[00:00:01] Speaker 00:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now open and in session.

[00:00:06] Speaker 00:
God save the United States and this honorable court.

[00:00:11] Speaker 05:
We'll hear argument first in number 20-1335, Evolved Wireless LLC versus HTC Corporation.

[00:00:20] Speaker 05:
Mr. Granite.

[00:00:25] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor, and may it please the court, Chris Granigan for Evolved Wireless.

[00:00:30] Speaker 00:
The district court's judgment should be reversed for two reasons.

[00:00:33] Speaker 00:
First, the 373 patent, the only patent at issue on appeal, is not covered by the covenants not to sue.

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And second, even if the 373 patent is covered by the covenants not to sue, those covenants cease to have any effect once LG terminated the agreement in which those covenants appeared.

[00:00:53] Speaker 00:
I'll start with the covenants not to sue themselves.

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They apply to patents that are technically or commercially necessary to make, use, or sell subscriber units.

[00:01:03] Speaker 00:
Subscriber units is a defined term in the agreement, and it means complete CDMA telephones and CDMA modem cards and any subsequent generation products.

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Now, as we've stated in our brief and as I'll get into, the only thing that a subscriber unit must have is CDMA.

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And importantly, that is true even if the subscriber unit is a multi-mode subscriber unit.

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I believe it is undisputed that a CDMA multi-mode device does not have to support LTE.

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It could, for example, be a CDMA slash GSM or a 3G, 2G device.

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And because the only thing that is necessary for a subscriber unit is CDMA, the only patents that are necessary to make, use, or sell subscriber units

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are patents that cover CDMA.

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Now Appellees are trying to argue that because the accused devices here are subscriber units and they support LTE, the 373 patent which is necessary to LTE must be covered by the covenants.

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That is the wrong question to ask.

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It is true that the accused products are subscriber units and that's because they support CDMA.

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But that does not answer the question of what patents are covered by the covenants.

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To answer that question, we look at what patents are, in the language of the agreement, necessary to make, use, or sell subscriber units.

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And because the only thing that is necessary for subscriber units is CDMA, the only patents necessary to make, use, or sell subscriber units are patents covering CDMA technology.

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Now let's look at why I say that

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The only thing necessary for subscriber units is that they support CDMA.

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And we'll start with the term complete CDMA telephone.

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That is a defined term and it means any complete CDMA including multi-mode terminal, and I'm cutting off some of the irrelevant portions of the definition here, but a complete CDMA terminal that can initiate and or receive wireless communications.

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Wireless itself is also a defined term, and it itself is limited to CDMA-based digital cellular systems, and again, I'm cutting off some irrelevant parts of the definition, and any other CDMA wireless applications.

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So a complete CDMA telephone is something that supports CDMA network technology.

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Appellees, again, hang their hat on the words, including multimode in the definition, and they contend that

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Because the accused products are multi-mode CDMA LTE products, patents covering LTE technology are necessary to make them.

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Again, that is the wrong question.

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In the language of the agreement, the question is what is necessary to make, use, or sell complete CDMA telephones.

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The only thing a device must do to be a complete CDMA telephone is support CDMA technology.

[00:04:12] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:04:13] Speaker 04:
This is Judge Plager.

[00:04:15] Speaker 04:
I'm with you on all of that, but you forgot to add the language that comes after a CDMA telephone or a CDMA modem card, the language that is, and any subsequent generation product.

[00:04:31] Speaker 04:
What is your understanding of what a subsequent generation product means?

[00:04:39] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honor, and that is exactly where I was going next.

[00:04:43] Speaker 00:
In our view, a subsequent generation product is simply a product that supports CDMA technology that is neither a complete CDMA telephone or a CDMA modem card.

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I believe the example we gave in our reply brief is something like a smart car or something else in the Internet of Things that are becoming more and more common.

[00:05:05] Speaker 00:
We think that is the correct understanding of subsequent generation products for a few reasons.

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First, the context in which it appears.

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As your honor noted, it appears in the phrase complete CDMA telephones, CDMA modem cards, and subsequent generation products.

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So the question we're asking is what is a subsequent generation product to a CDMA telephone and a CDMA modem card?

[00:05:30] Speaker 00:
Well, it's a product that is neither a CDMA telephone or a CDMA modem card.

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It is a new product that is not one of those.

[00:05:40] Speaker 05:
The way in which this term within this industry isn't generation abbreviated to G and isn't it standard to refer to products as 3G or 4G products?

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I believe, I agree with you that G and 3G means third generation network technology.

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4G certainly means 4G network technology, but I don't, that is not the phrase that's used here.

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It is subsequent generation product.

[00:06:15] Speaker 02:
But I guess that's the heart of Judge Dyke's question is exactly the problem I have with your argument.

[00:06:21] Speaker 02:
When it says subsequent generation products, a product that is subsequent to the CDMA 3G technology, it seems to me would very clearly encompass LTE 4G technology.

[00:06:32] Speaker 02:
That's exactly what I think the subsequent generation is.

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So I'm confused.

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I feel like you want it to be accessory parts, but accessory parts aren't next gen products.

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Next-gen products are the next generation of products, which is exactly what this is.

[00:06:51] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I think it does make sense to refer to things as subsequent generation products when we think about how products with connectivity have evolved.

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For example, we had computers that were connected to the Internet first, and then we had phones, and now we have Internet of Things products, smart cars, things like that.

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I think it certainly makes sense to refer to those things as

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subsequent generation technology.

[00:07:16] Speaker 02:
But it also makes sense to refer to the LTE forging products as the subsequent generation technology.

[00:07:24] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor, and we don't dispute that a subsequent generation product could be something that does support LTE as long as it also supports CDMA.

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And our point is the only thing that is necessary is that the subsequent generation product supports CDMA.

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And we think the way that

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that term was added to this agreement over time supports that reading.

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Recall that in the original 1993 agreement, the phrase was simply, I believe it was CDMA telephone, a complete CDMA and or dual mode CDMA telephone.

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That was broadened over time to the definition that we have today which is complete CDMA telephone, CDMA modem card or subsequent generation product.

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And I think that shows that the intent of the party was not to expand the term to include new network technology, but to include new products that are not just telephones, but for example, modem cars and other products.

[00:08:25] Speaker 00:
I think that... Yes, Your Honor.

[00:08:28] Speaker 04:
Mr. Granahan, this is Judge Plager again.

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Help me a little bit on this.

[00:08:33] Speaker 04:
I think I'm following you, but let me see if I can...

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simplify the terminology just a little bit for my own use.

[00:08:43] Speaker 04:
Do I understand you to say the phrase subsequent generation, as you understand it, refers not to generations of technology, but to generations of products?

[00:09:00] Speaker 04:
That is to say, a subsequent generation product is a product

[00:09:06] Speaker 04:
that is neither a telephone nor a modem card.

[00:09:12] Speaker 04:
Whereas if I understand your colleague on the other side, which I'm sure we'll hear from, I understand them to say subsequent generation means technology.

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Is that a fair statement?

[00:09:31] Speaker 00:
I believe that is correct, Your Honor.

[00:09:33] Speaker 00:
You certainly have accurately stated our position.

[00:09:37] Speaker 00:
I am not sure whether their position is that a subsequent generation product could be something that is LTE only or whether they believe that it must support CDMA.

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For example, on page 11 of their brief, they say that the license agreement covers devices that implement 3G and 4G technology.

[00:09:57] Speaker 00:
So I think their position might be that a

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subsequent generation product must support CDMA, although I'm not 100% sure on that.

[00:10:07] Speaker 05:
Unless my colleagues have further questions on this point, I'd like to, before we run out of time, ask you about the termination issue.

[00:10:15] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:10:17] Speaker 05:
So my understanding of opposing counsel's argument about this is that you're

[00:10:26] Speaker 05:
barred from raising the termination issue because you didn't make a motion, I guess, to supplement the summary judgment filings as required by the local rules.

[00:10:42] Speaker 05:
And could you tell me why you didn't make a motion, why you did it in the form that you did?

[00:10:48] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, to be candid, I don't know exactly why the decision was made to do it in the form that we did.

[00:10:55] Speaker 00:
I will say that I believe their position is not exactly that we should have made the motion.

[00:11:00] Speaker 00:
I believe it is that the district court appropriately excluded the evidence that we submitted of the termination because Evolt had not complied with the local rules.

[00:11:11] Speaker 00:
And we don't believe it was complete.

[00:11:13] Speaker 05:
Not complied with the local rules by making a motion, right?

[00:11:16] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:11:18] Speaker 00:
But their position is that the district court made the decision to exclude the evidence

[00:11:23] Speaker 00:
We don't believe that the district court did make the decision to exclude the evidence.

[00:11:27] Speaker 02:
We believe that the district court considered the evidence because it was discussed at the hearing.

[00:11:41] Speaker 02:
I don't think that we know what the district court did.

[00:11:43] Speaker 02:
It seems to me it's just a complete vacuum.

[00:11:47] Speaker 02:
So why don't we send it back for them, not send it back to necessarily find in your favor or send it back to necessarily find in opposing counsel's favor, but just send it back so the district court can actually explain to us what his thinking was on this evidence.

[00:12:04] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I certainly don't believe that you need to do that.

[00:12:07] Speaker 00:
I think the transcripts show that the district court considered it.

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And I think the district court erred by entering judgment in full.

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And I don't think appellees have contended otherwise.

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But if the court would rather remand so that the district court can make clear its reasoning, that is a remedy that we would be happy with.

[00:12:26] Speaker 04:
Excuse me.

[00:12:28] Speaker 04:
This is Judge Plager.

[00:12:28] Speaker 04:
When you say the district court considered it, am I mistaken?

[00:12:35] Speaker 04:
I didn't find anything in the district court's opinion

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which I've read with some care, that even mentions the termination issue.

[00:12:45] Speaker 04:
Where does the district court explain its consideration of this issue?

[00:12:53] Speaker 00:
You are correct, Your Honor, that it does not appear in the district court's opinion.

[00:12:56] Speaker 00:
The district court discussed the termination at the hearing on the summary judgment issue, though.

[00:13:01] Speaker 00:
I would point you to pages 4726 to 4728 and page 4730

[00:13:08] Speaker 00:
at the hearing.

[00:13:09] Speaker 00:
He asked several questions of evolved counsel at the termination showing that he considered it.

[00:13:14] Speaker 05:
But there was still no indication of why he didn't rule on it, right?

[00:13:21] Speaker 00:
He did not say exactly why he didn't rule on it in the summary judgment order, Your Honor.

[00:13:27] Speaker 00:
He did indicate that the termination would not have made a difference because there must have been a new agreement between LG and Qualcomm after the termination.

[00:13:38] Speaker 00:
And we certainly don't think that any new agreement would have made a difference because LG no longer owned the patent at that point and couldn't encumber it.

[00:13:45] Speaker 00:
But that was one of the reasons he gave for believing that it didn't make a difference.

[00:13:51] Speaker 05:
OK.

[00:13:51] Speaker 05:
Unless my colleagues have further questions, I think we're out of time.

[00:13:55] Speaker 05:
And we'll give you two minutes for rebuttal.

[00:13:58] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:13:59] Speaker 05:
We'll hear from Ms.

[00:14:00] Speaker 05:
Maroulas.

[00:14:06] Speaker 03:
Good morning, and may it please the courts.

[00:14:08] Speaker 03:
Victoria Maroulis for the Appellees.

[00:14:11] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, I would like to start with questions.

[00:14:14] Speaker 05:
While we're on the subject of the termination, could maybe address that?

[00:14:20] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:14:21] Speaker 05:
Isn't Judge Moore right that we have to send this back?

[00:14:25] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, I would disagree that it should be sent back because the district court judge was within his discretion to not consider the improperly and belatedly filed pleading.

[00:14:37] Speaker 03:
What happened here is that Evolve chose to violate local rules that are really important and vital for the district court's ability to control its dockets.

[00:14:47] Speaker 05:
You mean the local rule is the issue that filed a motion?

[00:14:50] Speaker 05:
Is that the point?

[00:14:51] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:14:52] Speaker 03:
Yes, they should have sought leave to file anything after the summary judgment briefing closed.

[00:14:57] Speaker 03:
Instead, they chose to file a notice, which is not a proper pleading in Delaware, did not seek permission of the court, and did not cure it for the rest of the remaining period between when they filed it in February and nine months later when the decision of the court issued.

[00:15:14] Speaker 03:
Under the Green case, which is the third circuit precedent to which we'll look regarding the regional law enforcement of the local rules, the court was within its discretion to not consider something that was not properly introduced into the family judgment record.

[00:15:31] Speaker 03:
The fact that the court mentioned it or somebody else mentioned it in the hearing does not mean

[00:15:37] Speaker 03:
that this particular pleading was part of the record, was properly introduced in the record, and that the court had any obligation to consider it.

[00:15:45] Speaker 02:
Well, but counsel, I think there's three significant differences between the Third Circuit's Green case and this one.

[00:15:51] Speaker 02:
And I'll go through all three with you, and then you can respond.

[00:15:53] Speaker 02:
Number one, the termination in this case occurred seven months after briefing ended.

[00:15:58] Speaker 02:
In Green, it occurred before briefing ended.

[00:16:01] Speaker 02:
Number two, Evolve diligently informed the court more than six months before the court issued a decision in this case.

[00:16:07] Speaker 02:
And number three, the court actually did allow argument on the termination point at the hearing itself, but then entirely failed to mention or address it in any dispositive way in the decision itself.

[00:16:20] Speaker 02:
Why don't those three factors take this case outside of what the Third Circuit did in green and suggest instead that we have a scenario where the district court just quite frankly overlooked something?

[00:16:32] Speaker 02:
something that it did allow argument on, I mean, and send it back for the court.

[00:16:37] Speaker 02:
The court may well do exactly what you're suggesting, but we're in an appellate court and we review decisions, and I just don't see that we have an actual decision on this termination question.

[00:16:48] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor, let me address all three.

[00:16:51] Speaker 03:
First of all, even though the termination or alleged termination

[00:16:55] Speaker 03:
occurred after the briefing and after the discovery, that did not evolve from seeking leave and seeking permission of the court to brief this issue.

[00:17:06] Speaker 05:
There was no lack of diligence here, right?

[00:17:09] Speaker 05:
They made the filing within a week of when they learned of it, right?

[00:17:15] Speaker 03:
Yes, sure.

[00:17:15] Speaker 03:
And it's not so much the lack of diligence on their part, but the prejudice to both the defendants who are police and the court, frankly, because the court is the one that suffered from the lack of proper procedure here.

[00:17:29] Speaker 03:
There was no request to submit briefing that would have put this alleged termination in

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proper context and no permission.

[00:17:40] Speaker 02:
Did the court suggest somewhere that I missed that it was prejudice and that there was therefore refusing to consider this?

[00:17:47] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor, it did not.

[00:17:49] Speaker 02:
But much like... You would like... Wait, wait.

[00:17:50] Speaker 02:
Hang on, Counsel.

[00:17:51] Speaker 02:
So whether or not prejudice exists is a question of fact.

[00:17:54] Speaker 02:
You'd like us to decide in the first instance as a matter of fact that this prejudice is a district court?

[00:18:02] Speaker 03:
No, Your Honor.

[00:18:03] Speaker 03:
What we're suggesting is that the local rules

[00:18:06] Speaker 03:
As interpreted by the Green Court and similar courts like Nall, for example, Nall versus Allentown suggests that deference should be given to the local rules and to the district court's ability to manage its own docket.

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
Council doesn't have a case that deference should be given to a court's decision about the local rules, and deference should be given to a court's decision about how to manage its own docket.

[00:18:31] Speaker 02:
That's our problem here.

[00:18:32] Speaker 02:
Our problem here is I don't see any decision that was rendered by the court.

[00:18:39] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, in the Green case, the court did not say that they were excluding the third party affidavit.

[00:18:46] Speaker 03:
The court simply did not consider, did not rely, did not mention it.

[00:18:51] Speaker 03:
And on appeal, the Third Circuit said that the court had the discretion to not consider it and not refer to it in the opinion.

[00:19:00] Speaker 03:
That is why we're relying on the Green case, because it does present a very similar situation to this case.

[00:19:07] Speaker 05:
And I don't want to answer... There is at least one very significant difference, and that is in Green, there was complete silence from the district court, whereas here,

[00:19:18] Speaker 05:
the district court did acknowledge the filing and talked about the possibility of a new agreement.

[00:19:25] Speaker 05:
But you would have expected in that context, if it was dismissing it for a failure to file a motion, that it would have said something about it.

[00:19:35] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, the district court referred to this notice in the hearing.

[00:19:40] Speaker 03:
But it was not considered in either the opinion or in any extended way during the hearing itself.

[00:19:48] Speaker 03:
There was a reference in passing during the hearing, but it was not consideration for the purposes of this case, nor was it part of the summary judgment record because it was filed belatedly and it was unaccompanied by any briefing that would allow the court to consider how does this alleged fact fit into the overall scheme of the case.

[00:20:10] Speaker 03:
What is the court to do with this belatedly filed notice?

[00:20:13] Speaker 03:
What is the court to do with this information?

[00:20:16] Speaker 03:
And it should be noted that Evolve did not cure this and did not attempt to seek leave at any time.

[00:20:22] Speaker 03:
They did seek reconsideration of the court's original decision in February, but did not include in their request for reconsideration this particular aspect.

[00:20:34] Speaker 03:
And they did not seek any either clarification or reconsideration of the opinion once the summary judgment opinion issued.

[00:20:44] Speaker 03:
In other words, they did not take the steps to assist this court and the district courts in resolving this issue.

[00:20:51] Speaker 03:
And it is our position that the discretion standard requires that we allow the court to manage its own docket and to reject, either expressly or implicitly, filings that violate the court rules and the court schedule.

[00:21:07] Speaker 03:
If you're honest with me, I'd like to address the next generation

[00:21:12] Speaker 03:
subsequent generation products before my time runs out.

[00:21:17] Speaker 03:
As Judge Moore and Judge Prager's questions suggest, it is absolutely undisputed in the realm of cellular technology that subsequent generation means the next standard.

[00:21:31] Speaker 03:
We move from 1G to 2G to 3G to 4G, eventually to 5G.

[00:21:37] Speaker 03:
But that is how the term is understood in this case and other cases.

[00:21:43] Speaker 03:
The district court understood it as such, the parties understood it as such, and evolved throughout this case.

[00:21:49] Speaker 03:
Before we got to the point of the summary judgment, we also referred to generations in exactly the way that appellees are treating it here.

[00:21:57] Speaker 03:
I direct the court to Appendix 287 and 88, which is a portion or revolves, a portion revolves complaints against one of the appellees.

[00:22:09] Speaker 03:
We've all clearly talked about generation as a leap between the different standards.

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
The G and C. Yes.

[00:22:18] Speaker 04:
Council, this is Judge Plager.

[00:22:21] Speaker 04:
Help me be clear on this.

[00:22:24] Speaker 04:
If we read the phrase subsequent generation products the way you want us to,

[00:22:33] Speaker 04:
that a subsequent generation refers to a standard or technology rather than the way your opponent wishes us to, then you win.

[00:22:46] Speaker 04:
Is that right?

[00:22:49] Speaker 03:
Yes, you are.

[00:22:50] Speaker 03:
The subsequent generation product is a separate ground from the multi-mode CDMA phones.

[00:22:56] Speaker 03:
So either of those provisions of the definition of subscriber unit

[00:23:01] Speaker 03:
provide independent basis to affirm the district court.

[00:23:06] Speaker 04:
And if we read it the way they ask us to, that is, that subsequent generation products refers to products and not to a standard or technology, then they win.

[00:23:23] Speaker 04:
Is that correct?

[00:23:26] Speaker 03:
Let me clarify this.

[00:23:28] Speaker 03:
So what our position is,

[00:23:31] Speaker 03:
is that the products that practice or support the subsequent generation standard are the subsequent generation product.

[00:23:44] Speaker 03:
So I think if I understand your honest question correctly, either way, whether you read it as subsequent generation product referring to the standard or product practicing that standard, the athletes win on this ground.

[00:24:03] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:24:07] Speaker 03:
So, very briefly, on the subsequent generation standard, we didn't hear those arguments today, but EVOLVE has a number of different arguments in their briefing that relies on various canons of contraction interpretation, like adjust and generous, or nocitoris ulcis, but these canons are not applicable because

[00:24:31] Speaker 03:
The terms here are not ambiguous, and I didn't hear the old council contest that, that there's ambiguity in the plain language of the agreement.

[00:24:40] Speaker 03:
And so those particular terms and those particular doctrines do not apply here.

[00:24:49] Speaker 03:
Separately from the subsequent generation product, which is one of the grounds that our police are relying on,

[00:24:57] Speaker 03:
The court also correctly held below that the 373 patent is technical and commercially necessary for making, using, or selling subscriber units because they're multi-mode CDMA phones.

[00:25:13] Speaker 03:
And the fact that the CDMA phone definition was amended and expanded over time to include multi-mode devices

[00:25:26] Speaker 03:
And because all the devices in this case... I'm sorry, Your Honor.

[00:25:31] Speaker 03:
Is there a question?

[00:25:33] Speaker 05:
No, I don't think there was a question.

[00:25:34] Speaker 03:
Apologies.

[00:25:37] Speaker 03:
Because the amendment was... Because the agreement was amended to add the multimode portion and all the devices in this case support both 3G and 4G standards.

[00:25:52] Speaker 03:
This is another way why

[00:25:54] Speaker 03:
this agreement supports the finding of exhaustion and license.

[00:25:59] Speaker 03:
In particular, council argued that the only multi-mode CDMA products are ones that include 3G and 2G.

[00:26:08] Speaker 03:
That is not correct.

[00:26:10] Speaker 03:
So long as the devices support 3G, if they also support 4G or 5G, for example, the 4G technology is

[00:26:20] Speaker 03:
technically and commercially necessary for making, using, and selling the subscriber units.

[00:26:26] Speaker 03:
In other words, there are two separate ways into independent provisions to read this agreement in a way that supports the court's finding of exhaustion and licensure.

[00:26:46] Speaker 05:
Okay, anything else?

[00:26:49] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, I believe I've covered my arguments.

[00:26:51] Speaker 03:
Does the court have any questions for either of the parts?

[00:26:56] Speaker 03:
If I have a few minutes left, I just want to reiterate the importance of the local rules in the district court's management of the case and the fact that if we were to send the states back and encourage behavior like evokes where they did not seek leave and did not give the court an opportunity to

[00:27:19] Speaker 03:
consider something and not include it in the docket that would encourage similar behavior and would take away from the court's ability to equitably and efficiently administer its docket.

[00:27:31] Speaker 03:
Therefore, this is not a mere technicality.

[00:27:34] Speaker 03:
This is an important issue and it's an issue that the Third Circuit addressed in green and in more cases and in both of them.

[00:27:42] Speaker 03:
It was

[00:27:45] Speaker 03:
clear to the court that the belatedly filed evidence despite whatever importance it might have that was filed without leave and without explanation was not something that the courts could and should consider.

[00:28:01] Speaker 05:
Okay.

[00:28:02] Speaker 05:
Thank you, Mrs. Mourouz.

[00:28:04] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:28:07] Speaker 05:
Mr. Granaghan, we have two minutes.

[00:28:10] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor, and very briefly, I just want to address the Green case very quickly.

[00:28:16] Speaker 00:
We think it is distinguishable for all the reasons that Judge Moore gave, and I also want to emphasize that not only was the District Court in Green silent about the affidavited issue, but there were reasons to believe in that case that the District Court had affirmatively excluded that affidavit.

[00:28:33] Speaker 00:
For example, the District Court stated that

[00:28:36] Speaker 00:
All of the properly produced evidence in that case was hearsay.

[00:28:40] Speaker 00:
The Third Circuit determined that that was a conclusion that would not apply to the affidavit at issue.

[00:28:46] Speaker 00:
And so the district court in green must have decided to exclude the affidavit from evidence.

[00:28:52] Speaker 00:
That did not happen here.

[00:28:55] Speaker 00:
The record shows that the district court actually considered the evidence of determination, yet decided that it did not matter.

[00:29:04] Speaker 00:
That itself distinguishes green.

[00:29:07] Speaker 00:
Unless the court has any further questions, I'll see the remainder of my time, and we ask that the judgment of the district court be reversed in full, and at the very least that it be reversed at least as to infringement occurring after termination of the agreement, which is December 31st, 2018.

[00:29:25] Speaker 04:
Counsel, before you go away, just clarify something for me.

[00:29:32] Speaker 04:
Perhaps it's more curiosity than necessarily determinative.

[00:29:37] Speaker 04:
But with regard to this terminate, do we know why there was an attempt to terminate or there was a termination of this agreement?

[00:29:47] Speaker 04:
And if anything, was there anything that followed it?

[00:29:53] Speaker 00:
I do not know, Your Honor, why the agreement was terminated.

[00:29:56] Speaker 00:
There was a termination provision that allowed either party to terminate the agreement as of December 31, 2018.

[00:30:03] Speaker 00:
And LG chose to exercise that termination option.

[00:30:07] Speaker 00:
I don't know why they made that decision.

[00:30:09] Speaker 00:
As to whether there was an agreement afterward, I am not sure.

[00:30:14] Speaker 00:
The evidence of record indicates that the parties were negotiating, but I'm not sure whether they actually came to an agreement.

[00:30:21] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:30:22] Speaker 04:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:30:24] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Ron.

[00:30:24] Speaker 05:
All right.

[00:30:24] Speaker 05:
Thank both counsel.

[00:30:25] Speaker 05:
The case is submitted.