[00:00:00] Speaker 03:
The next matter before us this morning is 23-1189, Estrada versus Smart.

[00:00:10] Speaker 01:
May I please the court, Nicole Masiello, representing Appellant Brian Estrada.

[00:00:14] Speaker 01:
The District Court here erred for three distinct reasons when it found Mr. Estrada needed to use a prison grievance process to exhaust the courthouse shooting that occurred miles from a jail.

[00:00:25] Speaker 01:
First, the plain text of the Prison Litigation Reform Act indicates that inmates only need to exhaust suits brought with respect to prison conditions.

[00:00:33] Speaker 01:
A courthouse shooting is plainly not a prison condition, so the exhaustion requirement does not apply.

[00:00:39] Speaker 01:
Second, the plain text, the Colorado Department of Corrections administrative grievance policy does not cover incidents that occur outside Department of Corrections facilities.

[00:00:49] Speaker 01:
And third, even if the prison's policy may have covered incidents outside the prison, the policy was so opaque that a reasonable inmate would not have known they needed to exhaust the courthouse shooting, so Mr. Estrada did not need to exhaust.

[00:01:01] Speaker 01:
The district court's contrary findings on any one of those questions constitutes a reversible error.

[00:01:06] Speaker 03:
Let me, let me, we heard it at the end.

[00:01:08] Speaker 03:
Let's start with your last one first on whether it was opaque.

[00:01:14] Speaker 03:
You don't use the term opaque anywhere in your arguments to the district court.

[00:01:21] Speaker 03:
How can we possibly find that you preserved this argument?

[00:01:26] Speaker 01:
So while we do not use the term opaque before the district court, if you look at our arguments on pages 159 to 161 of the appendix, particularly page 160, there are repeated citations to Ross v. Blake.

[00:01:42] Speaker 01:
And we repeatedly argue that there is no available remedy here.

[00:01:45] Speaker 01:
So despite not using that word.

[00:01:47] Speaker 03:
You argue Ross, but you never indicate which of the three circumstances that are discussed in Ross

[00:01:54] Speaker 03:
you're relying on.

[00:01:55] Speaker 03:
You just throw in a citation to Ross.

[00:01:57] Speaker 03:
I mean, I don't think that's preservation.

[00:02:00] Speaker 01:
And the district court didn't apparently see it because it didn't rule on it.

[00:02:05] Speaker 01:
The district court did not see it.

[00:02:06] Speaker 01:
That is correct.

[00:02:08] Speaker 01:
But if you look at those arguments that are made within our broad argument that Mr. Estrada did not need to exhaust here and there was no available remedy to him,

[00:02:16] Speaker 01:
He discusses the meaning of the term available.

[00:02:20] Speaker 01:
He talks about the materials that were provided to him.

[00:02:23] Speaker 01:
And between those and his reliance on Ross, we believe that fundamentally is an opacity question.

[00:02:31] Speaker 03:
So the district court should have rolled up its sleeves and created an argument?

[00:02:37] Speaker 03:
You have a hard sell with me on this.

[00:02:41] Speaker 01:
Your Honor.

[00:02:41] Speaker 01:
Fortunately, this court does not need to reach that question if it finds for us on either of our first two arguments.

[00:02:48] Speaker 01:
And if we look at the threshold question here of whether the PLRA even applies, the court doesn't need to look past the plain text of the PLRA to see that.

[00:02:59] Speaker 03:
Well, that's another preservation issue.

[00:03:02] Speaker 03:
You argued the policy.

[00:03:04] Speaker 03:
You didn't argue the statute.

[00:03:06] Speaker 01:
So this court can review the applicability of the PLRA because the district court explicitly passed on that question.

[00:03:15] Speaker 01:
If you look at page 199 of the appendix, the district court says, on this record, the court finds that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies the plaintiff's lawsuit.

[00:03:24] Speaker 01:
And per this court's doctrine in cases such as Sassoon v. Empire Marketing Strategies, when the district court explicitly considers and resolves an issue of law on the merits, an appellant can raise that issue on appeal, and there's no forfeiture waiver.

[00:03:39] Speaker 01:
So that issue is available for this court on de novo review.

[00:03:45] Speaker 01:
And so if we look at the district court's finding there that the exhaustion requirement applies, the district court aired because it did not look at the plain text of the PLRA.

[00:03:56] Speaker 01:
So the statute says, suits brought with respect to prison conditions.

[00:03:59] Speaker 01:
There are at least five reasons why a courthouse shooting was not a prison condition.

[00:04:05] Speaker 01:
First, it occurred at a courthouse.

[00:04:07] Speaker 01:
Second,

[00:04:08] Speaker 01:
My client was miles away from a prison when he was shot.

[00:04:12] Speaker 01:
Third, he was at the courthouse on the business of another branch of government and nothing about his status as an inmate required him to be there.

[00:04:21] Speaker 01:
And on that note, fourth, he would have been there even if he wasn't in prison.

[00:04:25] Speaker 01:
And fifth, his injury could have easily been caused by a non-prison employee.

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
So we believe each of those factors shows that this was not a prison condition.

[00:04:35] Speaker 01:
A courthouse shooting just doesn't meet the definition in the plain text, and that's really all the court needs to look to here.

[00:04:43] Speaker 03:
Can we look at 3626G2 of the PLRA that talks about the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison?

[00:04:55] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:04:56] Speaker 01:
So, Your Honor, there are three reasons why that provision doesn't apply here.

[00:05:02] Speaker 01:
And first, 3626G itself says that it does not apply.

[00:05:05] Speaker 01:
Section G begins as used in this section indicating that Congress only intended those definitions to apply.

[00:05:13] Speaker 01:
in that section.

[00:05:14] Speaker 01:
So Congress defined the term there because it wanted to make clear that the term did not carry its ordinary meaning in that specific section.

[00:05:22] Speaker 01:
And then second, Section 1997E does have a definition section, that's subsection H, and Congress chose not to define prison conditions there.

[00:05:31] Speaker 01:
which indicates that Congress intended the words to carry their plain, ordinary meaning in 1997E.

[00:05:37] Speaker 01:
And then third, if we look at Porter v. Nessel, the Supreme Court itself chose not to rely on 3626G.

[00:05:45] Speaker 01:
in Porter, which was a 1997 E case, instead deciding to interpret the term prison conditions in the context of 1997 E. And that's in footnote three of Porter.

[00:05:55] Speaker 03:
Yeah, I don't know that I read that footnote as expressing skepticism about the use.

[00:06:01] Speaker 03:
I think that's how you describe it in your brief.

[00:06:04] Speaker 03:
I mean, it didn't really say yay or nay about it.

[00:06:08] Speaker 01:
So it may not have explicitly said, do not use this, definitely use this definition, but the court there decided not to use that definition.

[00:06:17] Speaker 01:
And that shows that is a valid decision that can be made, that these are two separate statutes.

[00:06:23] Speaker 01:
And again, 3626G and 1997E, both of them have a textual basis that shows why that definition does not apply in 1997E cases.

[00:06:36] Speaker 03:
In turning to the PLRA, you would agree allows prisons to adopt policies for exhaustion.

[00:06:45] Speaker 01:
That is correct.

[00:06:46] Speaker 03:
And here we have a policy that includes things that don't happen in prison, like people on supervised release.

[00:06:55] Speaker 03:
Would you agree with that?

[00:06:56] Speaker 03:
That is correct.

[00:06:58] Speaker 03:
So it isn't really fair to say that it's limited to things that happen within the walls of the prison, is it?

[00:07:06] Speaker 01:
So Your Honor, I think that gets more to a different provision of the PLRA.

[00:07:10] Speaker 01:
We believe the department's policy speaks to whether there's an available remedy, not the definition of prison conditions.

[00:07:18] Speaker 01:
And on that issue, there is that provision that says people on supervised release in halfway houses are covered by the policy.

[00:07:28] Speaker 01:
That first covers who can bring a claim and who is

[00:07:34] Speaker 01:
who is obligated to use the policy, not necessarily what their claim relates to.

[00:07:39] Speaker 01:
And second, it carves out an exception to the policy to say, here's one instance where the policy is not going to apply in its ordinary natural scope.

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
Again, it's a prison policy.

[00:07:51] Speaker 01:
So if the prison policy always applied outside of prison, the Department of Corrections would not needed to have clarified that it applied to people on supervised release on parole.

[00:08:04] Speaker 01:
Inclusion there shows that that is one narrow exception that the department was carving.

[00:08:11] Speaker 01:
And again, while we're speaking about the department's policy, there are, again, three reasons why the policy does not apply outside of prison.

[00:08:20] Speaker 01:
And first, outside of that parolee halfway house provision, there is absolutely no indication in the text that it applies outside of a prison.

[00:08:30] Speaker 03:
Second, it is a- Well, there's no indication it does.

[00:08:32] Speaker 03:
I mean, it says not limited to.

[00:08:35] Speaker 01:
It does say not limited to, but as mentioned in our brief, we believe that phrase not including but not limited to is modifying policies, conditions, and incidents within the facility to cover situations like what arose in Porter where an inmate claimed that one instance of violence against them was not a prison condition.

[00:08:56] Speaker 01:
So we

[00:09:00] Speaker 01:
That also goes to the point, there is no evidence that any prisoner has ever used this policy to grieve an incident outside a prison.

[00:09:08] Speaker 01:
The other side just has shown nothing to show that the policy is ever used in this way.

[00:09:14] Speaker 01:
And again, it's a prison policy.

[00:09:17] Speaker 01:
And no one would expect a prison policy to apply outside a prison.

[00:09:23] Speaker 00:
Does the PLRA apply?

[00:09:28] Speaker 00:
to the Department of Corrections after the van has left the prison and is en route to the courthouse?

[00:09:37] Speaker 01:
So Your Honor, again, we would say that a prison condition within the meaning of the PLRA is an injury incurred as part of everyday prison life.

[00:09:47] Speaker 01:
So things that are within the prison's control would not have happened if the plaintiff were not in prison.

[00:09:53] Speaker 01:
So if we are speaking about the van specifically taking him to the courthouse for that hearing, then because he would have

[00:10:04] Speaker 01:
That is a much closer question than what happened here, because he does have to go to the courthouse on the business of another branch of government, and he would have to go to the courthouse either way, but if he was not in prison, he would not be in that specific van.

[00:10:19] Speaker 00:
So that... Well, take it at the end of the route, then they take the prisoner and they put him in the holding cell in the courthouse.

[00:10:28] Speaker 00:
And the Department of Corrections officer

[00:10:32] Speaker 00:
is there with him.

[00:10:33] Speaker 00:
If something goes wrong, he's under the control of the Department of Corrections officer.

[00:10:41] Speaker 00:
Does the PLRA apply to that?

[00:10:43] Speaker 01:
We would submit that that would not be a prison condition.

[00:10:47] Speaker 01:
And this court would not be the first one.

[00:10:49] Speaker 00:
So you're saying it's no longer a close question after the prisoner exits the van into the holding cell.

[00:10:58] Speaker 01:
That's the line of demarcation?

[00:11:02] Speaker 01:
All of it is a tricky question that, fortunately, the court does not need to resolve in this case since the facts are more clear.

[00:11:09] Speaker 00:
Well, no, but we need to always... People cite our decisions.

[00:11:14] Speaker 00:
We need to worry about what we say and what we do.

[00:11:19] Speaker 00:
What about in the courtroom?

[00:11:23] Speaker 00:
Generally, I mean, we don't have an evidentiary record on this.

[00:11:27] Speaker 00:
Generally, the corrections officer is nearby.

[00:11:31] Speaker 00:
and to control the movements of the prisoner.

[00:11:37] Speaker 00:
So wouldn't that be part of prison?

[00:11:42] Speaker 01:
Again, for those five reasons I mentioned earlier, we do not believe that it's part of prison.

[00:11:48] Speaker 01:
Another officer who was there easily could have shot him.

[00:11:51] Speaker 01:
Another officer who was there is the officer who pushed him over and caused him to lose a shoe.

[00:12:00] Speaker 01:
We don't believe that the officers being there is enough to make it a prison condition.

[00:12:07] Speaker 01:
And with the court's permission, I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal.

[00:12:12] Speaker 04:
Actually, counsel, but if we were to interpret this as strictly as you're suggesting, and I know you said we don't have to answer these questions, but I think Judge Murphy's correctly pointing out here that these are the natural questions that spring from this scenario.

[00:12:24] Speaker 04:
If we were to interpret this so strictly, doesn't that sort of countermand the entire purpose of exhaustion, which is, and purpose is, really is to allow prisoners to have a legitimate grievance procedure where they can say, this is wrong, this has been happening to me, to give the warden of these facilities an opportunity to take corrective action.

[00:12:42] Speaker 04:
If we interpret this so strictly, then it opens so many gaps that it eviscerates the purpose of the statute.

[00:12:50] Speaker 04:
Am I wrong about that?

[00:12:51] Speaker 01:
Well, we disagree that this would eviscerate the purpose of the statute for two reasons.

[00:12:55] Speaker 01:
First, there just are not going to be that many cases that arise in this context.

[00:13:02] Speaker 01:
There are not going to be that many courthouse shootings.

[00:13:04] Speaker 01:
There are not going to be that many inmates that get injured.

[00:13:05] Speaker 04:
But there will be a lot of scenarios where prisoners will claim something happened to them and their rights were violated, maybe outside of the four corners of the prison itself.

[00:13:15] Speaker 01:
And again, we are not suggesting the court draws a strict geographic line here.

[00:13:19] Speaker 01:
We think the court needs to look at

[00:13:21] Speaker 01:
all of the considerations that occur.

[00:13:24] Speaker 01:
And so here, geography definitely factors in as to why this is clearly not a prison condition.

[00:13:29] Speaker 01:
But if you look at the PLRA and the policy under guarding it, the complaints allow the prison to take corrective action that would

[00:13:40] Speaker 01:
specifically satisfy the inmate.

[00:13:42] Speaker 01:
Here there's nothing that could have been done that would have satisfied their suit.

[00:13:45] Speaker 01:
There's nothing that could have been done to build a better administrative record before it came before this board.

[00:13:51] Speaker 01:
Because it's not like there was a prison policy in place that dictated the behavior at issue here.

[00:14:01] Speaker 01:
It doesn't fall naturally within the PLRA is meant to allow prisons to administer themselves.

[00:14:08] Speaker 01:
And prisons are a place where the prison and the Department of Corrections controls every aspect of an inmate's life.

[00:14:16] Speaker 01:
So the inmates need an opportunity and a way to resolve issues they have with the prison, with prison officers.

[00:14:24] Speaker 01:
And the grievance policy provides them that outlet.

[00:14:28] Speaker 01:
This is a situation that steps a little outside of those bounds.

[00:14:32] Speaker 03:
And again, Your Honor, if this- Under Ross, didn't the Supreme Court say if it's unclear and there's two reasonable interpretations, err on the side of exhaustion?

[00:14:46] Speaker 01:
The court did say that in Ross.

[00:14:49] Speaker 01:
But here, the court also set forth the opacity for this.

[00:14:55] Speaker 01:
Tessin said if... I don't think you have an opacity argument.

[00:15:00] Speaker 01:
I know you don't, Your Honor.

[00:15:01] Speaker 01:
But respectfully, again, if the court has doubts about the PLRA argument or about the opacity argument, this prison shooting still has to be within the confines of the policy.

[00:15:15] Speaker 01:
And we believe that a courthouse shooting is fundamentally not a prison condition and that Mr. Estrada did not need to exhaust for this.

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
May it please the court, Abigail Smith, on behalf of Appellee Jacob Smart.

[00:15:36] Speaker 00:
Ms.

[00:15:37] Speaker 00:
Smith, let me ask you this so I don't have to interrupt you, because it's a record question.

[00:15:42] Speaker 00:
The record, I understand, is very limited.

[00:15:45] Speaker 00:
Is there anything in the record that indicates whether this court officer, whether it be a bailiff or whatever, whether or not that officer was armed?

[00:15:55] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry, which officer?

[00:15:56] Speaker 00:
The court officer.

[00:16:02] Speaker 00:
The record doesn't indicate armed, but one way or the other, that's fine.

[00:16:06] Speaker 02:
The record does not indicate.

[00:16:08] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:16:11] Speaker 02:
We respectfully request that this court affirm the district court because on the day of his attempted escape, Mr. Estrada was an inmate, he was an inmate on the day he filed his complaint, and he undisputedly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

[00:16:29] Speaker 02:
Here, he seeks an unprecedented exception to the PLRA, that it does not apply to incidents outside of CDOC facilities.

[00:16:40] Speaker 02:
We disagree with that interpretation because he was subject to the PLRA because of his status as an inmate legally in the custody of CDOC, not because of his geographic location.

[00:16:54] Speaker 02:
So he traveled to the courthouse under conditions imposed by CDOC

[00:16:59] Speaker 02:
He was there under conditions imposed by CDOC.

[00:17:03] Speaker 02:
And we think that's the distinguishing factor in this case.

[00:17:07] Speaker 02:
And to the extent that there's any lack of clarity, I think Ross really helps us here because the court took a look at the purposes of the PLRA.

[00:17:19] Speaker 02:
And it said, if an exception undermines any of these purposes, then it cannot stand.

[00:17:25] Speaker 02:
It cannot possibly be an excuse that Congress intended.

[00:17:31] Speaker 02:
And I think the relevant question in this case is, does CDOC have less of an interest in alleged employee misconduct just because it occurred somewhere other than a CDOC facility?

[00:17:45] Speaker 03:
Do you rely on something in the statutory language of the PLRA to come to that conclusion?

[00:17:52] Speaker 02:
So I think we rely on everything that the Ross Court relied on, which was their previous precedent, the statutory language of the PLRA, which is quite broad and does not indicate that Congress intended to create any categories, and then their view of the purposes of the PLRA.

[00:18:19] Speaker 02:
Did you have another question?

[00:18:21] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:18:21] Speaker ?:
OK.

[00:18:22] Speaker 02:
And I think it's also important to note that the Supreme Court has repeatedly said there shouldn't be exceptions to the PLRA that allow an inmate to decide whether his claim is grievable under the PLRA or it's not.

[00:18:39] Speaker 02:
Turning to their second argument that it is unclear whether CDOC's policy applied to this incident,

[00:18:46] Speaker 02:
I turn again to Ross and their determination, the Supreme Court's determination there, that if the policy is open to multiple reasonable interpretations, then Congress has decided that the inmate must exhaust.

[00:19:02] Speaker 03:
And I think the response would be, this isn't a reasonable interpretation.

[00:19:08] Speaker 02:
And we disagree with that.

[00:19:10] Speaker 02:
I think there are three good reasons to believe that this policy applies outside facilities.

[00:19:16] Speaker 02:
The language, including but not limited to, indicates that it has a broad scope.

[00:19:22] Speaker 02:
I think the second reason is that there are nine things that the policy says it does not cover.

[00:19:29] Speaker 02:
And none of those things are incidents outside a facility.

[00:19:33] Speaker 02:
And finally, the application to parolees and inmates in halfway houses indicates that the policy is intended to have a broad scope.

[00:19:43] Speaker 00:
But those are all

[00:19:44] Speaker 00:
facilities of CDOC.

[00:19:48] Speaker 00:
They're not the facilities of a different branch of government.

[00:19:52] Speaker 02:
That's true, but it does also apply to private facilities, which are by definition not CDOC facilities.

[00:19:57] Speaker 00:
But they're in contract with CDOC.

[00:19:59] Speaker 00:
Certainly.

[00:20:00] Speaker 00:
An article of court is not in a contract.

[00:20:05] Speaker 00:
Well, maybe it is on transportation.

[00:20:07] Speaker 00:
The Department of Corrections does transportation.

[00:20:11] Speaker 00:
Are there contracts?

[00:20:12] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:20:14] Speaker 00:
Are they in the record?

[00:20:17] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:20:20] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:20:21] Speaker 00:
So what you're telling me is that the transportation function of CDOC is pursuant to a written contract.

[00:20:32] Speaker 00:
Well, it may be.

[00:20:34] Speaker 00:
It may be.

[00:20:34] Speaker 00:
It is not always.

[00:20:35] Speaker 02:
So we have to eliminate that.

[00:20:38] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:20:41] Speaker 03:
So if the bailiff that is employed by the court had actually shot the Mr. Estrada here, would you agree that isn't required?

[00:20:53] Speaker 03:
They didn't have to comply with the PLRA?

[00:20:58] Speaker 03:
Or would you say even in that instance they would because his status is as an inmate?

[00:21:03] Speaker 02:
So it depends on his claims, Your Honor.

[00:21:06] Speaker 02:
In that case, we would argue that no CDOC employee is an appropriate defendant and therefore the CDOC policy would not apply.

[00:21:17] Speaker 03:
OK, but before you said it was the test was status as an inmate.

[00:21:22] Speaker 03:
So it's status as an inmate and a CDOC defendant?

[00:21:27] Speaker 02:
Right, because we're talking about the CDOC policy.

[00:21:30] Speaker 02:
So he must grieve according to CDOC's policy.

[00:21:34] Speaker 03:
Are we also talking about the statute?

[00:21:36] Speaker 03:
Was that preserved?

[00:21:38] Speaker 02:
So I would argue that it was not, Your Honor.

[00:21:42] Speaker 02:
None of these arguments about whether the PLRA applies outside of CDOC facilities were raised before the district court.

[00:21:52] Speaker 04:
Counsel, if it's status in a CDOC defendant that would trigger exhaustion, what if Estrada had escaped?

[00:22:00] Speaker 04:
And let's say two days later, Mr. Smart encounters him at the grocery store knowing he's an escaped prisoner.

[00:22:08] Speaker 04:
The confrontation ensues and he shoots him there at the grocery store.

[00:22:12] Speaker 04:
Would Mr. Estrada have to exhaust then?

[00:22:15] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor, because that, again, goes back to the understanding that the Ross court had of the PLRA, which is that, does CDOC have an interest in policing its employees' conduct?

[00:22:30] Speaker 02:
Does it matter that that employee conduct occurred in a prison facility or somewhere that is not a prison facility?

[00:22:41] Speaker 00:
So your bright line,

[00:22:45] Speaker 00:
They're not buildings or vehicles, but it's personnel.

[00:22:51] Speaker 00:
That's your bright line.

[00:22:52] Speaker 00:
If you involve anybody with the Department of Corrections, PLRA exhaustion applies.

[00:22:59] Speaker 02:
So we're reading the two things together.

[00:23:02] Speaker 02:
So we're saying that the PLRA itself applies because you are an inmate.

[00:23:08] Speaker 02:
And we were saying you have to exhaust according to CDOC policy, and CDOC policy applies to actions by employees.

[00:23:24] Speaker 02:
And I also wanted to respond to this argument that the policy was opaque and just state that that is an argument about whether the grievance procedure is accessible

[00:23:36] Speaker 02:
to the inmate, and here we have evidence that Mr. Estrada had successfully navigated that policy on at least three occasions the same year as his attempted escape.

[00:23:48] Speaker 02:
And so the evidence suggests that the policy was not opaque to him.

[00:23:55] Speaker 02:
And then I wanted to address, the reply brief raises two procedural arguments, alleges that the district court committed two procedural errors.

[00:24:06] Speaker 02:
The first, that exhaustion is an issue for the jury, which is something that five other circuits have considered and dismissed because it undermines the PLRI's purpose of lessening the number of inmate lawsuits and protecting the federal court's docket from having to

[00:24:25] Speaker 02:
go through the process of these inmate lawsuits.

[00:24:29] Speaker 02:
And the second is that he... Well, let me stop you there.

[00:24:31] Speaker 03:
Here, the district court said that there are no triable issues of fact, so it doesn't matter who the fact finder is, does it?

[00:24:40] Speaker 02:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:24:42] Speaker 02:
It's the same reason that we argue there's no

[00:24:45] Speaker 02:
basis for an evidentiary hearing.

[00:24:47] Speaker 02:
There is a suggestion in the briefs that Mr. Estrada was not given a full copy of the grievance policy, but the introductory materials on the record state clearly that that policy is available to all inmates in the library.

[00:25:00] Speaker 02:
CDOC does not actually provide copies to the inmates.

[00:25:11] Speaker 02:
If there are no further questions,

[00:25:14] Speaker 03:
Doesn't appear that there are.

[00:25:15] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:25:16] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:25:16] Speaker 03:
And I think she's out of time.

[00:25:22] Speaker 03:
We will take this matter under advisement.

[00:25:24] Speaker 03:
Thank you for your argument today.