[00:00:01] Speaker 04:
Yeah, thank you.

[00:00:02] Speaker 00:
All right. The last matter on for argument today is United States of America versus Benicio Nicolas Pareda, 25-4461, and each side has 15 minutes.

[00:00:30] Speaker 04:
Yeah, I'll text him right now.

[00:00:32] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:00:33] Speaker 04:
Yeah.

[00:00:38] Speaker 00:
Well, you've been patiently sitting out there.

[00:00:40] Speaker 02:
Good morning.

[00:00:42] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honors. May it please the Court, William Larson for the United States. I'd like to reserve four minutes for rebuttal, and I'll try to watch my clock.

[00:00:50] Speaker 00:
Okay. These are government appeal days, are they not, today?

[00:00:53] Speaker 02:
They sure are, Your Honor.

[00:00:56] Speaker 02:
The district court in this case suppressed the evidence by holding that as a matter of law The probation officer assigned to monitor defendant Benicio Pareda had no basis, even for a reasonable inference, that he resided in the trailer.

[00:01:12] Speaker 02:
No basis for a reasonable inference, despite the assigned location monitoring officer making daily observations of Mr. Pareda in precisely the trailer's location.

[00:01:23] Speaker 01:
Did they ever go by the location and just check it out?

[00:01:26] Speaker 02:
They did. Detective Amhadi testified that he observed Mr. Prada in the truck in the same location, actually inside the truck in the driveway.

[00:01:36] Speaker 01:
Did they think that he was just hanging out in the truck?

[00:01:40] Speaker 02:
You know, he didn't go into detail.

[00:01:42] Speaker 01:
But the little dots are on the other side of the house.

[00:01:45] Speaker 02:
The little dots are in the sort of drive going north, which is where the trailer was parked that morning.

[00:01:52] Speaker 00:
Does the record say what type of trailer this is?

[00:01:55] Speaker 02:
It is a trailer that staked down, and I would point the court to Exhibit 101, which was the body cam, which shows sort of the type of trailer that was at issue. It was a trailer to be pulled by a truck, so it was staked down.

[00:02:07] Speaker 00:
So then you can put it, but it was on blocks.

[00:02:09] Speaker 02:
It was on blocks at the time. That's correct. It was on blocks, you know, next to a Ford F-150, capable of pulling it, but not connected at the time of the search.

[00:02:17] Speaker 00:
So, and it was hooked. There was some connection for power to the house, right?

[00:02:22] Speaker 02:
That's right. So the testimony was, and it's reflected in the body cam footage as well, was the trailer was about 15 feet from the main residence, and the officers actually observed an extension cord running from the house to the trailer before the search.

[00:02:39] Speaker 01:
That was on the date when they went out there. Right, exactly. Not when they'd been out there before.

[00:02:43] Speaker 02:
Correct. So when they had been out there before, they had not seen the trailer. And this was one or two months before the search when Detective Amhadi had seen defendant in the truck but did not observe a trailer at that point.

[00:02:55] Speaker 01:
So when they arrived at the house, they knocked on the door, correct, of the house?

[00:02:59] Speaker 02:
They did, correct.

[00:03:00] Speaker 01:
And they asked for him?

[00:03:02] Speaker 02:
They asked where he was, and it was the mother of defendant's girlfriend who said, he's in the trailer. There was some dispute about exactly the wording that she used, but I think we've at this point settled that.

[00:03:14] Speaker 01:
They didn't ask, they didn't follow up and ask, well, is he living there?

[00:03:18] Speaker 02:
Correct. They did not at that point. They then went to the trailer and then heard, recognized his voice inside and ordered him out.

[00:03:24] Speaker 00:
So do we know who owns the trailer? We do.

[00:03:27] Speaker 02:
Well, we know who it's owned.

[00:03:28] Speaker 00:
What do we know in the record at the time?

[00:03:31] Speaker 02:
In the record, and this was submitted as one of the exhibits to the suppression briefing, the trailer is registered to defendant's mother, Thelma Pareta. This was also displayed as a permit in the, in the, trailer's windshield. The officers did not observe that permit before the search.

[00:03:47] Speaker 00:
So girlfriend's mother says he's over in the trailer. Right. So they go over to the trailer.

[00:03:53] Speaker 00:
And he doesn't come out right away, but he eventually comes out? Correct.

[00:03:59] Speaker 00:
So if – and they find drugs in the trailer and in the truck, right?

[00:04:08] Speaker 02:
They find that the drugs are in the truck. the roughly three kilograms of the fentanyl heroin.

[00:04:15] Speaker 00:
But what do they find in the trailer?

[00:04:17] Speaker 02:
They find the ammunition in the trailer, and I believe it's in a safe.

[00:04:21] Speaker 00:
So that's part of the evidence in the crime part of things.

[00:04:24] Speaker 02:
That's right. And the other things in the trailer that they find that would be relevant at trial, there's, I think, a ledger of payments that's in his handwriting rather than the girlfriend's. So there is other evidence that sort of connects him to the drugs in the truck in the trailer. They are. They're sort of interconnected.

[00:04:41] Speaker 00:
And his conditions, he's parole searchable? That's right. And what does that say you can do?

[00:04:46] Speaker 02:
It says they can search his residence, his property under his control, and his person with or without a warrant at any time. It's the standard PRCS search condition.

[00:05:00] Speaker 00:
And he was on a LOJAC, so that's how they could know where he was?

[00:05:04] Speaker 02:
Right. He had a GPS ankle monitoring that gave the real-time location information displayed on a map for the officer. So the officer actually was making daily observations on this map and then rechecked them before going out to visit the trailer that day.

[00:05:19] Speaker 00:
So why were they going out to do a check?

[00:05:24] Speaker 00:
What was the purpose?

[00:05:27] Speaker 02:
The impetus was they had, so they were aware that defendant had been, had had previous drug trafficking convictions. And what they saw him doing in the location monitoring was taking trips to Los Angeles, like, Los Angeles area. He's in Santa Monica at, or excuse me, Santa Barbara.

[00:05:47] Speaker 02:
Taking trips to Los Angeles at 2, 3 in the morning and, you know, going and being at an empty parking lot of a, you know, a business that's closed. And so they suspected he was going and potentially doing drug transactions, you know, He could have been doing anything else, but either way, it was evidence of a parole condition violation because it was an unauthorized trip of more than 50 miles.

[00:06:07] Speaker 00:
So what did the district court, what was the problem the district court had with the search? And why would you say that was wrong?

[00:06:13] Speaker 02:
So I think the problem that the district court had, and I think given the facts that we've laid out, this is not a close case under the facts and the government's view. And so there is a question, how did the district court get there? I think the district court got there by misreading Granberry. as we set out in our brief. There is this line in Granbury that builds on some language in prior Ninth Circuit cases that says, this is a relatively stringent standard requiring strong evidence of residence. Now, I think this court cleared some of that up in Berry, in the court's opinion in Berry, by saying this is not probable cause plus.

[00:06:50] Speaker 02:
There's no such thing as probable cause plus It would make no sense to apply probable cause plus to a search of a parolee who has lower Fourth Amendment protections than anybody else.

[00:07:01] Speaker 02:
But I think what the language in Granbury still does is suggest to district courts to do just the kind of divide and conquer analysis where you look at the evidence and you go, okay, well, Granbury says it needs to be strong evidence, so is this strong evidence? And if not, you know, we chuck it in the waste bin. We know the district court did that because the district court said she was doing that. The district court said, oh, well, this evidence just shows that he was present in the trailer, and therefore it doesn't support an inference of residence. I mean, that is defying common sense.

[00:07:32] Speaker 02:
Why? A lot of people just stay in trailers. Sure.

[00:07:37] Speaker 01:
And if they're saying if the – You know, it's just the trailers in your backyard. You can drive around all the time and see people – with trailers in their backyards. Why is that a clear inference?

[00:07:50] Speaker 02:
And if your GPS location that the officers knew and actually reviewed shows you staying in the trailer overnight on a regular basis.

[00:07:58] Speaker 01:
But you just said they didn't know there was a trailer there.

[00:08:00] Speaker 02:
They knew he was staying in the location of the trailer.

[00:08:03] Speaker 01:
He could have been staying in a tent, right? You have a lot of people live in tents.

[00:08:07] Speaker 02:
It could have been a shed. It could have been an ADU. They didn't know what it was. This court's opinion in Franklin shows that that doesn't matter.

[00:08:16] Speaker 02:
In Franklin, they have the tip that he's in a hotel. They don't know where in the hotel. They don't get that information until they go there and they talk to the front desk clerk, just like they talked to the mom.

[00:08:25] Speaker 00:
What's the evidence that he was staying there at that location? What is his connection in terms of the evidence at that location?

[00:08:33] Speaker 02:
So it's the GPS tracks showing regular overnight stays specifically on this location, not in the main residence. I mean, that's the key. When you look at the map, they are clustered directly on the trailer.

[00:08:43] Speaker 00:
And timing-wise?

[00:08:46] Speaker 02:
The maps that were submitted were the eight days prior to the search, but then the officer testified he'd been reviewing the same tracks since March of the same year and saw a similar pattern. They also knew he was not residing at his listed residence in Lompoc, which he can have more than one residence. Granbury's very clear on that. But this court has found relevant when a defendant is not regularly residing in the listed residence that's relevant to whether they're residing somewhere else.

[00:09:14] Speaker 00:
On a parole search, let's say, because you're supposed to keep your parole agent advised where you are. Right. Okay. If you haven't listed that as a residence, is that a basis for your parole agent to go out and check to see what's going on?

[00:09:27] Speaker 02:
Absolutely. I think nobody, I think, can test that they could go ask them what's going on. I think the question is, you know, probably most residents. Could they go in? Could they go in, exactly. Could they go into the trailers? And I think the question is, when you add all these facts together, are we here on sufficiency after a guilty verdict? No, we're here on probable cause review. Is there a reasonable inference of residence based on the facts known to the officers? I think common sense says there has to be.

[00:09:57] Speaker 04:
So, Counsel, one thing, Granbury says that you could only look at a residence, you can't look and it distinguishes between residence and property under control and suggests that you can't use property under control for a residence. Right. But this is a vehicle, and Granbury said that property under control could be a vehicle. So do you think because it's a trailer, which could be a residence or a vehicle, then Granbury's no longer governing on that point, and we could rule that this was a property under control?

[00:10:31] Speaker 02:
I think that's correct. I think the question this court faces on the property under control basis for the search is, Did Granbury announce a blanket rule applicable to every case anytime the residence is in question? I think that answer is no. Granbury is both explicit that it's just talking about the facts of that case, whereas here it is abundantly clear that the search property is a residence. We're talking about a brick and mortar apartment in that case. I think this court also in Cervantes, the more recent Cervantes case, does the analysis that we are saying the court should do here on the property under control basis where it It says, okay, they didn't have grounds for residence.

[00:11:08] Speaker 02:
The defendant in that case was staying in a hotel room. It wasn't his residence. But we are going to look at whether he controls the room still. So it was not mutually exclusive in Cervantes. It's not mutually exclusive here given the sort of long line of authority saying vehicles are property under control.

[00:11:23] Speaker 04:
And is one prong stronger than the other, residence versus property under control, or are they equally strong or –

[00:11:29] Speaker 02:
I think they're equally strong. I think the resonance is stronger because we have the evidence of the overnight stays. I mean, in terms of evidence of control, I don't think anybody's actually contested that he controlled the trailer. That wasn't the argument. The argument is sort of legal under Granbury. So I think it's uncontested he controlled it. He was inside it. His stuff was inside it.

[00:11:52] Speaker 02:
But I think given the state of the record and just sort of the pile of evidence of residents, I think it's very hard to conclude.

[00:12:00] Speaker 00:
From your perspective, is there something that needs to be clarified in publication on this?

[00:12:07] Speaker 02:
I think the court could usefully, so I think the court, from the government's perspective, was very clear in Berry already that Granbury is not probable cause plus. I think what the court could usefully do in this case, in addition to that, is clarified that when Granbury says strong evidence, that is no longer good law in light of Westby, where we are not supposed to divide and conquer, we're not supposed to look at each individual fact and discard it if it's insufficient on its own.

[00:12:38] Speaker 02:
To the extent that, I mean, the proof is in the defense brief in this case, where they try to defend the probable cause plus reading of Granbury, notwithstanding that we already have Granbury to go from. So I think this court, without going en banc, and obviously there are parts of Granbury that this panel could not overrule without en banc reading, but I think this court could clarify that to the extent Granbury can be read as requiring strong evidence inconsistent with this sort of guidance in Westby, this totality of the circumstances, common sense, inferential approach.

[00:13:14] Speaker 01:
Isn't the primary concern with Granbury is the concern for third people? you know, third parties' rights.

[00:13:20] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:13:20] Speaker 01:
I think that's... I mean, that's really what all... This really all comes down. Otherwise, you know, wherever the parolee is, you just go wherever and walk in and check on the parolee. I think that was... That's not right.

[00:13:32] Speaker 02:
Right. I think that was critical to the holding that probable cause is required in the first place, which ultimately comes from Motley, the court's en banc decision in Motley.

[00:13:41] Speaker 02:
And that is a holding that I think the court would need to go en banc to review. But we're not questioning that.

[00:13:47] Speaker 01:
So the reasonable inference, give me all the, state again all the facts in your view that lead to a reasonable inference that this was his residence when they showed up there?

[00:13:56] Speaker 02:
GPS maps clustered specifically on the location.

[00:13:59] Speaker 01:
And those were, they, was that like up to the day before or?

[00:14:05] Speaker 02:
It was up to the day of.

[00:14:07] Speaker 01:
Of. Right. Eight days worth of.

[00:14:09] Speaker 02:
It was eight days of maps and then testimony that those were consistent with the three months prior.

[00:14:13] Speaker 01:
Okay, so we got that. Okay, that's one.

[00:14:16] Speaker 02:
We have that the defendant took parole visits, home visits in Goleta. The resident of the house said he was in the trailer. Officers saw signs the trailer was being used as a residence. The fact that his truck was parked immediately next to the trailer.

[00:14:29] Speaker 00:
F-150, there's some evidence about that, right?

[00:14:31] Speaker 02:
Right, the F-150, exactly.

[00:14:33] Speaker 01:
Did they know that the F-150 was his truck?

[00:14:35] Speaker 02:
They do, and I think this is exactly – How did they know? because of Amhadi's prior observations. And I think this is exactly, and I do want to make sure I mention the truck in whatever remaining time.

[00:14:48] Speaker 02:
I think this is exactly an example of the failure to extend common sense inferences. Amhadi sees defendant in the truck five times. He sees defendant in the truck in the precise location the truck is parked that day. To say that there's not even a reasonable inference that that's the same truck, is just a failure to extend the kind of reasonable inferences in exactly the way that the Supreme Court said district courts are not supposed to do.

[00:15:09] Speaker 00:
So I think, if I understand the record, the officer had run the truck previously when he'd seen it, not on that day.

[00:15:19] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:15:20] Speaker 00:
But on that day, they didn't run the license plate again.

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
They re-ran it, I think, 15 minutes after the search of the truck started.

[00:15:27] Speaker 00:
Right, but... but the officer was firmly of the view it was that truck.

[00:15:32] Speaker 02:
Right. He said I think it's the same truck that he's been driving previously. He said this on the body cam at the time. I see I'm out of time.

[00:15:40] Speaker 00:
You are. Any?

[00:15:42] Speaker 02:
No, is there further questions?

[00:15:42] Speaker 00:
All right. Thank you. Thank you.

[00:15:52] Speaker 00:
Good morning.

[00:15:53] Speaker 03:
Good morning. May it please the court. Hunter Haney for Benicio Pareda. This court has consistently held that warrantless searches of a California community supervisee's home or property must be justified by probable cause that the home or property is indeed the supervisee's. The district court here soundly applied these precedents to conclude that the police lacked probable cause that the trailer and the truck at issue were Mr. Pareto's. Unless the court prefers otherwise, I'll address the two contentions regarding the trailer before turning to the truck.

[00:16:27] Speaker 03:
There was no probable cause that the trailer was Mr. Pareto's residence. The GPS data.

[00:16:32] Speaker 00:
I guess Officer Macedo or whatever testified that the GPS data regularly placed Pareto at the location of the trailer, which was located only about 15 feet from the Goleta house. When he arrived at the Goleta house, one resident told him that the Pareto was in the trailer, and he also saw that the trailer had an extension cord plugged into the connecting house. Why wasn't that enough for them to have probable cause to conclude the trailer was actually the part, was part of the Goleta address where Pareto had been residing?

[00:17:03] Speaker 03:
Because there's no question that regular presence overnight at an address is relevant to the analysis, but this court has repeatedly held that more information beyond that is necessary to actually establish residence. Franklin, Granberry, and Howard all explicitly hold that. And this GPS evidence at most placed Mr. Pareda as an overnight guest at the location during this eight-day span. And even that evidence... And plus the car.

[00:17:32] Speaker 00:
We got the car.

[00:17:34] Speaker 03:
The car was not observed before they went into the trailer. There was no evidence of that. In fact, the officers were discussing while they were searching the trailer, the truck, that's when the truck first actually came up a minute and a half into the actual body-worn camera. So there's no evidence on that point that they were aware of the truck even at the point that the trailer had already begun being searched. But regardless, by the government's calculations, this GPS data, which is what they're primarily relying on, placed Mr. Pareda at the Goleta location 40% more often than Lompoc, which again is not sufficient to show actual residents without additional evidence gathering.

[00:18:14] Speaker 03:
It wasn't clear that when... 40% more.

[00:18:16] Speaker 04:
What are you talking about?

[00:18:18] Speaker 03:
I believe in their reply brief, they did a word search of the GPS data in the ER and said that 40% more of the time over that eight-day span, he was at the Goleta location as opposed to the Lompoc location.

[00:18:31] Speaker 04:
But he regularly... Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. But he regularly overnighted there, correct?

[00:18:36] Speaker 03:
During that eight-day period... just reviewing the GPS data. He was at the Goleta location exclusively a few of those nights, and then a couple of the nights he was at Lompoc and Goleta. And on one night, there was just no data during that eight-day span. So it was mixed.

[00:18:52] Speaker 03:
And without any other evidence gathering that is, again, so characteristic of these cases, including Your Honor's decision in Barry from last year, it just wasn't clear that You know, I mean, we're talking about just an eight-day span. The officers didn't know that the trailer was even there.

[00:19:09] Speaker 04:
I thought the parole officer was observing him at that location longer, but he just went back.

[00:19:14] Speaker 03:
He was observed at the residence. And there needs to be probable cause. It would be a different question if the officers had searched the residence. But here the officer searched the trailer, which is a separate residence, of course. And there needs to be distinct probable cause as to the location searched, as this court held on Bonk and Motley, and as reemphasized in Granbury and this whole line of cases.

[00:19:32] Speaker 00:
Okay, would you agree... that probable cause analysis isn't frozen at the time the officers first arrived at the Goleta evidence. So at least in theory, hypothetically, even if the officers did not have probable cause to search the trailer before arriving at Goleta address, subsequent events could have allowed them to develop probable cause. Because you're saying they should have searched the residence. But other things happened after they got there. The woman in the residence said, hey, he's over there.

[00:20:03] Speaker 03:
He's there.

[00:20:03] Speaker 00:
Again, presence. And it's 15 feet away. That's right, presence. And it's got an extension.

[00:20:07] Speaker 03:
Right. So there was presence. Again, Ms. Loza's mother said that he was there. And in these other cases that have been at issue, including the government heavily emphasizes Franklin, there is someone who says, yeah, he's living there, or yeah, he rented the room. But here, all you have is the mother pointing them to the trailer saying, yeah, he's there. He's an overnight guest. And that is not sufficient, especially when, you know, there's no previous observation of the trailer and that these clusters were in a location where there were other structures, including what appeared to be an ADU.

[00:20:47] Speaker 03:
So what we know it most is he was there overnight several evenings over an eight-day period.

[00:20:53] Speaker 04:
And many times, which is a probable cause for residents, right?

[00:20:57] Speaker 03:
I disagree because I think it's consistent with any couple in the early stages of a relationship.

[00:21:02] Speaker 04:
I think it's consistent with the – But that's not probable cause. You don't have to rule out every other innocent explanation. You just – No. It just has to support the guilty inference, which all these facts do.

[00:21:14] Speaker 03:
This is – yeah, probable cause of residence, a fair probability analysis.

[00:21:17] Speaker 04:
So just because there's an innocent explanation that he's just overnighting guests, but that doesn't matter if all these facts also suggest residence.

[00:21:26] Speaker 03:
I think there is nothing more in terms of other facts beyond presence, and that was basically the discharge.

[00:21:31] Speaker 04:
Presence over a long period of time at night.

[00:21:33] Speaker 03:
Presence over an eight-day period at night on some nights.

[00:21:36] Speaker 04:
Okay, there's some dispute about that.

[00:21:38] Speaker 03:
Yeah, I don't think there's any dispute that he was not in the trailer.

[00:21:43] Speaker 03:
The trailer wasn't even known until they got there. And, you know, I think on top of that.

[00:21:50] Speaker 04:
Because the GPS showed that there's some location outside the residence that he was there multiple times at night, right? you go to the residence, the mom says, oh, in there, in the trailer, all that just confirms everything that they were thinking, that he was staying at this place and the mom pointed out exactly where he was staying. And he's there.

[00:22:08] Speaker 03:
It confirms that he was there, exactly. It does not confirm that he was a resident.

[00:22:12] Speaker 04:
And what you see in a lot of these other cases... You don't confirm he's a resident, you just have to have probable.

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
No, you have the probable cause of a residence. And the case law distinguishes between probable cause as to residency and probable cause as to presence. And what you often see... is the officers asking questions as to whether or not someone is staying there. You have the presence of a key is another factor that Barry, of course, emphasized. You have officers actually doing prolonged surveillance of the trailer.

[00:22:39] Speaker 00:
What was he wearing?

[00:22:41] Speaker 03:
His clothing? Yeah. From the body one camera, it was something white. I'm not sure if I recall exactly. Was he in pajamas or something?

[00:22:49] Speaker 03:
Pajamas?

[00:22:49] Speaker 04:
I think he was in shorts of some sort, right?

[00:22:51] Speaker 03:
I don't know if he was in pajamas or not, but this court, of course, emphasized in Howard that even the sight of the defendant in the girlfriend's apartment coming out in his boxer shorts is not enough because, again, all that shows is presence as an overnight guest.

[00:23:06] Speaker 00:
But why aren't you just dividing and conquering here? You're taking each one and saying, okay, that's not enough. But it isn't each one thing here. There's a whole gob of things.

[00:23:15] Speaker 03:
No, we're analyzing the totality of circumstances, and the court has identified four relevant factors that it emphasizes in these cases, and none of them are present here beyond the observations through the GPS evidence of presence.

[00:23:31] Speaker 04:
So if, I mean, take what you're saying is true, like all these inferences can suggest that he's an overnight guest, but all this could also suggest he's a resident, then why? Why do we have to pick one or the other? And then a probable cause saying that we take both of these inferences and the officers pick a reasonable one?

[00:23:49] Speaker 03:
I think that the only reasonable inference here is presence and not residence because of the fact that it wasn't his residence. It wasn't his residence?

[00:23:58] Speaker 03:
That there was no observation of a key. No one had made a statement that he was residing there. I'm sorry?

[00:24:05] Speaker 04:
He was inside of it.

[00:24:06] Speaker 03:
I think that's present in most of these cases, that the defendant is actually seated inside of the unreported address.

[00:24:11] Speaker 04:
That's because he's found outside of the residence, and they're trying to link him to the residence. He was found inside the residence.

[00:24:16] Speaker 03:
Yeah, I mean, again, I think any overnight guest would be found inside the residence by definition.

[00:24:20] Speaker 00:
So do you think there was probable cause to search the residence, not the trailer? Did I hear that?

[00:24:26] Speaker 03:
I think that would be a closer case, given what the officers had actually done, but I think they would have needed to actually surveil the residents to some extent to actually establish that fair probability. But that, of course, is not representative.

[00:24:38] Speaker 00:
Did you not tell me a little bit ago that they would have had probable causes?

[00:24:40] Speaker 03:
I think it would be a closer question. Absolutely. As to the House. As to the House. And these are, of course, you know, the court has to distinguish between the two because trailers have been recognized, of course, as residences. And that gets me to the second sort of part of this analysis I want to make sure I've tied to the rest.

[00:24:55] Speaker 01:
Let me just ask you one question before you do that. Through our case law, how do we define or...

[00:25:02] Speaker 01:
explain what residence is in this context.

[00:25:06] Speaker 03:
Yes, so that goes to the second question as to whether or not this trailer was a residence as opposed to Mr. Pareda's residence.

[00:25:14] Speaker 03:
This court in Granbury made clear that reading residence into the property under control provision would render the residence provision superfluous, and it's emphasized that since many times California courts have read the provisions consistently with that.

[00:25:30] Speaker 03:
The relevant factors as to whether something is a residence is defined by the Carney test that the Supreme Court has laid out, and here it's not even a close question. The trailer wasn't readily mobile, which is the first factor, and that it was propped up by stakes, it was parked, it wasn't hitched to a vehicle, and it had no motor. The second factor is whether the vehicle or the place at issue is subject to extensive regulation and inspection. No evidence of that here. We have this permit that kind of suggests that it was a long-term fixture in the neighborhood.

[00:26:02] Speaker 03:
And then third is whether the location is situated such that an objective observer would conclude that it was a residence. So here you have that it was connected to the utilities on a side street, and police were told that it was occupied and heard activity inside. So really under all three factors under Carney, this trailer unquestionably qualifies as a residence. And I don't take the government to be disputing that factor. The argument that's really being made here is that categorically, trailers are not subject to this Granbury point of law about the redundancy between the two conditions.

[00:26:41] Speaker 01:
How do you respond to the government's point that Granbury uses the term plus or extra evidence?

[00:26:49] Speaker 03:
So I don't take Granbury or this line of cases to be imposing anything above a probable cause standard.

[00:26:57] Speaker 03:
It does, all these cases do, when you read them carefully, they do mention strong evidence as being required, but they also reference the totality of circumstances in the fair probability language that has animated Supreme Court case law, both pre and post-Wesby. So I don't think that there's really any, I don't think that's ultimately dispositive because I do think we win under the fair probability test.

[00:27:24] Speaker 04:
So you're saying Granbury doesn't impose a new test even though it uses the word strong?

[00:27:28] Speaker 03:
That strong evidence language actually is from the en banc decision in Motley.

[00:27:33] Speaker 04:
But it's not suggesting a new?

[00:27:36] Speaker 03:
Yes, absolutely, Your Honor.

[00:27:39] Speaker 03:
And so, again, I think what the government the point the government's making about Granbury is that it's it's it's limited to brick and mortar residences. But I do not read it that way. I don't see any mention of brick and mortar residences. And this court is, of course, recognized that the Fourth Amendment can protect trailers as residences. That's Barajas of Olos. I want to make sure with my remaining time I can address the truck as well, because that's the final piece of this.

[00:28:04] Speaker 00:
There's some damning evidence in the truck. So let's just say we agreed with you on the trailer. Is the truck off limits or do you have to?

[00:28:14] Speaker 03:
So it is. I don't know if the court needs to ultimately reach the fruits argument because I don't think it satisfies the property under control condition here.

[00:28:26] Speaker 03:
But yes, that would be an alternative way of reaching the issue or of upholding the district court's conclusion of suppression to hold basically that the evidence was excludable as an illegal search of the trailer.

[00:28:42] Speaker 03:
But again, I think the F-150 here, at best, what Detective Amjadi observed was that he thought He was kind of speculating that this was, in fact, the same truck that he had seen Mr. Pareto driving on this prior occasion and where his partner had run the tags. But he never actually verified the truck, which, of course, is a very common truck parked on a public street, that this was, in fact, the same truck. So at most he had a hunch.

[00:29:10] Speaker 04:
Was it on a public street? I thought it was next to the trailer in some way.

[00:29:13] Speaker 03:
It was next to the trailer on a public street, yes. Oh, okay. Yes. It was a side street, but it was a public street, not a private drive of any kind. Okay. So it mostly had a hunch, and that is not enough to meet a probable cause standard.

[00:29:27] Speaker 03:
Amjadeh had not seen Mr. Prada driving the truck that day. He didn't claim Mr. Prada had the keys. He didn't ask any questions to determine ownership, and these are all factors that animate the cases in this area.

[00:29:39] Speaker 00:
Okay, those are the things that are in your favor, but how many times had he been seen in a F-150 that was registered?

[00:29:46] Speaker 03:
A handful of times. A few times he had been seen at other locations and once at a couple months before at this location.

[00:29:52] Speaker 00:
But it just happens to be where he is right now. Yeah. Can we consider that?

[00:29:57] Speaker 03:
So, yes, I think that's part of the calculus, but he had the information available to verify the plates. He did not use that. And I think requiring more knowledge in this particular circumstance protects against searches of not just F-150s, but Toyota Camrys, other very common cars of law-abiding citizens, just because they happen to be parked on a street by a parolee who is also suspected of driving that very common vehicle. It doesn't take much to look at your notes and check the plates to verify that it is in fact.

[00:30:27] Speaker 00:
So if he had checked the plates, that would have been good enough for you?

[00:30:30] Speaker 03:
I think so, yes. Under this court's decisions in Motley, under this court's decision in Motley, probable cause has to be particularized to the location search.

[00:30:40] Speaker 04:
So are you suggesting there's a rule then that you have to, verify the place before you apply?

[00:30:43] Speaker 03:
No, I think that's one option available to the officer.

[00:30:47] Speaker 03:
I think what you also see in this line of cases, I point the court to Dixon, is the defendant having the keys or questions and answers that were available to the officers because there were many people on the scene here. Is this the defendant's truck? It's pretty straightforward, and there were people who were willing to talk to the officers.

[00:31:05] Speaker 00:
Let me find out. Does anyone have any additional questions? Okay. The other thing is we used up all the time of the appellant. Do any of my colleagues have any additional questions in line of appellee's argument? All right. So we're done.

[00:31:22] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:31:22] Speaker 00:
We'd ask the court to affirm. Thank you both for excellent argument.

[00:31:26] Speaker 00:
This matter will stand permitted, and we're in recess until tomorrow at 9.