[00:00:15] Speaker 00:
May it please the court.

[00:00:16] Speaker 00:
I'm Mark Little on behalf of the plaintiff's appellants and I'd like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:21] Speaker 00:
Under Ex parte Young, a plaintiff may sue an officer of the state to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unlawful so long as that officer has some connection to the enforcement of the act.

[00:00:33] Speaker 00:
This court's application of that standard in three cases, Messines, Yu, and Brown, all demonstrate that Ex parte Young imposes only a modest burden and that it is applied pragmatically with its remedial ends in mind.

[00:00:46] Speaker 00:
Messiness is particularly relevant here.

[00:00:48] Speaker 00:
There, this court held that the Arizona Secretary of State's role in promulgating binding directives to local election officials far exceeded the sum connection with enforcement requirement under Ex parte Young.

[00:01:01] Speaker 00:
Macenus provides the blueprint for resolving this case because like in Macenus, here the SBCC members also promulgate binding non-discretionary directives to local officials who then must follow them as a matter of state law.

[00:01:17] Speaker 00:
Under Macenus, and frankly under this course other presidents... But the question is enforcement.

[00:01:20] Speaker 00:
What enforcement capacity do they have?

[00:01:23] Speaker 00:
So I think the lesson from Macenus is that enforcement means something more than the last link in the chain.

[00:01:31] Speaker 00:
messiness if we were taking the most narrow view of enforcement it would be the local election officials who were printing the ballots but this court said no look ordering someone giving a legally binding order to take an act here it was the secretary of state or rather there it was the secretary of state ordering the local officials to print the ballots in a certain way and again they had to follow that as a matter of state law that's also enforcement and you know looking let me answer you know i i'm just curious what

[00:02:02] Speaker 02:
So the council promulgates the rules, right?

[00:02:08] Speaker 02:
I guess, I don't know what to call it.

[00:02:09] Speaker 02:
Yes, your honor.

[00:02:10] Speaker 02:
Or?

[00:02:11] Speaker 02:
Building code.

[00:02:12] Speaker 02:
Building code, right?

[00:02:13] Speaker 02:
The building code, I gather, is binding on the local officials.

[00:02:18] Speaker 00:
Yes, your honor.

[00:02:18] Speaker 02:
Correct.

[00:02:19] Speaker 02:
And so the local officials apply the building code to applications that come in and do all the processing, approve applications and whatnot.

[00:02:28] Speaker 02:
Yes, your honor.

[00:02:30] Speaker 02:
The building codes.

[00:02:32] Speaker 02:
What does the council do if the local officials don't do it the way they think it should be done?

[00:02:41] Speaker 02:
Do they have any power to do anything?

[00:02:44] Speaker 00:
Right.

[00:02:44] Speaker 00:
What your honor is getting at, I believe, is whether there's any kind of supervisory function, whether they can ensure that the local officials follow their directives.

[00:02:54] Speaker 00:
And I want to make two points here.

[00:02:55] Speaker 00:
First, in Messines,

[00:02:58] Speaker 00:
there's no indication at all.

[00:02:59] Speaker 00:
In fact, I think it's rather clear that the Secretary of State there didn't have any powers to hire and fire or anything like that over the local election officials, and yet that legally binding order was enough.

[00:03:11] Speaker 02:
As to what would happen... Well, it was that manual that she produced, right?

[00:03:15] Speaker 02:
Oh, absolutely.

[00:03:16] Speaker 02:
It was a binding.

[00:03:17] Speaker 02:
The directives in the manual were binding.

[00:03:19] Speaker 00:
Yes, they were binding.

[00:03:21] Speaker 00:
But if local election officials just said, this is great, this is a binding order, but I'm just not going to

[00:03:27] Speaker 00:
follow it, there's certainly no indication from that case, and I believe the actual facts are that the Secretary of State, it's unclear if she could have compelled the local officials to follow it.

[00:03:40] Speaker 00:
Now, again, that is much the same here.

[00:03:41] Speaker 00:
I think everyone agrees that the building code is binding, that local officials have to follow, as to practically what would happen if some local building official just decided to do its own thing, to kind of flaunt state law.

[00:03:54] Speaker 00:
I think it's pretty clear what would happen in that instance, and that's that the attorney general would bring suit against that local official, compelling them to follow state law.

[00:04:06] Speaker 00:
The attorney general has certainly done this before in matters where a local county had an ordinance that didn't follow state law.

[00:04:13] Speaker 00:
That's the Department of Ecology versus Waukee-Occom County case that we cite in our reply brief on page 16.

[00:04:20] Speaker 00:
And there's every indication that what happened here.

[00:04:24] Speaker 00:
But how do we know that?

[00:04:27] Speaker 00:
Well, in terms of how we know it, it's kind of a commonsensical analysis.

[00:04:33] Speaker 00:
I mean, the Washington State Energy Code is an important policy of the state of Washington.

[00:04:39] Speaker 00:
The idea that the Attorney General will simply stand idly by and let it be flaunted is somewhat strange credulity.

[00:04:49] Speaker 00:
And you don't have to consider this in a vacuum.

[00:04:52] Speaker 00:
we laid this out in our opening brief that what we think is going to happen, the attorney general doesn't dispute any of that.

[00:04:57] Speaker 00:
In fact, stays very silent on what actions he would take in that process.

[00:05:02] Speaker 00:
But I want to point out that even if the attorney general wouldn't do anything, and even if this court thinks our arguments as to the attorney general might be weaker, that really doesn't have anything to do with our arguments against the SBCC members.

[00:05:16] Speaker 00:
There are really two groups of defendants here, the SBCC members and the attorney general.

[00:05:21] Speaker 00:
And again, as for the SBCC members, I really think the only distinction that the other side has raised here with Messinus, which, again, I think is a very on-point case, very factually analogous, is that in Messinus, it was a challenge to a statute.

[00:05:36] Speaker 00:
In here, it's a challenge to a regulation.

[00:05:39] Speaker 01:
That is true.

[00:05:40] Speaker 01:
That is... Well, not quite.

[00:05:42] Speaker 01:
I mean, the district court made this promulgation versus distinction.

[00:05:48] Speaker 01:
What's your response to that?

[00:05:49] Speaker 01:
Sure.

[00:05:50] Speaker 00:
So in miscellaneous, I will get to your honest question, but if you'll give me a little latitude, I think the key holding there is that in terms of enforcement, just what is enforcement?

[00:06:02] Speaker 00:
We know the issuing binding orders to local officials to take an act that violates federal law.

[00:06:06] Speaker 00:
Make that distinction.

[00:06:08] Speaker 00:
Right.

[00:06:08] Speaker 00:
And that's what I'm getting at here is that even if you look at Ex parte Young,

[00:06:13] Speaker 00:
just the key case itself, the test is some connection to enforcement.

[00:06:18] Speaker 00:
The test isn't and no promulgation.

[00:06:21] Speaker 00:
Messiness doesn't talk about promulgation or act like that's important.

[00:06:24] Speaker 00:
I don't know of any case that does.

[00:06:26] Speaker 00:
And in fact, I believe my friends on the other side can see it in their brief that they are not saying that you cannot have a dual promulgation and enforcement role.

[00:06:34] Speaker 00:
And again, I don't know why that wouldn't be the case because I can imagine all kinds of

[00:06:39] Speaker 00:
Scenarios in which statewide officials issue binding orders that they have some discretion over and that would qualify as in as in as enforcement under export a young principle my cards on the table, I think you're right that you're asking well for only a modest extension of Macenus and My problem is that I think machine is just wrong.

[00:06:57] Speaker 01:
It's just it was over broad It is not in the heartland of what ex parte young is about and so tell me why?

[00:07:04] Speaker 01:
Macenus is right and why should we should be granting this modest extension and

[00:07:08] Speaker 00:
So I guess first first runner I I honestly don't think that this requires any extension of missing is just on on his points.

[00:07:15] Speaker 00:
But as as to why Miss Messina's was was right.

[00:07:19] Speaker 00:
I think the notion that ordering someone else to violate federal law doesn't have any connection with that act that violates federal law.

[00:07:28] Speaker 00:
That seems a little strange.

[00:07:30] Speaker 01:
Well, I mean, the problem is they'll start to young about enforcement, right?

[00:07:32] Speaker 01:
That means being able to have some accountability over the people below you here.

[00:07:38] Speaker 01:
You know, the secretary had no has no accountability over the people below her.

[00:07:43] Speaker 00:
Well, I don't think it's it's accountability.

[00:07:45] Speaker 00:
And I hate to keep harping on most CNS and I promise I'll try to keep it to a.

[00:07:50] Speaker 00:
Minimum, but but they are just want to be very clear the Arizona Secretary of State and the local elected officials There were no lines beat exactly beat between them.

[00:07:58] Speaker 00:
And that's why I understand I understand your honor thinks it's wrong and of course, I Everyone knows that that the panel has has to follow the cases of the court But I think also a distinction that but I want you to yes.

[00:08:11] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:08:12] Speaker 00:
No, I understand but but I think practically again whether kind of there's this power to hire and fire or that kind of thing just

[00:08:20] Speaker 00:
The act of enforcing a law under Macenus, under all, and not just Macenus, I mean, frankly, under you, under Brown, it has never been kind of the last link in the chain of enforcement, the closest connection to enforcement, anything like that.

[00:08:32] Speaker 00:
It's always been some connection requirement.

[00:08:34] Speaker 00:
And so I think the key notion, frankly, the only notion that Your Honor would need to get comfortable with here is that enforcement means more than kind of boots on the ground doing things.

[00:08:46] Speaker 00:
And if I'm ordering someone to do those things,

[00:08:49] Speaker 00:
that's also part of the enforcement some connection tests i mean you can apply to the legislature right and no one thinks that we could use ex parte young to enjoying the arizona legislature or the washington legislator so you e your your honor is absolutely correct that it's part of young does not apply to the legislative branch of the state government's that's a bright line rule right i mean look connection test kind of suggested that it would well but the some connection test was was promulgated in the uh... context of state

[00:09:15] Speaker 00:
Executive branch officials.

[00:09:17] Speaker 00:
I mean, I think the language index part that young limits itself to state executive branch officials because look while agencies often do things like making law.

[00:09:26] Speaker 00:
I mean, what they're really doing is enforcing law.

[00:09:28] Speaker 00:
The executive branch enforces law.

[00:09:31] Speaker 00:
Sometimes they enforce law by just issuing orders.

[00:09:33] Speaker 00:
Sometimes they do it through a bit more of a formal process with more

[00:09:37] Speaker 00:
discretion, those things might be called rules or regulations, but those are enforcement of law.

[00:09:43] Speaker 00:
And frankly, the Ex parte Young Test shouldn't turn on what the executive branch calls its orders, whether they're just kind of preemptive orders or regulations, and nor should it turn on this power to hire or fire.

[00:09:57] Speaker 00:
I mean, the fact that under state law, what the statewide official says goes is a pretty close connection, frankly, more than just some connection.

[00:10:06] Speaker 00:
Unless the court has other questions, I'll save my remaining time for rebuttal.

[00:10:11] Speaker 01:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:10:22] Speaker 03:
May it please the court and July Simpson on behalf of the Washington State Building Code Council and the Attorney General of Washington.

[00:10:30] Speaker 03:
Ex parte young requires suit against the enforcer.

[00:10:33] Speaker 03:
Here, state law explicitly provides the counties and cities are the sole enforcers of the energy codes.

[00:10:41] Speaker 03:
The council promulgates but does not enforce the codes.

[00:10:45] Speaker 03:
If the plaintiffs want to bring this challenge to those codes in a suit against the council, the proper forum is in a rulemaking challenge under the state Washington Administrative Procedure Act.

[00:10:58] Speaker 03:
I'd like to make... Could they also see the local officials?

[00:11:02] Speaker 03:
Yes, they could do that, Your Honor.

[00:11:04] Speaker 01:
And they're not entitled to any sovereign immunity, right?

[00:11:06] Speaker 01:
The municipalities?

[00:11:08] Speaker 03:
They are not.

[00:11:09] Speaker 03:
However, the Attorney General and the Council are.

[00:11:12] Speaker 03:
As an initial matter, I'd like to make three factual points about what the council does and does not do when speaking about the council.

[00:11:20] Speaker 03:
First, the council is a quasi-legislative body that does not approve or deny building permits.

[00:11:26] Speaker 01:
They do not- I have a question about that.

[00:11:28] Speaker 01:
How come you didn't claim some sort of legislative immunity, if that's true?

[00:11:34] Speaker 01:
Can you repeat that?

[00:11:35] Speaker 01:
There is a doctrine of legislative immunity that you can't sue.

[00:11:39] Speaker 01:
There's some, on top of sovereign immunity, there's some immunities for legislative branch members.

[00:11:47] Speaker 01:
If they're a quasi-legislative organization, why did they claim that?

[00:11:52] Speaker 03:
I suppose it's possible that they could have done that.

[00:11:56] Speaker 03:
In this instance, what made the most sense in terms of an immunity to apply is the immunity of the 11th Amendment, which applies to executive branches where the council is housed in an executive branch.

[00:12:13] Speaker 03:
The council is a slightly unique agency.

[00:12:19] Speaker 03:
There was discussion previously here at the podium about

[00:12:22] Speaker 03:
how there are agencies that do promulgate rules and also enforce rules.

[00:12:27] Speaker 03:
However, here that is not the case.

[00:12:30] Speaker 03:
What we have here is we have an agency, the council, that only promulgates the rules and then the state statute explicitly states that it's the local officials that do the enforcing of those rules.

[00:12:42] Speaker 03:
And frankly, when we think about the local county officials enforcing those rules, what we talk about, they have significant penalties when they enforce.

[00:12:51] Speaker 03:
They can issue stop work orders, fines, even forced demolition, and the council does not oversee or supervise their decisions, and they don't have any recourse if they... You can issue opinions on how to interpret the regulations, correct?

[00:13:05] Speaker 03:
They can issue non-binding opinions.

[00:13:08] Speaker 01:
So if they issued an opinion and the local municipality just disregards it, the council can do nothing about it.

[00:13:14] Speaker 03:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:13:17] Speaker 03:
I would like to turn to the discussion of Messiness.

[00:13:20] Speaker 03:
Counsel did speak broadly about Messiness.

[00:13:24] Speaker 03:
And Judge Bumate, you mentioned that you thought that Messiness was wrong.

[00:13:28] Speaker 03:
And what I would like is to provide a way to look at Messiness in those cases that may assist this court.

[00:13:34] Speaker 03:
When we look at Messiness and you and the Brown case,

[00:13:39] Speaker 03:
What we're looking at is a distinct line of cases because those are cases that challenge statutes that don't typically give rise to enforcement proceedings.

[00:13:49] Speaker 03:
And that comes directly from the You case.

[00:13:52] Speaker 03:
And in these types of cases, the courts use the legal fiction of ex parte young to allow suit to proceed against state officials who give effect to the challenge codes.

[00:14:04] Speaker 03:
But by contrast, this case falls comfortably within a different category of cases where there are clear enforcement proceedings and clear enforcers.

[00:14:14] Speaker 01:
In Messines, if one of the county recorders disobeyed the manual, what would happen?

[00:14:19] Speaker 03:
It's unclear there, however, what we're talking about there is they challenged a statute.

[00:14:26] Speaker 03:
They challenged the order that candidates need to appear on ballots.

[00:14:31] Speaker 03:
There is no discretion there.

[00:14:32] Speaker 03:
The statute says the candidates have to appear in a certain order.

[00:14:36] Speaker 03:
The manual then enforced that.

[00:14:39] Speaker 01:
I thought you said it had no enforcement mechanism, right?

[00:14:42] Speaker 01:
There has to be some way to make sure the county recorder follows the law.

[00:14:46] Speaker 03:
It is a little difficult.

[00:14:49] Speaker 03:
Perhaps what I intended to say is that they don't typically give rise to enforcement proceedings as opposed to, say, a criminal case or here where you have a building code application and then the code is applied and enforced to that particular application.

[00:15:07] Speaker 02:
Well, in Messines, if a local official declined to follow the manual or the rule, the statute,

[00:15:14] Speaker 02:
I gather some suit could be brought in the local Superior Court.

[00:15:19] Speaker 03:
I believe, Your Honor, that in that case, actually, the only form was criminal.

[00:15:25] Speaker 03:
There was criminal enforcement provisions for failing to follow the Arizona state ballot order statute.

[00:15:32] Speaker 03:
But like I said, this is not the type of case that arises that gives, that's the stereotypical ex parte young enforcement action where there's clear enforcement.

[00:15:43] Speaker 02:
Let's assume that some Democratic county in Arizona that just

[00:15:48] Speaker 02:
declined to just set the ballot out the way they wanted it and didn't follow the statute.

[00:15:54] Speaker 02:
I imagine the Republican Party could go to court and try to get an injunction to compel the county clerk to comply with the law.

[00:16:05] Speaker 03:
In that case, it is possible that again in that situation that the court could use the legal fiction of ex parte young to allow suit to proceed against certain state officials who give effect officials.

[00:16:20] Speaker 03:
Then in that case, the county officials would not have 11th Amendment immunity.

[00:16:25] Speaker 03:
And there are that statute allowed for criminal sanctions.

[00:16:29] Speaker 03:
against county officials that failed to follow, but that's not the case here.

[00:16:35] Speaker 03:
Here what we have is a case that comfortably falls within the category of cases where it's enforced and there is an enforcer.

[00:16:45] Speaker 03:
These cases include Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Snook, Mendoza.

[00:16:51] Speaker 03:
These are all cases where there were clear enforcement proceedings and entities that enforce the law.

[00:16:56] Speaker 03:
And here we have a clear enforcer.

[00:16:59] Speaker 03:
That's the local building code officials, not the defendants.

[00:17:03] Speaker 02:
How about the Attorney General?

[00:17:05] Speaker 03:
The Attorney General does not enforce the energy codes.

[00:17:09] Speaker 03:
Again, that's entrusted to the local officials.

[00:17:11] Speaker 02:
And the Attorney General does not... Is the Attorney General precluded from... I mean, is he just can't get into this game?

[00:17:18] Speaker 03:
I think what your honor may be speaking referring to is the city of Sunnyside, which is about the discretionary authority to file a lawsuit in a matter of common concern.

[00:17:31] Speaker 03:
And it merely states that the AG has discretionary authority when there's a cognizable common law or statutory cause of action.

[00:17:38] Speaker 03:
But this is no more than a generalized duty to enforce, which is not enough under ex parte young.

[00:17:45] Speaker 03:
In fact, Ex parte Young specifically contemplated this very scenario where an attorney general is sued, and it stated that you cannot sue the attorney general just because he might represent the state in litigation involving enforcement of the statute.

[00:18:02] Speaker 03:
The attorney general has nothing more than discretionary authority.

[00:18:07] Speaker 03:
Ex parte Young provides relief against the enforcement of laws and not their promulgation.

[00:18:14] Speaker 02:
Could the Attorney General enforce it?

[00:18:17] Speaker 02:
Attempt to enforce it?

[00:18:18] Speaker 02:
Well, the plaintiffs... I mean, suppose, you know, the Attorney General, you know, just thought that the state policy of trying to reduce the use of gas was, you know, needed to be enforced.

[00:18:43] Speaker 02:
Could the could the attorney general say, you know, if any local entity doesn't doesn't comply, I'm going to go after him.

[00:18:51] Speaker 03:
Well, your honor, again, in city of Sunnyside that.

[00:18:53] Speaker 03:
did state that the attorney general does have discretionary authority in some instances.

[00:19:00] Speaker 03:
And in those situations, the plaintiffs would need to point to some cognizable common law or statutory law cause of action.

[00:19:08] Speaker 03:
And they simply have not done so in this case, which makes the attorney general not the appropriate defendant in this particular case under these particular circumstances.

[00:19:22] Speaker 03:
And the plaintiffs have not shown any real likelihood that the attorney general will take any action, anything beyond mere speculation.

[00:19:33] Speaker 03:
and also briefly going back to Messiness as that was a point points that were made specifically.

[00:19:42] Speaker 03:
Messiness did not hold that there's any lack of discretion anytime the rule promulgator is stripped of their 11th amendment immunity and plaintiffs do want to broaden the meaning of Messiness.

[00:19:53] Speaker 03:
to mean that it would strip a quasi-legislative agency without enforcement authority of its 11th Amendment immunity, and this is not what ex parte Young intended, and it's not how waivers of sovereign immunity work.

[00:20:07] Speaker 03:
If there are no further questions, then in conclusion, the district court properly dismissed the counsel and the attorney general due to its 11th Amendment immunity, and this court should affirm.

[00:20:19] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:20:20] Speaker 01:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:20:32] Speaker 00:
A few points in rebuttal your honors, but of course, feel free to interrupt me with questions.

[00:20:37] Speaker 00:
First, I want to.

[00:20:39] Speaker 00:
talk about this kind of floodgates or extension of messiness argument uh... look there are very clear lines here you it's only the egg eggs is executive branch can't go to the to the legislative branch i think that it's a lot of that is a party on going to swallow everything concerned off the table second issue here is really the miss what missing us did is

[00:21:02] Speaker 00:
It's a fairly narrow holding, frankly.

[00:21:04] Speaker 00:
It's when a statewide official issues orders that are binding under state law and that local officials, that leave local officials without discretion to avoid violating federal law, as in it is an order that under state law, they have to violate federal law.

[00:21:20] Speaker 00:
A lot of regulations and a lot of, frankly, orders from statewide officials are going to leave tons of discretion to local officials.

[00:21:28] Speaker 00:
In fact, when you look at most orders from the governor just broadly about how to enforce laws, they often leave quite a bit of enforcement discretion with the local officials.

[00:21:40] Speaker 00:
Those are not going to work under this theory because the key is this binding lawful order that I have no choice but to either violate state law, of course,

[00:21:50] Speaker 00:
or comply with.

[00:21:52] Speaker 00:
Second, Messines, it's not some aberration from this court's case law.

[00:21:56] Speaker 00:
I mean, this court has a fairly long tradition of having a broad conception of Ex parte Young.

[00:22:02] Speaker 00:
The Yu case and the Brown case, I won't belabor the court with the facts of those again.

[00:22:09] Speaker 00:
They're in a briefing, of course, and my point on those cases isn't that they're factual analogs.

[00:22:13] Speaker 00:
I think Messines is a close factual analog, but Yu and Brown

[00:22:17] Speaker 00:
it's not so much that they're clear factual analogues, it's that they show the flexible, pragmatic approach the court takes to ex parte Young.

[00:22:26] Speaker 00:
And again, I think when you kind of add that general approach to Messiness, even Messiness, I'm not sure, advances this course that much more in that direction than what it already was.

[00:22:38] Speaker 00:
Third point, there was some talk about

[00:22:40] Speaker 00:
you know, what else we could do?

[00:22:42] Speaker 00:
Could we sue all of the localities and all of that?

[00:22:46] Speaker 00:
And I want to be clear, you know, we believe we have a right under Ex parte Young to seek vindication of our federal rights in federal court.

[00:22:56] Speaker 00:
It is true that we could bring suit against, you know, 100 plus localities.

[00:23:02] Speaker 00:
That is less than ideal for numerous reasons.

[00:23:05] Speaker 00:
It's bad for us, and that would multiply cost and make it

[00:23:08] Speaker 00:
much more complicated.

[00:23:09] Speaker 02:
Could you do a defendant class action?

[00:23:13] Speaker 00:
Well, I'm not sure in this case if we could because there aren't, there are about a hundred some odd defendants.

[00:23:20] Speaker 00:
It's not as if we have, you know, 20,000 or something like that.

[00:23:24] Speaker 00:
And so I'm not sure if numerosity would be satisfied there.

[00:23:28] Speaker 01:
But if you won in one case, wouldn't it, you peel up and then they'll be binding on, I don't know how the state courts work there,

[00:23:34] Speaker 00:
Sure.

[00:23:35] Speaker 00:
So if we sued one of the localities in federal court, of course, that injunction would only be against that locality.

[00:23:44] Speaker 00:
You are correct that, well, it wouldn't even have presidential effect unless and until it got to this court, right?

[00:23:50] Speaker 00:
Because district court orders don't have presidential effect.

[00:23:53] Speaker 00:
In that instance, we would have a binding precedent.

[00:23:55] Speaker 02:
Well, I mean, they're somewhat authoritative.

[00:23:57] Speaker 02:
I do not mean to suggest that.

[00:24:01] Speaker 02:
You don't want to just say district courts.

[00:24:06] Speaker 00:
They don't really mean anything.

[00:24:07] Speaker 00:
I am talking in terms of legally binding presidential effect, which India might

[00:24:13] Speaker 00:
clients would want to feel comfortable and frankly what they would really want is an injunction against the parties and really there is no way to obtain an injunction against all the localities without suing them all and of course the Needless to say that's a complicated endeavor, but not just for us It's bad for the courts and it's bad for these localities many of which are

[00:24:34] Speaker 00:
small localities, many of which don't like the energy code and frankly don't want to enforce it.

[00:24:39] Speaker 00:
So you put really everyone in a bad position.

[00:24:41] Speaker 00:
This is the mechanism that, again, we think is lawful and we think also just makes the most sense in terms of an efficient adjudication of our claims.

[00:24:53] Speaker 00:
And I guess lastly, briefly on the attorney general point,

[00:24:57] Speaker 00:
this court's decision in long versus van de Kamp says you know what what you need to show is something beyond pay the ages is the chief law enforcement officer of of the state that's not our argument our argument is that in the words of this court there's a real likelihood.

[00:25:13] Speaker 00:
that the Attorney General would take action to enforce this law.

[00:25:18] Speaker 00:
And again, I will simply point out that even now, the Attorney General has not addressed that issue.

[00:25:24] Speaker 00:
And that's not, to be clear, the Attorney General taking this action and trying to enforce state law, nothing's wrong with that.

[00:25:31] Speaker 00:
It makes perfect sense.

[00:25:33] Speaker 00:
That's exactly what the attorney general is going to do, which is why the attorney general is also a proper ex parte young defendant.

[00:25:39] Speaker 00:
Unless the court has further questions, I'll yield the remainder of my time.

[00:25:42] Speaker 01:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:25:44] Speaker 01:
This case is submitted.