[00:00:01] Speaker 04:
Okay, it looks like counsel are ready.

[00:00:02] Speaker 04:
Our first case is 25-5071, United States versus Buzzard.

[00:00:08] Speaker 01:
Mr. Troskoski.

[00:00:10] Speaker 01:
Yes, may it please the court.

[00:00:12] Speaker 01:
I am Ryan Troskoski.

[00:00:13] Speaker 01:
I represent the appellant, James Buzzard.

[00:00:16] Speaker 01:
This is a unique case of ineffective assistance of counsel that has been fully litigated and preserved for direct appeal.

[00:00:30] Speaker 01:
As the court knows, the defendant has an unequivocal right to the effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process, and that right was violated in this case.

[00:00:42] Speaker 01:
So the original plea offer to the defendant was to Section 924-0.

[00:00:46] Speaker 04:
Before we move to the nitty-gritty, our usual practice is not to entertain a

[00:00:55] Speaker 04:
ineffective assistance claim until collateral proceedings.

[00:01:00] Speaker 04:
What counsels in this case to deviate from that ordinary practice?

[00:01:06] Speaker 01:
Well, the whole July 13th hearing was about ineffective assistance of counsel, and all the two trial court orders were about ineffective assistance of counsel.

[00:01:14] Speaker 01:
So it was raised and litigated and squarely presented before the district court.

[00:01:20] Speaker 01:
The record was developed specifically for this purpose.

[00:01:24] Speaker 04:
So that's why it's aren't there some fact questions still lingering as to?

[00:01:29] Speaker 04:
What counsel knew and did or didn't say to your client, those sorts of things?

[00:01:34] Speaker 01:
I would say no.

[00:01:36] Speaker 01:
If you look at the record, page 977 at footnote 2, that's the first trial court order on this.

[00:01:42] Speaker 01:
The trial court basically noted that it was undisputed that the trial attorney never told the defendant that there was an expiration date for the plea offer.

[00:01:55] Speaker 01:
So really,

[00:01:58] Speaker 01:
I don't think they're any factual.

[00:01:59] Speaker 04:
Didn't the district judge though make a finding that there was no expiration date?

[00:02:04] Speaker 01:
It did and that was incorrect because basically Clear clear incorrect clear error well not even we don't think we need to get to that The district court said that there was no explicit fixed expiration date

[00:02:21] Speaker 01:
But Frye only requires a formal offer with a fixed expiration date.

[00:02:28] Speaker 01:
So it can be implied.

[00:02:29] Speaker 01:
We had an implicit expiration date of June 6th in this case.

[00:02:36] Speaker 04:
We've segued from whether we should hear IAC now versus later in a collateral proceeding, and we've kind of moved to your other issues.

[00:02:46] Speaker 04:
So I mean, your position is there's no

[00:02:51] Speaker 04:
further need for the development of facts to make a determination that your client was ineffectively served by his lawyer in this proceeding.

[00:03:00] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:03:01] Speaker 01:
And another unique quirk of this case, we don't have to speculate, oh, would the defendant have accepted the offer?

[00:03:06] Speaker 01:
Well, we know we would have, because he actually signed it in this case.

[00:03:10] Speaker 01:
It's already a done deal.

[00:03:11] Speaker 01:
The government said it was too late, but it's all a done deal.

[00:03:15] Speaker 01:
I don't think there are any remaining factual questions.

[00:03:17] Speaker 00:
Don't we need some factual development about

[00:03:20] Speaker 00:
the issue of expiration, whether or not in fact it was an expiration plea that could be expired, and whether it was implied or explicit, and you can develop those facts.

[00:03:38] Speaker 00:
by testimony from the attorney in question.

[00:03:42] Speaker 01:
Well, if you look at page 11 of the government's brief, they know that they agree, and it's undisputed, that June 6 was the implied date.

[00:03:52] Speaker 01:
So it's not a disputed fact here.

[00:03:55] Speaker 01:
And the record doesn't need to be developed anymore because it's not contested.

[00:03:59] Speaker 00:
Don't we need to develop testimony from the attorney in question about various communications that he had with Mr. Buzzard?

[00:04:07] Speaker 01:
Maybe if the defendant was given an independent attorney, that record could have been developed more.

[00:04:13] Speaker 01:
So the trial attorney didn't argue any of this because he was conflicted.

[00:04:16] Speaker 00:
Why shouldn't that happen in the ordinary course of events with our case Galloway that that happens in a habeas case?

[00:04:29] Speaker 00:
I'm not familiar with Galloway as I stand.

[00:04:31] Speaker 00:
Galloway is one that says, we don't do this on direct appeal.

[00:04:35] Speaker 00:
Ineffective assistance of counsel we wait for a further development of the record I'm just saying the record doesn't need to be developed any further.

[00:04:45] Speaker 00:
I know you said that but you haven't answered my question about inquiry of this lawyer in question about what communications he had with buzzard and What buzzard understood did you understand it was going to be expired?

[00:05:00] Speaker 01:
The trial attorney fell in a sword and admitted he didn't tell the defendant about any expiration dates.

[00:05:06] Speaker 00:
But we need to know the discussions he had with him.

[00:05:10] Speaker 00:
He had discussions about the plea bargain itself.

[00:05:16] Speaker 01:
I would argue that there were no other factual findings needed to be made with basic value.

[00:05:22] Speaker 03:
Well, my understanding of what the district court was trying to do at this hearing was make a determination factually whether there was this expiration date on the five to seven years offer.

[00:05:39] Speaker 03:
And it did that with this hearing, this evidentiary hearing, and it determined that there was no expiration date.

[00:05:47] Speaker 03:
And in fact, there had been an actual rejection, an explicit rejection of the settlement offer, which I believe was June 20th.

[00:06:02] Speaker 03:
No, no, June 1st.

[00:06:07] Speaker 03:
There was explicit rejection of the offer.

[00:06:09] Speaker 03:
And after the explicit rejection of the offer by Mr. Buzzard, there was a counteroffer, which would certainly indicate

[00:06:17] Speaker 03:
There's no longer, I've rejected this offer, I'm giving you a new counteroffer.

[00:06:22] Speaker 03:
I mean, when you explicitly reject an offer, how can you consistently suggest it remains open?

[00:06:31] Speaker 03:
And you make a counteroffer after you explicitly reject it.

[00:06:35] Speaker 01:
I don't know, we don't know what the defendant knew on that point.

[00:06:39] Speaker 03:
Why does it matter what the defendant knew?

[00:06:41] Speaker 03:
The district court was saying, was there even an offer outstanding

[00:06:46] Speaker 03:
And the district court said, clearly not.

[00:06:49] Speaker 03:
On this day, June 1st, the offer was explicitly rejected by the defendant.

[00:06:59] Speaker 01:
I don't remember that June 1st date.

[00:07:01] Speaker 01:
I just know that June 6th was D-Day, no pun intended, and that the defendant didn't know anything about it.

[00:07:10] Speaker 03:
And what was the testimony about June 6th?

[00:07:13] Speaker 01:
Well, if you look at page 11 of the government's brief, their position below and on appeal, that's page 11 of their brief, was that June 6 was the final day that the plea needed to be accepted.

[00:07:26] Speaker 01:
And the defendant didn't know anything about this.

[00:07:29] Speaker 03:
I mean, really the problem is here, none of this was looked from the defendant's... Even though the court made a finding that he'd already explicitly rejected the offer by that date.

[00:07:39] Speaker 03:
It's a little confusing what's happening here.

[00:07:43] Speaker 01:
Anything that happened after June 6 doesn't really matter from our point of view.

[00:07:47] Speaker 03:
What about before June 6?

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
I don't think we had any rejection of any offers before June 6.

[00:07:53] Speaker 03:
Okay, all right.

[00:07:54] Speaker 03:
Maybe I've got the timeline wrong, but I know the district court did make a finding of an explicit rejection of the offer and a new counteroffer.

[00:08:02] Speaker 01:
I guess the overall part of this is I just hope we're not

[00:08:06] Speaker 01:
playing word games with the Sixth Amendment in the sense that formal, informal, explicit, implied.

[00:08:11] Speaker 01:
I mean, we have to look at this from the defendant's point of view.

[00:08:14] Speaker 01:
He did not know about any expiration dates.

[00:08:19] Speaker 03:
But that was the point that the court was trying to say.

[00:08:22] Speaker 03:
If there was no expiration date, there was nothing for him to be informed about.

[00:08:30] Speaker 01:
If there was no expiration date, we wouldn't be here.

[00:08:32] Speaker 01:
He would have pled guilty.

[00:08:34] Speaker 03:
Well, that's certainly not the case.

[00:08:36] Speaker 03:
We know that even after this offer was open for a couple of months, and he made many counter offers during this time.

[00:08:46] Speaker 01:
Only in the course of normal plea bargaining, plea negotiations, because he didn't know that he had a final deadline.

[00:08:53] Speaker 03:
And you don't agree that there was a finding that he rejected the offer at some point?

[00:09:00] Speaker 03:
That the district court made that finding?

[00:09:04] Speaker 01:
I don't as I stand here.

[00:09:05] Speaker 01:
I don't recall that exactly all right within the time all right.

[00:09:09] Speaker 01:
Thank you I'll save any other response for rebuttal Okay, thank you counsel May it please the court Thomas don't come for the United States

[00:09:34] Speaker 04:
Could you clear up Judge Moritz's timeline question?

[00:09:39] Speaker 02:
Sure, absolutely.

[00:09:40] Speaker 02:
From your perspective.

[00:09:42] Speaker 02:
And there was a finding to that effect, Judge Moritz.

[00:09:46] Speaker 02:
That was the court's written findings following the hearing were at volume one at page 1006, and it may have been 1006 and 1007, but that's where you'll find those findings.

[00:10:03] Speaker 03:
Wasn't that on June 1st?

[00:10:04] Speaker 02:
And that was on June 1st, and that's also contained within the government's briefing that wasn't disputed by Mr. Buzzard below, which is volume 1 at 960 through 962.

[00:10:15] Speaker 02:
That's where the government laid out all those offers and counter offers and rejections that I believe there were four counter offers from the defense, and I think the latest one was June 1st.

[00:10:27] Speaker 03:
And that all came up at the hearing?

[00:10:29] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:10:31] Speaker 02:
And there was no dispute at the hearing about the timeline.

[00:10:36] Speaker 02:
In fact, Mr. Buzzard's counsel went out of his way to say, I'm not disputing any of the timeline that Ms.

[00:10:43] Speaker 02:
Reininger for the government has laid out.

[00:10:45] Speaker 02:
We we got to the hearing on June 20th.

[00:10:49] Speaker 02:
Ms.

[00:10:49] Speaker 02:
Reininger told me that March 30th offer is no longer available and at that point is when I went to my client and said Let's try to sign it anyway and see if they'll accept it and go back to it essentially So what the June 1st rejection you did that?

[00:11:08] Speaker 03:
That you I'm sorry at what point did I?

[00:11:11] Speaker 02:
That was June 20th.

[00:11:12] Speaker 03:
June 20th.

[00:11:13] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:11:13] Speaker 02:
June 20th.

[00:11:14] Speaker 02:
Yeah.

[00:11:15] Speaker 03:
He went back and asked if he'd sign it even though it wasn't.

[00:11:20] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:11:20] Speaker 02:
Well, he brought it to him and asked him if he would sign it.

[00:11:23] Speaker 02:
But we know from

[00:11:25] Speaker 02:
several things in the record that that wasn't the first time he had seen that March 30th offer.

[00:11:31] Speaker 02:
One of the reasons we know is the June 1st counteroffer.

[00:11:35] Speaker 02:
Unless we had a fully fleshed out hearing.

[00:11:37] Speaker 03:
I think June 1st was the actual rejection of the offer according to the district court.

[00:11:42] Speaker 03:
yes and and I want to be I want to make sure that we're talking about the same thing maybe a counteroffer but I got the impression from the district court it was a an explicit rejection and then a counteroffer yeah which is not the same thing as just making a counter offer and expecting the offer to still be open

[00:12:02] Speaker 02:
Well, my recollection is that it was a counteroffer, but a counteroffer rejects the initial offer.

[00:12:11] Speaker 02:
So just by standard contract principles,

[00:12:15] Speaker 02:
that March 30th offer is only on the table to the extent the government wants to go back and revisit that, which the government can.

[00:12:24] Speaker 02:
But in this case, that June 1st counteroffer, what it shows us is it's one of many data points that shows us that the defendant knew about the March 30th offer and knew about it enough to evaluate it and make a counteroffer about it.

[00:12:39] Speaker 02:
And it also shows us that on this advanced question that the court didn't get to, because it didn't have to, of would the defendant have been prejudiced if there had been a firm expiration date and he wasn't informed about it, the next question under Frye is, well, would the defendant have accepted that offer if he had known about the expiration date?

[00:13:02] Speaker 02:
And we know from

[00:13:03] Speaker 02:
several data points here that he wouldn't have accepted that offer.

[00:13:07] Speaker 02:
The only time he was willing to accept that offer was essentially when it was too late, was the court had denied the motion to dismiss, there had been another pre-trial hearing denying some motions in limine that Mr. Buzzard's very conscientious and zealous counsel had brought up, and there was the June 20th hearing where all of the government's difficult to wrangle fact witnesses showed up.

[00:13:30] Speaker 02:
And Mr. Buzzard's counsel flew in from Philadelphia to view that and saw that they had all showed up.

[00:13:36] Speaker 02:
And that's the only time when Mr. Buzzard showed interest in the offer that he knew had been outstanding since March 30th.

[00:13:43] Speaker 02:
The other data point that I would point the court to are the text messages, the actual text messages between Ms.

[00:13:49] Speaker 02:
Reininger and Mr. Abreu about the offer.

[00:13:52] Speaker 02:
And those are at volume one at pages 981 and 982.

[00:13:57] Speaker 02:
And you can see Mr. Abreu uses language like, if I could have your response to the motion to dismiss in hand when I go back to talk to him, that would be an additional data point for talking to him about this offer.

[00:14:11] Speaker 02:
And he also says, I'll be talking to him more about that deal.

[00:14:16] Speaker 02:
So there's every indication from the record to the extent

[00:14:21] Speaker 02:
This court believes that the record is complete as to ineffective assistance of counsel, which we submit it's not.

[00:14:27] Speaker 02:
There's every indication from the record that Mr. Buzzard would not be able to make out the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of Strickland.

[00:14:36] Speaker 03:
Was there any testimony from his counsel at this hearing that

[00:14:43] Speaker 03:
Council believe that because they've been making counter offers, counter offers, counter offers each time implicitly or explicitly rejecting the offer.

[00:14:54] Speaker 03:
that that was a continuing, that that was something they could continue to do, which seems to be what you're suggesting happened here, is this defendant believed that they could continue to make counter-offers or eventually accept, because that's what they were doing, and the offer was never withdrawn.

[00:15:11] Speaker 03:
So isn't that a bit contrary to what the district court found then?

[00:15:16] Speaker 03:
I mean, because it turns out there basically was an expiration date where you can't keep making these counter-offers.

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
No, and there's a difference between the government revoking the offer and there being an expiration date.

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
Because an expiration date, at least as the Supreme Court discussed it in Frye, is essentially

[00:15:37] Speaker 02:
this offer is going to automatically expire by June 1st or by June 2nd.

[00:15:43] Speaker 02:
And that's what you needed testimony on because there wasn't anything on the face of the offer itself that would indicate that one way or the other.

[00:15:50] Speaker 02:
So we're in a factual inquiry about whether there's one of those expiration dates.

[00:15:55] Speaker 02:
And in Frye, the defense attorney knew about the expiration date and blew it and didn't tell his client about the offer.

[00:16:03] Speaker 02:
let alone, hey, there's an expiration date.

[00:16:05] Speaker 02:
And now the defendant lost out on that offer.

[00:16:08] Speaker 02:
So the court found that there was no expiration date.

[00:16:11] Speaker 02:
There was a firm revocation on June 20.

[00:16:15] Speaker 02:
And the government

[00:16:17] Speaker 02:
you know, the actions of the government counsel and Mr. Buzzard's counsel are consistent with the findings of the district court.

[00:16:25] Speaker 02:
That they continued to act as though they were trying to work out a possible deal.

[00:16:32] Speaker 02:
I believe on June 7th at the hearing, the government told the court, we're still in the midst of negotiating.

[00:16:39] Speaker 02:
And in fact, on June 20th, when the government revoked

[00:16:43] Speaker 02:
The March 30th offer, the government said, we're going to be presenting you with a new offer.

[00:16:49] Speaker 02:
And as often happens in these cases, when the government's position improves and when the government's willingness to make a deal decreases as you get closer to trial, that deal was going to be worse for Mr. Buzzard.

[00:17:01] Speaker 02:
It was going to be a plea to second degree murder instead of 924-0 with a cross-reference to the manslaughter guidelines.

[00:17:12] Speaker 02:
I think getting back to where we originally started, which is the ineffective assistance of counsel, I think Your Honors are 100% correct.

[00:17:23] Speaker 02:
Of course, we agree with this in our brief, that the record is not fully developed for review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.

[00:17:33] Speaker 02:
And this court has said in a number of cases that it's not only a preference of this court to wait until collateral proceedings, but virtually all ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.

[00:17:46] Speaker 00:
What I don't understand is you said that in an ineffective assistance habeas claim, a 2255 claim, we would need to know about

[00:18:01] Speaker 00:
the pending plea offer, as to its expiration or non-exploration.

[00:18:09] Speaker 00:
But there's been a finding that there was no expiration date.

[00:18:14] Speaker 00:
So why do you need further development of that?

[00:18:18] Speaker 02:
Well, one of the things that this Court has said in cases like Galloway and Flood is that you need, at the very least, some weighing in by defense counsel about whether, if there was an act that on its face appears to have been deficient performance, was there any strategy behind that?

[00:18:40] Speaker 02:
And I think as Judge Timkovich was asking earlier,

[00:18:43] Speaker 02:
you would need to get into the nitty-gritty of, you know, what did you say and what did he appear to understand based on what you said.

[00:18:52] Speaker 02:
It's not necessarily a black and white issue of did you say X, yes.

[00:18:59] Speaker 02:
And then you would need to get into an inquiry at the district court of whether the defendant was prejudiced.

[00:19:06] Speaker 02:
And we submit that on this record, incomplete as it is on ineffective assistance of counsel, only supports that there was no prejudice to the defendant in the manner that Frye talks about.

[00:19:20] Speaker 02:
Because every indication that we have in the record is that the defendant would not have accepted this plea agreement

[00:19:27] Speaker 02:
if it had a firm expiration date of June 1st or June 2nd.

[00:19:31] Speaker 00:
But you're talking about the March deal, rather than the second degree murder deal, right?

[00:19:41] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:19:41] Speaker 02:
And that's what I understand Mr. Buzzard to be focusing his arguments on, is that March 30th plea offer.

[00:19:49] Speaker 02:
Mr. Buzzard, to my knowledge, never signed any plea offer for second degree murder.

[00:19:59] Speaker 02:
But if he claims to have done that and claims there was some ineffective assistance with regard to the June 20th second degree murder offer, then that's yet again a situation that probably even more than the March 30th offer, we would need a hearing in the first instance at the district court and fact finding.

[00:20:18] Speaker 02:
The Massaro case from the Supreme Court says that unless the record is developed precisely for the purpose of conducting an ineffective assistance of counsel.

[00:20:28] Speaker 00:
Is there minimum mandatory on the second degree murder?

[00:20:32] Speaker 02:
Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.

[00:20:33] Speaker 02:
My understanding of second degree is that it's a maximum life, but that there's no mandatory minimum.

[00:20:39] Speaker 00:
And so you just get a guidelines range, and it's capped at life, right?

[00:20:47] Speaker 02:
I believe so.

[00:20:48] Speaker 02:
And there are aggravating circumstances under the second degree murder guideline.

[00:20:52] Speaker 02:
But my understanding is, unlike first degree murder, there's no mandatory sentence.

[00:20:59] Speaker 02:
OK.

[00:20:59] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:21:02] Speaker 02:
And as we said in our brief, I'll just briefly touch on the right to presence claim itself, which

[00:21:09] Speaker 02:
Every case that we've found from the Supreme Court and from this court has found that that is the type of claim that's subject to plain error review.

[00:21:18] Speaker 02:
It's not a structural error.

[00:21:21] Speaker 02:
Even when the defendant does have a due process right to attend the proceeding in question, you still have to preserve that.

[00:21:29] Speaker 02:
You still have to show prejudice on appeal.

[00:21:31] Speaker 02:
And that's the defendant's burden, because we're on plain error review.

[00:21:34] Speaker 04:
And you need no- When would the objection have occurred?

[00:21:37] Speaker 04:
When should it have?

[00:21:38] Speaker 02:
could have occurred at any number of places, could have occurred when he first found out that the hearing had taken place.

[00:21:46] Speaker 02:
There was a publicly filed docket entry on July 13th after the hearing where the court said, we held a hearing and I'm making the following findings based on this hearing.

[00:21:59] Speaker 02:
Defendant could have objected then, just as in Snyder, which was the Justice Cardozo case from 1934, where they went and viewed the crime scene.

[00:22:07] Speaker 02:
They took the whole jury out there.

[00:22:09] Speaker 02:
They took all the counsel, the bailiffs, the judge.

[00:22:11] Speaker 02:
The only one who wasn't there was the defendant.

[00:22:13] Speaker 02:
And the Supreme Court said, you could have asked for another viewing of the crime scene if you wanted.

[00:22:19] Speaker 02:
You had ample time before trial if you thought anything had been missed of substance.

[00:22:23] Speaker 02:
That didn't happen here.

[00:22:24] Speaker 02:
The defendant had ample time before trial and after that July 13th hearing to say, wait a minute, there was a hearing and I wasn't there and I was prejudiced in some way.

[00:22:34] Speaker 00:
But the only issue in that hearing where he was not present was the expiration issue.

[00:22:39] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:22:40] Speaker 02:
And it was information that was uniquely in the knowledge of the attorneys.

[00:22:47] Speaker 02:
And there was nothing that Mr. Buzzard could have added to that discussion on that point.

[00:22:55] Speaker 04:
And he has pointed out... He doesn't know about the hearing before it occurred?

[00:22:58] Speaker 02:
The indication from the record is he did.

[00:23:01] Speaker 02:
Because in the June... But what are those indications?

[00:23:04] Speaker 02:
On July 10th, his counsel filed a motion for the hearing.

[00:23:10] Speaker 02:
And he said, this is at volume one at page 850, they said in that July 10th motion for hearing, Mr. Buzzard has agreed to execute a waiver of speedy trial to ensure that this inquiry gets done.

[00:23:29] Speaker 02:
So it doesn't say explicitly we've told him that we're asking for a hearing, but in order to ask him if he'd be willing to execute a waiver of speedy trial on this issue, it indicates that they talked to him about the fact that they were requesting a hearing.

[00:23:43] Speaker 02:
But the point is, even if he didn't know about the hearing before it took place, he never objected

[00:23:51] Speaker 02:
after the hearing, his counsel didn't object.

[00:23:54] Speaker 03:
It was four days before trial?

[00:23:58] Speaker 02:
That sounds right.

[00:24:00] Speaker 03:
Not very long.

[00:24:01] Speaker 02:
Not long, but this was... We don't know.

[00:24:05] Speaker 03:
You're suggesting he has constructive knowledge because of the docket entry?

[00:24:09] Speaker 03:
Is that what you're saying?

[00:24:11] Speaker 03:
I'm suggesting... We don't know what his counsel told him, whether there had even been a hearing, whether a hearing had been granted.

[00:24:17] Speaker 02:
No, but what this court said in Byerly and in Hardy is that one of the data points for finding that the defendant, that the claim was subject to plain error, and I see that I'm out of time.

[00:24:32] Speaker 02:
May I finish?

[00:24:33] Speaker 02:
One of the data points that those courts both used was the defendant didn't object to being absent and his counsel didn't object at the hearing to his absence.

[00:24:44] Speaker 02:
And so that counts for subjecting his claim to plain error, the fact that his counsel didn't object.

[00:24:51] Speaker 02:
And again, if he wants to say that his counsel, as he's argued for the first time on appeal, was ineffective for failing to object, that's something that this court would

[00:25:02] Speaker 02:
would presumptively dismiss and send to the district court for a collateral proceeding in the first instance.

[00:25:08] Speaker 02:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:25:09] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:25:11] Speaker 01:
Unless there are further questions, I'll rest on the briefs.

[00:25:16] Speaker 04:
Excuse me, I didn't hear that.

[00:25:17] Speaker 01:
Unless there are any other questions, I'll rest on the briefs.

[00:25:20] Speaker 04:
Any questions?

[00:25:22] Speaker 04:
Counsel will accept your tender and counsel is excused.

[00:25:27] Speaker 04:
The case is submitted.