[00:00:04] Speaker 03: Counsel, if you want to save time for rebuttal, please watch the clock. [00:00:07] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:00:11] Speaker 04: Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court. Stanley Panikowski for the appellant, Tracy Anderson, Mind and Body, LLC. [00:00:20] Speaker 04: The District Court summary judgment should be reversed because the District Court failed to analyze the copyrighted works and failed to apply the correct legal standards. The complaint alleges infringement of the choreographic expression contained in the 19 copyrighted TA works. But the district court instead analyzed the underlying method, the TA method. [00:00:45] Speaker 01: Can I ask, did you invite that? Because if I look at your opposition to the motion to dismiss, the title is the TA method choreography is protectable. [00:00:58] Speaker 01: And then it says, I'm going to just quote, plaintiffs allege that the TA method expressed in the TA works contains choreography. Plaintiffs allege that the TA method is a choreography made up of custom and specific movement sequences and routines. So it seems like in the district court, you were arguing that it was the method that was protectable and was what was the subject of the copyright protection. [00:01:22] Speaker 04: Your Honor, Tam did not invite that error for several reasons. First, even looking at those statements in the opposition to the motion to dismiss, the focus is still on the choreography, and there are other statements in that opposition that we quote in our reply brief where there is also discussion of the TA works, which are unmistakably the focus of the copyright allegations in the complaint. [00:01:50] Speaker 01: But in that whole section, I actually don't even see any reference to the works. It's all, I mean, you know, Concluding sentences are these allegations, which must be treated as true, plausibly established that the TA method contains protectable choreographic works under the Copyright Act. In that whole section, it really seems to be focusing on the TA method. [00:02:14] Speaker 04: Your Honor, at 1 SER 252, lines 21 to 24, TAM's opposition says defendants' videos infringe TAM's copyrights. by copying the choreography movements, sequences, and routines depicted in the TA works, organizational structure and format of the TA works, and aesthetic elements depicted in the TA works. And Your Honor, to the... [00:02:42] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but since we're talking about the choreography in particular, I do have a question for you. How is the choreographic expression that is depicted on the DVDs meaningfully different from the choreography that makes up the TA method? That's where I'm stuck. I don't really understand how they're meaningfully different. [00:03:03] Speaker 04: Your Honor, the TA method is a choreography protocol that consists of a wide range of movement sequences and routines, and Ms. Anderson's method for combining those in various ways. And we see that in the complaint at 2ER pages 255 and 259. And it's also, Your Honor, undisputed in this case. At 1SER 34, it was undisputed between the parties that the TA method is a choreography protocol as defined in the complaint. [00:03:40] Speaker 04: And that is very similar, Your Honor, to how ballet is a method and consists of a wide range of movements and principles and ideas for combining those. And then from the ballet method, choreographers will produce specific works like the Nutcracker or Swan Lake. In the same way, Ms. Anderson uses the TA method, her choreography protocol, to produce specific expressive works. like the 19 TA works that are asserted in this case. [00:04:11] Speaker 04: And that is why, Your Honor, this case is like Hanagami and not Bikram's Yoga. The first sentence of this court's opinion in Hanagami is that dance is one of the oldest forms of human expression. The TA works unquestionably... Yes, Your Honor. [00:04:28] Speaker 01: Okay, I've watched the videos. To say they're Swan Lake and Nutcracker, that's... [00:04:36] Speaker 01: a very generous statement, right? Because there's no storytelling. There's no theme. They're not by skilled performers. It's not before an audience. It's to be done at home for fitness. It specifically says these are, you know, butt lifting, ab toning. They're fitness benefits. They're not artistic or expressive purposes. [00:04:57] Speaker 01: And then Tracy Anderson describes them herself as, you know, welcome to my dance aerobic videos. [00:05:05] Speaker 01: Can you explain why it's more like the Nutcracker and Swan Lake if it doesn't meet those criteria? [00:05:12] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honor. First, it is dance, and that is right out of the gate a major distinction between this case and Bikram's yoga because Hanagami recognizes that dance is expression. So the proper question then in this case, which the district court did not ask or answer, is where on the continuum that Hanagami described between dance uncopyrightable dance and copyrightable choreography does this fall. And it does not need to have the same degree of artistic content or historical pedigree as the Nutcracker or Swan Lake. [00:05:49] Speaker 04: But we do see in the record, Your Honor, at 2ER pages 106 to 118, the declaration of Maria Cowing that explains Ms. Anderson's method of selecting, arranging, and combining these different dance moves and sequences from classical ballet, hip-hop, and jazz. And from pages 107 to 118, Ms. Culling painstakingly sets forth many different specific movements and positions and sequences from those disciplines that are then combined. [00:06:23] Speaker 01: And they're also set to music, Your Honor, which is... Do you think the TA method is copyrightable? No, Your Honor. We do not argue that the TA... But that is what you argued to the district court, though. You said that was protectable. But tell me why you think the method is not protectable. [00:06:39] Speaker 04: So, Your Honor, the method is not protectable because that itself is the underlying system on which the TA works are based. Again, in the same way there's the ballet example, there's also the example of music, that jazz music is based on a certain set of notes, chords, rhythms, principles for combining them. And no one would assert that either ballet or jazz is itself copyrightable, just like the TA method. [00:07:06] Speaker 01: So would you say the method is more like the sequence in Bikram? It's like the sequence of the 26 yoga poses and the two breathing exercises? [00:07:14] Speaker 04: No, Your Honor, there is some analogy there, but the better analogy to Bikram's yoga would be that the Tracy Anderson method is like yoga, because Bikram's yoga sequence is was one specific sequence of 26 static poses and two breathing exercises that had to be performed strictly in that order. Here, you can have many expressive works based on the TA method, and we have 19 of them asserted in this case. And in your honor, if I may return to the judicial estoppel issue, even the references to the TA method refer to the TA method choreography in the opposition to the motion to dismiss. [00:07:54] Speaker 04: And when you look at the district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss at 1ER 232 to 236, there's no indication there that the district court relied in any way on even imprecise statements that refer to the TA method. And therefore, an essential element of judicial estoppel under the Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire versus Maine is missing there as well. [00:08:20] Speaker 03: Can you, if I can interrupt, if you can go back to the difference between the TA method and TA works. I know you've described it in a somewhat more abstract way, which I know you're trying to explain the concept, but in a more concrete way, can you tell me the difference? I mean, what's the difference between the two? Is it TA works? Is it the addition of music? Is it how things are sequenced? What's the difference between the two? [00:08:41] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honor. The difference is the TA work will reflect a particular selection process arrangement, and composition of movements and sequences that are among many that can be used as part of the underlying protocol that is the TA method. So it is as if Ms. Anderson has a menu of many different movements, sequences, routines drawn from different disciplines, and then Ms. Anderson has her ideas for how best to select and arrange and combine those in a compositional thus meeting another factor the court identified in Hanagami for choreography. [00:09:24] Speaker 04: And Ms. Kelling described this process in her declaration at pages 106 and 107 of the excerpts of record. So the method itself can be analogized in some ways to a cookbook. The system of ballet, a system of music like jazz would be the best analogy because we're in the artistic realm. [00:09:48] Speaker 04: realm here. And then Ms. Anderson will use those principles and those raw materials to create specific expressive works. And those works cannot be reduced either to the ideas underlying the method or to the individual components of those sequences any more than as this court said in Hanagami, you could reduce music to just notes. [00:10:15] Speaker 01: You would agree the compendium says that exercise routines and aerobic dances can't be protected because they're non-expressive physical movements. [00:10:26] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honor. [00:10:28] Speaker 01: How are the videos different than aerobic dances? Which she describes them, these are my aerobic dance videos or exercise routines. [00:10:37] Speaker 04: So, Your Honor. [00:10:38] Speaker 01: How do we distinguish aerobic dance exercise routine from these videos? [00:10:45] Speaker 04: So, Your Honor, I think that there's an important distinction here between aerobic dances and exercise routines. [00:10:52] Speaker 04: So under the compendium 805.4D, even though the compendium says that exercises themselves are not copyrightable, you can have a choreographic work that nonetheless incorporates even athletic exercises. or social dances, or short routines. And when you look at the TA works, both the videos that were lodged, as well as the undisputed descriptions in Ms. Culling's declaration, what you see, Your Honor, is that there is a rhythmic movement in a defined space. [00:11:30] Speaker 04: There is compositional arrangement in terms of the flow and transition movements. between these different movements. They are set to music, which is yet another hallmark of choreography in Hanagami. Even though these choreographed routines are designed to be performed by clients and consumers in studios or at home, at page 118 of the excerpts of record, Ms. Tulling explains that Ms. [00:11:57] Speaker 01: Anderson... You know, separate from the declarations, let's look at how she actually sells her programs. She says, with this program, your results will never plateau or fail you like any fitness programs you may have tried in the past. It's going to further strengthen your mind and body connection, torch calories. I mean, it's all about, you know, tone, strengthen, engage every muscle. This is a workout for all skill levels. I mean, even the way she describes it is, you know, she says this is a transform your body by doing the same workouts. [00:12:29] Speaker 01: that are created for clients in the studios? Do you have a body you never believed you could have? It all seems to be more focused on exercise, weight loss, strong lean muscles. [00:12:41] Speaker 01: It just doesn't seem that it's for the expressive or artistic. [00:12:46] Speaker 04: Your Honor, none of those items that you just mentioned are relevant to whether the choreographed routines in the TA works are copyrightable. That relates to perhaps the the intent for which the routines are to be used and some of the purposes behind them. But we know from the Supreme Court's decision in Star Athletica and throughout the compendium in portions that we cited in our briefing. [00:13:14] Speaker 01: But the compendium says you look at whether it's for a presentation before an audience, whether it's to be executed by skilled performers. whether there is dramatic content. I mean, these requirements are all from the compendium. I think you're arguing intent doesn't matter, but it seems to be in tension with the compendium. The compendium is saying, no, the fact that it's for an audience, by skilled dancers, has a theme, that it does matter. [00:13:44] Speaker 04: Your Honor, intent does not matter under the Supreme Court's decision in Starr Athletica. Those factors from the compendium that this court identified in Hanagami I do see where some of them tend to ask for some light to be shed on the creative process here. And to the extent that that is relevant, we have deposition testimony from Ms. Anderson, for example, at 2ER pages 32 to 36, describing that creative process. But those factors from Hanagami do not take us into a full-blown, intense, [00:14:20] Speaker 01: But isn't there an intent inquiry in Bikram? Because Bikram looks at, are you trying to achieve increased consciousness? What is the reason for the sequences? [00:14:34] Speaker 01: It seems like Bikram did consider intent. Is it designed to improve your health and achieve increased consciousness? So we would have to depart from Bikram if we were to say, no, you don't look at all at intent. What were the goals of this stance? [00:14:50] Speaker 04: Yes. So, Your Honor, I have three points in response to that. First, you are correct that there are statements in Bikram's yoga that do appear to look beyond the copyrighted work itself. However, second, Your Honor, this court in Bikram's yoga did that in an effort to make what it called the difficult distinction between ideas and expression and apply it here. So even if under Bikram's you can look at intent to determine whether something is idea or expression. [00:15:22] Speaker 04: We don't have that problem here because there's no question that the TA works are expression. And as this court said in Hanagami, dance is one of the oldest forms of human expression. So we're not asking the question the court asked in Bikram's Yoga about whether it's merely an idea. That's the TA method that is not asserted here. We have expression in the TA works, and the question is, the one that the court in Hanagami asked. Where does this fall on the continuum between dance and choreography? [00:15:53] Speaker 04: And third, Your Honor, the Supreme Court's holding in Starr Athletica about the irrelevance of design methods and purposes and marketability does cast some doubt on the methods of analysis used in Bikram's yoga, but the court may not reach that here because we're not dealing with the idea expression dichotomy. We're only dealing with expressions. [00:16:15] Speaker 03: Thank you. I think you're over time, but we'll give you an extra minute. [00:16:18] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:16:37] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honors. May it please the Court, Nathaniel Bach, Manat Phelps, four defendants, appellees. [00:16:44] Speaker 02: The TA works are fitness DVDs, and the exercise routines thereon are not copyrightable under Section 102B and this Court's opinion in Bikram, this Court should affirm. [00:16:56] Speaker 02: At every turn, this Court's opinion in Bikram forecloses plaintiffs' effort to claim copyright protection over exercise movements by calling them choreography. [00:17:07] Speaker 01: It seems like the District Court made some errors here. I don't see really any... presumption of validity, weight, or consideration? [00:17:19] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. With respect to the presumption of validity, both parties agree that that presumption is easily rebutted and can be done so. The presumption, first of all, doesn't apply to any non-copyrightable elements within a copyrighted work in the first place. So the presumption only goes so far. Here, because the exercises are not copyrightable in the first instance, There is no presumption that applies to those non-copyrightable elements, even if. [00:17:49] Speaker 01: But they were registered, so they should come with a presumption of validity based on the registration. And it looks like the district court only looked at presumption of ownership. [00:17:58] Speaker 02: Well, the presumption. [00:18:00] Speaker 01: Separate from, you know, whether you think that presumption can be overcome. Do you agree that it looks like the district court didn't actually analyze presumption of validity? [00:18:09] Speaker 02: I don't agree with that, Your Honor. [00:18:11] Speaker 01: Where in the opinion did that? [00:18:14] Speaker 02: Well, the district court recognizes the registration of the copyrights. [00:18:18] Speaker 02: There's no dispute as to that. But then, as we argued, goes to the question of Bikram, this court's opinion there, finding that that can be overcome by showing, looking to the design of the exercises at issue, the movements at issue, and therefore those are non-copyrightable ideas, methods, and processes that and therefore that's an easily overcome presumption in those instances. Whether or not the district court recited chapter and verse, there's a presumption of validity. [00:18:51] Speaker 02: The district court, well within its discretion and properly, looked at the record, the evidence that the defendants submitted in connection with the record to find that the presumption would be overcome in any event. [00:19:08] Speaker 02: The plaintiff admits that its copyright claim is only based on movements contained in the TA works. [00:19:15] Speaker 02: There's no allegation that there's piracy of the DVDs involved, no allegation that there's copying of costumes, of scenery, or of any other elements. Isn't there some reference to music, though? [00:19:30] Speaker 02: Well, there's no allegation that the music was copied, Your Honor. [00:19:35] Speaker 02: I believe that the question of music comes up in connection with this understanding of whether or not the movements could be considered choreography under the Copyright Office's various factors for assessing choreography. But in this particular instance, music is not alleged to be part of any copying that occurred. And at descriptive record 270, that's paragraph 51 of the complaint, the plaintiffs make clear what they are alleging was copied. quote, defendants' videos copy the choreography, movements, sequences, and routines from the TA works. [00:20:11] Speaker 02: Nothing more. [00:20:14] Speaker 01: What about this two-part test? It seems if showing that dance is protectable choreography is one way to show that the work is copyrightable expression, then it can't be correct that you have this two-part test where you have to establish that the work is copyrightable expression before you address whether the dance rises to the level of protectable copyright. Don't those two kind of collapse on itself? [00:20:44] Speaker 01: And so it seems like not the right test that was used here. [00:20:49] Speaker 02: Well, several things, Your Honor. First of all, I don't believe that the district court applied any sort of two-part test. [00:20:56] Speaker 02: They referenced a sets up a two-part inquiry, and that is true, right? Bikram, this court's opinion, says – You don't pass Section 102B. [00:21:04] Speaker 01: What's the difference between an inquiry and a test? [00:21:08] Speaker 02: It may be semantic, Your Honor. [00:21:10] Speaker 01: Yeah, so they did set up a two-part test here. [00:21:13] Speaker 02: But in any event, whether it did or it didn't, it is an accurate statement of this Court's opinions in Bikram and in Hanagami. [00:21:19] Speaker 01: In Bikram, the Court said – Well, how is it if you can establish number one with number two, then I don't see how one is a threshold to two. [00:21:28] Speaker 02: Well, I think the concern that the district court was looking at – and it's the same – concern this court had in Bikram is that by getting to the question of whether a particular sequence, as in Bikram, of yoga is choreography, would read out entirely the Section 102 question and leapfrog that inquiry as to whether or not it is simply an idea, method, or process that is non-copyrightable. If, as the plaintiff suggests, forget all of that, just look at the videos, Think about, you know, could this befall somewhere on the continuum of choreography? [00:22:07] Speaker 02: That is precisely what this court did not permit in Bikram. Said, we're looking at the design, we're looking at the research, the method, what exactly Mr. Chowdhury was attempting to do with his yoga sequence. And for all those reasons, you don't go beyond that. We don't have to look at the individual movements, the asanas, in connection with that sequence to determine that it's non-copyrightable. This court didn't have to do that. [00:22:38] Speaker 02: And this court didn't do that. This court didn't look, well, let me look at asanas one through five to determine whether that's copyrightable or not. The court operated at higher level, and rightly so, to say none of this from the outset can be copyrightable, whether it's called a compilation or choreography. And the court really was prophetic in In anticipating the very type of effort that plaintiff attempts here, stating toward the end of the opinion, page 1044. [00:23:12] Speaker 01: Don't you think that the district court focused its analysis all on the method and not on the works? And even if the method is not copyrightable, it's possible that some of the works could be, correct? [00:23:27] Speaker 02: Some of the works could be, but not the movements within the works, Your Honor. Not the workouts. It is that the movements that are attempting to be protected are exercise movements. That's plain from the record. Your Honor quoted a number of those facts a minute ago in the marketing materials. [00:23:45] Speaker 01: But if they're choreographies in the works, those would be copyrightable, correct? Again... Protectable, I should say. [00:23:52] Speaker 02: One cannot, even if you could colloquially call any of the movements choreography, that's from this Court's opinion in Bikram, even if the sequence, and I'm quoting from this Court's opinion in Bikram, Even if the sequence could fit within some colloquial definitions of dance or choreography, it remains a process ineligible for copyright protection. The same is true here. There is no daylight, and the plaintiff has shown none, that would establish where there is protectable expressive choreography within what is undisputedly workout exercises. [00:24:30] Speaker 03: TM works or method is a little bit in the gray area. I mean, there are certain exercises that you can say is clearly exercise. You watch exercise tape and someone's doing sit-ups, push-ups, lifting weights, right? And they can clearly say this is exercise. This is a little bit different, right? There's a little bit of dance and, you know, then incorporate it into the exercise. Maybe it's dance as part of exercise. And once you get to that gray area, then you get into question of, you know, what Hanagami, they say, you know, our court said, the line between choreography, dance isn't necessarily clear. [00:25:03] Speaker 03: So is this something maybe we should remand? The district court really didn't address that, the distinction between dance and choreography. [00:25:10] Speaker 02: Well, several things, Your Honor. First of all, in Hanagami, that was an appeal at the pleadings on a 12B6. And so the court was simply stating at that time, we can't determine on the record as it exists now that the plaintiff there, who was a professional choreographer, did not market workout tapes or DVDs, and actually registered the workout issue in that case as a choreographic work with the Copyright Office, the court did not say, oh, in every circumstance on summary judgment, you have to make such an inquiry and figure out if it falls on the continuum. [00:25:46] Speaker 02: Again, that would leapfrog the very inquiry that this court underwent in Bikram to determine that, no, there is no possibility of the movements being copyrightable expression because they are simply an idea, method, or process. And Your Honor's question about the fact that, you know, you look at it and you think, could this be dance? Could this be, how do I figure that out? Well, again, Bikram, this court addressed that in Bikram, stating that one cannot confer protection, copyright protection, on movements by labeling them choreography and fixing them in a tangible medium of expression. [00:26:26] Speaker 02: And it's the same with the Copyright Office's compendium. That's Section 805.53B that Judge Coe quoted earlier, that aerobic exercises cannot be copyrightable expression. And in Circular 52, which was released after the third issue of the compendium the following year, stating that, quote, a series of aerobic exercises or a complicated routine consisting of classical ballet positions or other types of dance movements intended for use in a fitness class are not examples of the types of work that can be considered. [00:27:07] Speaker 03: I guess the one issue I have is this is all abstract, and just looking at the papers here, it's hard to tell. and the district court didn't really analyze this issue. So, you know, maybe the district court is in the best position to look at it. I don't even know, did your client submit any of her videos here at all? I couldn't tell. I saw some video clips about it. I couldn't tell. [00:27:30] Speaker 03: Some were, I think most of them at least seem to be from your friends on the other side. [00:27:35] Speaker 02: Again, the question was really, and this is what we argued at the district court, and it's the same issue here on appeal, looking simply at the plaintiff's exercises, Can there be any copyrightable expression within those DVDs? And what we did was we submitted voluminous evidence of the plaintiff's own words. [00:27:53] Speaker 02: The marketing materials, when one goes to the website to download or order these particular DVDs, they are workouts. They talk about torching calories, flattening one's stomach, achieving balance in the body and mind. Those are all quintessentially the same types of results and design that this court addressed in Bikram and found could not. There was no reason to go and dig deep into the various yoga poses to determine whether there was anything there. [00:28:24] Speaker 02: At a very threshold level, those are the types of statements and design and intent that cannot render those movements. [00:28:31] Speaker 03: A lot of that is kind of marketing materials because that's what people want. They want to be fit. I don't know if it really addresses what the nature of those routines are. And I don't know. [00:28:45] Speaker 02: Well, again, I think it's I think the copyright office is in everyone. Everyone agrees. And by everyone, I mean this court, the copyright office in both the compendium and a circular 52 all agree that dances when they are for fitness and exercise cannot be copyrightable expression that could be considered choreography. [00:29:08] Speaker 01: What was litigated in the summary judgment motion? Just validity, right? So that would only require review of Tracy Anderson's videos. If you had litigated infringement, then we would have needed to see, I don't recall, what's the first name of your client, Roop? Her videos, right? But I didn't see infringement as part of the summary judgment. [00:29:27] Speaker 02: It was not a substantial similarity. Substantial similarity and infringement was not part of the summary judgment that we moved on, Your Honor. We moved on the basis of non-copyrightable, copyrightability of the plaintiff's exercises in the first instance. Correct. [00:29:43] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:29:46] Speaker 00: Council, I would like you to address Star Athletica, please. [00:29:50] Speaker 02: Certainly. [00:29:51] Speaker 00: As you heard your friend on the other side talk about, look, intent doesn't matter. It doesn't matter that Tracy Anderson was selling these as workout videos and all of that. So please address that. [00:30:03] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:30:05] Speaker 02: Two things on Star Athletica. It's all of a piece with the argument that, as Your Honor says, The other side argues intent doesn't matter. Well, that's simply not true, as Judge Koh observed with respect to this court's opinion in Bikram, where the court specifically looked at the question of design of the sequence in Bikram to determine that it was not copyrightable, to determine that it was an unprotectable process, idea, and method. And Star Athletica dealt with a very different issue under the Copyright Act. [00:30:36] Speaker 02: It dealt with the question of assessing a separability issue of useful articles under Section 101, the definition as it pertains to pictorial, sculptural, and sculptural works in Section 101. That was a question about cheerleaders' uniforms and whether one could separate the designs that were on those uniforms to determine whether they had separate expressive content that could be copyrightable. [00:31:02] Speaker 02: And what the court did there in any event, even though it said that the purpose of those particular uniforms was not the subjective intent was not relevant, the court did say how it's perceived does matter. So even if this court were to look simply at perception, which the court need not do because the court did that very thing in Bikram, the district court rightly found, and the evidence is undisputed, that nobody perceives, no reasonable juror could perceive the TA method or the exercises within the TA works as anything other than a workout. [00:31:40] Speaker 02: I see my time is up, Your Honor. Thank you. [00:31:53] Speaker 04: Your Honor, Defendants Council made an incorrect assertion that unravels their position. Council said that it is undisputed that the movements in the TA Works are exercise movements. That is not correct. In fact, the opposite is true. At one SCR 80, it shows that it is in fact undisputed that the TA works feature a selection and arrangement of movements that are informed by the TA method, classic dance steps that are well known to various dance modalities, such as ballet, hip-hop, jazz, and modern dance. [00:32:26] Speaker 04: And that is the crux of this case, Your Honor, because this is not a case like Bikram's Yoga, where the copyrighted book simply explained or described the underlying method, and the plaintiff tried to extend that copyright claim to the method. Here, we are not trying to extend the copyrights in the TA works to the TA method. Rather, we are asserting the choreographic expression in the TA works, and that is why, at a minimum, Your Honor, the case should be reversed and remanded to the district court to apply Hanagami's definition of choreography and the six instructive factors to the TA works. [00:33:04] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:33:06] Speaker 03: Great. Thank you. Thank you both for the helpful argument. The case is submitted.