker 01:
And therefore, they had no control over the policy. And likewise, if there was a judgment in this case, the state of California is not going to pay for that policy. The county of San Diego will have to pay for it in their budget.

[00:32:20] Speaker 01:
And that brings up another point. The sheriff submits budgets, and in those budgets, they have processing for CCW, administrative tasks. That's not the state of California funding their application process. They're doing it, and they're using an online vendor for that, not the state of California's vendor.

[00:32:43] Speaker 01:
So you have 58 counties with 58 elected officials, 58 budgets.

[00:32:49] Speaker 01:
and 58 individual sheriffs, all deciding who gets a CCW based on what they perceive or what they think, not what the state mandates.

[00:33:03] Speaker 01:
As for mootness, first of all, there's damages in this case. Whether it's nominal damages or not, there's still at least $1 in damages because the policy caused the harm.

[00:33:16] Speaker 01:
The harm was he lost a Second Amendment right.

[00:33:20] Speaker 01:
Second thing is his name is now in a database for revoked CCWs. That's reported to the Department of Justice. So all revocations are reported to the state. So it's not merely a county issue anymore. That permeates into an official record, and you can just follow the dominoes on that. So he applies in Delaware or Kansas, that's going to come up.

[00:33:48] Speaker 02:
When you say DOJ, is that state DOJ or federal DOJ?

[00:33:50] Speaker 01:
State DOJ.

[00:33:52] Speaker 02:
How would Maryland find out?

[00:33:56] Speaker 01:
Yes, they would have access to that because it would be in a Nixis system. I see.

[00:34:08] Speaker 01:
And I was not aware that Mr. Sewell received the CCW in the last 30 days, but when we filed the briefs and I put a little, basically, a note in there that he did apply, he has to wait one year every time he gets a rejection letter. So I think this is 24. So now it makes sense that he'd probably reapply it again, and so it would have been issued. But there's a one-year delay when he can reapply. So that's another damage he sustained previously.

[00:34:42] Speaker 01:
And what's going to happen with a, there's declaratory relief being requested in here. What's going to happen when a new sheriff comes in in the next election? I mean, this is, it's like a ping pong. It's similar with what happened in Bruin when the state of New York kept on passing laws against, when a city was issuing gun permits and they were getting sued. So the state of New York stepped in and interfered with that. And some of the justices were upset because they're, the state of New York was playing games with standing.

[00:35:14] Speaker 01:
And I think that's what's happening here as well because the policy is not changing.

[00:35:21] Speaker 01:
The fact that they gave them a CCW is not going to stop a future harm. There has to be an injunction on what happened here, which is a classification of a group and saying you're dangerous, therefore we can revoke your rights.

[00:35:35] Speaker 01:
And if we follow the logic of that, What's to stop the county of San Diego from saying, well, anyone with a bar license could be dangerous because you know what? They're driving the court fast. They're making arguments that are dangerous to the public. So you know what? We find attorneys dangerous. So anyone with a bar license, you're not getting a CCW either. I mean, you can see the slippery slope on this.

[00:36:00] Speaker 01:
And the policy behind all this is 1983 is getting watered down.

[00:36:08] Speaker 01:
When's it going to stop? Because more and more you're seeing it permeate into every single defense, whether it's jail mail, brutality of jails. Oh, it's the state. We have immunity. And it's a slippery slope is what's happening here in a dilution of 1983. And on that, we'll submit. Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:36:28] Speaker 03:
Great. Thank you both for the helpful argument. The case is submitted, and we are adjourned for the day.