[00:00:00] Speaker 03: case number 24 30 14. [00:00:02] Speaker 03: United States of America versus Jeffrey Henry Williamson, a balance. [00:00:08] Speaker 03: Mr Kramer for the balance is loyal for the ability. [00:00:11] Speaker 04: Good morning, your honors and may have pleased the court. [00:00:13] Speaker 04: Um, I think this is a very simple case in the end. [00:00:19] Speaker 04: Um, the Supreme Court, uh, [00:00:20] Speaker 04: as recently as two months ago, talked about the importance of interpreting statutes by their plain language and not adding anything. [00:00:28] Speaker 04: And they said, our task is to give effect to not nullify Congress's choice to include that factor in some provisions, but not others. [00:00:36] Speaker 04: I submitted that in a 20HA letter as terrorist versus United States. [00:00:41] Speaker 04: I think it was decided the last day of the term where they talked about the well-established canon of statutory interpretation [00:00:50] Speaker 04: that the court should not add anything and they said in Oklahoma. [00:00:56] Speaker 04: And this to me is essentially identical or indistinguishable from this case in Oklahoma versus Castro Horatio in 2022. [00:01:04] Speaker 02: Mr. Kramer? [00:01:05] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:01:06] Speaker 02: On page 17 of your brief, you say that at the trial court, [00:01:18] Speaker 02: The defendant suggested that the court dismiss the charges and stay the dismissal for a minimal period of time to allow butanar to file a 4246 certificate in North Carolina. [00:01:32] Speaker 02: I think I have at least that much right. [00:01:34] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:01:36] Speaker 02: I think during that minimal period of time, the implication was he would continue to be detained at Butener to allow Butener to file a certificate if he chose to. [00:01:47] Speaker 02: Am I still right? [00:01:50] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:01:50] Speaker 04: Sorry. [00:01:51] Speaker 04: And I think sorry. [00:01:51] Speaker 04: I think it's pronounced Butener every time I've been there. [00:01:54] Speaker 02: You look confused. [00:01:57] Speaker 02: Am I saying one or two or three confusing things? [00:01:58] Speaker 02: So it sounds like just maybe just myself. [00:02:01] Speaker 04: I would not pass an intelligence test. [00:02:03] Speaker 04: So everything's confusing. [00:02:04] Speaker 04: OK. [00:02:04] Speaker 02: Butener. [00:02:06] Speaker 02: So, uh, that's what the defendant asked for. [00:02:11] Speaker 02: And I'm wondering why we shouldn't just read the order to do that. [00:02:16] Speaker 02: And and only that it's true. [00:02:19] Speaker 02: The order uses the phrase to be examined. [00:02:23] Speaker 02: Um, but it's not totally clear that the district court's order orders the examination as opposed to [00:02:31] Speaker 02: Order says ordered the defendant shall remain at FCI button or a reasonable period of time not to exceed 45 days. [00:02:38] Speaker 02: It seems like that might be the order. [00:02:41] Speaker 02: Then it does explain its reason for that order. [00:02:44] Speaker 02: It expects that he will be examined and there will be a determination of whether to file a certificate or not. [00:02:50] Speaker 02: But if the order. [00:02:53] Speaker 02: Only orders. [00:02:55] Speaker 02: Attention for reasonable period of time, 45 days. [00:02:59] Speaker 02: and dismisses the charges, but stays it until that time elapses. [00:03:04] Speaker 02: It seems like the district court may well have done nothing more than issue the order that the defendant invited the district court to issue. [00:03:13] Speaker 04: Yes and no. [00:03:14] Speaker 04: No in the amount of time. [00:03:16] Speaker 04: I think what I said at the time to the district court was a minimal amount of time. [00:03:22] Speaker 04: And I believe I said seven to 10 days, which I think in retrospect was stupid of me. [00:03:29] Speaker 04: And I should have said two or three days. [00:03:31] Speaker 04: I look forward to his IAC appeal. [00:03:34] Speaker 04: Well, I think he files those quite frequently. [00:03:38] Speaker 04: So 45 days is the statutory time for an examination under 4246. [00:03:45] Speaker 04: It's way, I wouldn't even say it's in the ballpark. [00:03:49] Speaker 04: I think it should be two or three days. [00:03:51] Speaker 04: Frankly, he's been there at Butner for seven years, two years completing his sentence and five years pretrial in this case. [00:03:59] Speaker 04: And he had a competency exam and a sanity exam at Butner. [00:04:03] Speaker 04: And the notion that Butner needs [00:04:05] Speaker 04: 45 days. [00:04:07] Speaker 04: And I just want to get back to the no part is about the amount of time. [00:04:12] Speaker 04: The no part is also that the government's motion was entitled for an evaluation pursuant to 18 USC 4246. [00:04:22] Speaker 04: And it said at the very beginning for a reasonable period not to exceed 45 days to be examined to determine whether the butner [00:04:32] Speaker 04: should certify pursuant. [00:04:34] Speaker 02: I agree. [00:04:37] Speaker 02: I think the title of the government's motion could have been better in order for my theory to be correct. [00:04:44] Speaker 02: The to be examined language in the government's motion is mirrored by the to be examined language in the district court's order. [00:04:50] Speaker 02: If the district court's order could be read either way, and if you're saying that one way would be unauthorized by statute, [00:05:01] Speaker 02: It seems like why would we presume that the district court did something it wasn't authorized to do when we could read the order to say the district court is merely doing something it is authorized to do? [00:05:12] Speaker 04: Because the district court said exactly what it was not authorized to do, which is in authorizing the directive, quoting the first page of the district court's order, [00:05:27] Speaker 04: ECF 196. [00:05:28] Speaker 04: That's a parenthetical quoting another case. [00:05:31] Speaker 04: It's about the Gordina's Ortiz case, but what he says is in authorizing their directive file at 4246 necessarily contemplates [00:05:41] Speaker 04: the temporary commitment of that person so the director can conduct the evaluation. [00:05:48] Speaker 04: It's clear that this is an examination or evaluation, whatever you want to call it, being ordered. [00:05:54] Speaker 04: The government in its brief slaps a number of different names on this. [00:05:59] Speaker 04: They call it a preliminary determination. [00:06:02] Speaker 04: They say the scheme contemplates it, a preliminary assessment. [00:06:06] Speaker 04: I wouldn't mind. [00:06:07] Speaker 04: I mean, my argument is what it was in the district court. [00:06:11] Speaker 04: They cannot have an evaluation or examination of any type, because that's authorized by the statute in different situations. [00:06:19] Speaker 05: Can I interrupt you? [00:06:20] Speaker 05: Or I will. [00:06:21] Speaker 05: Sure, you're the judge. [00:06:23] Speaker ?: I will. [00:06:23] Speaker 05: I can. [00:06:26] Speaker 05: Why is it that you're not standby counsel? [00:06:29] Speaker 05: You're the real deal, right? [00:06:32] Speaker 04: I'm not sure he'd call me the real deal, but for the appeal on counsel, yes, counsel. [00:06:37] Speaker 05: Your client, why is he even covered by 4246? [00:06:41] Speaker 05: Well, because under that, I agree there's some question about that. [00:06:47] Speaker 05: That's not a tricky question. [00:06:49] Speaker 04: No, no. [00:06:50] Speaker 05: The reason I ask is 4246 only covers people who are hospitalized. [00:06:56] Speaker 05: And I've looked through this record, [00:06:58] Speaker 05: And at Butner, there are four facilities. [00:07:02] Speaker 05: You've been to Butner. [00:07:03] Speaker 05: There are four facilities. [00:07:04] Speaker 05: Three of them are fairly new. [00:07:06] Speaker 05: One of them is a medium security, low security, and then another medium. [00:07:12] Speaker 05: And then the fourth one is a hospital. [00:07:15] Speaker 05: The medical center. [00:07:16] Speaker 05: Medical center. [00:07:18] Speaker 05: He's not in the medical center. [00:07:21] Speaker 05: He says, I'm in FCI one. [00:07:25] Speaker 05: So if he's not hospitalized, the statute only deals with hospitalized people. [00:07:31] Speaker 05: Why is he even covered by 4246? [00:07:32] Speaker 04: I think that's a good argument. [00:07:35] Speaker 04: It was not made. [00:07:36] Speaker 04: It's not an argument. [00:07:37] Speaker 04: It's a question. [00:07:38] Speaker 04: No. [00:07:39] Speaker 04: I think you're right. [00:07:41] Speaker 04: But Mr. Williamson represents himself in the district court and doesn't let us really do anything. [00:07:50] Speaker 04: I think that's an argument that could have been made. [00:07:54] Speaker 05: One of the ways you get around it, I suppose, is that he would be examined in the medical center. [00:08:04] Speaker 05: And so therefore, he would be hospitalized. [00:08:09] Speaker 05: But then there's another problem with the order that I have, because the director, according to the order, is not the medical center director. [00:08:17] Speaker 05: It's the FCI-1 director. [00:08:20] Speaker 05: That seems to be a mistake in the order. [00:08:24] Speaker 05: And then, OK, that's just an observation. [00:08:28] Speaker 05: But I want to move on to, have you read Judge Choflat's opinion in United States v. Burry? [00:08:35] Speaker 05: No. [00:08:36] Speaker 05: It's exactly on point. [00:08:39] Speaker 05: Exactly what happened here is exactly what happened in the Burry case. [00:08:44] Speaker 05: And Judge Choflat, you talk about statutory interpretation, goes through about four or five pages interpreting 4246. [00:08:53] Speaker 05: And he comes up with the proposition, which I think is irrefutable. [00:08:58] Speaker 05: 4246 only deals with what the director has to do. [00:09:07] Speaker 05: It doesn't deal with the question of what to do before the director acts. [00:09:13] Speaker 05: And that's what we have here is a situation not covered by 4246A. [00:09:20] Speaker 05: It's dealing with how do you get [00:09:23] Speaker 05: How do you give the director the opportunity to make his judgment? [00:09:28] Speaker 05: Well, if I can... I'll give you the citation to bury... If I can go back... It's 142 Fed Forth, 184. [00:09:38] Speaker 04: If I can go back for a second, the question about the hospitalization, I think is a interesting question, but it was never raised in the district court. [00:09:47] Speaker 04: But he was in there for actually medical care. [00:09:52] Speaker 04: He had medical care for a long time. [00:09:56] Speaker 05: But that doesn't say that he's in the hospital. [00:09:59] Speaker 05: He was being treated in FCI-1. [00:10:04] Speaker 04: But also, they can do the evaluations. [00:10:08] Speaker 04: They don't have to be in the medical center to do the evaluations. [00:10:11] Speaker 04: They can. [00:10:12] Speaker 05: That's according to Judge Chouflat's opinion, and Barry, they do. [00:10:16] Speaker 05: Because there are only two facilities, Judge Chouflat wrote, in the United States that have the capability of doing 4246 examinations. [00:10:30] Speaker 05: One of them is the Medical Center at Butler. [00:10:33] Speaker 05: I think the other one's in Missouri. [00:10:35] Speaker 04: Well, there's one in Springfield, there's one in Rochester, Minnesota, there's one in Carswell, Texas. [00:10:41] Speaker 04: There's a whole bunch of institutions that do the exams. [00:10:44] Speaker 05: I'm wrong about that. [00:10:45] Speaker 05: The Springfield one doesn't have the capacity to do a 4246. [00:10:50] Speaker 05: And in Berry, the prisoner was transferred from the Springfield Medical Center to Butler IV. [00:10:58] Speaker 04: There's one, a bunch of the cases refer to the proceedings taking place in Rochester, Minnesota. [00:11:05] Speaker 04: So I think it's in Rochester. [00:11:09] Speaker 04: There's an institution. [00:11:11] Speaker 05: Nevertheless, I mean, nevertheless, the point [00:11:15] Speaker 05: that Judge Choflat makes and that I'm asking you is where in 4246 does it say even a word of giving the director the opportunity to make the examination of 4246 counter place? [00:11:31] Speaker 04: It doesn't at all. [00:11:33] Speaker 04: It just says in it. [00:11:35] Speaker 05: And so it stop there. [00:11:37] Speaker 05: If that's true, then [00:11:40] Speaker 05: What Judge Walton did in this case is not a violation of 4246. [00:11:45] Speaker 05: It can't be because he's ordering the same as in Barry's, ordering whoever is the director to do an examination. [00:11:57] Speaker 04: Well, he has no authority to do that under the statute. [00:12:00] Speaker 04: The statute lists, I think, six instances where an examination can be done, and you can't [00:12:07] Speaker 04: Judges just can't willy-nilly order examinations of people. [00:12:11] Speaker 04: They have to abide by the statute. [00:12:13] Speaker 05: But willy-nilly, he was representing himself. [00:12:17] Speaker 05: And in order to make a judgment about that, and not only that, but if you read the colloquies that went on for years, the guy seems to be mentally ill. [00:12:30] Speaker 05: And so the question becomes, what do we do? [00:12:33] Speaker 05: Release him? [00:12:35] Speaker 05: even if he's dangerous and then have the examination? [00:12:38] Speaker 05: No. [00:12:39] Speaker 04: Well, the government repeatedly says that there's ample evidence of his dangerousness in the record. [00:12:46] Speaker 04: Why the director of the facility at Butler can't issue the certificate is unexplained in the record without an examination. [00:12:55] Speaker 04: The statute never provides for an examination unless the certificate is filed. [00:13:01] Speaker 04: And it's a very, the government. [00:13:05] Speaker 05: The certificate is not the examination, is what you're saying? [00:13:09] Speaker 04: The way the district court in Puerto Rico and Cruz Ruiz set it out, and the Fourth Circuit in the Perkins case set it out quite distinctly, that the first step is to file a certificate. [00:13:24] Speaker 04: After the certificate is filed, then there can be an examination order. [00:13:28] Speaker 05: You don't release somebody [00:13:30] Speaker 05: before you make a judgment about whether to file the certificate? [00:13:35] Speaker 04: Well, the statute says the filing of the certificate stays the release. [00:13:40] Speaker 04: The statute says that. [00:13:42] Speaker 04: There's no provision otherwise to stay the release, although in the district court, I did say for a minimal period of time, which now we're a couple of years later, and that should be at most a couple of days. [00:13:56] Speaker 04: I mean, they did an examination of, ironically. [00:14:01] Speaker 05: That's a couple of days, yes. [00:14:04] Speaker 05: But in Barry, which is 2025 case, [00:14:09] Speaker 05: The prisoner had to wait in line because Butner MC was so backed up with 4246 requests that it would first come first serve. [00:14:24] Speaker 05: And so what happened is not only that, but then the facility head of Butner Medical asked for a 30-day extension beyond the 45, which the district court granted. [00:14:36] Speaker 05: And just one more point. [00:14:39] Speaker 05: Uh, if I remember your brief argues that that Judge Walton didn't have any authority because he's not in a court that's the closest to to the buttoner facility, right? [00:14:53] Speaker 04: Right. [00:14:53] Speaker 05: He's not in the district where buttoners look, but that's not an issue here. [00:14:56] Speaker 05: That order doesn't deal with that. [00:14:58] Speaker 05: And in very what happened is it was an Illinois. [00:15:02] Speaker 05: No, it was a Michigan court that ordered the examination. [00:15:07] Speaker 05: And when the certificate came down, [00:15:09] Speaker 05: It was the North Carolina court that held the hearing. [00:15:15] Speaker 05: And that's perfectly consistent with [00:15:18] Speaker 05: Judge Walton's order here because he doesn't say it is going to hold the hearing if there's a certificate. [00:15:23] Speaker 04: No, no, he said he would not. [00:15:24] Speaker 04: But what he did order is that whether the director should file, he said ordered the government's motion for an evaluation pursuant to 18 USC 4246 is granted. [00:15:38] Speaker 04: I mean, that's as clear as it can be to me that he's granting an evaluation pursuant to 4246 [00:15:45] Speaker 04: which he has both no authority to order. [00:15:48] Speaker 05: Or the determination of whether to issue a certificate. [00:15:52] Speaker 04: But that's something that appears, an exam for that purpose is nowhere in the statute. [00:15:58] Speaker 04: Absolutely nowhere in the statute. [00:16:00] Speaker 04: I'm sorry. [00:16:02] Speaker 04: No, that's a good one. [00:16:03] Speaker 03: So a question I have is, even if I were to accept your 4246 argument that the court had no authority for that, how does that intersect with the pretrial detention that was ordered under 3142? [00:16:20] Speaker 03: Because that pretrial detention is still in place because the dismissal order was stayed. [00:16:27] Speaker 03: So I guess if that order is still in place, I guess I have a question about [00:16:33] Speaker 03: whether the 4246 order is immediately appealable because there's another basis for his detention. [00:16:39] Speaker 03: And also in general, I'm just trying to understand how those two things interact with each other because there's not much in the briefing about that. [00:16:46] Speaker 04: Well, I think, first of all, the government has never challenged the appealability, obviously. [00:16:50] Speaker 04: But it's not just the detention. [00:16:54] Speaker 04: It's the compelled examination that is the bigger intrusion, according to Weisberger and Godinus Ortiz. [00:17:02] Speaker 04: It's not one or the other. [00:17:06] Speaker 04: But the compelled examination is the harm to Mr. Williamson. [00:17:14] Speaker 03: Sure, but if there was no compelled examination, but he's still subject to detention under 3142, then he could stay there until the director of the facility decided to issue a certificate if they chose to. [00:17:32] Speaker 04: That would end because the district court has dismissed the charges, but stated pending this appeal. [00:17:39] Speaker 04: Right. [00:17:40] Speaker 04: And so his detention would end if, [00:17:44] Speaker 04: his order for a further detention and a compelled examination was reversed. [00:17:50] Speaker 04: Then it would go back to the district court for the dismissal to be signed off on. [00:17:57] Speaker 04: did not. [00:17:58] Speaker 04: Mr. William, it's strange. [00:18:00] Speaker 04: Mr. Williamson represents himself. [00:18:02] Speaker 04: And so the issues you raise. [00:18:04] Speaker 04: So at one point I did say, I think seven to 10 days was the words I used. [00:18:10] Speaker 04: Um, I now think that's too long in light of the time that's passed. [00:18:14] Speaker 04: But [00:18:15] Speaker 04: Clearly, the director at Butner has the information they need. [00:18:22] Speaker 04: This whole thing arises because Judge Walton ordered an exam that he had no authority to order, which was the sanity exam. [00:18:31] Speaker 04: That can only be ordered if a defendant files a notice to raise insanity. [00:18:35] Speaker 04: But he ordered it over the objection while the government stayed silent and only later said that exam shouldn't have been [00:18:42] Speaker 04: But that's the only reason we're here, because he has already said, I don't need to abide by the statute. [00:18:47] Speaker 04: I can order whatever exam I want whenever I want, essentially. [00:18:52] Speaker 03: So if we would have vacate this order, which is the relief that's being sought. [00:18:57] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:18:58] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:19:00] Speaker 03: Then procedurally, the district court would have before it the rule 48A motion to dismiss. [00:19:07] Speaker 04: Well, I think more than that, he's already granted that. [00:19:12] Speaker 03: Right, but he granted that in this order, right? [00:19:14] Speaker 03: So if he would vacate this, then there would be a pending Rule 48A motion? [00:19:18] Speaker 04: Yes, yes. [00:19:19] Speaker 03: And then? [00:19:21] Speaker 04: And that would be granted, I assume, under this court's rulings on Rule 48A. [00:19:27] Speaker 04: I assume that would be routinely granted. [00:19:29] Speaker 03: And then Mr. Williamson would be released? [00:19:32] Speaker 03: Would there be? [00:19:33] Speaker 04: Well, in the time [00:19:35] Speaker 04: after the this court's decision and the mandate issue, then there's the mandate to issue. [00:19:40] Speaker 04: There would be plenty of time for the director at that point if they thought it was justified because, according to the government, there's ample evidence already in the record. [00:19:50] Speaker 04: So no examination is needed in any event. [00:19:53] Speaker 04: But [00:19:54] Speaker 04: If it went back like that, there would be ample time then before it actually landed back in Judge Walton's lap, it would be ample time for the director to file a certificate then. [00:20:07] Speaker 04: If the director thought it was warranted. [00:20:11] Speaker 02: Would we have the authority to stay our decision long enough to allow a preliminary assessment by the warden to decide whether to issue a certificate? [00:20:21] Speaker 04: Well, when you say preliminary assessment, I'm not sure what you mean. [00:20:26] Speaker 04: There's been plenty of review of Mr. Williamson over the, he's been a butler now the last two years of his prior sentence and for five years pre-trial in this case. [00:20:37] Speaker 02: Let me ask this, would we have the authority to stay our mandate for 45 days during which time the warden could decide whether to issue a certificate? [00:20:45] Speaker 04: Well, this court's mandate doesn't issue for 52 days. [00:20:50] Speaker 04: So I think that would be more than enough, obviously. [00:20:55] Speaker 04: 45 days, that's the opinion, and an extra seven days. [00:20:59] Speaker 04: So as I understand it, the mandate wouldn't issue for 52 days. [00:21:03] Speaker 04: That would be more than Judge Walton afforded them. [00:21:06] Speaker 04: But what they wouldn't be allowed to do is the order allowing the evaluation [00:21:13] Speaker 04: our examination would no longer be valid. [00:21:16] Speaker 04: I want to understand. [00:21:17] Speaker 03: They would just be able to issue a certificate. [00:21:19] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:21:20] Speaker 04: They would have 52 days to issue a certificate. [00:21:23] Speaker 05: I want to correct something. [00:21:25] Speaker 05: I said Judge Choflat. [00:21:27] Speaker 05: I meant Judge Wilkins because the Barry case was from the 4th Circuit. [00:21:32] Speaker 04: I'm sorry I'm not familiar with it. [00:21:34] Speaker 04: It's never been cited that I know of by anybody in this case. [00:21:39] Speaker 04: So I apologize for not being familiar. [00:21:42] Speaker 05: That's because all the briefs were filed before it already came down. [00:21:47] Speaker 05: It was issued in June, June 24th of this year. [00:21:53] Speaker 02: Is it a compliment to Judge Chouflat or to Judge Wilkinson that you? [00:22:00] Speaker 02: I don't want to get in the middle of that. [00:22:01] Speaker 02: I understand what it is that you think should have happened. [00:22:06] Speaker 02: And I think I follow 95% of it. [00:22:10] Speaker 02: You think the district court should have dismissed the charges, should have stayed the dismissal for two to three days, which would have allowed the warden to decide whether to issue a 4246 certificate. [00:22:27] Speaker 02: And Mr. Williamson would have remained detained at Butner for those two to three days. [00:22:35] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:22:38] Speaker 02: would the district court have had to extend Williamson's detention by those two to three days? [00:22:45] Speaker 02: Would it be the pretrial detention authority? [00:22:50] Speaker 04: No. [00:22:50] Speaker 04: Well, if you vacate the order, as Judge Rouse said, and the dismissal was no longer in effect, then he's back in pretrial proceedings with a 48. [00:22:59] Speaker 04: I'm not talking about what we would do. [00:23:01] Speaker 02: I'm talking about what you think the district court should have done originally. [00:23:04] Speaker 02: Oh, originally? [00:23:06] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:23:06] Speaker 02: Dismiss the charges, stay the dismissal, extend the detention for two to three days. [00:23:12] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:23:12] Speaker 02: And under what authority would the district court have extended the detention by two to three days? [00:23:16] Speaker 04: Well, I think if they stayed the dismissal, I think I was trying to be reasonable in the district court and not have some opportunity for the director to file the certificate if they wanted to. [00:23:32] Speaker 04: And that may have been wrong. [00:23:33] Speaker 04: I mean, if he had dismissed the charges, I think. [00:23:48] Speaker 04: I shouldn't say this, but I think a district court may have some limited inherent authority to stay a decision for a minimal period of time in circumstances like this, but I don't think they have the inherent authority to do much else. [00:24:03] Speaker 04: Anything else that was done in this case in the Supreme Court has been quite [00:24:08] Speaker 04: critical of inherent, the exercise of inherent authority, the exercise of something under the rubric of inherent authority. [00:24:16] Speaker 02: The detention would have been extended two to three days as authorized by the court's inherent authority. [00:24:24] Speaker 04: Well, I guess a better way might have been to have the district court say, [00:24:33] Speaker 04: I'll consider this. [00:24:34] Speaker 04: I'm going to grant this motion, but I'm going to wait two or three days. [00:24:39] Speaker 04: That might be, uh, better in the sense of that. [00:24:43] Speaker 04: The detention would be authorized, but I'm just telling the government on three days from now, this motion is going to be signed. [00:24:50] Speaker 05: I don't understand what the problems mean. [00:24:54] Speaker 05: The your client was being held pursuant to a pre day, you know, [00:25:02] Speaker 05: pre-trial detention. [00:25:05] Speaker 05: And until the indictment is dismissed, he's held there. [00:25:10] Speaker 05: And he's the one that is responsible for many of the postponements. [00:25:15] Speaker 05: He didn't want to come to Washington because he'd lose his file, so keep me at button or be pending the trial. [00:25:24] Speaker 05: But as long as that indictment is outstanding, then what's the [00:25:31] Speaker 05: It's no inherent authority. [00:25:33] Speaker 05: He already, it's just 4241 or whatever it is. [00:25:39] Speaker 04: I don't disagree with you, Judge Randolph, that the delays, nobody, we never argued that delays were not, were the government's fault or anybody's fault. [00:25:50] Speaker 04: But I think if [00:25:54] Speaker 04: What I was trying to get at is if Judge Walton dismissed the indictment, there would be absolutely no authority to hold him on. [00:26:00] Speaker 05: Oh, if he dismissed it, yeah. [00:26:01] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:26:02] Speaker 04: If it was dismissed, there would be no authority. [00:26:04] Speaker 04: And I was saying that he might have the inherent authority to stay it for two or three days. [00:26:08] Speaker 04: And certainly, that was not contested in the district court. [00:26:13] Speaker 04: Let me put it that way, that he would be able to do that for a very minimal period of time. [00:26:21] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:26:28] Speaker 04: I can't even see without the glasses with the lights. [00:26:34] Speaker 03: Recollation. [00:26:48] Speaker 01: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:26:50] Speaker 01: Aleah Lloyd on behalf of the United States. [00:26:52] Speaker 01: May it please the court. [00:26:54] Speaker 01: The district court permissibly extended the [00:26:57] Speaker 01: defendant's detention temporarily in order to facilitate the purposes of 4246A and gave the Bureau of Prisons Director notice and opportunity to effectuate the purpose of the statute, which was to make the initial determination on whether or not this defendant should be detained [00:27:16] Speaker 01: prior to being released. [00:27:17] Speaker 03: Ms. [00:27:17] Speaker 03: Lloyd, I think it's interesting that you began by saying this fulfills the purposes of the statute. [00:27:22] Speaker 03: But here, Congress has legislated a very specific statutory scheme for civil commitment, given the important liberty interests at stake. [00:27:31] Speaker 03: So where is the statutory authority for what the district court did here? [00:27:38] Speaker 01: So I think it's important, Your Honor, to recognize the defendant was already on pretrial detention when this occurred. [00:27:46] Speaker 01: The court certainly had the authority under, I want to say 3142, with the defendant already being detained, to issue an order like this and then continue that detention, especially given that the court stayed and motioned to dismiss. [00:28:03] Speaker 01: So that's where the detention authority comes from. [00:28:06] Speaker 03: Well, even if the detention comes from 3142 pretrial detention, where is the authority to order an evaluation or an examination? [00:28:15] Speaker 01: Yes, so the authority to order the evaluation or examination isn't, I want to construe the order appropriately. [00:28:22] Speaker 01: It were to examine in order to make the determination, we think, was a little bit inartful. [00:28:28] Speaker 01: But the gist of it is that the district court was giving the Bureau of Prison Facility Director the opportunity to make this determination, which the statute contemplates. [00:28:39] Speaker 01: As you look at the Senate report creating the statute, [00:28:42] Speaker 01: It is the director's responsibility to determine preliminarily whether the defendant should be released. [00:28:50] Speaker 01: So what the district court was doing here was giving the facility director that opportunity to make that preliminary determination. [00:28:58] Speaker 01: Whether the term is evaluate, assess, examine, it all means the same thing under the statute. [00:29:03] Speaker 01: The facility director has to certify that the qualifications for a certificate are met. [00:29:09] Speaker 01: And that necessarily entails some sort of evaluation. [00:29:14] Speaker 01: And so here, the district court's order merely just gave the facility director notice to say, hey, the triggering event has occurred. [00:29:22] Speaker 01: I'm dismissing this case. [00:29:24] Speaker 01: I know you need time to figure out whether or not you're going to file this statute, which entails the facility director saying not only that this defendant is suffering from some sort of mental defect that would create a danger to others or their property, [00:29:37] Speaker 01: but also that there is no available state custody arrangements that can be made. [00:29:42] Speaker 01: So let me give a little bit of time here for you to make that determination. [00:29:45] Speaker 01: It was just sort of throwing up a flag saying, the triggering event that you need to make a determination has occurred. [00:29:53] Speaker 01: I'm giving some time. [00:29:54] Speaker 01: Do with it what you will. [00:29:56] Speaker 01: Either file a certificate or don't file a certificate. [00:29:59] Speaker 01: But the district court has to be able to give the director some time in order to accomplish this initial determination. [00:30:05] Speaker 03: Some time, but now a great deal of time has passed. [00:30:09] Speaker 01: That is correct your honor, but that's only because the defendant asked for the district court's order to be stayed pending this appeal. [00:30:17] Speaker 02: But I don't understand. [00:30:18] Speaker 02: That answer because. [00:30:22] Speaker 02: I think according to you. [00:30:24] Speaker 02: The. [00:30:26] Speaker 02: The warden did not need. [00:30:29] Speaker 02: In order from the district court. [00:30:31] Speaker 02: In order to. [00:30:33] Speaker 02: Make whatever assessment is necessary to decide whether to issue a 4246 [00:30:39] Speaker 01: Well, the warden certainly needed a major part of that order, which is the dismissal of charges. [00:30:45] Speaker 01: And so the statute, unfortunately, is a little bit of a catch-22. [00:30:49] Speaker 01: I agree with you about that part. [00:30:51] Speaker 02: I think that is weird in its own right. [00:30:54] Speaker 02: But the warden doesn't need the mandate to issue on a dismissal of charges, because you were going to have the 45 days with the mandate stayed. [00:31:10] Speaker 02: So I'm not sure what the district, I'm not sure what the warden has needed for the past year and a half that the warden wouldn't have had, even if there had been no appeal. [00:31:22] Speaker 01: Well, I don't, the government doesn't control the warden, but I imagine the warden saw the stay of the order as a decision to allocate resources appropriately and wait and see how this was all going to shake out before it took any steps as [00:31:37] Speaker 01: Um, Judge Randolph is sort of already intimated. [00:31:40] Speaker 01: This is a very, uh, backed up process. [00:31:43] Speaker 01: There are a lot of defendants, a lot of, there are a lot of resource constraints for the BOP. [00:31:48] Speaker 02: That is a, I know it's not your fault that that answer may be the best answer, but I asked basically, why has it not already happened for a year and a half? [00:32:01] Speaker 02: And your answer is, well, maybe the warden had other priorities for a year and a half. [00:32:08] Speaker 01: Your Honor, I'm not sure why the warden is waiting, but the decision to file the certificate is completely within the warden's hands. [00:32:18] Speaker 01: There's nothing that we can do on our side to say you have to file it. [00:32:23] Speaker 01: The warden has absolute control over that decision. [00:32:26] Speaker 01: We can only do what we've done in this case and what other district courts have done in all of these cases, which is give the warden the opportunity to file it. [00:32:34] Speaker 02: Why do you even want the 45-day extension of the detention [00:32:38] Speaker 01: Well, we believe that that was a reasonable amount of time, given the resource constraints we know that exist. [00:32:43] Speaker 02: You just said a year and a half is not a reasonable amount of time, so I don't know why 45 days would have been a reasonable. [00:32:47] Speaker 01: Well, again, Your Honor, just to clarify, we wanted to give the warden, and we believe that it's necessary, as other courts have also held, to give the warden time to make this decision at the moment when it all occurred. [00:33:00] Speaker 01: What the warden is doing currently or why the certificate has not yet issued, [00:33:05] Speaker 01: is not something that we can order the warden to do or the BOP to do. [00:33:11] Speaker 01: We can merely, when we finally give the triggering event the ability to occur, which is the dismissal of all charges for reasons of mental issues. [00:33:19] Speaker 02: I understand that answer. [00:33:21] Speaker 02: And this is changing topics a little bit. [00:33:23] Speaker 02: I just want to confirm, if I think that we, the panel, think best, I'm not saying we will, but if we think it best to read the district court's order, [00:33:32] Speaker 02: to dismiss the charges, stay the dismissal, and extend the detention for 45 days. [00:33:39] Speaker 02: As a formal matter, ordering an exam, do you think that we can read the order then? [00:33:44] Speaker 01: I think that's definitely how the order can be read, Your Honor. [00:33:47] Speaker 01: And that's simply because the district court is doing nothing more than saying, here's the triggering event. [00:33:55] Speaker 01: It's occurred. [00:33:56] Speaker 01: Do what the statute contemplates, which is make some sort of determination. [00:33:59] Speaker 02: If we read it that way, would we [00:34:02] Speaker 02: affirm or would we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction? [00:34:11] Speaker 02: Because it's not, you can't bring in a locatory appeal for the extension of pretrial detention. [00:34:24] Speaker 01: That's a very good question. [00:34:25] Speaker 01: I think you could affirm. [00:34:28] Speaker 01: But if you wanted to do, the government's position has been that there is jurisdiction here. [00:34:34] Speaker 01: And I would submit that that jurisdiction still exists even if you read the order that way, given the fact that some sort of [00:34:50] Speaker 01: Given the fact that we're in a sort of 4246 twilight zone, and rather than say that there is no jurisdiction in these types of matters, the government believes that this is something that can't be reviewed. [00:35:07] Speaker 05: He's still under the pretrial detention. [00:35:10] Speaker 05: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:35:12] Speaker 05: And the order that went to Butner, the Judge Walton's order, said that he's going to dismiss that indictment pending the examination. [00:35:27] Speaker 05: He's not going to dismiss the indictment until the director of the facility decides either to grant or not to grant a certificate. [00:35:41] Speaker 01: 42 46 certificate right that I think you should read the order as saying that the defendant sure remain at FCI butner for a reasonable period of time not to exceed 45 days to facilitate the director being able to file the certificate and the dismissal estate pending the completion of that evaluation and determination. [00:36:03] Speaker 01: So it's tied to the 45 days. [00:36:05] Speaker 01: or whatever reasonable period of time needs to occur, not to exceed 45 days. [00:36:10] Speaker 01: So in that sense, the government would believe that once 45 days is ended, unless the director files some sort of notice with the court saying that he or she needs more time, at that point, the case would be dismissed. [00:36:25] Speaker 05: Right, yeah. [00:36:26] Speaker 05: But we never got to that point because he stayed this order pending appeal. [00:36:32] Speaker 05: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:36:34] Speaker 05: So once this order clicks in, then it's 45 days he's going to be held for the examination. [00:36:42] Speaker 01: Or some reasonable period of time. [00:36:43] Speaker 01: It could be much less than that. [00:36:45] Speaker 05: And same thing happened in Barry, and the director of what is it, FMC at Putner said, I need another 30 days in the district court granted it. [00:37:00] Speaker 01: I believe that's correct, Your Honor, and that's what's happened in a lot of the district court cases and some of the other circuit cases we decided. [00:37:07] Speaker 05: Do you know whether there's more than two facilities that are capable of doing 4246? [00:37:13] Speaker 01: I'm only aware of two, but I know that in the past there has been more, given the case law that exists. [00:37:20] Speaker 01: But at this current time, I'm only aware of at least two. [00:37:24] Speaker 01: What's the other one besides one? [00:37:26] Speaker 05: I'm not sure. [00:37:28] Speaker 05: Do you think that it's accurate in the order to say that it's whether the director of FCI, Butner, should file a certificate? [00:37:41] Speaker 05: Shouldn't it be the director of FMC? [00:37:45] Speaker 01: Your Honor, I think the statute contemplates it's the director of the Bureau of Prisons facility, and I think that would... That would be FCC, not FCI. [00:37:55] Speaker 05: It's the Federal Correctional Center. [00:37:58] Speaker 01: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would be the ultimate director of the entire facility, which would encompass both the corrections and the metal. [00:38:05] Speaker 01: It's not what happened in Burry. [00:38:14] Speaker 01: I would hope that the facility director would understand who they need to have to issue the certificate. [00:38:19] Speaker 01: But ultimately, it is the director of the facility that issues the certificate. [00:38:24] Speaker 01: The court can't order. [00:38:25] Speaker 01: the certificate to issue and that is not what happened here. [00:38:28] Speaker 01: The only thing that happened here was a continuation of a defendant who was already in custody and the notice given out to the facility that one of the triggering events that are contemplated by 4246A has actualized. [00:38:48] Speaker 01: Once that happens, it's only then that the director has the ability to file a certificate [00:38:53] Speaker 01: which necessarily requires a determination that the defendant meets the requirements of the statute, which are the fact that the defendant could that the director has to certify that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect. [00:39:10] Speaker 01: and that there are no suitable arrangements for state custody. [00:39:13] Speaker 01: And so that's exactly what happened here. [00:39:16] Speaker 01: The district court looked at the statute, realized that it had a defendant, which it had already determined was a danger to the community, given that it's holding him pretrial for that specific reason. [00:39:30] Speaker 01: Noted that if the statute requires the director to only issue the certificate when the defendant is in custody, [00:39:37] Speaker 01: but the triggering event is a dismissal of the charges, some amount of time had to happen to stay the defendant's release in order to make sure that a dangerous defendant was not immediately released before the director had the opportunity to make the determination that the statute contemplates. [00:39:54] Speaker 02: Where do you think the authority for that extension of time comes from? [00:39:57] Speaker 02: Is it 4246 or is it 4231 pretrial detention? [00:40:03] Speaker 01: In this case, [00:40:04] Speaker 01: We believe that the pretrial detention is the easiest authority to find that under. [00:40:11] Speaker 01: But we also would note that in other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, who handled this in Godenas, Arteez has found that the district court has the inherent authority to temporarily commit a defendant for purposes of an evaluation. [00:40:25] Speaker 01: And I think that would also, in some ways, fall under the pretrial release detention or release authority. [00:40:33] Speaker 01: Because a defendant under pretrial release, the district court also has the ability to order evaluations or mental health evaluations as necessary. [00:40:40] Speaker 01: And so ultimately, whether you look at the district court's inherent authority or what the district court may do with the defendant that's being detained under pretrial detention, the district court certainly had the ability to order the continued detention of this defendant. [00:40:56] Speaker 03: But those are two very different legal arguments. [00:40:59] Speaker 01: Yes, Your Honor. [00:41:00] Speaker 01: And the government's position is that you could do it under both. [00:41:05] Speaker 01: And the government's position is that you could do it under both. [00:41:07] Speaker 01: But here, the continued detention certainly was authorized under the pretrial detention order. [00:41:17] Speaker 02: This is a friendly question. [00:41:18] Speaker 02: 4246A says, speaking of the director of the facility, [00:41:24] Speaker 02: he shall transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for the district in which the person is confined. [00:41:31] Speaker 02: That suggests an assumption that the person is confined. [00:41:35] Speaker 02: There must be some authority being assumed that would allow confinement. [00:41:44] Speaker 02: Maybe it's inherent authority, but I think 4246, do you agree? [00:41:50] Speaker 02: 4246 presumes that the district court will have some authority [00:41:54] Speaker 02: to confine the person before the director of the facility transmits the certificate? [00:42:02] Speaker 01: Yes, and I think that happens in a variety of circumstances. [00:42:05] Speaker 01: One of the triggering events is that the defendant is getting ready to be released from a custodial sentence. [00:42:12] Speaker 01: And so at that time, the defendant's already in custody of the Bureau of Prisons, so that takes care of that issue. [00:42:18] Speaker 01: Another one is where the defendant's already committed to the custody of the attorney general. [00:42:23] Speaker 01: And so that would take care of it under that issue. [00:42:25] Speaker 01: In our particular case, it's when the criminal charges have been dismissed. [00:42:29] Speaker 01: And in our particular case, as I think the defendant cites in the Carrington case, the criminal proceedings are still ongoing. [00:42:39] Speaker 01: And so the district court here, as the court with the jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings, certainly had the authority to continue the detention it already had instituted. [00:42:52] Speaker 03: Okay, thank you. [00:42:58] Speaker 03: Mr Kramer will give you a couple minutes. [00:43:00] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:43:02] Speaker 04: I just want to say preliminarily that pre trial detention argument the government is making now was never argued in the district court or in their briefs on appeal. [00:43:10] Speaker 04: They've argued solely on 4246 and I want to say they have now disavowed what they asked for in their motion. [00:43:18] Speaker 04: It was entitled, a motion for an evaluation pursuant to 18 USC 4246. [00:43:25] Speaker 04: And they said for a reasonable period not exceeding 45 days to be examined to determine whether they should file it. [00:43:32] Speaker 04: And then on page 13 of their motion, I'm sorry, page 14 of their motion, they said he should be evaluated to determine whether his release [00:43:43] Speaker 04: would put the community in danger. [00:43:45] Speaker 04: And they said this court should order an evaluation to allow BOP to determine whether to file. [00:43:51] Speaker 04: And they ended up by saying that the director should be given an opportunity to evaluate the defendant for dangerousness. [00:44:03] Speaker 04: This is not just a certificate. [00:44:07] Speaker 04: Ended by saying for 45 days so that he can be evaluated for dangerous this and for decision by the director now that 45 days is for a full 42 46 exam. [00:44:18] Speaker 04: That's what the statute permits for a full exam. [00:44:21] Speaker 04: This issuance of the certificate and I think I have to revise something I said so when we were in the district court, I said. [00:44:29] Speaker 04: that the district court could stay its order for minimal period of time because it should dismiss the charges. [00:44:35] Speaker 04: And now we're way past that. [00:44:37] Speaker 04: We're over a year or a year and a half past when this order was first ended by the district court. [00:44:44] Speaker 04: I guess it was filed. [00:44:45] Speaker 04: We're well over. [00:44:46] Speaker 04: It was filed in December of twenty four. [00:44:50] Speaker 04: So there has been, I think it should just go back to the district court for dismissal at this point. [00:44:55] Speaker 04: Butner will be given, if this court were to reverse, Butner would have 45 plus seven days before this court's mandate would issue to the district court. [00:45:05] Speaker 04: And then Judge Walton would have to either issue a written order or set a hearing in court. [00:45:11] Speaker 05: Here's the way Judge Wilkinson responded to arguments like that. [00:45:15] Speaker 05: I'm just going to read this to you. [00:45:18] Speaker 05: It would make little sense to interpret the statute to require the release of dangerous mentally and keep incompetent individuals the moment their charges are dismissed without affording the government a reasonable opportunity to seek a certification under 4246. [00:45:36] Speaker 04: I'm not sure I disagree with that as a principle, but that's not what the statute says, first of all. [00:45:44] Speaker 04: And the Supreme Court has said you don't read words into the statute that aren't there. [00:45:49] Speaker 05: And second of all... I think we're dealing with an issue that is not... I mean, I tend to agree with you to the extent that the order here is not an order that you can [00:46:00] Speaker 05: You can look at 4246 and say it. [00:46:05] Speaker 05: 4246 just doesn't cover the question, how do you give the government an opportunity before you dismiss the invite? [00:46:16] Speaker 04: Well, then you're doing exactly what the Supreme Court says is impermissible. [00:46:22] Speaker 04: The court will presume that the legislator says what it means and means what it says. [00:46:28] Speaker 04: We have repeatedly stated that the text of a law controls over purported legislative intentions unmoored from any statutory text. [00:46:37] Speaker 04: The court may not replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress's intent. [00:46:43] Speaker 04: I think that covers this precisely. [00:46:45] Speaker 04: Also, Judge Walton's order clearly requires an evaluation. [00:46:50] Speaker 04: And two things, Mr. Williamson has already had an evaluation he should not have had because Judge Walton had no authority to issue that. [00:46:59] Speaker 05: Yeah, but the evaluations that he had were not 4246 evaluations. [00:47:07] Speaker 05: They were competency. [00:47:12] Speaker 05: whether he suffers from a mental disease sufficient to warrant him not being allowed to represent himself. [00:47:20] Speaker 05: No, but the 4246 inquiry is whether he's dangerous. [00:47:26] Speaker 05: You can be mentally incompetent and not dangerous, right? [00:47:30] Speaker 04: So it's designed to determine dangerous. [00:47:34] Speaker 04: But Judge Walton had already found him competent to represent himself before he ordered the exam on sanity at the time of the offense. [00:47:42] Speaker 04: He said he wanted to know whether there was an insanity defense. [00:47:46] Speaker 04: And that's only permissible under the statute when the defendant is filed a notice. [00:47:50] Speaker 05: None of those inquiries, I guess, were. [00:47:53] Speaker 04: No, but what I'm saying is... It deals with dangers. [00:47:56] Speaker 04: He's already been subject to one exam he never should have had. [00:47:59] Speaker 04: Now the government's saying you should have another exam because it's necessarily encompassed. [00:48:05] Speaker 04: One thing you didn't hear the government say was anything under the statute that authorizes this exam. [00:48:10] Speaker 04: And so by the time at this point in time now, it's a year and a half after or more than that after Judge Walton issued his order. [00:48:20] Speaker 04: Butner knows what's going on because Judge Walton even referred to an email he had gotten from Butner about the status of the case and whether Mr. Williamson would be going back to DC. [00:48:32] Speaker 04: And then [00:48:33] Speaker 04: If this court were to reverse, Butler would have another 52 days at which they know that the case is going back to Judge Walton. [00:48:41] Speaker 04: I think it should go back, at this point in time, should just go back to Judge Walton to effectuate his order to dismiss the indictment. [00:48:50] Speaker 04: He's already granted the motion, but it should just go back for that. [00:48:54] Speaker 04: And Butler should not have, at that time, either they will file the certificate immediately or not. [00:49:04] Speaker 04: Or they can file it even before Judge Walton does that, because it will go into effect at the dismissal. [00:49:11] Speaker 04: So I don't think they should have any extra time. [00:49:14] Speaker 04: If this court were to reverse, they're already going to get 52 more days. [00:49:18] Speaker 04: to have this issue under submission. [00:49:21] Speaker 04: But there's no way Judge Walton's order can be interpreted that he's just going to stay there for 45 days for them to determine whether to file a certificate because he ordered the motion for the evaluation pursuant to 4246. [00:49:37] Speaker 04: I'm not even sure they'll know what that means because 4246 is solely for dangerousness. [00:49:43] Speaker 04: It's not whether to issue a certificate. [00:49:46] Speaker 04: And second of all, if they have this evaluation, what happens later if they do issue a certificate? [00:49:53] Speaker 04: Then there's another evaluation, and an evaluation by an examiner Mr. Williamson has, which is denied to him under this order. [00:50:04] Speaker 04: And so it's because there's no statutory basis for it. [00:50:09] Speaker 02: I understand that you think we should not read the order to stop short of ordering an examination. [00:50:16] Speaker 02: But if there were two plausible readings of a district court order and one of those readings would require something that is not authorized by statutes and one of them orders something that is authorized by statutes, would you agree with me that we should read the order? [00:50:36] Speaker 02: There are two possible ways to read it. [00:50:37] Speaker 02: We should read it the way that [00:50:38] Speaker 02: would be authorized by statute. [00:50:40] Speaker 04: I don't think there's any plausible reading of this. [00:50:42] Speaker 04: It's authorized. [00:50:43] Speaker 04: I know. [00:50:44] Speaker 04: I know you're fighting that. [00:50:45] Speaker 02: No, we disagree. [00:50:46] Speaker 02: We may disagree about that. [00:50:47] Speaker 04: If you're saying he the judge Walton would just say he's to stay there for 45 days with no evaluation. [00:50:53] Speaker 04: There's no authority for that either. [00:50:57] Speaker 02: Um, to have maybe let me just ask it in the abstract. [00:51:01] Speaker 02: I just record the shoes in order. [00:51:03] Speaker 02: It could be interpreted two plausible ways. [00:51:05] Speaker 02: Interpretation A, not authorized by statute. [00:51:08] Speaker 02: Interpretation B, authorized by statute. [00:51:10] Speaker 02: Shouldn't we interpret it? [00:51:11] Speaker 04: Interpretation B. Very abstract type of thing. [00:51:18] Speaker 04: Taking your, prefacing it with the word plausible, when it orders an evaluation pursuant to the request, it has to be plausible. [00:51:27] Speaker 04: But the second law, because this was never argued, [00:51:31] Speaker 04: in the district court or in the government's brief, I don't think you can just have Mr. Williamson sit there and button her for 45 days. [00:51:39] Speaker 04: I don't think there's any authority for that either. [00:51:41] Speaker 04: So I guess the answer is there's no authority for either one. [00:51:45] Speaker 02: Can I just ask about one more thing? [00:51:46] Speaker 02: You pushed back against Judge Randolph's theory because you thought it was kind of insufficiently textualist. [00:51:56] Speaker 02: If we were to be sort of hypertextualist and just look at 4246B in isolation, it says, prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order a psych examination. [00:52:13] Speaker 02: And it doesn't say anything about a certificate being filed first. [00:52:19] Speaker 02: And subsection A, which is all about the certificate, doesn't say anything about an examination. [00:52:27] Speaker 02: Again, if we were going to be kind of as hypertextualist as maybe you were suggesting to Judge Randolph, we would just look at subsection B. It says the court may order a psych examination. [00:52:39] Speaker 02: It doesn't say anything there about how a certificate has to come first. [00:52:44] Speaker 02: So as long as the psych examination is prior to the day of the hearing, which of course it was here, then what the district judge will be authorized is authorized by subsection B. Well, I think that would be a [00:52:56] Speaker 04: portrait reading of the statute beyond any reasonable, because section one talks about the institution of the proceeding. [00:53:05] Speaker 04: And the other parts are all what happens in that proceeding. [00:53:10] Speaker 04: And it's only instituted by the filing of their certificate. [00:53:13] Speaker 04: And then comes the psychiatric exam. [00:53:17] Speaker 04: And subsection E is about the discharge. [00:53:21] Speaker 04: I'm sorry, where? [00:53:22] Speaker 04: Subsection B? [00:53:23] Speaker 04: Oh, B. I'm sorry. [00:53:24] Speaker 04: I thought, right. [00:53:27] Speaker 04: Prior to the date of the hearing, but there's no hearing unless subsection eight takes place first. [00:53:34] Speaker 02: You could just read subject and be to say that the court may order a psych examination. [00:53:37] Speaker 02: When can it order it anytime as long as there hasn't been a hearing first? [00:53:42] Speaker 04: Well, it says prior to the date to the date of the hearing. [00:53:46] Speaker 02: I will say I'm not persuaded by this, but I think you're sort of asking for and maybe the best interpretation that you're asking for, but you're asking for sort of a Goldilocks version of not as holistic [00:53:56] Speaker 02: as judge Wilkinson and not as hypertextualist as as what I was saying. [00:54:01] Speaker 04: I may be right. [00:54:02] Speaker 04: I just think when subsection a says this is how the proceeding starts the certificate is issued. [00:54:09] Speaker 04: The director has to find this and then it says it's sent to the clerk's office [00:54:14] Speaker 04: and the court orders a hearing. [00:54:16] Speaker 04: And then the next section in time says, prior to the date of the hearing, not of any hearing or a hearing, but prior to the date of the hearing, that has to refer back to the hearing in subsection A. I don't see any other way to read that, but I think you're right. [00:54:34] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:54:34] Speaker 03: Thank you, Mr. Kramer. [00:54:36] Speaker 03: The case is submitted.