[00:00:02] Speaker 04: 23-7044, United States v. Woodmore. [00:00:08] Speaker 04: Counsel for Appellant, if you would make your appearance and proceed, please. [00:00:15] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:00:16] Speaker 02: My name is John Campbell. [00:00:17] Speaker 02: I am counsel for the defendant appellant, Calvin James Woodmore. [00:00:24] Speaker 02: If it pleases the Court, I would like to begin my discussion with the [00:00:30] Speaker 02: the two jury instructions that I identified in my briefing. [00:00:35] Speaker 02: The first one was a jury instruction where the court instructed the jury that an attorney may have the right to interview witnesses. [00:00:47] Speaker 02: And then there was a second part to that instruction as well. [00:00:49] Speaker 02: And I'll offer my comments in two parts. [00:00:53] Speaker 02: With respect to this first part about whether an attorney has a right [00:00:58] Speaker 02: to interview a witness, I would submit that that's just not the case, particularly with respect to defense counsel. [00:01:07] Speaker 02: I'm not aware of any natural right that I might have to talk to a witness, any statutory right that I might have to talk to a witness, or any contractual right or otherwise that I might have to talk to a witness. [00:01:20] Speaker 00: Do you have any law that says you don't have to talk to a witness? [00:01:24] Speaker 00: That I don't have to talk to a witness? [00:01:26] Speaker 00: Yeah, or that you can talk. [00:01:27] Speaker 00: Is there any case law out there on that? [00:01:31] Speaker 02: Well, Your Honor, a witness doesn't have to talk to me. [00:01:33] Speaker 02: I can approach them. [00:01:34] Speaker 00: No, that's not my question. [00:01:35] Speaker 00: Have you got any case law that says that that's prohibited? [00:01:43] Speaker 02: I mean, other than the fact that a witness doesn't have to talk to me, I can't compel a witness in a criminal case to talk to me. [00:01:52] Speaker 00: No. [00:01:53] Speaker 02: I can ask them to talk to me, but they don't have to. [00:01:56] Speaker 00: In the case... Is that contrary to any other situation? [00:02:00] Speaker 00: Whether it be civil or not, you can always subpoena, but a witness can always say, I'm not talking to you. [00:02:06] Speaker 00: Or a witness can say, yeah, I'll be happy to be with you. [00:02:11] Speaker 02: In a civil case, Your Honor, the witness can be subpoenaed in for a deposition, and then they have to talk to me unless they have some privilege that allows them to not answer a question. [00:02:22] Speaker 02: With the case of the government in a criminal case, particularly in these conspiracy cases, oftentimes many of the witnesses who aren't agents for the government are co-defendants, and they have cooperation agreements, and they have a contractual obligation to talk to the United States, or else they have violated the terms and conditions of their cooperation agreement. [00:02:46] Speaker 02: So the way this instruction is written just simply [00:02:50] Speaker 02: isn't correct. [00:02:51] Speaker 02: I have no right to talk to these witnesses and they have a contractual obligation to talk to the United States. [00:02:57] Speaker 04: I struggle to understand why that's so. [00:03:03] Speaker 04: You have a right to talk. [00:03:05] Speaker 04: They don't have to talk to you. [00:03:07] Speaker 04: I mean, just as when I'm walking down the street and I want to say hello to somebody and they don't want to talk to me, I have a right to talk to them. [00:03:16] Speaker 04: I have a right to say, hey, do you want to go to lunch? [00:03:20] Speaker 04: They don't have to go with me. [00:03:22] Speaker 04: I mean, it seems to me that the whole, [00:03:25] Speaker 04: The way you're interpreting this, as I see it, is that the instruction says, witnesses are obligated to talk to the defense. [00:03:34] Speaker 04: Well, of course they are not, but you have a right to seek to talk to them. [00:03:40] Speaker 04: They may not want to talk to you. [00:03:42] Speaker 04: What am I missing here? [00:03:44] Speaker 04: What in this instruction suggests that [00:03:48] Speaker 04: suggested somehow or other that they have an obligation to engage in an intercourse with you, and that is wrong. [00:03:58] Speaker 04: I admit that's clearly wrong. [00:04:00] Speaker 04: But what is wrong with this? [00:04:04] Speaker 02: Well, what's wrong with it is I do not have a right to talk to these people. [00:04:10] Speaker 04: Why don't you have a right to talk to them? [00:04:11] Speaker 04: You can go up to a witness and say, I want to talk to you. [00:04:14] Speaker 04: Will you talk to me? [00:04:15] Speaker 04: And they say no. [00:04:17] Speaker 02: Well, first of all, most of them are represented by counsel. [00:04:19] Speaker 02: So I can't do that. [00:04:21] Speaker 02: I can contact their lawyer. [00:04:22] Speaker 04: Yes, you can. [00:04:23] Speaker 02: And ask if the lawyer will allow me to talk to them. [00:04:27] Speaker 02: But the way this instruction is written, it implies that there's going to be communication between the two of us, like is the case with the United States, where they have a cooperation agreement. [00:04:39] Speaker 02: And they actually sit down with the United States and discuss [00:04:43] Speaker 02: what their testimony is going to be on the day of trial because they're cooperators. [00:04:46] Speaker 02: They have a contractual obligation to communicate with the United States. [00:04:50] Speaker 02: And a big part of my case was pointing this out to the jury. [00:04:55] Speaker 02: And then we get to the instruction point, and the court tells them that both parties could have talked to them, which simply is not true, and that they're not to draw a negative inference from the fact the United States did talk to them. [00:05:06] Speaker 04: What is the standard that we evaluate the court's choice of giving this instruction? [00:05:14] Speaker 04: What is the standard of review for that? [00:05:18] Speaker 02: Your Honor, I believe it's abuse of discretion. [00:05:20] Speaker 02: All right. [00:05:21] Speaker 04: Well, what is arbitrary or a matter of legal error from the court saying that you can try to speak to a witness? [00:05:31] Speaker 04: Let's assume there are two plausible interpretations here. [00:05:36] Speaker 04: One, the interpretation you have, and then one being the interpretation that you can seek to contact through counsel a witness. [00:05:45] Speaker 04: And if the witness doesn't want to talk to you, the witness doesn't have to talk to you. [00:05:48] Speaker 04: And under that interpretation of this, if there are those two competing interpretations, how could we find that the court abused its discretion by giving this instruction? [00:06:03] Speaker 02: Well, this implies that defense counsel [00:06:06] Speaker 02: and the United States are on equal footing. [00:06:08] Speaker 04: I'm sorry, you didn't answer my question. [00:06:09] Speaker 04: If there are two plausible interpretations of this instruction, how could we find that the district court abused its discretion in choosing its interpretation and therefore giving the instruction? [00:06:26] Speaker 02: The way this instruction is written, [00:06:30] Speaker 02: a finger on the scale for the United States, Your Honor. [00:06:34] Speaker 04: I'm sorry. [00:06:34] Speaker 04: I'm waiting for the answer. [00:06:35] Speaker 04: If there are two plausible interpretations, you can tell me that the interpretation I'm offering is not plausible and is therefore not one that can be gleaned from the plain text of that instruction. [00:06:48] Speaker 04: But if it is a plausible interpretation and you have yours and I'm offering another, how can we find that the district court abuse its discretion by choosing [00:06:59] Speaker 04: Not yours. [00:07:03] Speaker 02: I guess I just don't understand your question, Your Honor. [00:07:05] Speaker 04: Well, let's try it this way. [00:07:07] Speaker 04: There are two plausible interpretations of one instruction. [00:07:10] Speaker 04: What I'm saying is, if the district court chooses A, and you say it means B, and they're both plausible, under the standard of review, how can we hold that the district court abused its discretion by choosing A? [00:07:31] Speaker 02: I just find the A interpretation to be an unreasonable interpretation of this instruction, Your Honor. [00:07:37] Speaker 01: How do you get around United States versus John, which basically said the instruction is OK? [00:07:43] Speaker 02: I'm aware of the opinion, Your Honor. [00:07:44] Speaker 02: I just don't believe it's a correct statement of what the law is, Your Honor. [00:07:49] Speaker 01: But we are bound by it. [00:07:52] Speaker 01: One panel cannot overturn another panel's decision. [00:08:01] Speaker 01: I don't know how to answer that, Your Honor. [00:08:02] Speaker 01: You have to get it unbunked. [00:08:08] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:08:17] Speaker 02: With respect to the second half of this instruction, it says that the fact that a witness has talked to an attorney [00:08:28] Speaker 02: should not by itself reflect adversely on the truth of the testimony of the witness. [00:08:34] Speaker 02: I would submit that the jury should be allowed to evaluate whether or not this created any sort of bias in the witness, just like it would evaluate any other act of bias. [00:08:48] Speaker 02: And the second half of this instruction seems to [00:08:52] Speaker 02: tell the jury that they can't draw any negative inference from the fact that an attorney has talked to a witness. [00:09:00] Speaker 02: Whereas I think that the jury should be allowed to evaluate that like they would evaluate any other issue of bias. [00:09:08] Speaker 02: The second jury instruction that was discussed in the briefing deals with whether or not a definition of methamphetamine actual should have been provided to the jury. [00:09:21] Speaker 02: The term methamphetamine actual is used in the instructions when it's defining what the elements of the crime are, although it never defines what methamphetamine actual, but then when you get to the actual verdict form, it doesn't use the term methamphetamine actual anywhere, and it doesn't define what methamphetamine versus methamphetamine actual is for the jury. [00:09:49] Speaker 02: This is the verdict form, which is at page 383 in the pleadings for the record on appeal. [00:09:58] Speaker 02: The jury is asked to determine whether there's 50 grams or more or 5, but less than 50 grams and less than 5 grams of methamphetamine in this case, which varies from the term methamphetamine ash, which is used earlier in the instructions. [00:10:16] Speaker 02: So it's unclear to me whether the jury [00:10:19] Speaker 02: just tabulated up methamphetamine that they thought was attributable to my client, or whether or not they made any judgment as to whether or not this was methamphetamine actual? [00:10:32] Speaker 01: Wasn't there some testimony that the methane in this case was pure? [00:10:42] Speaker 02: Well, certainly there was some that was tested. [00:10:45] Speaker 02: There were two theories offered by the government with respect to my client. [00:10:48] Speaker 02: There was a package that was intercepted that was very pure methamphetamine. [00:10:53] Speaker 02: But there was also a number of packages that were sent to my client's girlfriend or wife's house while he was in jail. [00:11:03] Speaker 02: 11 packages were sent. [00:11:05] Speaker 02: None of that methamphetamine was tested. [00:11:07] Speaker 02: And so I don't know if the jury is considering [00:11:13] Speaker 02: that methamphetamine as attributed to my client or if they believed that the methamphetamine that was intercepted and tested is attributable to my client. [00:11:23] Speaker 02: But they were never instructed in how to ascertain whether or not something was just a mixture in substance containing methamphetamine or methamphetamine actual. [00:11:32] Speaker 02: And then in the actual verdict form, all they're asked is whether or not there was 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with no use of the term methamphetamine actual. [00:11:43] Speaker 04: Did you object to the verdict form, or have you ever challenged the verdict form on appeal, have you? [00:11:48] Speaker 02: I objected to, at trial, I objected both to the instruction and to the verdict form that it didn't include a definition for what methamphetamine actual was. [00:12:00] Speaker 04: What have you done on appeal as it relates to the verdict form? [00:12:03] Speaker 04: I don't recall there being any challenge to the verdict form on appeal. [00:12:08] Speaker 02: Well, on appeal, I objected to the fact there wasn't a definition for the term methamphetamine actual included with a packet of jury instructions. [00:12:19] Speaker 04: And I guess what the thrust of your argument, as I understood it, was, at least in part, that there is a confusion created for the jury by the fact that the indictment refers to methamphetamine actual. [00:12:32] Speaker 04: And then when they get to the verdict form, there is no reference to actual at all. [00:12:37] Speaker 04: and leading the jury, the jury could therefore come up with any version of methamphetamine to, to hold your client responsible. [00:12:44] Speaker 04: Did I understand that correctly? [00:12:46] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:12:46] Speaker 04: Okay. [00:12:47] Speaker 04: Well then the harm comes in part from at least as it relates to that comes from the verdict form. [00:12:54] Speaker 04: The fact that the verdict form does not include a reference to actual and in such that it would align with at least we know we're talking about the same thing, which is what I understood you to be saying. [00:13:06] Speaker 04: And you didn't, you aren't challenging on appeal the verdict form. [00:13:18] Speaker 02: I understand what you're saying here. [00:13:22] Speaker 02: Okay. [00:13:23] Speaker 02: I'll reserve the balance of my time for rebuttal if the court allows. [00:13:43] Speaker 03: May it please the court, counsel? [00:13:46] Speaker 03: I'm James Braun on behalf of the United States. [00:13:50] Speaker 03: The defendant has raised three issues on appeal. [00:13:53] Speaker 03: And unless the court has questions about a particular issue, I plan to go through each in order, at least the ones that Mr. Campbell covered during his presentation. [00:14:03] Speaker 04: I do have a question, Mr. Braun. [00:14:05] Speaker 04: And I'm not really clear why there wouldn't be a definitional instruction as it relates to methamphetamine actual. [00:14:12] Speaker 04: The response that one might offer is that it's common sense and everybody knows what actual is. [00:14:21] Speaker 04: In the narcotics arena, I'm not sure that's right. [00:14:25] Speaker 04: And more to the point, the sentencing guidelines don't think it's right because they define what methamphetamine actual is. [00:14:32] Speaker 04: So why shouldn't we have an instruction here? [00:14:34] Speaker 04: Why would the jury know when it sees in the indictment actual what actual means? [00:14:41] Speaker 03: Two parts to that answer, Your Honor. [00:14:42] Speaker 03: First, starting with the sentencing guidelines. [00:14:44] Speaker 03: The guidelines define the term methamphetamine actual because they deal with methamphetamine differently than the statute does. [00:14:51] Speaker 03: The statute uses the word methamphetamine to mean actual methamphetamine, and then it talks about it. [00:14:57] Speaker 04: As opposed to a mixture of substances. [00:14:59] Speaker 03: Exactly. [00:14:59] Speaker 04: Well, the guideline definition, it seemed to me, was very much along the same lines. [00:15:04] Speaker 04: The guideline definition was very similar to the instruction that he presented. [00:15:08] Speaker 03: The guidelines, though, when they talk about methamphetamine, when they use the word just methamphetamine, it means mixture and substance. [00:15:14] Speaker 03: So it's the opposite of the statute. [00:15:17] Speaker 03: And so when they use the term methamphetamine actual, that's something that's not in the statute. [00:15:22] Speaker 03: And the term methamphetamine in the guidelines is the opposite of the statute because that does mean mixture and substance. [00:15:28] Speaker 03: So there it makes sense to define it because they're using the word differently than the statute does. [00:15:34] Speaker 04: And when the term is used in the statute, you're saying absent the reference to actual, the term means pure methamphetamine. [00:15:47] Speaker 03: Exactly. [00:15:48] Speaker 04: It means actual. [00:15:51] Speaker 04: Why would you use the term actual, then, in the indictment if it didn't matter? [00:15:55] Speaker 04: If it didn't matter for purposes of the statute? [00:15:57] Speaker 04: Because when the jury looks at the indictment, it sees the word actual. [00:16:00] Speaker 04: And it says, hmm, what does that mean? [00:16:03] Speaker 04: And where does it find out what that means? [00:16:05] Speaker 03: Right. [00:16:06] Speaker 03: And I think the word actual is in there because of the fact that it's used in the sentencing guidelines. [00:16:12] Speaker 03: And to mean the amount of pure methamphetamine [00:16:17] Speaker 03: in a given sample. [00:16:19] Speaker 04: I got it. [00:16:19] Speaker 04: But if there's harm here, the harm comes from jury confusion. [00:16:22] Speaker 04: And why wouldn't the jury be confused if it has a term in there? [00:16:27] Speaker 04: Well, I mean, you think it's important enough to put in because that's what the guidelines have. [00:16:30] Speaker 04: Well, if the jury looks at that word, what gives it content? [00:16:38] Speaker 03: So going back to basics, as far as the point that a district court's decision to give or not to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [00:16:47] Speaker 03: And in reviewing the district court's exercise of its discretion in this case, this court should really look at that decision in the context of the whole case. [00:16:56] Speaker 03: And here, the context is not one relatively small amount of methamphetamine that's impure, where the parties really are fighting over is the actual amount over that 50-gram threshold. [00:17:11] Speaker 03: Here, the smallest sample was 54 grams. [00:17:15] Speaker 03: of 98% pure methamphetamine. [00:17:17] Speaker 03: That's the sample that was purchased from early Woodmore in, I believe it was November of 2018. [00:17:22] Speaker 03: That's the smallest sample, and it's over the 50-gram threshold. [00:17:26] Speaker 03: But then on top of that, we have the pound, the 440 grams that was seized in August of 2019 straight out of the mail. [00:17:36] Speaker 03: And that was 99% pure. [00:17:39] Speaker 03: Well, 10 times the 50-gram threshold, almost 500 grams. [00:17:45] Speaker 03: And then on top of that, we had the substantial testimony from Noelle, Kimberly Noelle, the source of supply, that she would send this methamphetamine, this high-quality methamphetamine, one to two times, well, every one to two weeks, a pound for a year. [00:18:03] Speaker 03: So we're dealing with pound on pound of high-quality methamphetamine. [00:18:07] Speaker 03: And we have a sample to compare to to know what, when we talk pure, we're talking 99% pure. [00:18:12] Speaker 03: were so far above that 50-gram threshold that it was entirely reasonable for the district judge in this context to decide that it would not be helpful to the jury to try to define methamphetamine actual, because no reasonable jury could find that there wasn't more than 50 grams of methamphetamine actual here. [00:18:32] Speaker 03: Setting aside the obvious question of whether the defendant is guilty of participating in the conspiracy or not, that's not what this case came down to, whether [00:18:42] Speaker 03: We're talking about 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine. [00:18:47] Speaker 03: The amount that was seized, the amount that was testified to, so far exceeded that threshold that the judge concluded it simply wouldn't be helpful. [00:18:56] Speaker 03: And that makes sense when you look at the John case, where even the court in that case said, we don't recommend this instruction. [00:19:03] Speaker 03: We find that it wasn't really helpful, but it concluded that it wasn't confusing in the context of the case. [00:19:09] Speaker 03: Counsel, let me ask you, and you can help me out, [00:19:12] Speaker 03: And I'm sorry, I think that was the Harwell case, not the Chaun case. [00:19:19] Speaker 00: On the methamphetamine that was mailed to the home, as I recall, you put on testimony as to the actual, we're using the word, the quantity as far as its purity is concerned. [00:19:38] Speaker 00: And then the other part of it was mail word [00:19:42] Speaker 00: It was mailed to his home, and where was the other mail for him? [00:19:45] Speaker 00: I can't remember. [00:19:47] Speaker 03: It was mailed to multiple residences, including, I believe, 11 packages to the defendant's residence. [00:19:52] Speaker 00: Did you put on the testimony, though, that proved the purity of that testimony? [00:19:58] Speaker 00: I know you did on the home, but I don't recall you doing that in regards to the other places that it was mailed. [00:20:06] Speaker 03: Well, there were only two samples that were seized, Your Honor. [00:20:08] Speaker 03: The one that was purchased from early Woodmore in November of 2018, that was tested and the purity was determined, 98% pure. [00:20:18] Speaker 03: And then the sample that was seized that was being shipped to the new address, the hotel address in Arkansas in August of 2018. [00:20:25] Speaker 03: And of course, that was seized, it was tested, and the purity was determined to be 99% pure. [00:20:31] Speaker 03: None of the other samples were seized, the other packages. [00:20:35] Speaker 03: They were testified to by Noelle and some of the law enforcement witnesses who were observing things happening but didn't actually seize the packages. [00:20:44] Speaker 03: So we didn't have those to determine a purity, but we do have that one seized sample, and that's really all that matters. [00:20:53] Speaker 03: Noelle testified to what she would send. [00:20:55] Speaker 03: She didn't testify that one package was any different than another, and the one that we seized was 98% pure. [00:21:01] Speaker 04: Did you say the packages were in fact [00:21:03] Speaker 04: the same kind of meth? [00:21:05] Speaker 04: In other words, as opposed to saying that there's no testimony that was different, was there testimony that was the same? [00:21:12] Speaker 03: No, I don't think there was any specific testimony as to that. [00:21:14] Speaker 03: But there was testimony that this was a good source of supply, that she provided good methamphetamine. [00:21:19] Speaker 03: And so I think the idea was it was consistent, that it was high quality. [00:21:24] Speaker 03: And the seized sample certainly corroborated that. [00:21:28] Speaker 03: It was high quality. [00:21:29] Speaker 04: They were in the same high 90s range. [00:21:32] Speaker 04: Exactly. [00:21:33] Speaker 04: OK. [00:21:33] Speaker 04: Could I shift topic here to the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the money laundering and the money laundering conspiracy? [00:21:41] Speaker 03: If I could just make a quick correction with Villegas, the case that dealt with the methamphetamine actual jury instruction. [00:21:48] Speaker 03: I appreciate precision. [00:21:49] Speaker 04: Precision is a good thing. [00:21:51] Speaker 04: I'm going to ask you some questions to make sure I understand the record. [00:21:55] Speaker 04: And you can just tell me yes or no if it fits. [00:21:59] Speaker 04: As I understand it, there is no evidence that the defendant did more than one transaction of $2,000. [00:22:09] Speaker 03: That is correct. [00:22:10] Speaker 04: OK. [00:22:11] Speaker 04: There is no evidence as to the source and the money for the $2,000. [00:22:16] Speaker 03: I would dispute that. [00:22:19] Speaker 03: No direct evidence. [00:22:21] Speaker 03: There is circumstantial evidence that the defendant did not have any other legitimate source of income and that early didn't either for the relevant time period. [00:22:31] Speaker 03: And so that is circumstantial evidence that this was the proceeds of drug trafficking because there was substantial evidence [00:22:37] Speaker 03: that he was involved in drug trafficking, in a lucrative drug trafficking organization. [00:22:41] Speaker 03: But no, there was no direct evidence saying this money was from selling drugs, and he tried to transfer that money. [00:22:49] Speaker 04: And so the idea in your response to that question, the notion would be neither early nor the defendant had legitimate sources of income. [00:22:59] Speaker 04: Therefore, the money could have only come from drug trafficking. [00:23:03] Speaker 03: That's right, especially when it's in the context [00:23:05] Speaker 03: The other testimony that that's how this organization worked. [00:23:09] Speaker 03: They had to get the money from Oklahoma to California. [00:23:12] Speaker 03: And the way they did that was through wire transfers. [00:23:14] Speaker 03: And Noelle testified that she only talked with Early or later after he went to jail with Amber about the drug shipments and the money being transferred back. [00:23:26] Speaker 03: So the reasonable inference is that when someone else would transfer money, it was at Early's direction or his request. [00:23:32] Speaker 04: Well, maybe. [00:23:34] Speaker 04: Let me just finish my list here. [00:23:36] Speaker 04: Yes, sir. [00:23:37] Speaker 04: There's no evidence, and I understand your qualification on the other point. [00:23:40] Speaker 04: No evidence the defendant discussed money laundering with earlier anybody else? [00:23:47] Speaker 03: No, except for the circumstantial evidence that Noelle did testify that she only talked to Early. [00:23:53] Speaker 03: And so the inference is that if the defendant is then transferring money, it's at Early's request. [00:24:00] Speaker 04: OK. [00:24:02] Speaker 04: Well, there's no evidence of directions from Early about this specific transfer, is there? [00:24:06] Speaker 03: No, except for the circumstantial evidence. [00:24:08] Speaker 04: OK. [00:24:10] Speaker 04: And this particular $2,000, there's no evidence really. [00:24:15] Speaker 04: What is the evidence that this was in furtherance of drug trafficking except for the fact that there was a drug trafficking conspiracy underway? [00:24:24] Speaker 04: And I want to be specific about this point. [00:24:26] Speaker 04: Early was involved in a luxury goods enterprise with Noel, right? [00:24:32] Speaker 04: I mean, the point was that she would send him luxury goods and he would send her money. [00:24:38] Speaker 03: That's right. [00:24:39] Speaker 04: OK. [00:24:39] Speaker 04: Well, and there was no allegation that that was the lawful in itself, right? [00:24:43] Speaker 03: No. [00:24:44] Speaker 03: I would hesitate to call it an enterprise because I don't believe that there was any evidence that Early was then selling the goods or doing anything like that. [00:24:53] Speaker 03: He was purchasing goods that Noel would receive for next to nothing. [00:24:57] Speaker 04: OK. [00:24:57] Speaker 04: He purchased goods. [00:24:58] Speaker 04: And he sent for money through wire transfers for those goods. [00:25:02] Speaker 03: That is right. [00:25:03] Speaker 04: OK. [00:25:04] Speaker 04: And was there any suggestion that that activity was intuitively involved with the drug trafficking such that if he stopped buying the luxury goods, I mean, if he stopped the drug trafficking enterprise, that those two things were so connected that one hinged on the other. [00:25:25] Speaker 04: I'll phrase it that way. [00:25:26] Speaker 03: There was no direct evidence of that. [00:25:29] Speaker 03: OK. [00:25:29] Speaker 03: But there was evidence from, I believe it was, [00:25:32] Speaker 03: and I hesitate to say the witness, there was evidence from a witness testimony as far as what was Noelle's cut, what was the arrangement for her cut. [00:25:42] Speaker 03: And it wasn't just $500 for each shipment, it was help paying bills and cars and things like that. [00:25:49] Speaker 03: And so this would fall in the things like that category of Noelle's understanding of what her cut would be is that [00:25:57] Speaker 03: Early would send her money in addition to the $500 that she received for each shipment. [00:26:03] Speaker 03: And so in that context, and again, with the jury free to make reasonable inferences, the reasonable inference is that they needed to keep Noelle happy. [00:26:13] Speaker 03: And that meant buying luxury goods that she received for next to nothing. [00:26:18] Speaker 03: OK. [00:26:19] Speaker 04: Well, all right, I get that point. [00:26:23] Speaker 04: Was there any, beyond this inference that you are asserting is reasonable, there's no suggestion that that was some sort of explicit arrangement they had. [00:26:34] Speaker 04: He bought luxury goods from Noel, right? [00:26:38] Speaker 03: He did, yes. [00:26:40] Speaker 04: OK. [00:26:40] Speaker 04: And let me just posit a hypothetical for you. [00:26:43] Speaker 04: If, in fact, Early gives money to the defendant, $2,000 to transfer to Noel, doesn't tell him what it's for, [00:26:54] Speaker 04: We don't know that this money was for luxury goods or for drugs. [00:27:00] Speaker 04: At that point, and the defendant turns around and sends it, tell me why that is a conspiracy, mind you, and I'm talking mens rea now, give me mens rea. [00:27:12] Speaker 04: Tell me why that is a conspiracy to engage in money laundering and why that in fact is money laundering. [00:27:21] Speaker 03: The defendant was part of a conspiracy that wasn't just him and early. [00:27:24] Speaker 03: It wasn't just a cast of two characters. [00:27:25] Speaker 03: It was a cast of many characters. [00:27:27] Speaker 04: There were two conspiracies. [00:27:28] Speaker 04: There's a drug conspiracy and there's a money laundering conspiracy. [00:27:31] Speaker 04: I'm not questioning his involvement in the drug conspiracy. [00:27:34] Speaker 04: I want to know, based upon that hypothetical, [00:27:37] Speaker 04: why that is money laundering conspiracy and why his intent would have been consistent with money laundering conspiracy. [00:27:45] Speaker 03: Right. [00:27:45] Speaker 03: And even the money laundering conspiracy had multiple members because that's how this organization worked. [00:27:51] Speaker 03: There was the drug conspiracy where they were getting drugs from California and selling it, the money laundering conspiracy where they would take the proceeds from that drug trafficking activity, which was substantial. [00:28:01] Speaker 03: When you're talking about 20 to 30 pounds of methamphetamine over the course of that year, [00:28:06] Speaker 03: or two years, 2017 to basically 2019. [00:28:11] Speaker 03: That's a substantial amount of income that's generated from that. [00:28:15] Speaker 03: They have to get that back to California. [00:28:17] Speaker 03: The way they did that in the testimony was that early would have people. [00:28:21] Speaker 03: I see I'm out of time, but if I could finish my answer. [00:28:23] Speaker 03: I definitely want you to finish. [00:28:24] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:28:25] Speaker 04: And note, I'm not questioning that money was being transferred back as part of the drug trafficking conspiracy. [00:28:32] Speaker 04: There's only one allegation in this complaint that's of action. [00:28:36] Speaker 04: that supports the money laundering conspiracy, and that's the $2,000 transfer. [00:28:41] Speaker 04: So I gave you the hypothetical, and I'm asking you why that is enough for money laundering conspiracy tied to the mens rea of that crime, and why that's enough for substantive money laundering. [00:28:53] Speaker 03: Please. [00:28:54] Speaker 03: Right. [00:28:54] Speaker 03: So that's the overall conspiracy. [00:28:57] Speaker 03: There was substantial evidence of that, that multiple people would transfer money at Early's request to Noelle or Noelle's designee in furtherance of the drug trafficking conspiracy. [00:29:09] Speaker 03: Now, as far as this defendant in particular, so that establishes the conspiracy. [00:29:12] Speaker 03: Now, as far as his participation in the conspiracy, again, Noelle testified that she only talked with Early and then later with Amber about the money being transferred. [00:29:22] Speaker 03: And so that indicates that she said she would have talked to Early about this $2,000. [00:29:26] Speaker 03: That means that he had to tell director request that the defendant try to transfer that $2,000. [00:29:33] Speaker 03: Now, there was the evidence that the only legitimate income, or there was no legitimate income, that the only income was from drug trafficking. [00:29:40] Speaker 03: So that's drug trafficking proceeds that the defendant is transferring to Noel. [00:29:45] Speaker 03: The reasonable inference from that is that it's to pay Noel for the drugs because that's what- Why not luxury goods? [00:29:54] Speaker 03: Or the luxury goods. [00:29:55] Speaker 03: in furtherance of the conspiracy to keep the source of supply. [00:29:59] Speaker 04: And that's based on some inference that they had to keep her happy and therefore they were buying luxury goods. [00:30:05] Speaker 03: That's right. [00:30:07] Speaker 03: All right. [00:30:07] Speaker 03: And yes, it's circumstantial evidence. [00:30:09] Speaker 03: It's based on what we submit as reasonable inferences. [00:30:12] Speaker 03: But that's for the jury. [00:30:13] Speaker 03: There was the actual evidence of the drug trafficking, of the [00:30:19] Speaker 03: money transfers of the lack of legitimate income. [00:30:23] Speaker 03: And the jury was entitled to make reasonable inferences from that evidence to determine that this defendant, when he tried to transfer that $2,000, was doing it with the proceeds of drug trafficking to further and promote the drug trafficking conspiracy by either paying for methamphetamine or keeping their sources alive. [00:30:41] Speaker 04: Where does the mens rea fit into this? [00:30:44] Speaker 04: I mean, the defendant's not an automaton. [00:30:47] Speaker 04: I mean, he's given the money. [00:30:48] Speaker 04: We've got to prove that he, in fact, had the mens rea of engaging in this conspiracy to engage in money laundering. [00:30:57] Speaker 04: Assuming that Early hands him the money, let's assume for the moment that it is drug proceeds. [00:31:02] Speaker 04: Early hands him the money, doesn't tell him where the money comes from, just tells him, send it to Noel. [00:31:07] Speaker 04: Is that enough for money laundering conspiracy? [00:31:10] Speaker 03: We believe in the context of this case where the defendant is, it's not like the defendant has no involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy. [00:31:17] Speaker 03: And he's just given this money. [00:31:19] Speaker 03: He's intimately involved with the drug trafficking conspiracy. [00:31:23] Speaker 03: He knows where Early gets his money. [00:31:24] Speaker 03: He knows where he gets his money. [00:31:26] Speaker 03: So again, especially when you're talking about mens rea, we rarely have direct evidence of mens rea. [00:31:33] Speaker 03: We have to rely on circumstantial evidence. [00:31:35] Speaker 03: And the circumstantial evidence here is that being involved in the drug trafficking conspiracy, knowing where Early gets his money, knowing that you have to pay your source of supply [00:31:45] Speaker 03: for the drugs you're getting, that that would indicate that he knew what he was doing, that he knew this was the proceeds of drug trafficking, and that he knew that he was doing it to promote the money laundering conspiracy and the drug trafficking conspiracy. [00:32:02] Speaker 04: Thank you, counsel. [00:32:03] Speaker 04: And thank you to my colleagues for indulging me and pursuing that. [00:32:07] Speaker 04: If you'll round him up to two minutes, and then we'll, you don't have to take it all. [00:32:15] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:32:17] Speaker 02: I just want to point out the Council made the argument that Calvin Woodmore did not have any other sources of income. [00:32:28] Speaker 02: That's not supported by the record. [00:32:30] Speaker 02: There was evidence in the record that Calvin Woodmore and Early Woodmore had a horse business. [00:32:36] Speaker 02: Now granted, there was a witness, Ashley Miller, who testified that they did not make much money from that business. [00:32:44] Speaker 02: But there's no qualification as to what not much money means, and that can vary pretty dramatically from person to person. [00:32:52] Speaker 02: You could still not make much money and still make thousands and tens of thousands of dollars a year. [00:32:59] Speaker 02: So to say that they didn't have any other sources of income I don't think is correct. [00:33:03] Speaker 02: They did have some legitimate income with this horse business, training horses or boarding horses or whatever that may be. [00:33:10] Speaker 02: And that is acknowledged in the United States Reply Brief on page 26. [00:33:16] Speaker 02: And that's all I have, Your Honor. [00:33:20] Speaker 04: Thank you, Counsel. [00:33:21] Speaker 04: Any? [00:33:23] Speaker 04: Case is submitted. [00:33:24] Speaker 04: Thank you for the argument.