[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
23-2049, United States versus Reza.

[00:00:05] Speaker 02:
Council propellant, if you'd make your appearance and proceed, please.

[00:00:08] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:00:10] Speaker 02:
We're on bench on behalf of Mr. H.O.

[00:00:13] Speaker 00:
Reza.

[00:00:24] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:00:26] Speaker 00:
Ladies and justices, United States,

[00:00:30] Speaker 00:
The district court found that the totality of circumstances in this case supported probable cause.

[00:00:34] Speaker 00:
That determination rests on factors that shouldn't be given the weight that the court gave them.

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We're asking this court to review de novo the determination of that probable cause.

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The government's brief focuses

[00:00:45] Speaker 00:
extensively on the dangerousness and then less so on the collective knowledge that was imputed to Officer Rodriguez.

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But the district court and the government can't explain how Rodriguez's actions on the supposedly reliable source of information were disregarded, is the word I would use by Officer Rodriguez.

[00:01:07] Speaker 00:
Alabama v. White is the case that we've talked about that anonymous tip is reliable under certain circumstances.

[00:01:14] Speaker 02:
That leads into my question.

[00:01:17] Speaker 02:
Was this an anonymous tip?

[00:01:19] Speaker 02:
I mean, the district court found that it was not.

[00:01:21] Speaker 02:
The officers testified that they knew the person, and in your brief you referred to it as an anonymous tip, and you do now.

[00:01:27] Speaker 02:
It's not, is it?

[00:01:29] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, the government and the trial counsel here never, the trial counsel asked for the identity and was never provided it.

[00:01:40] Speaker 00:
It was referred to, and Officer Sneedon and Detective Hedetta referred that they knew this individual, but

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It didn't come out that who this individual was or the information supporting this individual.

[00:01:54] Speaker 02:
Well, is that really how the case law has dealt with the question of whether something's anonymous?

[00:01:58] Speaker 02:
You don't have to know as defense counsel who it is for it to be still known to the people receiving the information, right?

[00:02:06] Speaker 00:
In your honor, what I would do is I would suggest that the type of information that is more important was an Alabama versus White where they provided information that the defendant would be leaving an apartment at a specific time, in a specific vehicle, and going to a specific hotel with the cocaine.

[00:02:24] Speaker 00:
Those were outwardly verifiable items.

[00:02:27] Speaker 02:
Well, let me pause for just one quick second to put a bow on this point.

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The district court specifically found that it was not an anonymous tip.

[00:02:36] Speaker 02:
You're not suggesting that that was clear error, are you?

[00:02:39] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I think that the district court found that Officer Sneedon said that he knew who this person was.

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That person was not identified.

[00:02:53] Speaker 00:
To the extent that that's different than an anonymous tip, I think that I disagree that the lack of identification doesn't make him anonymous.

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Am I making sense here?

[00:03:05] Speaker 03:
So you equate unidentified to the defendant with anonymous.

[00:03:09] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:03:10] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:03:11] Speaker 03:
I appreciate that.

[00:03:13] Speaker 03:
But you haven't made a separate argument that the finding of the district court was clearly erroneous.

[00:03:18] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:03:20] Speaker 00:
I would agree with that.

[00:03:22] Speaker 00:
Yes, if that answers the court's question.

[00:03:24] Speaker 02:
It does.

[00:03:25] Speaker 00:
I think more important than the anonymous or the source of information or the court identifying the individual was the type of tips that were provided.

[00:03:34] Speaker 00:
Because going back to Illinois v. Gates, the veracity, reliability, and basis of the knowledge are highly relevant as to whether that tip can support probable cause or reasonable suspicion here.

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Unlike Alabama v. White, the only predictive factor was that this white SUV with chrome rims was going to be driving on Lee Street.

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That in Roswell is essentially the town of Roswell.

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It's not Los Angeles where we're saying they were driving on a particular block and as the

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District Court noted they were actually found a half mile from Lee Street on Texas, and then the stop goes down fifth.

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The reliability, Officer Sneeden knew the identity of the tipster, going to the court's direct question, and considered that tipster's information significant.

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But he didn't take that to a magistrate and ask for a warrant.

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And we've briefed that and argued that because the fact that neither he nor Detective Herrera

[00:04:32] Speaker 00:
that who had argued that that had resulted in success or testified that that had resulted in a successful arrest.

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They didn't confirm it.

[00:04:39] Speaker 02:
And why would they have to?

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I mean, the Supreme Court has an exception to the warrant requirement, which is the automobile exception.

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And the exception is there whether you like it or not, whether I like it or not.

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So why would they have to do that?

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Because, Your Honor, I think that they are saying that we have this information, we believe this information, we found this information credible.

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But yet they didn't do what, if that information truly was believable or credible, would have been to take it to a magistrate and obtain a warrant.

[00:05:07] Speaker 03:
Well, that's one thing they could have done, but as the Chief Judge has just indicated, you don't have to do it under the law.

[00:05:18] Speaker 00:
I agree that they don't have to do it under the law, Your Honor.

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The fact is, though, that I think it leads to the calculus of whether or not that's a reasonable action on behalf of that officer.

[00:05:29] Speaker 03:
But that's not what we're asked to do.

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whether the facts that were known to them were enough to support a stop under these circumstances.

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And it isn't the subjective belief of a particular officer, it's a reasonable officer looking at all that

[00:05:50] Speaker 03:
totality of the circumstances.

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And I would go back to the fact that Officer Rodriguez, being the reasonable officer, looking at those factors, had decided it was going to release Mr. Reza once he got the insurance and he ticketed him for the insurance and the registration.

[00:06:10] Speaker 00:
The support or the idea that a reasonable officer had information and believed he was going to proceed with that and effectuate an arrest or a search, I don't think is borne out by Officer Rodriguez's actions at the scene of the time of the events that say, no, I was going to ticket this individual and I was going to let him go.

[00:06:32] Speaker 02:
Part of your discussion with Judge McHugh focused on the question of subjective intent, and that flows through your brief.

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And why is it relevant at all what Officer Rodriguez thought, what he wanted to do, what he thought he was doing?

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Why is that relevant under the Fourth Amendment?

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The question is, I think,

[00:06:53] Speaker 02:
this before us today is was there an objective basis to believe that there was probable cause that there there was criminal contraband in that car isn't that the question the only question it is your honor i would submit that the information does not support that the only unlike alabama the only verifiable information here is that there was a white suv

[00:07:15] Speaker 00:
with rims, the rest of it that the SUV had fentanyl was not observable or wasn't the type of information that would be known or acted on.

[00:07:22] Speaker 00:
The tip was that he was going to be in the area that had been the day prior.

[00:07:27] Speaker 00:
That wasn't for this day.

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This is an individual who lives in Carlsbad.

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And just the fact that he's out and about would suggest that that tip is information.

[00:07:37] Speaker 00:
But that wasn't verifiable that two sources had relayed that fentanyl was possessed in three months prior.

[00:07:43] Speaker 00:
That's just...

[00:07:44] Speaker 00:
vague information as opposed to the type of information that Illinois v. Gates or Alabama had where this individual is leaving in this car at this time in this place that are verifiable outwardly demonstrable type of information that can be corroborated.

[00:08:02] Speaker 02:
Let me ask you and remind me, I mean in those cases my recollection is that

[00:08:06] Speaker 02:
Well, I don't know.

[00:08:07] Speaker 02:
Remind me, did the officers in those cases that you just alluded to, did they know the person that they were going to stop?

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that they were going to stop.

[00:08:18] Speaker 00:
I believe they knew the individual they knew they were going to stop, but not the anonymous.

[00:08:22] Speaker 00:
They were anonymous.

[00:08:23] Speaker 02:
Okay, well in this instance, just what do we do with the fact, this is a small town in New Mexico, what do we do with the fact that the officers knew him, knew his record, knew he was engaged in narcotics, knew he was engaged in that kind of narcotics, and had reason to believe that he was doing exactly what they

[00:08:44] Speaker 02:
what the source of information said that he was doing.

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In terms of, doesn't corroboration play a role in this, and isn't that a form of corroboration?

[00:08:54] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I think the Court hopefully has made my point, which is that because it's a small town, because this is information that Officer Schneen knew, because he knew Reza, if he had put any objective reasonable belief in those facts as he articulates and testifies them, then that would have been information that he would have taken to a magistrate.

[00:09:12] Speaker 02:
And you're taking us right back to where we were before.

[00:09:15] Speaker 02:
Whether it would have been best practices or optimal to go to a match straight has nothing to do with whether we're here to determine what was legal or illegal, not what was the best practice for the officer.

[00:09:28] Speaker 02:
And if it was not illegal for those officers to act on that information they had, including their history of information about the defendant, about what he did,

[00:09:40] Speaker 02:
about his narcotics activity as they understood it.

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If it was not illegal for them to act,

[00:09:49] Speaker 02:
Then you don't win, right?

[00:09:51] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:09:51] Speaker 00:
I agree with the court there.

[00:09:52] Speaker 00:
But the issue here is that we're taking these, what I would term very minor factors, that USB León is a case that I signed my reply brief where the court went through the factors of the drug hub, the driving plants, inconsistent statement, the messy car, the nervousness.

[00:10:09] Speaker 00:
And those are the factors that we see here.

[00:10:14] Speaker 00:
much more nebulous factors that, and in Leon the court said that the factors must eliminate innocent travel and reliance on the mantra of totality can't make those factors here, just the SOI, the credibility, the articulation of the two months prior, can't make those into probable cause.

[00:10:34] Speaker 03:
Well, it's not two months prior, it's a day prior.

[00:10:40] Speaker 03:
The source that was known to police officers

[00:10:44] Speaker 03:
saw the defendant with fentanyl in this car the prior day.

[00:10:52] Speaker 00:
Correct.

[00:10:53] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:10:53] Speaker 00:
The too much prior was that he had been seen.

[00:10:56] Speaker 00:
Two sources were laid in the past three months that he had been held.

[00:10:58] Speaker 03:
They had gotten tips on their tip line, and another informant had called and told them.

[00:11:05] Speaker 03:
So they had corroboration to what the identified informant told them on this occasion.

[00:11:15] Speaker 00:
That's what they testified to, Your Honor, yes.

[00:11:18] Speaker 03:
Well, you're not challenging that testimony, are you?

[00:11:22] Speaker 00:
I'm challenging the weight that should be given to those factors.

[00:11:26] Speaker 00:
And those are similar to driving towards a high crime area.

[00:11:31] Speaker 00:
Innocent Travel, there's a rummler device that's designed and was activated twice by Officer Rodriguez.

[00:11:37] Speaker 00:
They testify it's designed to gain the attention of inattentive drivers, not illegal conduct.

[00:11:42] Speaker 00:
It's not a spike strip or something that you throw down that's created for criminal conduct.

[00:11:46] Speaker 00:
It's inattentive drivers.

[00:11:47] Speaker 02:
Well, to go to the Rumbler device, I think that was raised in connection with their trying to get him to stop.

[00:11:54] Speaker 02:
And what do we do?

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And the government, I think, alluded to this in his brief as a factor supporting probable cause.

[00:12:02] Speaker 02:
What do we do with the fact that he didn't stop?

[00:12:04] Speaker 02:
when he was initially followed by, when law enforcement was initially following him and had to use the Rumbler device twice before he stopped.

[00:12:16] Speaker 02:
Like, I don't know what it was, 25, well, there was a period of time where he did not stop.

[00:12:21] Speaker 02:
What do we do with that in terms of whether that supports probable cause?

[00:12:24] Speaker 02:
I mean, as the government asserts that it does.

[00:12:27] Speaker 00:
Your honor, I think we looked at Leon and that's just one of those factors where an individual who's pulling over chose not to pull over and took what was described as dirt spots on the side of the road, but pulled into an apartment complex.

[00:12:38] Speaker 00:
And your honor, respectfully, I would ask if that's answered the court's question to reserve the last two and a half minutes.

[00:12:45] Speaker 00:
Please.

[00:12:46] Speaker 00:
Thank you, your honor.

[00:12:51] Speaker 01:
And may I please proceed?

[00:12:53] Speaker 01:
You may.

[00:12:54] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:12:55] Speaker 01:
I would first like to remind the court of the standard of review here.

[00:13:01] Speaker 01:
And Judge McHugh, you hit the nail on the head.

[00:13:05] Speaker 01:
He is not challenging the facts, just the weight to be given to each one of those.

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The credibility of witnesses, weight to be given the evidence, and reasonable inference drawn from that evidence.

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are determinations that fall within the province of the district court.

[00:13:19] Speaker 01:
And they made these determinations.

[00:13:21] Speaker 01:
And in fact, one of the determinations they specifically made was that the SOI, the source of information here, was, and this is the court's words on page 11 of that order, adequately reliable and credible.

[00:13:33] Speaker 01:
That's something that they specifically found.

[00:13:36] Speaker 01:
And the government's contention here, respectfully, Your Honors, is that the district court got it exactly right.

[00:13:43] Speaker 01:
Shortly after Carlsbad, New Mexico Police Department Officer Israel Rodriguez pulled the defendant over in that white Nissan SUV with large chrome rims, he had probable cause to search the defendant's car for contraband, specific contraband, that being the guns and that being the fentanyl pills that were the subject of the informant's tip the day prior.

[00:14:05] Speaker 01:
And he was authorized to conduct this search under the automobile exception to the probable cause search warrant requirement.

[00:14:14] Speaker 01:
Doesn't matter, and I think Your Honor hit the nail on the head.

[00:14:17] Speaker 01:
Again, a lot of things don't matter.

[00:14:20] Speaker 01:
This officer's subjective intent, Officer Rodriguez's subjective intent, perhaps to release the defendant after the stop if he could have provided insurance.

[00:14:30] Speaker 01:
The fact that it might have been a pretextual stop, the length of the stop.

[00:14:34] Speaker 01:
Why didn't he ultimately, why didn't anybody get a warrant?

[00:14:38] Speaker 01:
None of that stuff matters because we are looking at the objective facts and whether the objective facts justify execution of the automobile exception.

[00:14:48] Speaker 01:
And here, what I'm contending, the outer bounds when probable cause can be found is one minute into that lawful traffic stop.

[00:14:56] Speaker 01:
So we have what is a lawful traffic stop by virtue of those expired tags.

[00:15:01] Speaker 01:
the defendant is pulled over.

[00:15:02] Speaker 01:
And I didn't choose one minute arbitrarily.

[00:15:04] Speaker 01:
One minute is when the officer receives that driver's license, figures out that Eddie Joe Reza, the defendant, is far from home, is nowhere near his home, and presumably has no good reason to be in this high crime area.

[00:15:17] Speaker 01:
And when the officer sees a corroboration of the informant's tip, that Eddie Joe Reza is, in fact, alone.

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
So that's really when probable cause materializes.

[00:15:28] Speaker 01:
OK.

[00:15:29] Speaker 02:
Help me with this then.

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
And that's helpful because so you're not saying that at the time they stopped him, they had probable cause.

[00:15:40] Speaker 01:
I'm not saying that they didn't.

[00:15:42] Speaker 02:
I think they should.

[00:15:43] Speaker 02:
Don't give me the double negatives.

[00:15:45] Speaker 02:
Let's rephrase that then.

[00:15:46] Speaker 02:
When did they have probable cause in your view?

[00:15:52] Speaker 02:
What was the earliest point?

[00:15:54] Speaker 02:
You spoke about the one minute, and the one minute implies that they had to see something that happened, in other words, that took place when they stopped him.

[00:16:03] Speaker 02:
that would support probable cause.

[00:16:05] Speaker 02:
I didn't think that was your position.

[00:16:06] Speaker 02:
So I need to be clear when, what is the earliest point that there was probable cause?

[00:16:12] Speaker 02:
Stated affirmatively.

[00:16:14] Speaker 01:
Affirmatively, it would be when Eddie Joe Reza pulled halfway into that handicapped parking spot in the Colonial Hillcrest apartment complex.

[00:16:22] Speaker 01:
That's when probable cause existed.

[00:16:25] Speaker 01:
You see, Officer Rodriguez was entitled to make that stop.

[00:16:28] Speaker 01:
It was a lawful stop.

[00:16:29] Speaker 02:
So you did not have probable cause based upon the Crimestoppers reports and based upon the anonymous, the confidential source.

[00:16:37] Speaker 02:
There was no probable cause at that point.

[00:16:40] Speaker 01:
That wasn't my contention in the briefs, and the contention here today is that a lot of these factors add up and accumulate.

[00:16:49] Speaker 01:
It is not a divide and conquer strategy, and none of these factors simply stand in isolation.

[00:16:54] Speaker 01:
They all pair together to amount to probable cause.

[00:16:58] Speaker 02:
I get that, but I want to know when that probable cause attached.

[00:17:01] Speaker 02:
Okay, so it's not the confidential, at least your position was,

[00:17:04] Speaker 02:
It's not the confidential source.

[00:17:06] Speaker 02:
It's not the Crimestoppers.

[00:17:07] Speaker 02:
Okay, was it once they had the SOI information, once collectively the officers had that?

[00:17:16] Speaker 02:
Now I understand, well, at least I didn't understand that being your position in your brief, but you're telling me now that even that wasn't enough.

[00:17:24] Speaker 02:
It had to be something else had to happen.

[00:17:27] Speaker 02:
before you actually had probable cause to search the vehicle.

[00:17:30] Speaker 01:
I think that's a fair position.

[00:17:32] Speaker 01:
So we have the informants tip, not based on stale information, based on information that was gleaned by the informant, who is not anonymous, who is known to both Detective Herrera and Sergeant Sneathen.

[00:17:43] Speaker 01:
The informants information was gleaned the previous night.

[00:17:46] Speaker 01:
So we have the information

[00:17:48] Speaker 01:
gleaned from the source of information.

[00:17:51] Speaker 01:
We have the fact that the source of information is trusted by the police department.

[00:17:55] Speaker 01:
I think the identity being known by Detective Herrera and Sergeant Sneeden, but I think Detective Herrera specifically said he was reliable and he was trustworthy in the past.

[00:18:05] Speaker 01:
If you recall, he provided information that led to the arrest of another felon in possession the previous month in June of 2020.

[00:18:12] Speaker 03:
And that's all true, but I think you just said that even with all that,

[00:18:17] Speaker 03:
In your view, there wasn't probable cause until they saw his car, well, until his car stopped.

[00:18:26] Speaker 02:
Until his car was pulled over, that's what I understood you to say, in the parking lot, which baked into that would be the delay between the time that the officers used the Rumbler device and he pulled over.

[00:18:38] Speaker 02:
As I understood you, that was the earliest point.

[00:18:41] Speaker 02:
Now, to be clear here, what that negates

[00:18:46] Speaker 02:
is the position that once you had the SOI and everything else, you had probable cause.

[00:18:54] Speaker 02:
Then the question was, do I just see him have a reason to pull him over?

[00:18:58] Speaker 02:
Those, at least, are two pretty stark differences.

[00:19:01] Speaker 02:
And I'm not saying they result in a different outcome, but I'm just saying I want to be clear what your position is.

[00:19:06] Speaker 02:
Your position, as I understood it today, is even with the SOI, even with the confidential, even with the crime stoppers,

[00:19:16] Speaker 02:
You did not have probable cause until they saw him, until he drove in front of the officers, and then stopped.

[00:19:24] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, I think that's correct.

[00:19:26] Speaker 01:
OK.

[00:19:27] Speaker 01:
I think you have the tips, and the tips are the road to probable cause.

[00:19:32] Speaker 01:
They're certainly putting us on the right path.

[00:19:34] Speaker 01:
It's Officer Rodriguez's ultimate observations that night at 11 PM that put us over the goal line.

[00:19:41] Speaker 01:
And so Officer Rodriguez,

[00:19:42] Speaker 01:
What he knows is the defendant's been flagged as armed and dangerous by the Carlsbad Police Department.

[00:19:48] Speaker 01:
He was a gang member, convicted felon.

[00:19:51] Speaker 01:
He has been in a shootout with police, and he has possessed guns and drugs.

[00:19:55] Speaker 01:
And now when he sees him, when Officer Rodriguez sees the defendant pass by him in that vehicle, we are in the final stage of developing probable cause for that evening.

[00:20:06] Speaker 01:
He is driving, the defendant is driving that exact same car described by this tipster.

[00:20:12] Speaker 01:
in Carlsbad, New Mexico, that white Nissan SUV with large chrome rims.

[00:20:17] Speaker 01:
He's driving late at night and he's driving in a high crime area of Carlsbad.

[00:20:22] Speaker 01:
I think officer Rodriguez said it was known for homicides, shootouts, burglaries, foot pursuits, and he personally knew about arrest warrants being effectuated there.

[00:20:32] Speaker 01:
He was driving, and it's a point worth mentioning, a half mile from Lee Street.

[00:20:38] Speaker 01:
Lee Street, I believe, runs east-west, and he was a half mile, several blocks,

[00:20:43] Speaker 01:
was the term used several blocks away from the area the original tipster mentioned he would be.

[00:20:49] Speaker 01:
And so corroboration is coming left and right.

[00:20:51] Speaker 01:
It's all materializing in the officer's head.

[00:20:54] Speaker 01:
And the defendant's driving, as we said, is serving to raise alert levels.

[00:21:00] Speaker 01:
And that's a quote from Officer Rodriguez's testimony.

[00:21:04] Speaker 01:
They are the only cars on the road.

[00:21:06] Speaker 02:
And despite that.

[00:21:07] Speaker 02:
And by driving, what are you talking about now?

[00:21:09] Speaker 02:
You're talking about the fact they didn't stop?

[00:21:11] Speaker 02:
Or are you talking about something else?

[00:21:12] Speaker 01:
I'm talking about the lack of stopping, Your Honor.

[00:21:14] Speaker 01:
I'm not attributing some sort of traffic infraction like speeding or anything like that.

[00:21:19] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:21:19] Speaker 04:
Counselor, before you move on, can I ask you, just in response to the Chief's questions, does it matter, the earliest that probable cause, what accrued into your argument?

[00:21:37] Speaker 04:
I'm in the sense that don't you just have to show that you have probable cause when you searched?

[00:21:44] Speaker 04:
Or are you looking at a different point in time that you had to have probable cause?

[00:21:50] Speaker 01:
No.

[00:21:50] Speaker 01:
I don't know.

[00:21:51] Speaker 01:
And it's tough to say when probable cause actually materialized.

[00:21:55] Speaker 01:
It's a tough question to answer when push comes to shove and saying, well, did you have probable cause after the tip?

[00:22:03] Speaker 01:
What about when you're saying?

[00:22:04] Speaker 04:
Well, my question is a little different.

[00:22:06] Speaker 04:
When do you have to have probable cause?

[00:22:09] Speaker 01:
Well, certainly prior to the effectuation of any search or something like that.

[00:22:14] Speaker 01:
And I certainly think probable cause is in place either at the moment of the stop when he pulls into that handicapped spot or right after that stop when he sees the driver's license, sees that he's far from home, and sees that he's in this high crime area at night alone, exactly as the tipster said he would be.

[00:22:35] Speaker 04:
So certainly before the search is what you're saying.

[00:22:38] Speaker 01:
That is correct.

[00:22:39] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:22:40] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:22:41] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:22:42] Speaker 01:
And as I was saying, the driving, I characterized as bad driving, but it is suspicious driving.

[00:22:48] Speaker 01:
How about that?

[00:22:48] Speaker 01:
Raise the officer's alert levels.

[00:22:50] Speaker 01:
They are the only cars on the road.

[00:22:52] Speaker 01:
And despite that, he is still, the defendant is still not pulling over, despite his unobstructed view of the officer's car.

[00:23:00] Speaker 01:
He passed areas he could have stopped.

[00:23:03] Speaker 01:
Your honor is correct.

[00:23:05] Speaker 01:
Judge Holmes that he had to use the rumbler air horn that ground shaking device twice.

[00:23:10] Speaker 01:
There was the suspicious activity of rolling down his passenger window for really no rhyme or reason and parking halfway in the parking spot.

[00:23:18] Speaker 01:
All of that in its totality.

[00:23:21] Speaker 01:
That's what I'm asserting amounts to the probable cause necessary to invoke the automobile exception.

[00:23:28] Speaker 01:
And I can finish with this if there are no additional questions.

[00:23:32] Speaker 01:
I think the judges were exactly right.

[00:23:35] Speaker 01:
The objective facts matter.

[00:23:37] Speaker 01:
The inquiry here is an objective one.

[00:23:39] Speaker 01:
And here, these objective facts

[00:23:42] Speaker 01:
Created probable cause and justified the search the initial stop was justified because the defendant had expired registration I think the defendant concedes this and the subsequent search was valid because it was supported by probable cause that being the automobile exception And if your honor has no money no more questions.

[00:24:01] Speaker 01:
I can see the rest of my time no Thank you counsel.

[00:24:04] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:24:04] Speaker 01:
I appreciate your time

[00:24:12] Speaker 00:
In response to the court's question, the government stated that there was no good reason to be this far from home when asked a minute into the stop and they seized the driver's licensee address.

[00:24:24] Speaker 00:
We're back in Carlsbad, it's not a large town, but the issue here is that this

[00:24:31] Speaker 00:
goes straight at Santos and Sandoval that talk about criminal history, and that people with criminal histories, essentially under the way the government has presented its case, I think are roving targets for warrantless arrests.

[00:24:43] Speaker 00:
There's not.

[00:24:44] Speaker 00:
I think the difficulty that the government has articulating when and how I had probable cause takes me directly back to Officer Sneadon and Deputy Heredes,

[00:24:56] Speaker 00:
Determination of their subjective, I'm getting sidetracked again, subjective determination of the credibility, but objectively looking at that.

[00:25:04] Speaker 00:
Those are the type of things that objectively looking at it a minute into the stop, if the PC is going to arise from a bad parking determination, I don't think that that gets us there.

[00:25:16] Speaker 00:
And that brings me to the Montes Ramos case that I had in the reply brief where the deputy on a

[00:25:25] Speaker 00:
County Road in New Mexico sees an individual who he lists and articulates a whole bunch of factors, sticks his nose simply just inside the window to verify that what he believes is going to be marijuana smells like marijuana, and this court reversed it because the deputy's minimal intrusion in that case was sufficient for reversal.

[00:25:43] Speaker 00:
And that's, I think, where we're at here is that the probable cause is not objectively there with the source of information and the tipsters.

[00:25:55] Speaker 00:
It's just nebulous factors that were floating out there that are being proffered for the idea that this is something that should be done, but they're not.

[00:26:04] Speaker 02:
You don't question the stop, right?

[00:26:06] Speaker 02:
I had no impression.

[00:26:07] Speaker 02:
Okay, so they had a right to stop them, they had a right to go through the drill associated with the violation, the traffic violation.

[00:26:15] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:26:15] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:26:16] Speaker 00:
And as we come back to that, that's where I keep coming back to, and I think the question was whether an objective officer, using Officer Rodriguez as that objective officer who performs a lawful traffic stop, just says that had I been given this information, I was going to let him go.

[00:26:30] Speaker 00:
This is an individual who,

[00:26:32] Speaker 00:
I think it's on page 11 of the brief talks about he knew the facts that he was going to be, he had criminal history, he was going to be there, he had the source of information from that briefing.

[00:26:46] Speaker 00:
Those are all items that were known to him.

[00:26:47] Speaker 00:
And so when we get into the objective determination, I don't think that it's there, Your Honor.

[00:26:54] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Counsel.

[00:26:55] Speaker 00:
May I excuse you, Your Honor?

[00:26:56] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:26:56] Speaker 00:
The case is submitted.