[00:00:01] Speaker 01:
Kristen McLeod Ball on behalf of Amicus National Immigration Litigation Alliance, addressing timeliness and jurisdiction in the two cases, the two petitions. Petitioners Council will address the merits, and I'd like to reserve four minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:17] Speaker 01:
These cases are about whether individuals facing persecution, torture, and death, if deported, have any right to a day in court. Petitioners in these cases did precisely as instructed by this court when they received reinstatement orders. They pursued their fear-based claims in front of immigration judges and the BIA in reliance on the fact that they would be able to seek judicial review at the conclusion of those proceedings. The Supreme Court's decision in Riley last year upended that practice, and as the Supreme Court itself acknowledged, created considerable practical difficulties, especially for people like the petitioners whose cases were already ongoing at that time.

[00:00:58] Speaker 01:
Although the Supreme Court suggested that the government could ease these difficulties by waiving procedural objections in cases like this, the government has instead raised myriad objections to try and close the courthouse doors to petitioners' claims. Their arguments, which leave petitioners in a catch-22, which would result in a bar to judicial review, are both unfair and incorrect.

[00:01:21] Speaker 01:
On timeliness, I'll start with equitable tolling.

[00:01:24] Speaker 01:
And twelve fifty to be one is a run of the mill filing deadline subject to the presumption in favor of tolling, which Congress didn't rebut here.

[00:01:34] Speaker 01:
The government has said that you're too.

[00:01:35] Speaker 05:
I'm sorry. Your two issues that you were going to address is timeliness and jurisdiction, Your Honor. And so with respect to jurisdiction, you don't think we need to revisit our jurisdiction case law? and application of our jurisdiction jurisprudence over restatement orders in light of Riley? Because it seems like that's the main argument that the government is making regarding jurisdiction.

[00:02:03] Speaker 01:
No, Your Honor. I think that this court's precedent, which has had for decades, found that reinstatement orders are reviewable by petition for review still stands. The cases that respondent cites you know, that purportedly allow reconsideration of that precedent don't meet the high bar for doing so. They aren't clearly irreconcilable with this court's precedent. Not one of them addressed a petition for review of a reinstatement order or reassessed whether a reinstatement order is a final order under the statute.

[00:02:39] Speaker 04:
Is there something we need to, I mean, to me, just as a logical matter, because a reinstatement order reinstates the prior order of removal, it seems that it can't be the final order of removal. And the only way I can see my way through this is to consider that it is a final order of removal and that the statute contemplates that there can be more than one final order of removal in a particular proceeding?

[00:03:22] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:03:23] Speaker 01:
The statute doesn't preclude the fact that there could be more than one final order that's applicable to a single person.

[00:03:32] Speaker 01:
The reinstatement statute, it's... First, let me step back. The prior order that is the basis for a reinstatement order...

[00:03:43] Speaker 01:
at the time that it's reinstated, is not an operative order, right? It's defunct. If a person comes back, DHS can't simply remove them again on the basis of that order, absent going through the process set forth in the reinstatement statute, which DHS has enacted regs that sort of speak to that, right? So a reinstatement order is only permissible if somebody is...

[00:04:11] Speaker 01:
departed under a prior order of removal, and they return unlawfully. And before reinstating someone, before issuing a reinstatement order, DHS has created a process.

[00:04:23] Speaker 01:
It requires a set of legal and factual determinations, including whether there's a prior order, the identity of the person subject to the order, and evaluating the manner in which they return to the United States.

[00:04:36] Speaker 03:
I guess that argument suggests there is only one final order of removal. Just whether it's actionable or not depends on what happens with the proceedings. And that's consistent with our treaty obligations that we have to review if someone has a reasonable fear of being tortured or in the country of removal.

[00:04:56] Speaker 03:
Or I guess I'm trying to parse out Judge Wardlaw's concern that there might be more than one final order of removal. But I'm reading – I'm listening to your argument, and you seem to suggest that there's only one, but it's defunct until it gets animated again after the process.

[00:05:14] Speaker 01:
I think that's one way to treat it. But I think additionally, right, a reinstatement order, if you look at the text of it, is a decision, order, and certification – It states someone is removable in accordance with 1231A5. And what the statute requires when defining a final order is that it's an order that concludes a non-citizen is deportable or orders its deportation. And my point earlier in saying that if somebody comes back, you can't just deport them because they have a final order of removal that was previously executed, is that this reinstatement order does order someone's removal, right?

[00:05:52] Speaker 01:
You cannot just, if somebody is deported, their final order is executed, and they come back lawfully, that's fine. There's no final order that could order them deported at that stage. It only happens following the reinstatement process and the issuance of the reinstatement order. And, you know, I think that that's clear in the plethora of cases in which this court has reviewed both the factual and legal determinations that form the basis for the reinstatement order, that set of determinations that I was mentioning, as well as evaluating the process that is used by DHS to reinstate orders, DHS and EOIR.

[00:06:38] Speaker 01:
And so I also think that this court's decision in Vega-Anguiano is instructive, where the court looked at whether in a challenge to a reinstatement order, the challenge sort of made a collateral attack on the prior order. If that petition for review was timely filed because it was filed within 30 days of the reinstatement order versus 30 days of the prior order. And so the court has already looked at and decided that the reinstatement order is a separate order.

[00:07:12] Speaker 03:
What was that case again?

[00:07:13] Speaker 01:
Vega-Anguillado. versus bar, that's at 982 F3 542 from 2020.

[00:07:24] Speaker 01:
Unless the court has other questions about jurisdiction, I could move to equitable tolling.

[00:07:30] Speaker 01:
So there's a lot of discussion about whether this is a mandatory rule and whether that means it's not subject to tolling. No one disputes that the statute says a petition must be filed no later than 30 days after a final order of removal. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly said use of a mandatory word like must or shall doesn't determine whether a deadline is subject to tolling.

[00:07:55] Speaker 05:
You jumped to equitable tolling. I mean, I don't know if you're going to discuss retroactivity or if your other counsel is going to. I'm happy to address retroactivity, Your Honor. My question is, don't we have to deal with retroactivity first before we get to equitable tolling?

[00:08:13] Speaker 01:
I think that there are a number of sort of equitable exceptions that would allow the court to treat these petitions as timely filed. I think that the retroactivity case law would permit that or equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

[00:08:26] Speaker 04:
What is your position on retroactivity?

[00:08:32] Speaker 01:
My position is that under the sort of test set out by this court under Nunez-Reyes, that it would be appropriate to treat the new rule that a PFR is untimely unless it's filed within 30 days of a reinstatement order, prospectively only. The factors that this court considers, they favor prospective application.

[00:08:57] Speaker 01:
There was a change in law. Riley clearly overturned longstanding precedent set by this court in Ortiz-Alfaro when reaffirmed in Alonzo Juarez's

[00:09:08] Speaker 05:
But did the Supreme Court, in your view, apply the rule of retroactivity?

[00:09:14] Speaker 01:
I think that the Supreme Court simply didn't address what it didn't apply the rule to Mr. Riley himself. Right. It acknowledged that the rule it was announcing was non-jurisdictional and then found that because the government didn't wish to press a timeliness ground for dismissal. it found that there was nothing to preclude the case from going forward. So the case was remanded on that basis.

[00:09:36] Speaker 05:
And I appreciate that. But then isn't there a presumption? I mean, you say that they didn't discuss it, but isn't there a presumption then that retroactivity applies?

[00:09:46] Speaker 01:
I think that this is a very unique situation, Your Honor. And appreciably, often, most new rules do apply retroactively. But this court in Nunez-Reyes Provided that there are still some situations where there is a new rule in civil proceedings, it's non-jurisdictional, that the court can go back and apply the Chevron oil test to look at whether retroactive application is appropriate or not.

[00:10:13] Speaker 05:
And I guess what's the best case or authority that tells us we should do that here? Because it's just not clear to me.

[00:10:23] Speaker 05:
whether the Supreme Court did not apply the rule because of the government, but would have, I mean, inference here that maybe they would have.

[00:10:35] Speaker 05:
And what do we do with that? Does it have to be clear? I'm just trying to see what you're looking at to provide authority for that.

[00:10:43] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, we're looking at Nunez-Reyes in terms of the rule here. And I think that it's relevant that The Supreme Court certainly didn't have to look at retroactivity here because it wasn't going to apply the rule to Mr. Riley himself. And moreover, the Supreme Court had received a number of statements from the government that suggested that there was going to be waiver in cases like this that were in the pipeline.

[00:11:15] Speaker 01:
In the briefing, they had talked about the possibility of if the...

[00:11:21] Speaker 01:
the court was going to remand to look at jurisdictional issues, they could waive timeliness.

[00:11:25] Speaker 03:
If we were to agree with you that there is equitable tolling, do we need to reach the question of retroactivity? Is that something that we have to address?

[00:11:35] Speaker 01:
Not in this case, if you find that the deadline is subject to equitable tolling and that tolling is warranted for these two petitioners, which I think is certainly the case here, right? An extraordinary circumstance prevented them from timely filing. And they acted very diligently upon sort of being faced with that extraordinary circumstance.

[00:11:54] Speaker 05:
So we would sort of jump over retroactivity?

[00:11:58] Speaker 01:
I think that the court doesn't address retroactivity in every case. And so I think that the court could go forward without addressing retroactivity. But as I mentioned, there's a number of equitable reasons that the court could look to to determine that petitions like this in the pipeline

[00:12:18] Speaker 05:
So would the equitable tolling decision, if we were to agree with you, go to equitable tolling, would be just unique to Mr. Tovar-Reyes?

[00:12:29] Speaker 01:
Well, equitable tolling determinations, right, are in two parts. First, it's whether the statute is subject to equitable tolling, and presumably that would apply to folks beyond Mr. Tovar-Reyes and Mr. Colin Carrillo.

[00:12:40] Speaker 01:
the determination about whether tolling is appropriate in a particular case. That is a fact-specific determination.

[00:12:46] Speaker 03:
And I take it you tend to agree with the Sixth Circuit's approach to this question?

[00:12:51] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor. I think Axelage-Perez explains why, looking at the presumption in favor of tolling, the factors that generally apply.

[00:13:01] Speaker 01:
1252B1 is a run-of-the-mill statute of limitations. It's not... It doesn't have any of the sort of characteristics of statutes where courts have found that the presumption in favor of tolling is rebutted.

[00:13:16] Speaker 01:
It's short. It's directed at the petitioner. It doesn't sort of use especially emphatic or detailed language. It doesn't have a whole set of exceptions that would be supplanted by the use of equitable tolling. And it's within a statutory scheme that's often cases are initiated by laypeople. who are not necessarily represented by counsel. And so the sort of humanitarian concerns at issue are especially strong.

[00:13:42] Speaker 03:
What other INA provisions have courts found are subject to equitable tolling?

[00:13:48] Speaker 01:
So this court and the other courts that have considered it have found that the deadline for filing motions to reopen and motions to reconsider found at 1252 C. Sorry, I apologize. I just said that wrong. 8 U.S.C. 1229, C7 and C6 are subject to equitable tolling. And those are, you know, similarly using language.

[00:14:12] Speaker 01:
Motions shall be filed by a particular time.

[00:14:15] Speaker 01:
But the court has found that tolling is appropriate for those deadlines.

[00:14:19] Speaker 03:
Any other provisions beside those?

[00:14:21] Speaker 01:
The court hasn't addressed it as far as I know, but the BIA itself has found that the deadline for filing administrative appeals is subject to equitable tolling as well in a case called Morales Morales, matter of Morales Morales.

[00:14:38] Speaker 04:
Can I ask a question specific to this procedural status of these cases?

[00:14:45] Speaker 04:
In these two cases, The withholding only proceedings are ongoing.

[00:14:55] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor. And Petitioner's Council can address the merits and the facts in more detail, but both of them remain pending, one at the Immigration Court and one at the Board of Immigration Appeals.

[00:15:07] Speaker 04:
Okay. So, and we're entitled under our recent authority in Navarette, which I understand has been vacated, We wouldn't be able to just review the withholding only determination unless we put off the review of the reinstatement order.

[00:15:37] Speaker 04:
And then when we do that, we could then review both the withholding only determination along with the validity of the reinstatement order.

[00:15:53] Speaker 01:
My understanding is that Navarrete didn't address the sort of stay issue. That was a case in which there was already a decision on the withholding-only claim, and so they were both in front of the court.

[00:16:03] Speaker 04:
So we have a different procedural status right here.

[00:16:07] Speaker 01:
A different procedural status and also a different situation in terms of the fact that petitioners both raised challenges both to the reinstatement order and to sort of the fact that they're going to want to challenge the determination of fear-based proceedings. They want to preserve their ability to review it.

[00:16:25] Speaker 03:
You mean petitioners here?

[00:16:26] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:16:27] Speaker 03:
That they've challenged the reinstatement orders. They obviously haven't challenged the withholding only determination because that's pending.

[00:16:33] Speaker 01:
Apologies, yes. They are trying to preserve their ability to review those.

[00:16:37] Speaker 05:
Do you want to reserve the balance of your time?

[00:16:39] Speaker 01:
I would love to do that. Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:17:00] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors. May it please the court, Kelsey Morales on behalf of petitioners. I would like to reserve three minutes of my time for rebuttal. I will focus on petitioners' challenges to their reinstatement orders. We ask the court to hold that the reinstatement regulations are invalid and vacate petitioners' reinstatement orders. Alternatively, we ask the court to hold proceedings in abeyance until the conclusion of their fear-based proceedings before the agency. Petitioners make two challenges. First, that their reinstatement orders are invalid because they were issued by ICE agents, not immigration judges, as required by 8 U.S.C.

[00:17:37] Speaker 00:
1229A.

[00:17:38] Speaker 00:
As such, the regulations governing the reinstatement orders are ultra-virus to the statute and therefore invalid. Second, petitioners assert that they should be eligible for asylum even in reinstatement proceedings. Barring asylum produces inhumane results and conflicts with the asylum statute.

[00:17:56] Speaker 00:
We recognize that the court has previously denied these arguments, deferring to the agency that these regulations were reasonable interpretations of the law. But the Supreme Court has since made clear that deference to reasonable interpretations are not enough. The court must seek the best reading of the statutes before it. Here, the court's prior deference to the agency is clearly irreconcilable with Loper-Bray.

[00:18:21] Speaker 00:
As the regulations are ultra-virus to the Immigration and Nationality Act and exceed congressional authority and intent. This court should reconsider its decisions in Morales Izquierdo and Perez-Guzman and vacate petitioner's reinstatement orders.

[00:18:35] Speaker 00:
I will first start with our argument that the INA requires immigration judges to issue reinstatement orders.

[00:18:42] Speaker 00:
This court has previously considered this argument in Morales Izquierdo. A panel of this court determined that the reinstatement regulation that provides that ICE agents can issue the reinstatement order was invalid and contrary to the plain language of the immigration statute at section 1229A. There, the statute provides that immigration judges have the sole and exclusive procedure for determining who could be admitted to the country. There, in reviewing the plain language as well as legislative history, the court found that the regulation was ultra-virus to the statute.

[00:19:23] Speaker 00:
We recognize that the court took this issue en banc and reconsidered it and deferred to the agency at step two. It found that the agency had presented a plausible reading of the interpretation. But we now know following Loper-Bright that that deference isn't sufficient, that the court must make an independent determination regarding the law. And here we submit that 8 U.S.C. 1229A governs reinstatement proceedings and that immigration judges must make these determinations.

[00:19:57] Speaker 00:
There's a number of reasons why we believe that. First, we start with the plain text.

[00:20:03] Speaker 00:
While 1229A establishes that it is a sole and exclusive procedure, the reinstatement statute does not present any procedures at all. And what we do know is that in the old reinstatement provisions at INA 242F, immigration judges were the ones who issued reinstatement orders.

[00:20:27] Speaker 00:
When Congress promulgated this statute in 1996, it is assumed to have known that immigration judges were the ones issuing these reinstatement orders.

[00:20:37] Speaker 00:
Also, it makes sense for immigration judges to make these determinations. As my friend spoke earlier, reinstatement determinations are complex determinations. They're a mix of immiscibility questions as well as potentially address of retroactivity claims, mistaken identity claims, claims to citizenship. There's also a very limited amount of relief that can be made. It makes sense that these type of determinations are set before qualified immigration judges, as opposed to ICE agents.

[00:21:12] Speaker 03:
I would think that if there's more limited review from reinstatement orders, that that counsel's in favor of officers being able to conduct those because it presumes that Congress has signaled you already had a full removal hearing in front of the IJ, reinstatement order comes in, there are only limited grounds in which you can seek review of that decision, including non-judicial review for certain things, So why would that counsel in favor of immigration judges doing this rather than officers?

[00:21:43] Speaker 00:
Yeah, and so I'd point the court to the court's decision in Coit v. Holder. I think there we learned that IRA had dual purposes. It was both expediency and accuracy. Immigration judges are more likely to make accurate determinations regarding who is subject to reinstatement as opposed to have it be an ICE agent making these determinations that then goes to an immigration judge that then come before this court. An immigration judge has more qualified knowledge in terms of making these type of determinations.

[00:22:16] Speaker 00:
But I do want to ask, did I address your question there at all? You did, yes.

[00:22:23] Speaker 00:
And we believe that this court can reconsider that decision in line with Loper-Bright. There, Loper-Bright suggests that while Chevron-based precedent is not overturned, It said so as to specific agency actions. The agency actions at issue in Morales Izquierdo on bank decision, as well as the Perez-Guzman case that dealt with asylum eligibility for individuals in reinstatement proceedings, addresses the specific action to those two non-citizens. Here, we are bringing two specific claims to this court.

[00:22:57] Speaker 00:
That is, whether or not the reinstatement orders as to these two petitioners are valid, and whether or not they should get an opportunity to apply for asylum. And this is the suggested reading of the Fourth Circuit in the Orzurumbo v. Bondi case. I will now turn to the asylum question, if there are no further questions on Morales y Scherzo.

[00:23:21] Speaker 00:
This court has previously considered the question of whether or not the regulation barring asylum eligibility for individuals in reinstatement proceedings is valid. And the court there deferred to the agency again at Chevron Step 2. It acknowledged that the agency had shown some weaknesses and that there was tension between applying this extreme, harsh, critical bar to noncitizens in reinstatement proceedings. But they deferred to the agency here.

[00:23:54] Speaker 00:
The court doesn't have to do that now. And I would like to point the court to the extreme humanitarian concerns that could arise if individuals in reinstatement proceedings aren't eligible for asylum. Individuals who are deported may face new and extreme hardship in their home country. They may face persecution. They may face torture. Our petitioners here are an example of that, and they should be entitled to the opportunity to apply for asylum based on that new harm. Otherwise, individuals could face expulsion from this country when they have extreme fear-based claims.

[00:24:25] Speaker 00:
I see that my time is up, so I will save the rest for rebuttal if there are no further questions. Thank you. Thank you.

[00:24:49] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honors. May it please the Court, Zachary Huybanks for the Respondent, the Attorney General of the United States.

[00:24:55] Speaker 02:
Although these cases appear to present several complex thorny issues, the cases are ultimately rather simple because neither petitioner can get over this jurisdictional hurdle of presenting a callable challenge to the DHS officer's determination to reinstate their prior removal orders. In other words, even if we assume and I am not conceding, but if we assume that petitioners were correct on the tolling question and the reviewability question, petitioners do not challenge the factual predicates of this DHS officer's determination, and their legal challenges run headlong into this court's precedent, which a sitting panel of this court cannot overturn.

[00:25:34] Speaker 02:
So for that reason, these cases can be resolved very simply on that jurisdictional defect.

[00:25:40] Speaker 02:
Otherwise, we do still raise our argument that these reinstated orders are not reviewable final orders as contemplated in the statute. Recent trilogy of Supreme Court cases has made that clear.

[00:25:51] Speaker 02:
And otherwise, we disagree.

[00:25:54] Speaker 03:
So counsel, walk us through what about the trilogy of these cases make our current precedent irreconcilable with that new Supreme Court precedent.

[00:26:04] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor. So when we look at Nasrallah, Guzman, Chavez, and DeRiley, the Supreme Court has repeatedly honed in on what this term final order of removal means.

[00:26:14] Speaker 05:
And so... But does it matter that Nasrallah didn't involve reinstated removal orders or reasonable fear proceedings? It seems like that might make a difference here because the bar is so high to determine if it's a Miller versus Gammy type of issue.

[00:26:32] Speaker 02:
I recognize that the bar was higher on, and I appreciate that being pointed out now. And I would just add... that that does also support our arguments as to why petitioners cannot prevail on their legal challenges to the reinstatement orders as such, because of the lack of clearly irreconcilable precedent. But regarding the final order removal question, what matters is that the Supreme Court in these three cases has really honed in on the term final order of removal, notably most recently in Riley, onto that this has to be an order that determines removability or commands removal.

[00:27:07] Speaker 02:
And then that undercuts the reasoning of this court's line of cases on why it accepted, for purposes of review, that a reinstatement order is effectively or functions as a final order removal. And I would go back to this court's 2001 case in Castro-Cortez, where the court said these are not literally final removal orders. They're something else. And then Morales-Escarado also supports that rationale of these are a separate proceeding. They're not just a species of removal.

[00:27:37] Speaker 03:
And as the Supreme Court said in Fernandez-Vargas, it's – But I mean doesn't – the Supreme Court is talking about a final order of removal being the actual order that causes the removal itself, right? In Riley, the timing period was that Faro order, which is a different type of administrative order, and that's the actual instrument that orders removal, not the later – cat determinations which you know for for purposes of that are separate from what does that have to do with a reinstatement order i mean if anything i would think a reinstatement order is in the same flavor of a faro order that that's the instrument that orders the removal itself so how does riley support your cause riley supports our cause your honor and i agree with most of what you've said i

[00:28:27] Speaker 02:
I think the key distinction here is that the FARA, the final administrative removal order in Riley's case and similar cases, that is itself a removal order. Without that order, the individual cannot be removed. And the reinstatement order, I understand it. Obviously, white courts have said they are very similar in the sense that, excuse me, let me just back up. So the reinstatement order is different because if we even just look at the text of the order, it says we are reinstating, i.e. enforcing this prior order that's already been entered. And as the Supreme Court said in Fernandez-Vargas, it's a tool, a way to implement or end a continuing violation.

[00:29:04] Speaker 02:
And that's why it's in this own bucket where it's not a FARO. And to your honest point, it's also not a CAD order in that it's completely separate. It very much is its own separate procedure that occurs only in these situations where an individual has been removed and comes back unlawfully. And Congress set up a system where There doesn't have to be a removal order every time someone comes back in unlawfully after already being removed.

[00:29:30] Speaker 03:
But let me ask you, I mean, the implication of what you're arguing is, is that if someone is subject to a reinstatement order and there's a reasonable fear that they might be tortured on return, there would be no judicial review of that order. Is that correct?

[00:29:50] Speaker 02:
I believe so, Your Honor.

[00:29:51] Speaker 03:
So then how does that square with our treaty obligations that we cannot remove someone to a country of removal where there's a likelihood of torture under CAT?

[00:30:00] Speaker 02:
Well, the agency does do its job, Your Honor, and does evaluate these claims.

[00:30:05] Speaker 03:
But that's separate from what Riley says, is that it is confirmed that there is judicial review of CAT orders.

[00:30:16] Speaker 03:
And there are regulations. I mean, otherwise, why would we have a reasonable fear determination if at the end of the day, none of it is subject to any judicial review?

[00:30:27] Speaker 02:
I would just say that there is judicial review of a CAT order. when it's alongside review of a final removal order, which is the only thing this court has jurisdiction of. And these cases kind of illustrate.

[00:30:38] Speaker 03:
But I guess my premise is, let's say a reinstatement order, you're saying that's not a final order of removal. Someone goes to a reasonable fear determination, and there's a determination that there would not be a cat fear. That is not reviewable under your argument.

[00:31:01] Speaker 03:
um by by a court and i just i i don't see how that can be when especially with the way that riley discusses the fact that cat orders have to be reviewable because there could be a present fear that someone might be tortured upon return that may not have existed when the original final order of removal was was ordered i understand i understand your concern your honor i do but it does go back to what does the statute say and that we can only have review

[00:31:27] Speaker 02:
or excuse me, not we, this court can only have review over a final removal order, Your Honor. And there are practical implications. I'm sorry, there's one more.

[00:31:37] Speaker 04:
How is that consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of the zipper clause that allows us to review everything all at once? And that would be, if there's a colorable challenge to the reinstatement order, it would be under that clause, we would have review of the...

[00:31:57] Speaker 04:
the BIA's withholding determination as well.

[00:32:02] Speaker 02:
Again, Your Honor, it's still, that still presupposes that there is a reviewable final order. And I'll go back to what I said at the top of my argument of petitioners didn't present a colorable challenge to the only order in their cases here.

[00:32:14] Speaker 04:
And it's part of the difficulty of this case is it's not- I think they actually, they did because we have this intervening case of Loper v. Bright and I'm not sure that, although the Supreme Court said, well, we don't have to go back and revisit every statute, that was kind of dicta. And I'm not sure that we shouldn't be reexamining every statute if it's true that the judiciary has an independent obligation to review the language of the statute and not to defer to the agency interpretation.

[00:32:59] Speaker 02:
Well, Your Honor, I think this Court has answered that question, Lopez v. Garland and Murillo-Chavez v. Garland. Whatever the merits of that argument are, there is now more precedent of this Court saying that Loper-Bride is not this intervening change that wipes the slate clean and allows the Court to reevaluate these prior decisions, Your Honor. So I think there's a lot of effectively roadblocks to get to what petitioners claim to be arguing.

[00:33:22] Speaker 04:
You're asking us to reevaluate our prior decisions, which there are many, saying a reinstatement order is a final order. Yes, Your Honor.

[00:33:33] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:33:35] Speaker 04:
No end of inconsistent agency actions here.

[00:33:39] Speaker 02:
Well, Your Honor, as I said at the top, though, I do think my initial argument allows this court to And this court should resolve these cases on the simplest possible basis, especially because it is jurisdictional in nature of an individual to get into the courthouse doors needs to have some sort of challenge that the court can actually entertain. And here, there's no factual challenge, and the legal challenges are foreclosed. And I'm happy to discuss equitable tolling as well, unless there are more questions on either of those parts of our arguments.

[00:34:10] Speaker 03:
Why don't you turn to equitable tolling, and I'd like to hear your reactions to the Sixth Circuit's approach to that question over this provision.

[00:34:19] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:34:22] Speaker 02:
We believe that the statute does not allow for equitable tolling because of the tax history, as well as especially the federal rules of procedure. I understand the Sixth Circuit did reject this argument very recently, Your Honor. But I do think when we look at the Irwin presumption that statutory deadlines are generally amenable to tolling. Here, federal rule 26B was on the books before Congress made this amendment. And that effectively inverts or rebuts or stops the presumption because it applies to this very specific thing of a petition for review from an agency decision.

[00:35:02] Speaker 02:
So that's kind of the baseline rule. And if we look just at the history of the statute, Post Irwin, in 1995, the Supreme Court decided the Stone case, which held that the old deadline was mandatory and jurisdictional, and cited the federal rules for the proposition that it is not subject to equitable tolling. A year later, Congress shortened the deadline, traded out permissive language for mandatory language, going from a may to a must. I think that all supports the idea that here, Congress was not operating in a situation where this presumption would be applicable.

[00:35:37] Speaker 02:
And respectfully, we do believe the Sixth Circuit got the decision wrong and didn't give the federal rule, did not specifically give the federal rule the weight it is due. Because otherwise, I'm not sure what effect federal rule 26B2 has if it does not apply in this situation, Your Honor.

[00:35:59] Speaker 03:
What do you make of the fact that several courts have found motions to reopen to be equitably told? And that's very similar language. It also has shall in it. What makes that different than this?

[00:36:13] Speaker 02:
So a motion to reopen before the agency.

[00:36:16] Speaker 03:
A petition for review. Well, as I understand it, it's the well, I guess both the motion to reopen before the agency. But is there are there is are there cases that talk to the equitable tolling? I guess it's agency specific. Is that is that your argument?

[00:36:35] Speaker 02:
Well, my argument, yes. The federal rule 26B, which is one of our main arguments, especially in the Colin Carrillo briefing, that wouldn't apply. because of a motion to reopen before the board it's a completely different animal and that actually i think would be more similar to a lot of the cases petitioners rely upon of for example these um inner tax court appeals or various case filing documents in district courts be it a habeas petition or what have you i think that actually supports our argument and that petitions for review from agency actions are fundamentally different because Congress effectively approved the federal rules by not overruling them.

[00:37:14] Speaker 02:
And that's why, in this case, Congress's silence on tolling in the specific deadline provision actually supports our argument. And I would just note that in the 1252, there is on the, I'm sorry, I don't remember the chapter number, but regarding positioners opening brief, that provision specifically gives this court authority to extend the deadline for good cause shown. Congress knows how to use that language. They did not do it in the PFR deadline, Your Honor.

[00:37:41] Speaker 05:
What's your best case to support your point on this?

[00:37:50] Speaker 02:
I think Gengalves versus Bondi from the First Circuit from 2025, Your Honor, would be one of our better arguments. And again, I do acknowledge the Sixth Circuit has rejected this argument in immigration cases, and the D.C. Circuit has also rejected it in Securities and Exchange Commission cases, Your Honor.

[00:38:08] Speaker 05:
Well, to rule in your way, we would create a circuit split.

[00:38:12] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor, but again, I would point out that these cases should be resolved at the very front-line question of, did petitioners present an argument? Because, again, even if we assume I'm wrong here, petitioners are not— A final order of removal, is that what— No, Your Honor, just that petitioners are not challenging the facts and that their legal arguments are foreclosed, and that's a separate jurisdictional defect. So even—

[00:38:36] Speaker 05:
I'm sorry. They're foreclosed. Why?

[00:38:39] Speaker 02:
So their arguments, their legal arguments against the reinstatement order are foreclosed by Morales, Escurado, and Perez-Guzman, respectively. And then this court's cases in Lopez v. Garland and Rio Chavez v. Garland stating that Loper-Brite doesn't wipe the slate clean and that this court still has to respect its prior precedent.

[00:39:04] Speaker 03:
And so you're saying that the only way that they can challenge the reinstatement order is if they make factual challenges because they don't have legal challenges?

[00:39:15] Speaker 02:
I'm not going to first close the possibility that a different petitioner could have a legal challenge that would have not been decided by this court previously. My argument is the challenges presented today do not clear the hurdle.

[00:39:25] Speaker 03:
But I mean at least it clears the hurdle of being colorable because to Judge Wardlaw's point, Loper Bright opens up the possibility that petitioners may prevail on that issue. I mean you are just kind of picking and choosing which precedent should be – that we should be bound by under the Ninth Circuit. Like we can't ignore that precedent, but let's go ahead and wipe the slate clean on the jurisdictional ones. Yeah.

[00:39:52] Speaker 03:
However that shakes out, those are colorable arguments on either side, aren't they?

[00:39:57] Speaker 02:
Respectfully, no, Your Honor. And I do acknowledge that both parties in this case do have to have some arguments that appear to be in tension. But the distinction here is that post-Loper Bright, the Lopez case and the Mario Chavez case rejected this idea that stare decisis doesn't apply to the Chevron-era precedents that did rely on Chevron. If other circuit courts have gone differently, that's something for them to shake out. But this court already took care of those arguments, Your Honor, and that's why it's foreclosed. If, for example, those two cases did not exist and these cases emerged a month after Loper Bright, I don't think I would be standing here saying that the arguments were, I would not be saying with the same conviction that the arguments are foreclosed, Your Honor.

[00:40:38] Speaker 04:
And so let me get this really clear because I want to just really understand your argument. So tell me which cases of ours foreclose the Loper Bright argument.

[00:40:51] Speaker 02:
They are cited in both our briefs. I believe it's Lopez versus Garland from 2024, and Murillo Chavez might be versus Bondi. I apologize.

[00:41:02] Speaker 02:
They are cited throughout our brief for this proposition.

[00:41:04] Speaker 04:
Okay, but I don't have your brief, so I'm not operating on all fours here. So what's the second case that you said? Just tell me the first name.

[00:41:15] Speaker 02:
Murillo Chavez, M-U-R-R-I-L-O.

[00:41:21] Speaker 02:
Chavez. Okay. We don't know if it's Bondi or... I'm sorry, Your Honor. I just don't have my brief open and I wanted to answer your question. That's okay.

[00:41:29] Speaker 04:
I understand. I understand. Just, okay. It might be Bondi. It might be Blanche.

[00:41:38] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor. But both those cases dealt with prior agency decisions on... Lopez was crimes involving moral certitude in this court saying if the court had already deferred to the board's interpretation that a specific crime was a crime involving moral turpitude, those decisions are, the court is bound to, bound by stare decisis, Your Honor.

[00:41:59] Speaker 04:
Okay. So, I think you raise an interesting point.

[00:42:09] Speaker 04:
I also think that the Supreme Court just didn't want us to have to get into, reopen all of those cases on which is a What's the crime of violence? I mean, it's already chaotic enough to go back and redo all those cases under new standards would just be an immense job for the courts.

[00:42:44] Speaker 04:
But there may be questions of a different nature that are of sufficient importance.

[00:42:55] Speaker 04:
In particular, I'm thinking about jurisdictional questions and judicial review questions that would warrant going back and re-looking at it with fresh eyes. Because there has been, as you pointed out earlier, a number of developments in the Supreme Court which are shaping our understanding of the Immigration Act and how it bears on these new proceedings.

[00:43:32] Speaker 02:
Your Honor, I understand the impulse. I don't know of a case from this court crafting such an exception, and I think if that was the impulse, this court would have to take either these issues or similar issues up in an en banc petition, respectfully.

[00:43:46] Speaker 04:
Yeah, I guess that is one option.

[00:43:52] Speaker 03:
Do you agree that Navarette is not binding on this particular case because that petitioner there was challenging the cat-only order as opposed to the reinstatement order here?

[00:44:09] Speaker 02:
I think I understand your question but I know I believe never is fundamentally binding and controlling in this case your honor because. I think what really kind of – if I understand – But why?

[00:44:21] Speaker 03:
Because the petitioner there never challenged the reinstatement order himself. And in fact, at the oral arguments in Navarette, counsel essentially said, yeah, they would be frivolous. And so the panel declined the request to amend, to challenge the reinstatement order themselves. Whereas here, you petitioners are actually challenging the reinstatement order. They're not challenging a later determination because it hasn't happened yet.

[00:44:54] Speaker 03:
I understand you disagree with the nature of that challenge, but doesn't that make this case fundamentally different than Navarette? What makes Navarette binding on us?

[00:45:04] Speaker 02:
Well, so what Navarette said is that an individual has to bring a colorable challenge, and that means it has to have some possible validity. And that is my argument, is that these arguments do not have any possible validity because they are foreclosed by precedent, Your Honor. That's why I believe Navarette's controlling. I don't think Navarette only applies in this very narrow circumstances of you have to bring, you can't not bring any challenge. I think there has to be some sort of challenge. And it kind of goes to both petitioners' cases are repeatedly asking for an abatement To the point where in the Tovar Reyes brief on pages 30 and 31, the petitioner says, well, if the agency grants withholding in CAT, he may end up electing to forego judicial review altogether.

[00:45:44] Speaker 02:
That, I think, also shows why Navarette's controlling here and why my first argument is arguably our best argument of if we want to hash out whether or not this reinstatement order was valid or not, The cases are here. They're before the court, and the arguments are foreclosed.

[00:45:59] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry to interrupt. The request for abeyance has come straight out of Riley.

[00:46:06] Speaker 03:
I mean that is what the Supreme Court said a petitioner should do. It understood the practical difficulties of the consequences of the case, which was you have to file a petition for review in the court of appeals from a FARA order, from the order of removal, even if there are yet to be determined CAT issues or withholding issues. So why would we hold that against petitioners for doing exactly what the Supreme Court suggested would be the right path to obtain judicial review of a later cat decision that would be folded into a challenge to a reinstatement order?

[00:46:46] Speaker 02:
Let me clarify my position just a hair. Okay. Because I do think this, again, is why this case is controlled by Navarette, is if this court were to decide to have jurisdiction and grant the abeyance, And then eventually, hypothetically, these hypothetical adverse orders come and petitioners hypothetically decide they want to challenge them. Then these cases look even closer to Navarrete in that they didn't bring a colorable challenge to the reinstatement order, Your Honor. And that's why I started off with that argument today, is I do think that is what is controlling here, is absent a claim of some possible validity, this court has nothing to do.

[00:47:24] Speaker 02:
There's no jurisdiction at that point.

[00:47:26] Speaker 03:
But I mean in general, you wouldn't disagree with the Supreme Court suggestion that that would be the appropriate way of doing it. If there's a reinstatement order, you challenge that within 30 days.

[00:47:40] Speaker 03:
Ask the court of appeals to hold it in abeyance pending anything CAT-related or withholding-related and then seek judicial review from that as well if need be.

[00:47:54] Speaker 03:
I take it as long as there's something colorable about the challenge to the reinstatement order, you wouldn't find that objectionable, would you?

[00:48:02] Speaker 02:
I would not make the exact same argument about the jurisdictional point, Your Honor. I know there are other cases pending with same issues, and I don't want to foreclose any arguments any of my colleagues may make today or any other day. So I do not know what argument we specifically would make. I can imagine us arguing that if an individual does have colorable challenges, that the court should hear them in the first instance and see what happens. But I do take your point, Your Honor, that the only way petitioners could eventually find a way to judicial review on these potential hypothetical CAD orders would be to do what you just described.

[00:48:36] Speaker 04:
Counsel, I just want to ask another question. It might not bear directly on this case, but tell me what the proper procedural move would be if a person comes back that fits the definition of the criteria for reinstatement and expresses fear because of dramatically changed country conditions.

[00:49:17] Speaker 04:
If I go along with your assumption that there's no judicial review of that, What would be the way to obtain review, even just by the agency?

[00:49:30] Speaker 02:
Well, the individual, if they expressed a fear, would be placed in reasonable fear proceedings where they would get an interview. If an asylum officer determines that they have what's called a positive reasonable fear, they are placed in withholding-only proceedings. If the asylum officer determines the inverse, that they did not press that fear, or excuse me, present a reasonable fear, then they would still get immigration judge review over that determination.

[00:49:58] Speaker 02:
And in the situation you're describing, I do think it is important to point out that the DHS has the authority to reinstate removal orders, but in various situations, they will determine and decide not to do that in a situation and instead place the individual back in full removal proceedings, which would then create a new removal order and allow all these claims to be heard.

[00:50:17] Speaker 02:
without setting any specific cases i've seen that happen in various cases where, for whatever factor GHS decides the proper course would be to.

[00:50:27] Speaker 02:
issue a new charging document and start removal proceedings over allowing full removal proceedings, not this kind of bifurcated situation.

[00:50:37] Speaker 03:
Yes. Sorry. What is your view about the retroactivity? I know that's not your main argument, but what is your view about seeing Riley as having perspective only relief versus applying retroactively?

[00:50:50] Speaker 02:
It's happy to address it, Your Honor.

[00:50:52] Speaker 02:
Riley is a Supreme Court decision.

[00:50:54] Speaker 02:
Obviously, the presumption is that it applied fully retroactively. I would disagree that it did not apply the rule announced in Mr. Riley's case for the simple reason that the rule announced was this is the deadline and it's not jurisdictional. If the rule was jurisdictional, it would have been dismissed.

[00:51:10] Speaker 05:
You agree that it did not explicitly apply the rule?

[00:51:16] Speaker 02:
Well, because the old rule was jurisdictional, so it would have been dismissed. So by applying, saying it is not jurisdictional, it allowed...

[00:51:24] Speaker 02:
The difference between a jurisdictional rule and a mandatory claims processing rule is that the government could then waive our objection, which is what the Supreme Court did. So I do think it applies.

[00:51:34] Speaker 05:
Were there words in the opinion that said we are applying this retroactive?

[00:51:40] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor, but that is the default assumption unless they explicitly say the otherwise.

[00:51:45] Speaker 05:
I understand the presumption, and that's what I'm trying to figure out as well, whether or not because the government in that case kind of took that issue away from the Supreme Court, it looks like anyway, because they weren't going to apply the 30 days.

[00:52:04] Speaker 05:
And so it looks like it just...

[00:52:08] Speaker 05:
might have fallen off a cliff. And so we're looking at whether or not the presumption applies, I guess.

[00:52:15] Speaker 05:
And you're saying that the presumption does apply?

[00:52:18] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor, I am. And I do believe, because it announced this new rule that the statutory filing deadline was not jurisdictional, it inherently applied it to Mr. Riley's case by not dismissing his case. Mm-hmm.

[00:52:32] Speaker 05:
your friends across the aisle on this equitable tolling point is to Botchler. I think it's, I don't know if it's pronounced.

[00:52:38] Speaker 02:
I know the case.

[00:52:39] Speaker 05:
Yeah. So why aren't, why should we not follow that here? It seems like it's very similar.

[00:52:47] Speaker 02:
Don't remember the exact specifics, but it, I believe that was an appeal or a position to the article one tax court. So again, it's just a different situation altogether. And, I mean, the case that would be closest would be the Harrow v. Department of Defense case from 2024. And in that case, the Supreme Court left open the tolling question. But very similar situation where they said a petition for review from an agency decision to a circuit court is non-jurisdictional. And I'm not aware of the Supreme Court ever directly answering the question as to what the effect is in this specific situation, which we do believe rebuts the presumption that tolling applies, as set out in Irwin, because of the federal rules.

[00:53:30] Speaker 02:
And I would again remind of this statute-specific history, where a year before the statute was amended, the Supreme Court said the deadline is mandatory, jurisdictional, and cannot be told, citing federal rule 26B. Then Congress amended it and made the deadline tougher, and they switched out permissive language to mandatory language, Your Honor. For all those reasons, we do believe This specific statutory deadline is not amenable to equitable tolling. And if there are no further questions, Your Honor, for all these reasons, the government believes both cases should be dismissed or denied.

[00:54:04] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:54:06] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:54:21] Speaker 01:
I'll briefly address some of the jurisdictional arguments before moving to tolling.

[00:54:27] Speaker 01:
Navarrete is distinct, and as Petitioner's Council will get into, we certainly raise at a minimum colorable claims. Navarrete involved a petition for review filed before Riley was announced, so it expressly challenged only a reasonable fear determination, and expressly the petitioner's attorney expressly conceded that any challenge to the reinstatement would be frivolous. That's distinctly not the case here.

[00:54:50] Speaker 01:
As to the argument that the reinstatement order is not a final order and therefore that's a jurisdictional bar, even in Castro-Cortez, this court acknowledged that a reinstatement order gives effect to a prior order, which I think does sort of map onto the fact that the statute talks about whether an order orders removal in addition to whether an order – sort of conclude somebody is removable in terms of defining the types of orders that can be final orders of removal.

[00:55:21] Speaker 01:
Riley and Nasrallah, as Your Honors were discussing, both affirmed that CAT orders are judicially reviewable. And the government's position appears to be that we should just trust the agency and any sort of judicial review is not necessary of those life or death claims in this situation. That's the impact of determining that a reinstatement order is not a final order here.

[00:55:46] Speaker 01:
Nor is it appropriate that the DHS can essentially choose to put somebody in 240 proceedings and choose who gets judicial review. That doesn't sort of meet those obligations. And because there's a reasonable interpretation of the statute that treats a reinstatement order as a final order, that's appropriate in terms of avoiding the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by eliminating judicial review and also supported by the presumption in favor of judicial review.

[00:56:11] Speaker 01:
In terms of the equitable tolling, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26B2. To be clear, the Supreme Court discussed FRAP 26 in nutraceutical. It discussed FRAP 26B1, a bar to extending the time to file a notice of appeal, which doesn't have any exceptions. Here, respondent argues that FRAP 26B2 rebuts the presumption in favor of tolling, but those two provisions have a key difference.

[00:56:42] Speaker 01:
B2 has an exception to allow extending deadlines where a deadline is authorized by law.

[00:56:49] Speaker 01:
As respondent conceded, finding that 26B2 rebuts the presumption in favor of tolling, which has to be done by Congress, not by the federal rules, is directly contrary to the Sixth Circuit in Oxlodge, the D.C. Circuit in Nelson, and is...

[00:57:11] Speaker 01:
In Harrow, the Supreme Court didn't sort of defer to FRAP 26B2. When it gave directions on remand about considering tolling, it said that the presumption in favor of tolling is a high bar and that we don't understand Congress to lightly alter the age-old procedural doctrines that read tolling into statutes of limitations as the sort of presumed rule. Finally, Boakler is especially relevant here. It has many of the same characteristics as the deadline here.

[00:57:44] Speaker 01:
And while it's true that Boakler involved a petition for review to tax court rather than the type of petition for review that's subject to Rule 26B2, there are similar rules of procedure for tax court which contain a similar sort of bar to extending petition for review deadline set by statute. The Supreme Court didn't look at that at all in deciding that the statute in Boeckler was subject to equitable tolling.

[00:58:11] Speaker 01:
And last point, if the court will allow it, Goncalves, which respondents suggested was the best case in their favor, was issued before Riley, so it treated the filing deadline as jurisdictional, necessarily not subject to tolling, and so it didn't analyze tolling at all.

[00:58:28] Speaker 01:
For those reasons, I would ask that this court finds that it has jurisdiction to review these petitions and to treat them as timely filed.

[00:58:38] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:58:38] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:58:47] Speaker 00:
Just a couple of points, Your Honor. We more than raise colorable challenges to the reinstatement order.

[00:58:57] Speaker 00:
Our challenges go at heart of what the statute requires. and I would point the court to the decision of the panel, and Morales Izquierdo is saying, when you review the statute, as you should, the reinstatement regulations barring an immigration judge from hearing reinstatement orders is unlawful. That is exactly what Loper Bright asked this court to do, to engage in an independent review of of statutes and the en banc decision deferred to the agency.

[00:59:34] Speaker 00:
So I think here we can look directly to the panel decision of Morales Izquierdo to to find that we more than raise colorful challenges.

[00:59:43] Speaker 03:
Can I ask you about that, counsel? It's one thing for the court in Loper Bright to say that we don't defer to an agency's interpretation of statute.

[00:59:52] Speaker 03:
But is that enough to say that a three-judge panel of our court could overrule a prior Ninth Circuit decision?

[01:00:01] Speaker 03:
Why? Because, I mean, under Miller v. Gamme, we have to find that the prior decision is clearly irreconcilable with intervening Supreme Court authority. And I don't, it's kind of hard to read Loper Bright as doing that much when it isn't speaking to this particular issue.

[01:00:17] Speaker 00:
I read Miller v. Gamme as saying when the both the reasoning and the theory of a higher authority intervene in this court's precedent. The court is not bound by that prior precedent, and they must kind of apply the Supreme Court's determination here. And so I read Loper Bright as clarifying what the analytical framework is for reviewing statutes. And so that framework is completely at odds with what the court did and Morales Izquierdo and Perez-Guzman, which was a Chevron Step 2 analysis.

[01:00:56] Speaker 03:
So, I mean, in your view, Loper Bright gives a three-judge panel the license to go back and revisit any and all prior Ninth Circuit decisions that relied on the prior Chevron defense standard?

[01:01:13] Speaker 00:
Not all decisions, Your Honor. I think if new citizens bring claims challenging the validity of of regulations or statutes that the court priorly deferred to the agency, the court has a duty to engage in a new analysis. So we're not asking the court to invalidate Morales Izquierdo or Perez-Guzman as it applied to those petitioners. But we are asking when the court is faced with this question, as it applies to our petitioners, what is the correct determination of the law as the court sees it when engaging in the traditional tools of statutory analysis?

[01:01:50] Speaker 00:
and not deferring to the agency. And so here, I think the decisions that the court will make must be different. For Perez-Guzman, the court clearly found that there was a tension between the statutes and deferred to the agency despite recognizing weaknesses and having concerns. And then Morales Izquierdo, the panel went to the Chevron step two, without engaging in constitutional avoidance analysis or reviewing the rules of lenity in making that statutory determination.

[01:02:27] Speaker 00:
So I think as it applies to these petitioners, this specific agency action, which is ICE reinstating these two petitioners, the court has an obligation to determine what is the correct law at the time.

[01:02:40] Speaker 00:
And I know my time has run.

[01:02:42] Speaker 05:
Yes, it has. So if you want to make your final concluding statement.

[01:02:46] Speaker 00:
We asked... We stand firmly behind these two challenges, that the reinstatement regulations are invalid. And we ask that the courts vacate petitioners' reinstatement orders. And alternatively, if the court is disinclined to do that, we ask that the court hold these proceedings in abeyance pending the conclusion of their fear-based proceedings. Thank you.

[01:03:07] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[01:03:14] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[01:03:17] Speaker 05:
Ms. Morales and Ms. McLeod-Ball and Mr. Hugh Banks, appreciate the oral argument presentations here today. The cases of Tovar Reyes and Colin Carrillo, National Immigration Litigation Alliance versus Blanche is now submitted. Thank you.