[00:00:01] Speaker 03:
The next case before us this morning is United States versus Wiggins 25-6013.

[00:00:10] Speaker 03:
Counsel for appellant, if you would make your appearance and proceed, please.

[00:00:18] Speaker 02:
May it please the court.

[00:00:19] Speaker 02:
My name is Howard Pinkus from the Federal Public Defender, and I represent Ronnie Wiggins.

[00:00:25] Speaker 02:
The government agrees that Mr. Wiggins is not an armed career criminal.

[00:00:29] Speaker 02:
and that he is entitled to sentencing relief.

[00:00:32] Speaker 02:
He is also entitled to relief from his conviction.

[00:00:35] Speaker 02:
Reasonable suspicion of drunk driving was dispelled by Officer Robertson's interaction with Mr. Wiggins, which was confirmed by a test he administered, just to be sure.

[00:00:46] Speaker 02:
At that point, there was no basis to continue to detain Mr. Wiggins.

[00:00:50] Speaker 02:
The evidence later obtained from his SUV, including the gun on which this felon in possession prosecution was based, should therefore have been suppressed.

[00:01:00] Speaker 02:
At the outset, in preparing for oral argument, I noted that the calls to the 911 operator were introduced at trial, though they are not in the record on appeal.

[00:01:10] Speaker 02:
Leaving aside the government's waiver of any argument for affirmance on the alternative ground, that there was reasonable suspicion of reckless driving that was not dispelled, those calls could not be considered.

[00:01:23] Speaker 02:
Under footnote two of this court's decision in the United States versus Brown, which is at 496 F3 1070,

[00:01:30] Speaker 02:
For the 911 calls to have been considered, there would need to be at least proof of what was reported to the 911 operator that made its way to dispatch.

[00:01:41] Speaker 02:
The proof is completely lacking here, and there is certainly not the indisputable proof that is needed in the context of a request to affirm on an alternative ground.

[00:01:52] Speaker 02:
As for reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, as Officer Robertson explained,

[00:01:58] Speaker 02:
He pretty quickly figured out that Mr. Wiggins was not intoxicated, and he confirmed this with a field sobriety test.

[00:02:05] Speaker 03:
And you're talking about the HGN test.

[00:02:07] Speaker 02:
I am, yes, Your Honor.

[00:02:08] Speaker 03:
And by the time that, right before he did that, he had put in for dispatch to get information about the status of whether there were any warrants out for Mr. Wiggins, right?

[00:02:21] Speaker 02:
He had done that before the HGN test, yes, Your Honor.

[00:02:26] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:02:27] Speaker 03:
And it seems to me that's a distinction with the difference, is it not?

[00:02:30] Speaker 03:
Because he was conducting the matters that were part of the purpose of the stop.

[00:02:36] Speaker 03:
And part of that was, as Rodriguez itself indicates, part and parcel of that, is checking to see if there are warrants.

[00:02:43] Speaker 03:
And so he put in that call.

[00:02:46] Speaker 03:
And when it came back as possible warrants, why did that not take on a life of its own?

[00:02:51] Speaker 02:
Because he continued the detention after the point at which

[00:02:56] Speaker 02:
the reasonable suspicion was dispelled and at that point the mission of the

[00:03:02] Speaker 03:
stop was completed.

[00:03:04] Speaker 03:
But was that the full mission of the stop when Rodriguez speaks about part of the mission of the stop being to check for warrants?

[00:03:11] Speaker 03:
And if he had made the call to check for warrants, if he had contacted dispatch, was he supposed to call dispatch back and say, no, no, no, don't give me the information that you found because I've done an HGN test on him and he doesn't seem to be drunk?

[00:03:26] Speaker 02:
No, what he's supposed to do is release Mr. Wiggins, let him go on his way.

[00:03:31] Speaker 02:
What Rodriguez also says is that a warrant check is permissible to allow the officer to complete his mission safely, the traffic mission safely.

[00:03:42] Speaker 02:
And the mission was completed once reasonable suspicion of any violation was dispelled.

[00:03:52] Speaker 02:
At that point, the traffic stop should have ended.

[00:03:56] Speaker 02:
And that's the problem here is that

[00:03:59] Speaker 02:
I mean, the easiest thing for the officer to do was just to hand Mr. Wiggins back his license and let him go on his way.

[00:04:06] Speaker 02:
He had already completed the mission and the warrants check on officer safety grounds is designed to allow him to complete that mission safely.

[00:04:18] Speaker 02:
The mission was over once the traffic, the basis for the stop was dispelled.

[00:04:24] Speaker 01:
Council, don't we have cases that say the purpose of a warrant check is not just officer safety?

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
And because those additional purposes, such as just good governance and ensuring people don't have warrants who are out and about on the streets, I think we have one case that's discussed that.

[00:04:42] Speaker 01:
So don't those other purposes also come to play here?

[00:04:46] Speaker 01:
Because I hear you saying, well, the safety mission was over once the investigation of drunk driving had concurred.

[00:04:53] Speaker 02:
No, those reasons do not allow for the continued detention here.

[00:04:58] Speaker 02:
As the court explained in Rodriguez, inquiries in the interest of traffic safety are allowed as incident to a traffic stop and to determine whether an apparent traffic violator is wanted for other traffic offenses.

[00:05:13] Speaker 02:
Here, the traffic stop was over.

[00:05:14] Speaker 02:
There was nothing that the warrants check for traffic purposes

[00:05:21] Speaker 02:
could be incident to.

[00:05:23] Speaker 02:
And he was not an apparent traffic violator.

[00:05:25] Speaker 02:
He was not a traffic violator.

[00:05:28] Speaker 03:
Just your statement of the rules suggests to the contrary, apparent traffic violator.

[00:05:32] Speaker 03:
And so it is incident to determining whether he's an apparent traffic violator.

[00:05:37] Speaker 03:
Well, you're going through the process of determining whether that's true.

[00:05:40] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:05:41] Speaker 02:
The apparent traffic violator refers to the stop.

[00:05:45] Speaker 02:
And the reasonable suspicion here was dispelled.

[00:05:48] Speaker 02:
At that point, he's not an apparent traffic violator.

[00:05:51] Speaker 02:
He's somebody who was mistakenly stopped when there may have been reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, but that investigation revealed he was not driving while intoxicated.

[00:06:02] Speaker 02:
And at that point, he was not an apparent traffic violator, and he should have been allowed to leave.

[00:06:07] Speaker 02:
Just as the court doesn't allow stops to check for traffic safety under Delaware v. Bruce, once it's determined that he's not an apparent traffic violator, there is no basis

[00:06:21] Speaker 02:
for checking to make sure that he's operating the vehicle safely.

[00:06:25] Speaker 03:
Well, alluding to Judge Federico's comments, we have a bunch of cases where there is, and I'm not going to take the time to fish out the exact name right now, but at least my recollection, and tell me if I'm wrong,

[00:06:41] Speaker 03:
is that we have a bunch of cases where there are people driving on the roads, where, you know, most of these are highway traffic stop cases, where you get the idea of the individual, whatever cause you'd have reasonable suspicion to pull them over to begin with.

[00:06:55] Speaker 03:
You get the idea of that person.

[00:06:57] Speaker 03:
And we have held that there's a certain amount of allowance for you to go through this dispatch process, check the ID, check for warrants, do all of those things, and then hand them their license back and let them go.

[00:07:10] Speaker 03:
A lot of these cases turn on the question of whether you did that too long, whether you held them too long, whether you didn't give him his ID back, all that kind of stuff.

[00:07:18] Speaker 03:
But the basic premise that when you would conduct a traffic stop,

[00:07:23] Speaker 03:
Let's say for the tag was off or something, you conduct a traffic stop.

[00:07:28] Speaker 03:
The law enforcement officer can go through this process that Jeff Federico alluded to of just checking for warrants.

[00:07:36] Speaker 02:
Certainly can if reasonable suspicion is not dispelled.

[00:07:40] Speaker 02:
If there's a traffic violation that gives the right to do these checks, or once it's dispelled,

[00:07:50] Speaker 02:
the basis for the checks doesn't exist anymore.

[00:07:53] Speaker 02:
So all of those cases are where the detention is still lawful because reasonable suspicion has not been dispelled.

[00:08:00] Speaker 01:
That's the difference in this case.

[00:08:01] Speaker 01:
Can you help me understand your argument that the traffic violation investigation was dispelled?

[00:08:08] Speaker 01:
I guess maybe this refers back to your first point about the 911 calls.

[00:08:15] Speaker 01:
But as I understand it, the calls were made that there's a vehicle driving erratically.

[00:08:20] Speaker 01:
You don't contest that the initial stop was to investigate why that vehicle was driving erratically.

[00:08:26] Speaker 01:
Why do we need to categorize it so cleanly as only an investigation into potential drunk driving as compared to just general reckless driving?

[00:08:36] Speaker 02:
Well, the call notes on which the stop was based do not reflect that driving erratically, weaving in their lane.

[00:08:47] Speaker 02:
And the district court

[00:08:49] Speaker 02:
determined that the stop, as the officers testified to, was for the purpose of investigating drunk driving.

[00:08:56] Speaker 02:
The district court didn't make an alternative finding on suspicion of reckless driving.

[00:09:02] Speaker 02:
And the government has not, in this appeal, effectively made such an argument.

[00:09:08] Speaker 02:
All they do is say driving erratically, therefore reckless driving.

[00:09:13] Speaker 02:
They don't try to link it to the Oklahoma statute.

[00:09:19] Speaker 02:
Driving within a lane is not reflective of driving carelessly or wantonly without regard to the safety of persons or property, which is how Oklahoma defines reckless driving.

[00:09:32] Speaker 02:
So there really is no basis here for this court to determine that there was another basis of reasonable suspicion that was not dispelled.

[00:09:44] Speaker 02:
So when the officers agreed that

[00:09:48] Speaker 02:
When Officer Robertson agreed that Mr. Wiggins was not intoxicated, that's when the stop should have ended.

[00:09:58] Speaker 01:
Counsel, the paradigm you're constructing here is that, again, once reasonable suspicion is dispelled, then they can take no additional action because they can't extend the stop.

[00:10:09] Speaker 01:
But what about a case where the violation under investigation is speeding?

[00:10:14] Speaker 01:
And an officer observes it by use of a radar gun, knows the speed is in excess of the limit, and stops someone.

[00:10:21] Speaker 01:
There are cases where that happens, and then an officer quickly determines they're not going to write a ticket.

[00:10:25] Speaker 01:
They'll just give them a verbal warning.

[00:10:27] Speaker 01:
But then they continue to carry on with the other administration purposes of the stops, checking for a valid license and registration, checking for warrants.

[00:10:36] Speaker 01:
Under your paradigm, though, none of that would be permitted, because

[00:10:41] Speaker 01:
The investigation, the reasonable suspicion is dispelled.

[00:10:44] Speaker 01:
The officer knows the speeding occurred.

[00:10:47] Speaker 02:
Well, the reasonable suspicion is not dispelled in that situation.

[00:10:50] Speaker 02:
There is a traffic violation.

[00:10:52] Speaker 02:
And the traffic violation is what allows for the continued detention, regardless of what enforcement action the officer will ultimately decide to take.

[00:11:05] Speaker 02:
There is still a continued basis for the detention.

[00:11:09] Speaker 02:
There isn't when reasonable suspicion has been dispelled.

[00:11:12] Speaker 01:
What's the basis in that case that doesn't apply in this case?

[00:11:15] Speaker 01:
It's the speeding.

[00:11:17] Speaker 02:
We know that the motorist was speeding.

[00:11:21] Speaker 02:
And if he was speeding, they can do all of these other things like check to make sure he's now not an apparent traffic violator, he's a traffic violator, to see whether he otherwise can safely operate the vehicle and do a safety check for that reason.

[00:11:37] Speaker 02:
That's missing when

[00:11:39] Speaker 02:
there is no basis any longer for reasonable suspicion of any traffic violation.

[00:11:46] Speaker 03:
Well, for a moment, let's focus on the inevitable discovery argument.

[00:11:52] Speaker 03:
And even if, after the HGN test, there was a dispelling of the notion that he was a violator, why wouldn't it be inevitable

[00:12:01] Speaker 03:
that they would have in fact stopped him, either required him to stay there or pulled him out of the drive-through lane and held him, when mere moments after that, they got the hit back that there was a possible warrant.

[00:12:16] Speaker 03:
And specifically, what I'd like you to respond to is the White case, which seemed to have a number of historical facts that many more than actually were present here.

[00:12:24] Speaker 03:
I mean, I'm sorry, the reverse of that.

[00:12:27] Speaker 03:
At least as many facts in white as there are here.

[00:12:30] Speaker 03:
to suggest that there would have been inevitable discovery.

[00:12:35] Speaker 02:
Well, I don't have the white case firmly in mind, but I can say... Well, that was a case cited in the briefs, though.

[00:12:40] Speaker 02:
Well, I can say that the... I mean, I'm thinking of Nix versus Williams, but what has to be shown is as a matter of historical fact what the police would have done.

[00:12:53] Speaker 02:
And we don't know what the police would have done because nobody testified to that.

[00:12:57] Speaker 02:
They didn't testify they would have kept tabs on Mr. Wiggins.

[00:13:00] Speaker 02:
They didn't testify whether they would have gone on to other duties.

[00:13:05] Speaker 02:
They didn't testify to whether they would have acted based on the initial report of a warrant.

[00:13:11] Speaker 02:
which had to be confirmed before they could take action.

[00:13:14] Speaker 03:
Well, they did act based upon the initial determination of whether there was a warrant in which they continued to engage in a conversation with him.

[00:13:22] Speaker 03:
So they did act.

[00:13:23] Speaker 02:
Well, but they continued to unlawfully detain him.

[00:13:25] Speaker 02:
If they had let him go and if he had left McDonald's, we don't know what they would have done because they never testified to what they had done.

[00:13:31] Speaker 03:
Well, one of the reasons the white case is significant is the court engages in a lot of inferences as to what the government would have done based upon things that it did do.

[00:13:41] Speaker 03:
It did check the records of the individuals who were at this event, and it was in a room.

[00:13:46] Speaker 03:
They go into the room, the defendant has a gun, they check the records of the people who were in the room, and so the court would say, well, the court, our court said, well, they would have checked Mr. White's records anyway, and they would have found they would have gotten a hit.

[00:14:00] Speaker 03:
Well, in this situation, they had already called it in, okay?

[00:14:04] Speaker 03:
So they already called it in.

[00:14:06] Speaker 03:
You've got this moment in time where if we take your argument,

[00:14:10] Speaker 03:
the reasonable suspicion is suspended, surely they would have gone after him, and there's a reasonable basis to believe, because of what they did do.

[00:14:20] Speaker 03:
What they did do is they immediately followed up and said, well, you hold on and wait until we determine what the ultimate outcome is.

[00:14:28] Speaker 03:
That was on the basis of thinking they could detain him, which was wrong.

[00:14:30] Speaker 03:
No, no, no, no, no, no.

[00:14:32] Speaker 03:
Why is that on that basis?

[00:14:34] Speaker 03:
If what we're looking at is what they did do,

[00:14:37] Speaker 03:
Once they found out that there was a possible hit, he was predicated on the possible hit.

[00:14:43] Speaker 02:
But we don't know what they would have done if he had departed the McDonald's because they never testified to that.

[00:14:48] Speaker 02:
There are no demonstrated historical facts about that.

[00:14:51] Speaker 02:
They had unlawfully detained him.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
And that's the context in which they kept him there.

[00:14:57] Speaker 02:
They thought they could keep him there, wrongly, unreasonably.

[00:15:01] Speaker 02:
And that's why there's also, why Utah versus Strife is also inapplicable here.

[00:15:07] Speaker 02:
And we would ask the court to vacate Mr. Wiggins' conviction and order the evidence suppressed.

[00:15:15] Speaker 02:
At a minimum, it should vacate a sentence and remand for recensing without consideration of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

[00:15:21] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:15:26] Speaker 00:
May it please the court, Daniel Gridley for the United States.

[00:15:30] Speaker 00:
This court should affirm the district court ruling denying

[00:15:34] Speaker 00:
Mr. Wiggins motion to suppress and the court may affirm the decision of the district court on any of three solid legal grounds, the attenuation doctrine, inevitable discovery, as well as simply a finding that the detention of Mr. Wiggins was not unlawfully extended.

[00:15:54] Speaker 00:
On October 30th, 2022, shortly after midnight, two different citizens observed Mr. Wiggins

[00:16:04] Speaker 00:
the appellant's erratic driving, each of those individuals felt compelled to use the 911 call system to summons emergency assistance.

[00:16:14] Speaker 00:
According to 911 calls, the citizens described Mr. Wiggins driving as all over the place on the road and very erratic.

[00:16:24] Speaker 00:
And another caller described that he almost went off the side of the road.

[00:16:30] Speaker 00:
They conveyed information about his location so police could intervene in this situation that they apparently deemed an emergency, and Officer Robertson did just that.

[00:16:43] Speaker 00:
It is my understanding of the law that under United States v. Smith, 527F2 at 694, that this court can take into consideration

[00:16:53] Speaker 00:
facts that were introduced at trial.

[00:16:55] Speaker 00:
Both of the redacted 911 calls were submitted during the jury trial in this matter.

[00:17:02] Speaker 00:
As we assess the reasonable suspicion in this matter, it's important for us to keep in mind that the level of suspicion required for investigatory detention is considerably less than proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence.

[00:17:20] Speaker 00:
Furthermore,

[00:17:21] Speaker 00:
It's not even necessary that the government have evidence linking the suspect into a particular criminal offense.

[00:17:30] Speaker 03:
Once the HGN test came back negative, what basis was it for them to hold him?

[00:17:37] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, we would submit that

[00:17:39] Speaker 00:
there was still reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, generally speaking.

[00:17:45] Speaker 03:
And what general activity, reasonable suspicion of general criminal activity was there?

[00:17:53] Speaker 00:
Reports from the 911 system that Mr. Wiggins was driving erratically all over the road.

[00:18:02] Speaker 00:
I would submit that that is one.

[00:18:07] Speaker 00:
reasonable suspicion of reckless driving could be other things, Your Honor, but certainly reasonable suspicion of criminal activity overall.

[00:18:17] Speaker 03:
We heard the defense today say that what went on here in terms of the factual basis does not correlate with Oklahoma's reckless driving statute.

[00:18:27] Speaker 03:
Do you disagree with that?

[00:18:29] Speaker 00:
I do disagree with that, Your Honor.

[00:18:31] Speaker 00:
I'd submit that when someone reports that someone is calling to 911, reporting that they are all over the place on the road and very erratic, and that two different people have felt the need to use 911, that the common sense implication there is that this rises to a level of an emergency.

[00:18:53] Speaker 00:
In other words,

[00:18:54] Speaker 00:
We need immediate law enforcement attention to this matter, or else it's going to pose a risk to the public.

[00:19:01] Speaker 00:
I would submit a logical inference here.

[00:19:08] Speaker 03:
But the Oklahoma statute would govern and provide the basis for a criminal offense based upon what the officers knew at the time, reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense?

[00:19:20] Speaker 03:
That's different than this talk about an emergency.

[00:19:23] Speaker 03:
I'm asking the specific question related to the Oklahoma statute for reckless driving.

[00:19:29] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry.

[00:19:30] Speaker 03:
Can you restate the question?

[00:19:30] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:19:31] Speaker 03:
I'm talking about the specific statute that relates to reckless driving in Oklahoma.

[00:19:36] Speaker 03:
How does that correlate with the conduct of the defendant that was reported in this case?

[00:19:41] Speaker 03:
And would the officers, therefore, have had a reasonable suspicion that he violated that statute?

[00:19:46] Speaker 00:
I would, Your Honor.

[00:19:48] Speaker 00:
When we look at the specific statute

[00:19:50] Speaker 00:
47 OS 11901A talks about reckless driving motor vehicle in a careless or wanton manner without regard to the safety of persons or property or in violation of and then goes on to talk about the speeding.

[00:20:07] Speaker 00:
I would submit that the evidence put out on the 911 call is synonymous with that type of driving behavior and that

[00:20:16] Speaker 00:
certainly it rises to the level of reasonable suspicion.

[00:20:20] Speaker 00:
But again, I would also reiterate that it's not a requirement that the officer be able to link to any particular criminal offense.

[00:20:30] Speaker 00:
It's a general criminal offense overall that must be used to assess.

[00:20:38] Speaker 00:
As the Court has also reiterated, once

[00:20:40] Speaker 00:
the officer has detained him and initiated the process of a traffic stop, there's certain things that go as part of that, go hand in hand with that, as part of the basic mission of the stop.

[00:20:53] Speaker 00:
And it's undisputed that when they initially contacted him, there was a valid basis for this stop.

[00:21:00] Speaker 00:
And officers, as I think the court is aware, go by standard procedures.

[00:21:06] Speaker 00:
And Officer Robinson testified in the suppression hearing

[00:21:10] Speaker 00:
that he was following standard procedures.

[00:21:13] Speaker 00:
One of his standard procedures is to run a warrant check on every driver that he stops.

[00:21:19] Speaker 01:
And in this case, he did that when in relation to the horizontal gaze nystagmus test being administered?

[00:21:27] Speaker 00:
He attained Mr. Wiggins identification 50 seconds into the video.

[00:21:35] Speaker 00:
That was not full 50 seconds into the stop.

[00:21:39] Speaker 00:
He called that in a minute and 55 seconds into the video, and he performed the HGN test at 317 into the video.

[00:21:48] Speaker 00:
And so then after that, he starts to lecture or warn Mr. Wiggins about his driving behavior, which I would submit he's within his lawful right to do, based on the information that he has at the time, whether he

[00:22:06] Speaker 00:
intends to give him any type of warning or arrest, I'd submit that's irrelevant here.

[00:22:13] Speaker 00:
And so he's engaged in the normal process of a stop.

[00:22:16] Speaker 00:
And this court, the Supreme Court in Ramirez, and this court in Mayville, Ramdyle, and specifically in Dawson has talked about the fact that even when an officer has completed

[00:22:33] Speaker 00:
everything that is related to the initial traffic infraction that he's pulled this individual over, it's not over until he's completed all the other tasks tied to the mission of the stop.

[00:22:48] Speaker 00:
In the Dawson case specifically, the officer had written the citation, was absolutely done with that process, and he waited and he kept the driver there for the purpose of obtaining

[00:23:02] Speaker 00:
rental agreement, which the driver had trouble finding.

[00:23:05] Speaker 00:
And so the court found in Dawson that's fine because that is a task that is closely linked to the mission to the stop.

[00:23:15] Speaker 00:
We would argue that just like in Dawson where the rental agreement issue is closely tied to the stop, here the warrant check, which was initiated early on in the process, is closely tied to the stop.

[00:23:28] Speaker 00:
And so the mission is not complete until

[00:23:32] Speaker 00:
the warrant check is complete.

[00:23:39] Speaker 00:
I would also, going on to inevitable discovery, defense claims that the government did not put forth sufficient information or evidence as to the issue of inevitable discovery.

[00:23:53] Speaker 00:
I would submit that the video itself that was presented gave

[00:23:59] Speaker 00:
immense amount of information on that issue and what the situation played out and what the officers would have done as the court mentioned in the White case.

[00:24:11] Speaker 00:
The video tells us that, one, that this was a very busy drive-through line at the McDonald's.

[00:24:17] Speaker 00:
If you look closely at the video, you can also see that Mr. Wiggins has passed the station where he would have put in his order.

[00:24:26] Speaker 00:
And so he's got an order in, and he's into the part of the line where he's simply waiting to pick up his order.

[00:24:33] Speaker 00:
And so logic would stand to reason.

[00:24:36] Speaker 00:
I think he indicated he'd placed an order for a hamburger.

[00:24:39] Speaker 00:
He's hungry.

[00:24:41] Speaker 00:
Logic would stand to reason that he's going to wait that out, and he's not going to divert out of the line necessarily.

[00:24:47] Speaker 03:
After he's been stopped by the police, maybe he doesn't have an appetite anymore.

[00:24:52] Speaker 03:
I don't know whether that logic would necessarily dictate that.

[00:24:55] Speaker 03:
Was there any testimony at all about what the officers would have done?

[00:25:00] Speaker 00:
I don't know that there was the explicit question, what would you have done had you released him and then gotten a hit back.

[00:25:08] Speaker 00:
But as the court has pointed out, we know what he would have done because we see exactly what he did when he received work.

[00:25:16] Speaker 00:
that this individual had a possible warrant.

[00:25:22] Speaker 00:
And furthermore on that issue with regard to the inevitable discovery doctrine, that was a factual finding that was made by the court.

[00:25:30] Speaker 00:
And that was a factual determination which implicates the clear error standard I would submit.

[00:25:38] Speaker 00:
And I just don't believe that there's been any information, evidence that's been put before the court that that was

[00:25:45] Speaker 00:
a clear error for the court to draw that conclusion.

[00:25:50] Speaker 00:
And then again, Your Honor, we get to, Your Honors, we get to the issue of the attenuation doctrine.

[00:25:57] Speaker 00:
When we look at the attenuation doctrine, it's undisputed that the first element set out by Utah versus Streve, the short proximity here cuts against the government.

[00:26:09] Speaker 00:
The second factor intervening circumstances

[00:26:13] Speaker 00:
cuts in favor of the government.

[00:26:15] Speaker 00:
The only disputed issue based on the briefing is the third and final factor, which is purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct.

[00:26:25] Speaker 00:
Just like in Utah v. Streve, the officer in question held an individual.

[00:26:33] Speaker 00:
In that case, it was without reasonable suspicion at all to even initiate the detention, held on and ran him for warrants check.

[00:26:44] Speaker 00:
And the court determined that under the circumstances, that did not rise to the level of the type of purpose and flagrant official misconduct that would cut against the government.

[00:26:57] Speaker 00:
And this court in Ramos reiterated and said a little more meat on the bones as far as what those type of requirements are for

[00:27:08] Speaker 00:
the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct.

[00:27:13] Speaker 00:
One, it must be obvious that the, to the officer, excuse me.

[00:27:25] Speaker 00:
One, it must, the impropriety of the official misconduct was obvious, the official knew, and at the time that his conduct was likely unconstitutional, but engaged in it nevertheless.

[00:27:38] Speaker 00:
and two, that the misconduct was investigatory in design, purpose, and executed in the hope that something might turn up.

[00:27:49] Speaker 00:
It's clear from the record in this case, and in fact, Officer Robertson testified, he was simply following his standard operating procedure in obtaining a warrant check on Mr. Wiggins.

[00:28:05] Speaker 00:
I would again submit that this court has three viable options to affirm the decision of the district court denying the motion to suppress.

[00:28:16] Speaker 00:
Simply put, the detention was not unlawfully extended because the Officer Robertson was engaged still in the part of the mission of the stop.

[00:28:29] Speaker 00:
Two, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies as well.

[00:28:34] Speaker 00:
There is no information of a clear error made by the district court as to that finding.

[00:28:40] Speaker 00:
And finally, the attenuation doctrine also applies.

[00:28:45] Speaker 00:
If there are no other questions from the court, I would simply ask the court to affirm the ruling of the district court.

[00:28:53] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:28:58] Speaker 03:
Case is submitted.

[00:29:01] Speaker 03:
Thank you for your fine arguments.