[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
Brent Electric Company versus International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

[00:00:05] Speaker 02:
It is docket 23-5108 and counsel.

[00:00:09] Speaker 02:
We are ready for you when you're ready for us.

[00:00:12] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:00:14] Speaker 04:
May it please the Court, my name is Mark Hutt, and I'm here representing the appellant in this case, Brent Electric.

[00:00:22] Speaker 04:
And I intend to reserve a few minutes for rebuttal if that happens.

[00:00:26] Speaker 04:
There is a first principle in arbitration.

[00:00:29] Speaker 04:
that is strictly a matter of consent.

[00:00:32] Speaker 04:
That means that if a party does not consent to arbitration, they can't be forced to arbitrate a matter.

[00:00:37] Speaker 03:
What if they do consent?

[00:00:39] Speaker 03:
That's it.

[00:00:39] Speaker 03:
What if they do consent?

[00:00:40] Speaker 04:
If they do consent, then they have to arbitrate the matter.

[00:00:43] Speaker 04:
It is a matter of consent.

[00:00:45] Speaker 03:
Well, in this case, didn't the language of the memorandum of understanding find its way into the regular, the big agreement?

[00:00:58] Speaker 03:
prior to the execution of the newest agreement.

[00:01:03] Speaker 04:
We have maintained, Your Honor, that the Memorandum of Understanding is a separate agreement.

[00:01:07] Speaker 03:
I know, but how do you get around the language that was in court, that was in the, I forget the way, the 2018 agreement?

[00:01:17] Speaker 04:
The question of whether or not there was consent to arbitrate this matter is really a question that arises under the collective bargaining agreement and the language is contained in there.

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And that is under clause section 1.02d.

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And that is the section that provides the issues that can be provided to arbitration in this case.

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So that's what I'm focusing on, Your Honor, is the language where it says

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that these particular matters can be submitted by the parties to arbitration.

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And it has a definition there.

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That's what I am saying.

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That's what I'm pointing to as the focal point for what the parties do consent or did consent to submit to arbitration.

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Now, the addendum four, that's a separate matter.

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And we maintained that addendum four is a separate agreement to which my party, Brent Electric, was not a signatory.

[00:02:14] Speaker 04:
Brett Electric did not sign that Addendum 4.

[00:02:17] Speaker 03:
No, but it says in that original deal that it shall apply to all firms who sign a letter of consent to be bound by the terms of this agreement.

[00:02:28] Speaker 03:
And didn't that happen?

[00:02:33] Speaker 04:
Well, Brett Electric did sign a letter of consent to be bound.

[00:02:37] Speaker 03:
And didn't the agent, or whatever you want to call it,

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put that language right into the agreement?

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The letter of consent had to do with the joint bargaining that was provided by NECA.

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Right.

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And it did consent initially to having joint negotiations through NECA and having NECA represent it with the union.

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However, in September of 2020, that consent was revoked.

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So again, getting back to the question of if that clarifies what you're asking,

[00:03:12] Speaker 03:
Well, I'm not sure it does because it was done years before this memorandum of understanding.

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But my client, our client, Red Electric, never signed that agreement.

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When was that agreement, and when did he say, I'm not going to sign it?

[00:03:55] Speaker 04:
They did not say they're not going to sign it.

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They just did not sign it, Your Honor.

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The Addendum 4, we maintain, is a separate agreement.

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It is not a part of the collective bargaining agreement.

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And it's a standalone agreement.

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And what has happened is the district court here basically inserted

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the birth electric into this memorandum four, this addendum four, instead of a West Coast.

[00:04:23] Speaker 04:
It did that in its decision and made it an unwilling participant to addendum four.

[00:04:28] Speaker 01:
Well, it made a factual determination, certainly against you on that, and if we agree or we find that wasn't clearly erroneous, you lose on that issue as far as addendum four.

[00:04:40] Speaker 01:
It's just part of the contract.

[00:04:49] Speaker 04:
a collective bargaining agreement, then yes, on that we do.

[00:04:52] Speaker 01:
And that is what the district court did make that factual finding.

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Right.

[00:04:57] Speaker 04:
Then it would be a part of the collective bargaining agreement if that was a case that wasn't corporate.

[00:05:04] Speaker 03:
Well, the MOU and the NECA signed in 2012 and modified in 2018 with binding on Brent Electric during the entire

[00:05:17] Speaker 03:
2018 collective bargaining agreement, was it not?

[00:05:21] Speaker 04:
Well, then, yes.

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If it was an agreement that was adopted by Brent Electric, then sure, it could be adopted.

[00:05:29] Speaker 03:
No, not adopted.

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They agreed to be bound by it by the letter of assent.

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Again, that letter of assent was revoked in 2020.

[00:05:37] Speaker 03:
Yeah, I know, but it was already there prior to 2020.

[00:05:40] Speaker 04:
Yes.

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So if the Addendum 4 is in place, then it would be bound by the 10th of the terms of Addendum 4.

[00:05:51] Speaker 01:
Arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but you had you have in the 2018 agreement my understanding of what this is all about is the interest arbitration provision That basically said unilateral submission of all disputes when you negotiate a new successor agreement You're bound to that that was a 2018 collective bargaining agreement

[00:06:16] Speaker 01:
You were represented by NECA that you're bound by that.

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So I'm struggling.

[00:06:21] Speaker 01:
And the district court interpreted the word all to mean all.

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It said it's unambiguous.

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It includes both permissive and mandatory provisions.

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I mean, that's what we're talking about here, right?

[00:06:37] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

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And we maintain it.

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You are contractually obligated to follow that.

[00:06:43] Speaker 01:
at least for the 2021 collective bargaining agreement.

[00:06:47] Speaker 01:
That is true.

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Not beyond that.

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It's not a successor type.

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It doesn't continue on.

[00:06:53] Speaker 01:
That's a different matter.

[00:06:54] Speaker 04:
You are correct, Your Honor.

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But we state that the language that is in that section that gives consent to arbitration is ambiguous.

[00:07:02] Speaker 03:
How?

[00:07:03] Speaker 04:
Because it states unresolved issues and disputes arising out of failure to negotiate a renewal or modification of this agreement.

[00:07:11] Speaker 04:
We say that that doesn't include

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electric can waive its rights to a permissive subject not being a part of the arbitration is if it does that knowingly, it does that unmistakably, and it does that explicitly.

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And our client didn't do that here.

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There's also a second circuit case that is in complete agreement with what we're saying, that these permissive subjects of bargaining fall outside of that definition

[00:07:53] Speaker 02:
It's a minority view, though, is it not?

[00:07:58] Speaker 04:
The Second Circuit says it, and I believe that it is a minority view on that issue, but it is an ambiguity.

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And here, the court and the union, by their arguments, make that argument stronger.

[00:08:10] Speaker 04:
In the district court below, they made the argument, and the district court found that, yes, the language is unambiguous.

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It is clear.

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However, it does exclude one permissive subject of bargaining.

[00:08:23] Speaker 04:
And that is a second-generation interest arbitration provision.

[00:08:26] Speaker 02:
Now, when you say public policy, you also say statutory rights, right?

[00:08:31] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:08:31] Speaker 02:
Does the NLRA support you in that?

[00:08:36] Speaker 02:
What provision of the NLRA are you talking about?

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I was referring to Section 8A-5, Section 8B-3,

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A, 5, 8, B, 3, and 8D.

[00:09:02] Speaker 03:
8D isn't dog?

[00:09:04] Speaker ?:
Yes, it is dog.

[00:09:05] Speaker 04:
And those specifically provide that when bargaining is going on for a collective bargaining agreement, that a party has a statutory right not to agree to permissive subjects of bargaining.

[00:09:18] Speaker 04:
In fact, that's so ingrained

[00:09:31] Speaker 01:
you have that right, but you also can negotiate away that right, which is what happened here.

[00:09:36] Speaker 04:
Well, you can't agree that permissive subjects be included in the arbitration provision.

[00:09:42] Speaker 01:
What's your, what is called forceful evidence of intent as far as somehow the terms unresolved issues of disputes with respect to the successor agreement doesn't include all unresolved issues and disputes?

[00:10:00] Speaker 01:
What is your

[00:10:01] Speaker 04:
forceful evidence of intent.

[00:10:12] Speaker 04:
that exist, that Brent Electric could do that, and those permissive subjects that I have been talking about be included in that definition of the arbitration provision if it's through a clear and unmistakable waiver.

[00:10:24] Speaker 04:
So pretty important to say that.

[00:10:26] Speaker 04:
If that is a statutory right, that is a public policy.

[00:10:29] Speaker 01:
And what's not clear and unmistakable when you've agreed to

[00:10:34] Speaker 01:
negotiate all unresolved disputes.

[00:10:39] Speaker 01:
What's not clear about that?

[00:10:40] Speaker 04:
Well, the thing that's not clear about it, Your Honor, is if it says unresolved issues and disputes, and that always sweeps in, permissive subjects are bargaining, then there's no right that's being given, there's a right that's being taken away, that there be a clear and unmistakable waiver.

[00:10:57] Speaker 01:
For that next successor agreement, yes.

[00:10:59] Speaker 01:
Beyond that, no.

[00:11:01] Speaker 01:
Unless you agree, you didn't agree to it correct in the 2021.

[00:11:05] Speaker 01:
collective bargaining agreement.

[00:11:06] Speaker 01:
There was no such provision.

[00:11:08] Speaker 04:
In 2021, they submitted some claims.

[00:11:11] Speaker 04:
They submitted some issues to the CIR, the Council Industrial Relations.

[00:11:16] Speaker 04:
We, from the beginning, objected to the submission of those permissive subjects of bargaining to the CIR.

[00:11:24] Speaker 04:
And we always said that those permissive subjects of bargaining should not have been before the CIR.

[00:11:28] Speaker 01:
But did the 2021 agreement contain the same

[00:11:33] Speaker 01:
clause, this interest arbitration clause, regarding successor agreements.

[00:11:38] Speaker 04:
The 2021 agreement does not continue.

[00:11:40] Speaker 01:
Right, because you have the ability not to agree to that.

[00:11:46] Speaker 04:
So if there is another agreement or successor agreement, that would not go to interest arbitration.

[00:11:52] Speaker 04:
Right, right.

[00:11:53] Speaker 04:
But our position is that that language is

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It is ambiguous.

[00:11:58] Speaker 02:
And then what?

[00:11:59] Speaker 02:
What if it is ambiguous?

[00:12:01] Speaker 04:
If it is ambiguous, we say then you have to go or you have to start with this statutory and public policy exception that applies to permissive subjects of bargaining.

[00:12:13] Speaker 02:
Does it resolve in favor of the union or not?

[00:12:16] Speaker 02:
Is there a principle that says it does?

[00:12:19] Speaker 02:
Ambiguous language in it.

[00:12:22] Speaker 04:
Yes, in the district court, the district court did find that it was not ambiguous, that it was clear and ambiguous.

[00:12:29] Speaker 02:
But if it is ambiguous, is there a principle of law in this setting, obviously this labor setting, that you interpret in favor of the union?

[00:12:39] Speaker 04:
Well, if it's ambiguous, then you have to look to other sources to determine if, in fact,

[00:12:47] Speaker 04:
was meant to be a part of the consent that was provided for the arbitration.

[00:12:54] Speaker 01:
Well, the district court said there was a presumption of arbitrability.

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If it's ambiguous, the presumption applies.

[00:13:01] Speaker 01:
That's the first thing that it says.

[00:13:03] Speaker 04:
We say that that analysis should not apply here because we have a well-defined public policy.

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And that well-defined public policy is that permissive subjects of bargaining cannot be forced upon an employer.

[00:13:15] Speaker 03:
Well, are you saying that

[00:13:18] Speaker 03:
You flat cannot include permissive items to be bargained if you want to.

[00:13:26] Speaker 03:
Yes, you can.

[00:13:29] Speaker 03:
Isn't that the main issue here, whether or not those permissive items are included as a result of the assent letter and the inclusion of the language from the, was it Onesco?

[00:13:48] Speaker 04:
memorandum well it's our it's our position that the the only way the permissive subjects can be included as part of the arbitration is if they agree the parties agree both the union and the company agree the permissive subjects will also be submitted to interest arbitration okay and isn't that the issue is whether there was such agreement given the letter of assent and the NECA

[00:14:18] Speaker 03:
inclusion of those items in the collective bargaining agreement?

[00:14:23] Speaker 04:
We say it's a question of whether or not the particular language in the CEA that was agreed to by NECA is, in fact, broad enough to encompass permissive substance.

[00:14:41] Speaker 04:
And we're saying that it is not because there is this

[00:14:46] Speaker 04:
well-known public policy that says permissive subjects should not be submitted unless they're specifically agreed to at the front end.

[00:14:56] Speaker 04:
If the parties agree that permissive subjects should apply and can go to arbitration, then that's fine.

[00:15:03] Speaker 04:
Then they go to arbitration.

[00:15:05] Speaker 04:
That's our position.

[00:15:06] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:15:07] Speaker 04:
And the circuit courts on this are overwhelming in their support for our position on this.

[00:15:15] Speaker 04:
We cite to those.

[00:15:17] Speaker 02:
Don't a number of those cases deal with continuing arbitration interest provisions?

[00:15:27] Speaker 02:
When you sort those out, the string side shrinks considerably, doesn't it?

[00:15:34] Speaker 04:
It does go down some because there are some of the cases that do apply this analysis to other permissive subjects and say that these other permissive subjects, besides

[00:15:47] Speaker 04:
interest arbitration, the second generation interest arbitration provision.

[00:15:52] Speaker 04:
Those other permissive subjects should not be a part of an arbitration decision.

[00:15:59] Speaker 02:
Any other questions?

[00:16:00] Speaker 02:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:16:05] Speaker 05:
Good morning, Your Honor, and may it please the Court.

[00:16:08] Speaker 05:
My name is Glenda Pittman.

[00:16:09] Speaker 05:
I'm here on behalf of the IBW Local 584.

[00:16:15] Speaker 05:
From local's perspective, this is a very straightforward contract interpretation and compliance case.

[00:16:23] Speaker 05:
Brent Electric made a deal in 2018 by agreeing to the collective bargaining agreement that NECA had negotiated with Local 584 to go to interest arbitration concerning every unresolved bargaining issue in 2021.

[00:16:45] Speaker 05:
After the fact, after the horse had left the barn, Brent Electric got some form of buyer's remorse and said no one didn't really agree to present to the interest arbitrator, the CIR, permissive subjects of bargaining.

[00:17:10] Speaker 05:
There is a body of Supreme Court

[00:17:15] Speaker 05:
involving the steelworker's trilogy from the 1960s, Granite Rock, AT&T, and others that say that when you have a disagreement about what the scope of a bargaining, the scope of an arbitration agreement is, there's a rubric that you follow for how you determine whether or not the particular dispute really is within

[00:17:43] Speaker 05:
the scope of that arbitration clause.

[00:17:47] Speaker 05:
And you start by looking at the plain language of the arbitration provision.

[00:17:55] Speaker 05:
The district court did that.

[00:17:58] Speaker 05:
The district court followed the law that's actually applicable and also followed governing 10th Circuit precedent in the form of the McElroes case.

[00:18:11] Speaker 05:
By the way, McElroy's has been approved of by the NLRB as correctly stating that contractual bargaining obligations and statutory bargaining obligations are separate.

[00:18:25] Speaker 05:
They're separately enforceable.

[00:18:28] Speaker 05:
And contractual obligations are enforceable even if there are no statutory bargaining obligations.

[00:18:37] Speaker 01:
That case wasn't factually similar, though, was it, to this?

[00:18:42] Speaker 05:
You're asking about McElroy's?

[00:18:45] Speaker 05:
Factually somewhat different, except that the interest arbitration language was very similar.

[00:18:53] Speaker 05:
The extension or the Evergreen language provision was very similar.

[00:18:57] Speaker 05:
And the defense that the employer raised was exactly the same.

[00:19:03] Speaker 05:
We don't have a statutory obligation to bargain," said McElroy's.

[00:19:08] Speaker 05:
And the 10th Circuit said, well, no, you don't.

[00:19:14] Speaker 05:
But you have a contractual obligation to bargain to present your bargaining issues to the interest arbitration body in that case and to abide by the award and the collective bargaining agreement that's awarded.

[00:19:30] Speaker 05:
So I think that the factual differences are insignificant.

[00:19:35] Speaker 01:
Was there contractual language like this where they were trying to decide whether terms like unresolved disputes included mandatory and permissive interests?

[00:19:51] Speaker 05:
The macroids did not address the question of specifically whether

[00:19:58] Speaker 05:
the language encompassed permissive subjects of bargaining.

[00:20:02] Speaker 05:
No.

[00:20:03] Speaker 05:
Instead, the statutory bargaining obligation that the macros could address was McElroy's assertion that because it was a Section 8F agreement, they didn't have any statutory obligation to bargain at all, and they could simply walk away and not do interest arbitration.

[00:20:23] Speaker 05:
And the court, your court, said, well,

[00:20:28] Speaker 05:
Maybe that's true, but he signed this contract and it's binding.

[00:20:34] Speaker 05:
And we have the same statutory kind of defense here.

[00:20:39] Speaker 05:
Brent Electric says it had no statutory bargaining obligation to negotiate over permissive subjects.

[00:20:49] Speaker 05:
And that should somehow be read into the

[00:20:53] Speaker 05:
otherwise pretty clear language of section 1.02d.

[00:21:00] Speaker 05:
The answer is no.

[00:21:01] Speaker 05:
It should not be read into it.

[00:21:03] Speaker 05:
Granite Rocks said don't do that.

[00:21:08] Speaker 05:
Brent's waiver argument here has a number of problems, but one of them is that neither side here had a statutory obligation to bargain a successor contract.

[00:21:22] Speaker 05:
They were both Section 8F, well, it was a Section 8F bargaining relationship.

[00:21:28] Speaker 05:
And as discussed in the brief, Section 8F bargaining parties have an obligation to make no unilateral changes in the terms of the existing contract, but the statutory obligation

[00:21:47] Speaker 05:
does not extend to the negotiation of a success agreement.

[00:21:52] Speaker 05:
And the reason for that is really simple.

[00:21:56] Speaker 05:
It is unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act for an employer to recognize as the collective bargaining representative a union that does not have the support of a majority of the employees.

[00:22:09] Speaker 05:
Section 8F makes an exception to that.

[00:22:13] Speaker 05:
but only concerning the terms of that Section 8F contract, not concerning what has to be or what obligations might exist for a successor.

[00:22:25] Speaker 05:
I also want to make the point that the waiver cases that Brent has cited, not a single one of them talks about

[00:22:41] Speaker 05:
applying a clear and unmistakable waiver to determine what the scope of an interest arbitration provision is.

[00:22:50] Speaker 05:
There is no body of law that can give you any guidance in that regard.

[00:22:56] Speaker 05:
The only applicable body of law here in determining the scope of that provision is the body of law that the Supreme Court has established and that the Tenth Circuit has dutifully followed

[00:23:11] Speaker 05:
Pretty much every time you've had a case asking you to decide this issue.

[00:23:17] Speaker 03:
Now what's the significance of the letter of assent?

[00:23:21] Speaker 05:
The letter of assent is a device that is used by employers who want the employer association to be their bargaining representative.

[00:23:35] Speaker 05:
And that was one that we have one in this case.

[00:23:38] Speaker 05:
There was one signed, I believe it was back in the middle 1990s, but I don't think that it's terribly germane in the question of the scope of the interest arbitration language.

[00:23:53] Speaker 03:
It's simply... Isn't it some way involved in whether the MOU became part of the 2018 collective bargaining agreement?

[00:24:09] Speaker 05:
I have to, I believe, redirect any thoughts here.

[00:24:16] Speaker 05:
I don't think that the letter of assent that was signed back in the 1990s has much directly to do with whether or not addendum four was part of the 2018 collective bargaining agreement.

[00:24:30] Speaker 05:
I want to make a point about addendum four here.

[00:24:35] Speaker 05:
The district court found it undisputed.

[00:24:39] Speaker 05:
that addendum four was part of the 2018 collective bargaining agreement.

[00:24:44] Speaker 05:
And the reason it found it undisputed, found it undisputed under federal rule of civil procedure 56E2, is that the union presented evidence that when negotiating the 2018 collective bargaining agreement, NEDA and local 584 considered addendum four as part of it,

[00:25:05] Speaker 05:
and considered NECA and IBW Local 584 to be the only parties to that agreement, to the 2018 agreement.

[00:25:15] Speaker 05:
OSCO was not a party to that agreement.

[00:25:19] Speaker 05:
Brent Electric did not provide rebuttal evidence, and so the district court found in 156E2 that it's undisputed.

[00:25:28] Speaker 05:
If there are...

[00:25:36] Speaker 05:
No other questions?

[00:25:40] Speaker 05:
Does anyone want to address mootness?

[00:25:44] Speaker 05:
Yes, please.

[00:25:49] Speaker 05:
First, I felt it.

[00:25:53] Speaker 05:
I felt compelled to raise mootness because attorneys have a responsibility to the court to raise an issue that might go to their jurisdiction.

[00:26:06] Speaker 05:
And I didn't want to be on the wrong side of that responsibility.

[00:26:12] Speaker 01:
Well, you have an obligation to do it much sooner than you did, based on your knowledge and under our local rules, I mean.

[00:26:19] Speaker 05:
I'm sorry, Your Honor.

[00:26:21] Speaker 01:
You have an obligation to file that motion much sooner.

[00:26:24] Speaker 01:
And you did know that it was expiring, the agreement was expiring.

[00:26:29] Speaker 05:
Yes, and we said that in the briefing as well as in the briefing that

[00:26:35] Speaker 05:
was in compliance.

[00:26:38] Speaker 05:
And it is true that we could have filed something about mootness earlier.

[00:26:44] Speaker 01:
Well, why would it be moot when I think one of the arguments that they point out is that if they were to win, for instance, on the

[00:26:58] Speaker 01:
on the issue of the addendum for, they would be able to seek reimbursement of some amounts paid in for employee benefits.

[00:27:16] Speaker 01:
Is that right?

[00:27:17] Speaker 05:
Well, I believe that what Brent asserted was that it would be able to seek reimbursement for $750 spent on

[00:27:27] Speaker 05:
a surety bond premium since June 1 of 2021.

[00:27:33] Speaker 01:
I want to say there was a $4,000 or $5,000.

[00:27:35] Speaker 05:
And that was in contributions to two benefit funds that are called industry funds.

[00:27:47] Speaker 05:
They assist

[00:27:49] Speaker 05:
the bargaining parties in gaining market share.

[00:27:53] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:27:54] Speaker 01:
And why isn't that enough?

[00:27:56] Speaker 05:
Well, there are a couple of reasons.

[00:27:58] Speaker 01:
First, surety bonds are... I'm talking about the $4,000 or $4,500 payment.

[00:28:04] Speaker 05:
I think it was... Contributions.

[00:28:05] Speaker 01:
They claim over $5,000.

[00:28:06] Speaker 01:
Not for that.

[00:28:07] Speaker 01:
Not for the bond.

[00:28:08] Speaker 05:
I'm talking about... Brent says that they could be entitled to reimbursement from the funds

[00:28:17] Speaker 05:
for those.

[00:28:18] Speaker 05:
Well, funds are not parties to this.

[00:28:19] Speaker 01:
They don't have to be.

[00:28:20] Speaker 01:
They would be entitled to, they don't even have a claim if they don't succeed.

[00:28:27] Speaker 01:
They would then have a claim for reimbursement, right?

[00:28:33] Speaker 01:
If they succeed.

[00:28:34] Speaker 05:
You're asking me if Brent succeeded in getting the district court reversed, it would have a claim

[00:28:42] Speaker 05:
for reimbursement.

[00:28:43] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:28:44] Speaker 01:
That's what they're arguing, isn't it?

[00:28:45] Speaker 05:
I think that Brent's voluntary compliance and voluntary adoption of the agreement pretty much wipes out any claim that they might have.

[00:28:56] Speaker 01:
Well, it's at least a question.

[00:29:02] Speaker 05:
Would you like a further response?

[00:29:03] Speaker 01:
No, I'm... All right.

[00:29:07] Speaker 01:
Your motion basically just said it was moot and you didn't cite any authority.

[00:29:11] Speaker 01:
I disagree.

[00:29:13] Speaker 01:
I mean, other than just one case.

[00:29:17] Speaker 05:
Well, we cited at least two 10th Circuit decisions.

[00:29:25] Speaker 05:
However, we've now raised the mootness issue.

[00:29:27] Speaker 05:
It's in your hands.

[00:29:29] Speaker 05:
I've discharged my responsibility.

[00:29:32] Speaker 05:
And of course, we will abide by whatever your decision is.

[00:29:37] Speaker 05:
Any other questions?

[00:29:40] Speaker 02:
Looks like not.

[00:29:42] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:29:42] Speaker 02:
Thank you both for your arguments.

[00:29:44] Speaker 02:
The case is submitted and counsel are excused.