[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
Mr. Brody.

[00:00:02] Speaker 03:
Good morning, and may it please the Court.

[00:00:05] Speaker 03:
I'm going to try to reserve three minutes for a bottle, but we'll monitor that myself.

[00:00:11] Speaker 03:
Let me start first with the question of whether the warrant had probable cause.

[00:00:16] Speaker 03:
When you strip away the speculation and the conjecture in the warrant, what you're left with is actually very little.

[00:00:23] Speaker 03:
Appellant paid an application fee and was living in the apartment he paid that fee for.

[00:00:28] Speaker 03:
And the apartment manager thought that CW was appellant, and CW being the person whose name was on the actual application.

[00:00:36] Speaker 03:
You also have this drug transaction from two years prior, or roughly two years prior.

[00:00:41] Speaker 03:
What you don't have, crucially, is any evidence at all that the information on the application, CW's information, was used without permission.

[00:00:50] Speaker 03:
Did CW give permission?

[00:00:51] Speaker 03:
We don't know.

[00:00:52] Speaker 03:
Did CW himself rent the apartment?

[00:00:54] Speaker 03:
We don't know.

[00:00:55] Speaker 03:
Was CW living there?

[00:00:56] Speaker 03:
We don't know.

[00:00:57] Speaker 02:
Why isn't the apparent impersonation, the fact that the landlord identified Langford as CW, enough?

[00:01:09] Speaker 03:
It's not enough because the only thing we know from the warrant, if we read it very carefully, is that the apartment manager thought that Langford was CW.

[00:01:18] Speaker 03:
That doesn't tell us anything about whether Langford represented himself as CW to the apartment manager.

[00:01:23] Speaker 03:
All it says is that the apartment manager thought that.

[00:01:26] Speaker 03:
We have no idea why.

[00:01:27] Speaker 02:
Nothing?

[00:01:28] Speaker 03:
Nothing.

[00:01:30] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:01:30] Speaker 03:
I really don't think it says anything.

[00:01:31] Speaker 03:
And, you know, it's on the police at that point to say, why did you think that?

[00:01:37] Speaker 03:
You know, is it because he told you that he's CW?

[00:01:41] Speaker 03:
Is it because he otherwise indicated to you that he was CW?

[00:01:45] Speaker 03:
All we know is that the apartment manager

[00:01:47] Speaker 03:
thought he was CW.

[00:01:49] Speaker 03:
I don't think that we can infer anything from that other than perhaps a presumption.

[00:01:53] Speaker 03:
Is it possible that he told the manager that?

[00:01:56] Speaker 03:
And that's why the manager thinks that, yes, it's possible.

[00:01:59] Speaker 03:
But it's not a reasonable inference.

[00:02:01] Speaker 03:
And so we don't have, crucially, that evidence that Appellant was holding himself out as CW.

[00:02:07] Speaker 00:
And again, I would pose the question, what about the social security number, the birth date, the tax information?

[00:02:16] Speaker 00:
usually wouldn't use somebody else's personal information like that.

[00:02:20] Speaker 03:
Well, and that's it.

[00:02:22] Speaker 03:
I appreciate you're on that question.

[00:02:24] Speaker 03:
And you're asking it in exactly the way I think that that gives us some insight into how the warrant was worded.

[00:02:30] Speaker 03:
You know, it says he used the information, but we don't know that he used the information.

[00:02:36] Speaker 03:
We know that the application for the apartment had that information on it.

[00:02:41] Speaker 03:
So and we don't know how the application.

[00:02:42] Speaker 04:
Why isn't that a use?

[00:02:44] Speaker 04:
that it is on his application that he presumably filled out, and probable cause isn't certainty, but why isn't that enough?

[00:03:01] Speaker 03:
Well, and I think Your Honor said it exactly right, that he presumably filled out, but we don't know that.

[00:03:06] Speaker 03:
We don't know how the application, who filled it out, and we don't know how it came to the general manager.

[00:03:11] Speaker 02:
Well, presumably would even be enough.

[00:03:14] Speaker 02:
I mean, the rebuttal comes later on in the process.

[00:03:17] Speaker 02:
Do you concede if we hold that there was probable cause from the apartment information, then whatever problems might arise from the presentation of the drug information don't render the warrant invalid?

[00:03:35] Speaker 00:
Yes, I would agree with that.

[00:03:37] Speaker 00:
But why is the drug information, you know,

[00:03:40] Speaker 00:
Why should we not consider that?

[00:03:41] Speaker 00:
Because, I mean, we're kind of saying, well, maybe somebody would allow somebody else to use their apartment and even use their birth date and social security number, perhaps.

[00:03:52] Speaker 00:
But what if we also know that the person who's doing this is somebody where there's indications even in a year or two ago was involved in drug dealing?

[00:04:03] Speaker 03:
leads to an untenable result, which is that you can build this inferential chain where there are such weak links.

[00:04:12] Speaker 03:
So at the very foundation of that set of inferences is this notion that because Appellant was engaged in a drug transaction, let's say roughly two years ago, that he's still a drug dealer.

[00:04:24] Speaker 03:
And if you go on from that point and say, well, OK, if he's still a drug dealer, he's probably involved in using false identities.

[00:04:31] Speaker 03:
And therefore, it's probably on the premises and so on.

[00:04:33] Speaker 03:
Each link has to stand up and that very first one collapses.

[00:04:38] Speaker 03:
This court, many courts have recognized the ephemeral nature of drug evidence and the fact that unlike some other forms of evidence, the longer the period transpires between the initial offense and some presumptive subsequent offense, the less probable cause there is.

[00:04:56] Speaker 02:
So, Mr. Brody, can I take you to the March 19th warrant with an eye on the clock here?

[00:05:01] Speaker 02:
So with respect to the phones,

[00:05:03] Speaker 02:
Um, I mean, why wouldn't the very least good faith apply here?

[00:05:08] Speaker 02:
The government went, um, back to court describing exactly what it was going to do, uh, and, and got an order, um, saying that it could do it.

[00:05:19] Speaker 03:
Because it left out the absolutely crucial information that it had not yet submitted the phones.

[00:05:26] Speaker 02:
It didn't give... Why is that, why is that crucial?

[00:05:29] Speaker 02:
Um, he still doesn't have the phones back.

[00:05:32] Speaker 03:
It's crucial because, um,

[00:05:33] Speaker 03:
I think it's essentially undisputed, I don't know what my colleague is going to say, but I think it's undisputed that the extent, the length of time over which the government maintains possession over somebody's electronic device, a phone for example, increases the incursion on their Fourth Amendment rights.

[00:05:49] Speaker 03:
And you have to balance that when you're applying, when you're granting a warrant, you have to balance that against the government's legitimate interest in pursuing extraction of that data.

[00:05:58] Speaker 04:
But when you don't- Do we properly take into account the fact that your client never sought return of the phones before then?

[00:06:09] Speaker 03:
I think the court can consider that.

[00:06:13] Speaker 03:
And I will say, though, that the motion to suppress is still an assertion of my client's privacy rights.

[00:06:19] Speaker 03:
And so I think to say that it has to come in the form of a Rule 41 motion for the return of property would be to elevate form over substance.

[00:06:27] Speaker 03:
But even if Your Honor is right that not having asked for the phones back sooner diminishes slightly my client's privacy rights, it still has to be weighed against the government's legitimate interest.

[00:06:39] Speaker 03:
And there is no legitimate interest in simply sitting on the phones

[00:06:44] Speaker 03:
for months on end without even submitting them a pronoun.

[00:06:47] Speaker 00:
Do you think the issue is that they didn't search it or that they didn't tell the magistrate that they hadn't begun searching it?

[00:06:56] Speaker 03:
I think it's a combination of those two things, but I think it's both.

[00:07:01] Speaker 03:
It shows a lack of diligence and it negates, it shows a lack of diligence, which is an incursion of my client's Fourth Amendment rights, which is unacceptable on its own.

[00:07:11] Speaker 03:
And in addition to that, it cannot be rescued by the warrant or any sort of good faith reliance on the warrant because the warrant was obtained in effect under false pretenses.

[00:07:20] Speaker 03:
That is, by misleading the judge without including this very crucial information.

[00:07:25] Speaker 03:
And I would point out, I'll just say this very briefly since I know I'm running out of time, that the warrant application or the rollback, pardon me, the application for an extension of time said we've got a backlog and not only

[00:07:40] Speaker 03:
uh... did they not know that was the case because they hadn't submitted it but in fact after they submitted the phones i believe the first phone was the data was extracted almost immediately and the second phone it was about within a month so it turns out at least at the time they later submitted it there really was no backlog and all of them are you are you contending that they have statements in the record will give you time for a bottle so uh... are you contending that statements made in the request for the extension were

[00:08:08] Speaker 00:
you know inaccurate at the time they were made yes in so far as they omitted a crucial fact which was the failure to have submitted the phones even have submitted the funds for analysis but did they say that they say otherwise you know i mean i think you're saying what they omitted this fact i gather you think is important because it just shows they hadn't even started this project but i'm trying to figure out why is that significant i mean they did go back to the to the court and say they needed more time to do this i mean i think an implication is that

[00:08:38] Speaker 00:
They either hadn't started it or they hadn't completed it, one of the two.

[00:08:42] Speaker 03:
Well, they said that there was a backlog.

[00:08:44] Speaker 04:
I'd like to ask you about the backlog question.

[00:08:49] Speaker 04:
The fact that they were able to process the phones or search the phones relatively soon after receiving the extension, to me, does not logically imply that there had been no previous backlog.

[00:09:05] Speaker 04:
I mean, sometimes there's a backlog and it's cleared.

[00:09:08] Speaker 04:
And so I agree with that, your honor.

[00:09:11] Speaker 04:
I agree with that.

[00:09:12] Speaker 04:
So to me, there's kind of a disconnect.

[00:09:16] Speaker 04:
And when they say there's a backlog, there may have been.

[00:09:20] Speaker 04:
And I guess I don't really follow the logic.

[00:09:24] Speaker 03:
I understand.

[00:09:24] Speaker 03:
And I think you're right.

[00:09:25] Speaker 03:
It doesn't mean there wasn't a backlog at the time.

[00:09:27] Speaker 03:
But whether there's a backlog or not, it's clear that submitting the phone sooner is going to result in the data extraction sooner.

[00:09:34] Speaker 03:
And not submitting them all is inevitably going to delay that extraction.

[00:09:38] Speaker 03:
And if I could just turn very briefly to your question, I refer the court to the Metter case, the Southern District of New York case, because that dealt with exactly the same scenario.

[00:09:48] Speaker 03:
And the answer that court gave was, look, the failure to submit it

[00:09:52] Speaker 03:
is a violation of the defendant's order.

[00:09:54] Speaker 02:
Well, matters seem to involve a little more back and forth with the court, right?

[00:09:59] Speaker 02:
The matter, by the time the order was issued in matter, there was the court itself had already said, all right, what's going on?

[00:10:06] Speaker 02:
Speed it up a little bit here.

[00:10:07] Speaker 02:
And there's none of that here.

[00:10:09] Speaker 03:
There's none of that here because the government didn't tell the court, we haven't submitted it yet.

[00:10:12] Speaker 03:
If they had told the court, Your Honor, we haven't even submitted this, it may very well have had exactly that back and forth.

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
I think a court, a magistrate would say, why haven't we submitted it yet?

[00:10:22] Speaker 03:
the defense well the defense at that point didn't know the truth about i mean at the time they didn't have the phone back right there there's still no request which would have been a queue yes that's true although even if the phone had come back the mirror image might have been delayed in its extraction as well so this part was this part of the process ex parte yes yes it is right all right we'll put three minutes on the clock for your rebuttal thank you thank you mr brody

[00:10:51] Speaker 00:
We'll hear from the United States.

[00:10:55] Speaker 01:
Good morning, and may it please the court, Rajesh Srinivasan for the United States.

[00:11:00] Speaker 01:
Neither warrant in this case was defective.

[00:11:02] Speaker 01:
The March 12th warrant was supported by ample probable cause based on allegations of ongoing identity theft and reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations, which magistrate judges are allowed to consider in granting a warrant.

[00:11:16] Speaker 01:
The March 19th warrant was executed without any delay, let alone unreasonable delay, and officers were allowed to subsequently review the data on those phones in accordance with the terms of the warrant under Rule 41E2B.

[00:11:32] Speaker 01:
At a minimum, any lack of bad faith makes suppression unwarranted.

[00:11:36] Speaker 01:
Unless the court wants me to start elsewhere, I will begin with the delay issue.

[00:11:41] Speaker 01:
The argument in the

[00:11:44] Speaker 01:
defendant's brief is limited to whether there was an unlawful delay in execution of the warrant.

[00:11:51] Speaker 01:
But Rule 41 answers this question.

[00:11:53] Speaker 01:
A warrant for digital devices is deemed executed upon seizure of the devices, not upon subsequent review of the data.

[00:12:01] Speaker 02:
Are there any Fourth Amendment, just to go to assuming that the rule, or outside of the rule, what are the Fourth Amendment constraints here?

[00:12:09] Speaker 01:
The Fourth Amendment constraints I think would not be anything to do with the search.

[00:12:14] Speaker 01:
The search would be the same if you performed it on the day after you seized the phones versus 15 months, 20 months later, or eight months here.

[00:12:25] Speaker 01:
But I think the concern would be the retention of the phone.

[00:12:30] Speaker 01:
So the Fourth Amendment interest that the defendant would have is in the continued seizure of the phone.

[00:12:36] Speaker 01:
However, there is no Fourth Amendment harm that the defendant identified here in the context of the retention of the phone.

[00:12:44] Speaker 01:
As you pointed out, Judge Johnstone, he didn't ask for the phone back.

[00:12:47] Speaker 01:
And indeed, even in the briefing here, I don't see any complaints about the continued seizure of the phone being an impediment to defendants' privacy rights.

[00:12:59] Speaker 02:
What do we do for Fourth Amendment purposes when the warrant has expired by its own terms?

[00:13:05] Speaker 02:
And then we get a couple months later in order.

[00:13:10] Speaker 02:
I understand from the record that with respect to Thompson, the government went and got a second warrant.

[00:13:17] Speaker 02:
I'm not sure why it didn't do it here, but why shouldn't we require a warrant once the original warrant has expired?

[00:13:25] Speaker 01:
I wouldn't frame the issue here as a warrant expiration because the warrant was executed as soon as the phones were seized.

[00:13:34] Speaker 01:
There were limitations on how the government would later review the devices.

[00:13:39] Speaker 01:
But in those limitations, there was a provision that allowed the government to ask for extensions of time to review those devices, which is exactly what the government did here.

[00:13:50] Speaker 01:
After they were unable to review the data in the first 120 days,

[00:13:54] Speaker 01:
They went back to the court and asked for an extension and then completed the review within that time period.

[00:14:01] Speaker 01:
And my colleague is incorrect that the issue that the court should be focusing on is when the government started the review rather than when they finished the review.

[00:14:12] Speaker 01:
If the interest here is the continued retention of the phone by the government, the continued seizure, then it doesn't matter when the government started review.

[00:14:20] Speaker 01:
It matters how long the defendant was deprived of their phone without the government having some legitimate need to maintain the phone.

[00:14:31] Speaker 02:
But wouldn't that at least be true of the gap between the expiration of the warrant by its own terms?

[00:14:40] Speaker 02:
What's the legal status of the the warrant after it's expired on its own terms and before the government's asked for an extension?

[00:14:49] Speaker 01:
The legal status of the phone is that it was a phone that was lawfully seized pursuant to a warrant and there I have found no case that says that once

[00:15:00] Speaker 01:
Evidence is seized under a lawful warrant that the government has to give back the evidence at some point in the litigation.

[00:15:09] Speaker 02:
The 120 days just went to search.

[00:15:11] Speaker 02:
And so that's what the extension was covering.

[00:15:13] Speaker 02:
The seizure remained fine under the warrant.

[00:15:17] Speaker 01:
That's correct.

[00:15:18] Speaker 01:
If the government had searched the phone outside of those 120 days without seeking an extension, we might have a different issue in terms of compliance with the terms of the warrant.

[00:15:30] Speaker 01:
And the defendant, I think, then, would have to show some sort of prejudice and malfeasance and bad faith on the government's part in order to get suppression, even in that scenario.

[00:15:40] Speaker 01:
But of course, that is not the situation we have here, where the government did go back to the court and ask for an extension.

[00:15:47] Speaker 00:
But at a minimum... The warrant doesn't give a time period.

[00:15:51] Speaker 00:
It says, well, you can't... It makes provision for extensions, which you got.

[00:15:57] Speaker 00:
It doesn't say,

[00:15:58] Speaker 00:
you can't you know you have to seek such an extension within such a reasonable time or you know so what what would happen if the government had seized this and then held the evidence for years and then gone back and sought an extension is does that raise a fourth amendment question i don't think it raises eight fourth amendment question

[00:16:21] Speaker 01:
in as much as a magistrate with the, if a magistrate granted an extension, I don't think it would raise a fourth amendment question.

[00:16:28] Speaker 00:
Could a magistrate deny that extension on the ground that it raises a fourth amendment question?

[00:16:34] Speaker 01:
I think the

[00:16:36] Speaker 01:
I'm not sure they could deny it on the ground that it raises a fourth amendment question, but they could certainly deny it on a lack of good cause for an extension.

[00:16:43] Speaker 01:
A magistrate judge could reasonably conclude that the government had plenty of opportunity to review the phone data and they can't renew their review period after sitting on this evidence for years.

[00:16:56] Speaker 02:
But I'm not sure how that works, right?

[00:16:58] Speaker 02:
So the consideration of

[00:17:01] Speaker 02:
cause for the warrant is done upfront.

[00:17:05] Speaker 02:
The extension is by itself not a warrant, so it doesn't contain that consideration.

[00:17:12] Speaker 02:
So it's unclear to me how whatever the magistrate is doing in issuing the first warrant on its own terms for a search of 120 days can possibly kind of be perpetual then when that's not considered at the time of the warrant.

[00:17:31] Speaker 01:
If I understand your question correctly, Judge John Stone, I think you're asking how would a magistrate could account for the government's delay in reviewing a phone for years after.

[00:17:43] Speaker 02:
And I think that- It would be one thing if the government asked for that and foresaw that, and that's when the warrant issued.

[00:17:49] Speaker 02:
But the second document is not a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.

[00:17:53] Speaker 02:
It's an extension, but I'm not sure what to make of that, what that is.

[00:17:59] Speaker 01:
I think what it is is a extension of the terms of the warrant under which the government was allowed to review it.

[00:18:08] Speaker 01:
As I said, if the government didn't seek an extension, I think we would have a different case and we would be analyzing this issue differently.

[00:18:15] Speaker 01:
So I think the way that this court should look at it is the government can act within the terms of the warrant by reviewing the data within 120 days.

[00:18:25] Speaker 01:
Outside of that time period, the government would be acting outside of the terms of the warrant.

[00:18:30] Speaker 01:
But if the government receives an extension, then they are back within acting within the warrant's terms.

[00:18:36] Speaker 02:
Have we approved a search pursuant to such an extension before?

[00:18:41] Speaker 01:
I can't recall a case that dealt with this precise issue, but courts in this circuit routinely grant extensions for reviewing digital devices and certainly an extension that span less than eight months is frequently granted.

[00:18:57] Speaker 00:
There's an allegation that in seeking the extension, the government wasn't forthcoming about the backlog and some other facts.

[00:19:07] Speaker 00:
How do you respond to those charges?

[00:19:09] Speaker 01:
Two responses.

[00:19:11] Speaker 01:
The defendant here didn't directly challenge the extension.

[00:19:14] Speaker 01:
And in the warrant context, in the warrant affidavit context, the defendant needs to prove that an omission of a fact was deliberate or reckless, as well as material.

[00:19:27] Speaker 01:
And the defendant here has made neither showing.

[00:19:29] Speaker 01:
But to your point earlier, Judge Bress,

[00:19:32] Speaker 01:
The reasonable implication from the application is that review had not, at least was not completed, if not begun.

[00:19:42] Speaker 01:
And as I said earlier, I'm not sure if it's material that review, whether review has been started or not, because the real question for the defendant is when is the review period going to be up?

[00:19:55] Speaker 01:
How long is the seizure going to be?

[00:19:58] Speaker 01:
If the government starts review on day one and ends it on day 120, the defendant's in the same position as if they start review on day 119 and end it on day 120.

[00:20:11] Speaker 01:
So I don't think when the government starts review is a relevant question under the Fourth Amendment.

[00:20:17] Speaker 01:
Regardless of any of these issues, the court could avoid ruling on these issues by simply going to the good faith exception.

[00:20:25] Speaker 01:
There is no evidence of bad faith in this case.

[00:20:27] Speaker 01:
The officers went back to the court at every step.

[00:20:31] Speaker 01:
asking for permission to seize evidence, asking for permission to review the data on the phones.

[00:20:36] Speaker 01:
And there is no reason that suppression would deter police misconduct here, where police acted exactly as they should have under the fourth amendment.

[00:20:46] Speaker 02:
I guess, do you have any explanation, I mean, just your knowledge in the case, why there's a second warrant for the Thompson phone and not for the Langford phone?

[00:20:55] Speaker 01:
I do not have an explanation for that.

[00:21:00] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:21:00] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:21:01] Speaker 00:
Thank you for your presentation.

[00:21:07] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:21:08] Speaker 03:
I'll respond to that just by saying that the Fourth Amendment is the end, the be-all end-all here.

[00:21:16] Speaker 03:
It is the last word in this analysis.

[00:21:19] Speaker 03:
And to the extent that the government is suggesting that because the warrant was already executed, there was no upper limit on the amount of time that they could take to review the phone, that's false.

[00:21:29] Speaker 03:
this court has applied the fourth amendment analysis to the length of time in which the government has to extract data and review the contents of that data in fact if you look at the uh... and this isn't where there's a where there's a warrant or other order in place expressly authorizing no warrants that are no order can uh... trump the the fourth amendment and i agree with your honor that

[00:21:55] Speaker 03:
if the government had provided sufficient information to the court that justified the extension of time, that that would be a finding essentially by the court that it was within the Fourth Amendment.

[00:22:08] Speaker 03:
That's the magistrate's analysis, and that's the extension analysis.

[00:22:12] Speaker 03:
Is this within the Fourth Amendment?

[00:22:14] Speaker 03:
And I want to make what I think is a crucial point, which is that the harm to the defendant is not that he didn't get his phones back in time.

[00:22:24] Speaker 03:
The harm to the defendant in a case like this is that the government possesses extensive personal information for a long period of time.

[00:22:34] Speaker 03:
That's the harm that the Supreme Court has recognized.

[00:22:36] Speaker 02:
Why should it matter then when they'd started or finished or whether they'd started the search?

[00:22:41] Speaker 03:
Because the sooner that they start the search and the sooner that they complete the search, the sooner all of the information that is irrelevant to the case goes out of possession of the government.

[00:22:52] Speaker 03:
That is exactly why, for example, even the Second Circuit has held that when the government's reviewing the mirror image of data, not even the device itself, that that is limited by a Fourth Amendment analysis.

[00:23:04] Speaker 03:
Because the government just can't sit on your personal data, this extensive personal data that you might find in a cell phone, forever.

[00:23:12] Speaker 03:
And they can't cure that just by saying, well, here's your phone back.

[00:23:15] Speaker 03:
Because the same analysis applies even to a mirror image.

[00:23:23] Speaker 03:
Also, I wanted to point out that in the Rule 41 advisory notes, they state that they considered putting an upper limit on how long the government's allowed to spend reviewing it.

[00:23:35] Speaker 03:
But they rejected that because there are a lot of factors to consider in terms of how long it should appropriately take.

[00:23:42] Speaker 03:
And that is a nod by the committee to the fact that

[00:23:45] Speaker 03:
They can't give a one-size-fits-all number, but it's ultimately governed by a reasonableness analysis.

[00:23:51] Speaker 03:
So there's no suggestion, even in Rule 41 itself, that that would somehow trump the Fourth Amendment analysis.

[00:23:58] Speaker 00:
So here, I mean, the amount of time that they had it was not especially long beyond the time that they were already authorized initially, you know?

[00:24:07] Speaker 00:
So the nature of some of my questions to the government is, what if they hold this for years and that's not this case?

[00:24:11] Speaker 00:
So what was unreasonable about just the

[00:24:15] Speaker 00:
quantum of time that we had here, given the rest of the authorization that they already had in the first place.

[00:24:21] Speaker 03:
And again, I think it's the weighing analysis.

[00:24:25] Speaker 03:
It's the intrusion on the defendant's privacy justified by the government's legitimate interest in maintaining it.

[00:24:32] Speaker 03:
And that determines how long they can hold it.

[00:24:35] Speaker 03:
And there is no legitimate interest in not submitting the phones at all.

[00:24:44] Speaker 03:
There was no interest, no legitimate interest in that four-month period during which they didn't even put the phones in queue to be reviewed.

[00:24:51] Speaker 03:
And for that reason, then, I say it falls in favor of the appellant.

[00:24:55] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:24:55] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:24:56] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:24:56] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:24:57] Speaker 00:
We thank both counsel for the helpful briefing argument.

[00:24:59] Speaker 00:
The case of United States v. Langford is submitted.