[00:00:02] Speaker 04: The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now open and in session. [00:00:07] Speaker 04: God save the United States and this honorable court. [00:00:11] Speaker 00: I'll now call up the first case for argument this morning, 192121, Lippert Components versus M.O.R. [00:00:20] Speaker 00: Ride International. [00:00:22] Speaker 00: Mr. Fountain, are you ready to proceed? [00:00:26] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor. [00:00:27] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:00:28] Speaker 03: This is Ryan Fountain. [00:00:31] Speaker 03: There are four fundamental rules we need to keep in mind today. [00:00:35] Speaker 03: First, pleadings are not final briefs. [00:00:39] Speaker 03: Second, whether or not to exercise discretion is a question of law. [00:00:44] Speaker 03: And in that regard, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to exercise discretion when it's called for. [00:00:53] Speaker 03: And finally, it's an abuse of discretion to sanction actions that are legally permitted. [00:00:59] Speaker 03: Now today, [00:01:00] Speaker 03: we cannot undo the damage that has been done to the appellant, especially after four years of delay, but we can mitigate its ongoing adverse effects, specifically the scarlet letter of sanction that follows an attorney for the rest of his life. [00:01:15] Speaker 05: Which, which, which sanction are you talking about here, Mr. Fountain? [00:01:18] Speaker 05: I gather there, um, you say that there are two sanctions here. [00:01:22] Speaker 05: One is the monetary sanction under 1927 based on the filing of the amended complaint. [00:01:28] Speaker 05: And then the other, [00:01:29] Speaker 05: is what you describe as a sanction of excluding from the record or striking from the record certain documents? [00:01:40] Speaker 03: Well, there are actually three aspects to the sanctions. [00:01:42] Speaker 03: First, having to do with the amended complaint where there was both a monetary sanction and an express finding of objective unreasonableness. [00:01:53] Speaker 03: Secondly, with regard to the implementation of the magistrate's order, [00:01:59] Speaker 03: The sanction had two parts. [00:02:01] Speaker 03: First, to preclude additional filings, which may be moot. [00:02:06] Speaker 03: And secondly, to deny access to important judicial records, to strike those records from the public access. [00:02:17] Speaker 00: And both of those... Let me just... Oh, go ahead, please. [00:02:21] Speaker 00: No, I just wanted you to specify what records those are that you think have important public issues. [00:02:30] Speaker 03: Um, docket entry 108, docket entry 109, docket entry 114, and 115. [00:02:37] Speaker 03: Docket entry 108 and 109 were the reasons why the magistrate expressly amended his order, and in fact, docket entry 109 was cited by the magistrate in his amending order. [00:02:51] Speaker 03: But the reason those are important as a part of the scarlet issue, scarlet letter issue, can be quantified not just in the attorney's [00:03:00] Speaker 03: reputation in the profession, but also, for example, as to pro-HIVJ motions. [00:03:05] Speaker 03: As you're no doubt aware, many attorneys, myself included, litigate cases outside their home districts, usually by means of pro-HIVJ motions. [00:03:14] Speaker 03: And on many of the forms used by district courts, the question is asked, have you ever been sanctioned? [00:03:21] Speaker 02: Mr. Fountain, this is Judge Rano. [00:03:23] Speaker 02: I'd like for you to get to the heart of your case. [00:03:27] Speaker 02: What exactly is it that you're appealing? [00:03:29] Speaker 02: Just forget about this lesson that you've given us in different aspects of law. [00:03:36] Speaker 02: What's your skin in this game? [00:03:38] Speaker 03: The skin in the game is twofold. [00:03:41] Speaker 03: I'm out a lot of money, and that goes on from the interest rates. [00:03:45] Speaker 03: And secondly, I've got two official sanctions on the record that I have to carry with me from now on, not just reputationally, but every time I try to go into a different court. [00:03:58] Speaker 03: I have to explain those. [00:04:00] Speaker 03: And if I don't have access, first off, if the sanction stands, I'd like to get the sanction removed in the first place. [00:04:07] Speaker 03: But if the sanction stands, I need access to the records to be able to prove the sanction was unjust. [00:04:12] Speaker 03: Because otherwise, when I had these Pro-Hoc Vichy motions reviewed, courts are typically going to impose restrictions and conditions that significantly increase the cost of my participation. [00:04:23] Speaker 02: I understand that. [00:04:25] Speaker 02: I understand that part. [00:04:26] Speaker 02: and you want the sanctions, you want us to reverse on the sanctions. [00:04:31] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:04:32] Speaker 03: And I want my money back and interest. [00:04:34] Speaker 02: Well, okay. [00:04:35] Speaker 02: And we have a standard of review. [00:04:38] Speaker 02: So, present your argument as to why reversal would be proper under a standard of review. [00:04:47] Speaker 03: The standard of review is in two parts. [00:04:49] Speaker 03: We have some questions of law that you reviewed de novo and a question of fact that you review [00:04:55] Speaker 03: for the clearly erroneous standard. [00:04:57] Speaker 03: On the question of law, was the pleading, the amended complaint, plausible factually and legally? [00:05:06] Speaker 03: Now, Lippert has not argued that the alleged facts were not plausible before this court, and the district court did not find the facts not plausible. [00:05:13] Speaker 05: But Mr. Connell, why really is that the question? [00:05:16] Speaker 05: I mean, why wasn't the district court well within its discretion to say, [00:05:23] Speaker 05: You presented this very assertion by way of a defense. [00:05:30] Speaker 05: The district court rejected it in full on the merits and it was nothing but a waste in this case to refile the same assertion by way of a counterclaim. [00:05:45] Speaker 03: Because it wasn't the same assertion. [00:05:47] Speaker 03: The district court rejected it the first time around and said, there are some problems here. [00:05:52] Speaker 03: You didn't address the following issues. [00:05:54] Speaker 03: We're dismissing without prejudice. [00:05:57] Speaker 03: We turned around within the timeframe previously allotted by the court, corrected those problems. [00:06:03] Speaker 05: What are the problems? [00:06:04] Speaker 05: You're speaking too abstractly. [00:06:06] Speaker 05: What was it that you asserted in the amended complaint counterclaim that might even plausibly have removed [00:06:16] Speaker 05: the counterclaim from the force of the earlier dismissal of the defense? [00:06:21] Speaker 03: Well, two things. [00:06:22] Speaker 03: We addressed the due process requirements, and we addressed the I4I case more specifically. [00:06:28] Speaker 03: We pointed out that Justice Breyer's concurring opinion was entirely plausible, and indeed other courts after us have adopted that approach as well. [00:06:41] Speaker 03: And we also changed the remedy we were seeking. [00:06:45] Speaker 03: We weren't just asking for unconstitutionality. [00:06:48] Speaker 03: We had that as one of three options for what we were trying to do. [00:06:52] Speaker 03: And the fundamental flaw in what the district court's analysis was is the district court said, yes, the obviousness examination is a factual determination. [00:07:04] Speaker 03: Sure it is. [00:07:05] Speaker 03: But not doing that at all is a question of law. [00:07:09] Speaker 03: And that's where Justice Breyer's argument picks up. [00:07:12] Speaker 03: When you have a flaw as a question of law, you're not bound by the clear and convincing standard of 282. [00:07:20] Speaker 03: And other courts have picked that up subsequently. [00:07:23] Speaker 00: We have as an example... You just mentioned... Let me interrupt. [00:07:26] Speaker 00: This is Sharon Post. [00:07:27] Speaker 00: You just mentioned that you changed the remedy. [00:07:30] Speaker 00: Can you be a little more specific? [00:07:32] Speaker 00: You changed the remedy you were seeking? [00:07:34] Speaker 00: One, that that makes it stand significantly different. [00:07:38] Speaker 00: And two, how did you change the remedy? [00:07:41] Speaker 03: We offered three alternative remedies for this. [00:07:44] Speaker 03: First, that as applied, 282 was unconstitutional. [00:07:49] Speaker 03: Secondly, 282 doesn't apply as per Justice Breyer's opinion, because this is a question of law. [00:08:04] Speaker 03: And third, even if it does apply. [00:08:07] Speaker 00: So that's a different remedy? [00:08:08] Speaker 00: So that's a different remedy than you were seeking in the affirmative defense? [00:08:13] Speaker 03: Well, the first time around, we said it should be held unconstitutional. [00:08:17] Speaker 03: The second time around, we're saying it doesn't apply here. [00:08:19] Speaker 03: It's a non-issue. [00:08:21] Speaker 03: And the third thing we said is, even if it applies and even if it is an issue, we have met the clear and convincing standard because of this other evidence in both file histories. [00:08:33] Speaker 03: So that's a different remedy all around. [00:08:37] Speaker 03: And we were up front about this all the way through, that this was new issues of law, but it turns out that it wasn't so new because other cases had picked this up after us. [00:08:47] Speaker 03: The Communique Laboratory case and the Technology Development case both decided on this analysis with regard to Section 101. [00:08:58] Speaker 03: Communique Laboratories is cited at 151 Fed Sub 3rd, 778, the discussion beginning on page 787. [00:09:07] Speaker 03: And technology development is cited at 258 Fed Sub 3rd, 884, the discussion picking up on page 887 through 888. [00:09:19] Speaker 03: So these were plausible legal theories as demonstrated by other courts. [00:09:24] Speaker 03: But the fundamental flaw that the district court in our case made was not realizing that the failure to exercise discretion itself is a question of law. [00:09:38] Speaker 03: Moving on, and I say I'm running out of a little bit of time here, one of the reasons I asked for argument today is to resolve some of the allegations that have come up on appeal before this Court. [00:09:49] Speaker 03: Let's not have two ships passing the night leaving guesswork for this Court. [00:09:53] Speaker 03: We can get explanations and meanings, particularly with regard to the allegations Morite has made on page 18 of its brief regarding the questions of privilege, which we contend there were none, [00:10:07] Speaker 00: concessions of uh... i'm not i'm not understanding this line of advocacy mister popham uh... you oral argument is uh... fifteen minutes on the five there were more commons raised in red and beer gray brief is the opportunity to respond to those argument oral argument isn't the time i think you would agree a new argument and new matters containment briefing so are you [00:10:36] Speaker 00: now raising matters or making arguments that were not contained in your grade brief? [00:10:42] Speaker 00: And if so, do you think that's appropriate? [00:10:45] Speaker 03: No, ma'am, I'm not. [00:10:46] Speaker 03: I'm urging opposing counsel to address the items I raised in my grade brief, and I'll reserve response to that on rebuttal. [00:10:56] Speaker 03: OK. [00:10:56] Speaker 03: So if there's no other questions I can answer for the court at this time, I would reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal. [00:11:04] Speaker 00: My colleagues, have any other questions for Mr. Fountain at this time? [00:11:07] Speaker 00: Not now. [00:11:07] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:11:08] Speaker 00: No. [00:11:10] Speaker 00: All right. [00:11:10] Speaker 00: Let's hear from the other side. [00:11:12] Speaker 00: Is it correct that you are dividing argument? [00:11:19] Speaker 04: That is correct, Your Honor. [00:11:21] Speaker 00: All right. [00:11:22] Speaker 00: So tell us who you are and how much time you have and what you're going to cover. [00:11:28] Speaker 04: Your Honor, this is Jonathan Fromel representing Eppley-Lippert Components. [00:11:33] Speaker 04: Uh, I have reserved seven minutes of time to address the issues specifically related to the sanctions, uh, related to the, um, committed complaint. [00:11:45] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:11:48] Speaker 04: May it please the court in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by either sanctioning Mr. Fountain for filing a counterclaim and violation of the district court's order or in determining the appropriate amount of those sanctions. [00:12:03] Speaker 04: With respect to the first issue, there is a threshold issue. [00:12:08] Speaker 04: Mr. Fountain was clearly required to seek leave of court to amend his pleadings. [00:12:12] Speaker 04: The district court, you can find this at appendix page eight, expressly stated, if Moride wishes to amend its pleadings, it must seek leave of court to amend consistent with rule 15. [00:12:25] Speaker 04: This was an express statement that leave was required, and Mr. Fountain did not seek that leave. [00:12:31] Speaker 04: his hindsight argument at pages three and four of his reply brief, that that was nothing more than a reminder to Moride that since the October 28th deadline was approaching, that deadline must be observed or else the other provisions of Rule 15 would apply. [00:12:48] Speaker 04: It does not make sense and from my perspective, it itself seems objectively reasonable. [00:12:55] Speaker 00: Putting aside... [00:12:57] Speaker 00: Let me interrupt. [00:12:59] Speaker 00: What do you say to Mr. Fountain's argument that in his counterclaims, he raised different requests for relief than he had originally? [00:13:11] Speaker 00: And the last point I think he made was, I guess, I don't remember. [00:13:15] Speaker 00: If it's an affirmative defense, he didn't say, even if the clear and convincing evidence standard applies, we still win because [00:13:23] Speaker 00: and he made that the first time in his counterclaim. [00:13:27] Speaker 00: One, is that inaccurate? [00:13:29] Speaker 00: And two, if it is accurate, why doesn't it make a difference? [00:13:34] Speaker 04: Your Honor, I believe that Mr. Fountain may be correct in that the focus of his affirmative defense, which was a relatively bare-mode splitting, was just that the clear and convincing standard does not apply and violates due process. [00:13:48] Speaker 04: I would say, to answer your question in two parts, [00:13:52] Speaker 04: First of all, the relief thought was basically the same. [00:13:55] Speaker 04: I don't believe that there is any difference in saying that the clear and convincing standard doesn't apply or we may have met the clear and convincing standard. [00:14:04] Speaker 04: It was still the same basic theory that the clear and convincing standard violated due process and violated more rights due process. [00:14:13] Speaker 04: So I think that if there is a distinction, it's a distinction without a difference. [00:14:19] Speaker 05: I'm sorry, I don't remember that Justice Breyer's concurrence in I4I, which was a concurrence and not a dissent, made any point about due process. [00:14:31] Speaker 05: I thought he said only that to talk about a burden of persuasion is necessarily to talk about only facts. [00:14:44] Speaker 05: And there is no such thing as clear and convincing evidence on the legal question. [00:14:49] Speaker 05: What does that have to do with due process? [00:14:52] Speaker 04: Your honor, I would agree with you there. [00:14:53] Speaker 04: I don't necessarily see the connection with due process. [00:14:57] Speaker 04: I was just phrasing that in the context of Mr. Fountain and more rides pleadings that had focused this issue on the issue of whether more rides due process had been violated as a result of the clear and convincing standard. [00:15:11] Speaker 04: So I would agree with you, your honor, that again, Justice Breyer's decision was [00:15:17] Speaker 04: merely a concurring decision and it also does not expressly address the issue of due process in any way. [00:15:26] Speaker 05: Did the district court in granting the 1927 sanctions rely independently on the failure to seek leave to file the amended pleading or how does that [00:15:43] Speaker 05: basis relate to your just being repetitious basis? [00:15:50] Speaker 04: Your honor, the district court relied on both, it primarily and initially relied... What page should I look at in the appendix? [00:15:58] Speaker 04: Your honor, I believe it would be... Give me one moment. [00:16:07] Speaker 04: I believe it would be on pages four and five of the appendix, but I'm calling that up right now. [00:16:14] Speaker 00: I thought it was on 8, but I may be wrong. [00:16:28] Speaker 04: Getting there right now. [00:16:34] Speaker 04: So, Your Honor, page 8 specifically references and initially... You're right, Your Honor, and thank you for the clarification. [00:16:42] Speaker 04: Page eight, um, initially, uh, the court decides that counsel's decision to reassert the same theory was objectively reasonable. [00:16:51] Speaker 04: And then the court as a secondary, um, secondary, uh, level of review indicated that even if the court had not dismissed the counterclaim, it would have stricken it, uh, because more I did not seek leave. [00:17:04] Speaker 04: So I think the, the primary issue is the repetitive pleading issue. [00:17:09] Speaker 04: the secondary issue is that the Rule 15 lead was not sought. [00:17:14] Speaker 05: I'm sorry. [00:17:15] Speaker 05: I'm not as perceptive with my eyes. [00:17:21] Speaker 05: Where particularly on page 8 is the leave point? [00:17:24] Speaker 04: It's very near the bottom of page 8. [00:17:27] Speaker 05: Oh, the sentence says that is particularly true given? [00:17:31] Speaker 04: Yeah, and then there's also a write and then indeed. [00:17:34] Speaker 05: In the next sentence, the indeed sentence. [00:17:37] Speaker 05: Okay, thank you. [00:17:38] Speaker 04: Correct. [00:17:39] Speaker 05: Can I ask you this? [00:17:42] Speaker 05: There is a brief discussion in the blue brief of the difficulties or of the objections that Mr. Fountain made to certain amounts of the sanction, about 5,000 or something, representing about 31%, and two questions. [00:18:08] Speaker 05: Is there anything in your red brief that responds to that? [00:18:11] Speaker 05: And second, what did the district court say about that amount of sanctioned set of objections? [00:18:21] Speaker 04: Your Honor, in our red brief, we did not go into significant detail other than to point to the fact that we had presented the invoices, we had presented the hourly rate, we had presented that all to the district court. [00:18:38] Speaker 04: And then going to your second question, Your Honor, the district court specifically indicated that it had reviewed all of those invoices. [00:18:46] Speaker 04: It had reviewed the issues raised by Mr. Fountain. [00:18:49] Speaker 04: It had in fact made a determination that the amounts were appropriate and proper. [00:18:56] Speaker 04: And in fact, I believe it's at page 23 of the appendix and I'll confirm that. [00:19:03] Speaker 04: District Court had weighed the evidence and had determined that in its decision that, if anything, the amounts were conservative and not overstated. [00:19:15] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:19:18] Speaker 00: I think I heard the bell go off, sir, so did you? [00:19:22] Speaker 00: I think it's time for your colleague. [00:19:26] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:19:26] Speaker 04: If there's no further questions, I'll turn it over to Mr. Salteel. [00:19:32] Speaker 01: May I please the court? [00:19:33] Speaker 01: This is Joseph South Hill, and I will be arguing on behalf of the Moride defendant, and I will be addressing the second issue that was raised in Mr. Frumlin's brief that related to the order striking certain of this filing. [00:19:48] Speaker 05: This is Judge Toronto. [00:19:49] Speaker 05: Can I ask you this question? [00:19:51] Speaker 05: If we agree with you on this issue that the appeal of this particular [00:20:01] Speaker 05: um, striking order, um, is not, uh, a proper appeal and dismiss it and say that that was not a sanction. [00:20:12] Speaker 05: Um, would it then be clear that, um, the attorney would not have to include that striking order in reporting, in answering a question on pro hack VJ or other forms? [00:20:28] Speaker 05: Have you been sanctioned? [00:20:31] Speaker 01: Yes, I would agree with that. [00:20:36] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:20:39] Speaker 01: As we're asking is that this court dismiss the second issue for lack of jurisdiction or in the alternative, affirm the district court's order striking certain of his filing. [00:20:50] Speaker 01: As we've outlined, you know, the Constitution requires that there be a case or controversy to proceed in an appeal for this court to have jurisdiction. [00:21:00] Speaker 01: The case, the parties have settled the case so there's no case or controversy. [00:21:05] Speaker 01: We do recognize that this court has found a limited exception to this rule that requires, that allows for an attorney who has been sanctioned to appeal. [00:21:18] Speaker 01: But those cases make very clear that critical language, negative commentary, reputational harm or determinations of lack of credibility [00:21:27] Speaker 01: those are insufficient to confer jurisdiction to this court. [00:21:32] Speaker 01: We believe that the order that struck Mr. Fountain's filings were very clear. [00:21:36] Speaker 01: Mr. Fountain wasn't being sanctioned in that order. [00:21:39] Speaker 01: He wasn't fined. [00:21:41] Speaker 01: He wasn't reprimanded. [00:21:42] Speaker 01: He wasn't punished. [00:21:43] Speaker 01: In fact, what the order held is we're not sanctioning Mr. Fountain. [00:21:48] Speaker 01: We're applying those sanctions to Moray. [00:21:51] Speaker 01: And so it was clearly not a sanction. [00:21:54] Speaker 01: Any alleged reputational harm that exists because of it is not enough to confer jurisdiction. [00:22:02] Speaker 01: Now, in his reply, Mr. Fountain identifies two other possible basis for jurisdiction. [00:22:11] Speaker 01: One, he mentions the public access doctrine, but that really does not confer jurisdiction on this court. [00:22:17] Speaker 01: That really goes to the merits of his argument, not to whether there's jurisdiction. [00:22:21] Speaker 01: And in the second, he mentions that at the end of the order, he was required to seek leave before filing any other documents. [00:22:30] Speaker 01: He calls this an injunction. [00:22:32] Speaker 01: It's not an injunction. [00:22:34] Speaker 01: Courts routinely ask participants to seek leave. [00:22:38] Speaker 01: It's a common requirement. [00:22:39] Speaker 01: But regardless of all this, Mr. Fountain has conceded in his brief that because the case is settled, that issue is moved. [00:22:47] Speaker 01: And since it's moved, it cannot confer jurisdiction to this court. [00:22:51] Speaker 05: Can I just clarify something? [00:22:52] Speaker 05: Was the directive to seek leave before filing anything, that is the directive to Mr. Fountain, limited to this case or did it run to his filing anything in other cases? [00:23:06] Speaker 01: I believe it was just limited to this particular case. [00:23:18] Speaker 01: I'm sorry. [00:23:19] Speaker 01: And then I was just going to address the merits. [00:23:23] Speaker 01: If the court gets to the merits of the motion to strike, we believe that the court did not abuse its discretion in striking those documents. [00:23:33] Speaker 01: The court found that Mr. Fountain had no reason to be filing those documents as I already explained. [00:23:39] Speaker 01: The court didn't sanction Mr. Fountain and more I wasn't asking the court to sanction Mr. Fountain. [00:23:45] Speaker 01: And since he wasn't in any danger of being sanctioned and the court recognized this in its filing, it was reasonable for the court to strike those documents. [00:23:55] Speaker 01: And again, just because Mr. Fountain doesn't like what was being said doesn't give him the right to start filing documents in a case. [00:24:02] Speaker 01: To address the public access doctrine which Mr. Fountain raises, one, he acknowledges that courts routinely file documents under seal and strike documents. [00:24:12] Speaker 01: That's not a prohibited action. [00:24:15] Speaker 01: to stop a court from doing that, to allow anyone to file anything at any time would just lead to chaos and not allow a court to manage its own docket. [00:24:26] Speaker 01: Mr. Fountain cites the Consonantial case, and I just want to address that briefly. [00:24:30] Speaker 01: The Consonantial case is distinguished on its facts. [00:24:33] Speaker 01: That dealt with a case where a report was originally filed under CO, but the party who then filed it under CO introduced that report at a public hearing [00:24:44] Speaker 01: where the contents of the report became public and then was used at that hearing and then used in the subsequent court ruling. [00:24:52] Speaker 01: And then a newspaper later on wanted access to the underlying report. [00:24:56] Speaker 01: This is a different situation here where Mr. Fountain was filing confidential and privileged documents. [00:25:04] Speaker 01: He didn't have the authority to be filing and making public. [00:25:08] Speaker 01: And the court didn't rely on any of Mr. Fountain's documents in its order. [00:25:14] Speaker 01: And so on that basis, the continental case is easily distinguished. [00:25:21] Speaker 01: So for all these reasons, if the court... We believe the court should dismiss the appeal on the second issue for lack of jurisdiction, but to the extent it gets to the merits, we ask that it affirm the district court order strikingly documents because that was not an abuse of its discretion. [00:25:36] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:25:38] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:25:40] Speaker 00: Okay, we're on to your remaining rebuttal time, Mr. Fountain. [00:25:45] Speaker 03: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:25:46] Speaker 03: The question was raised a few minutes ago is, what does Justice Breyer's concurring opinion have to do with due process? [00:25:53] Speaker 03: And the answer is quite simple. [00:25:55] Speaker 03: Due process requires a neutral tribunal. [00:25:58] Speaker 03: If we're looking at heightened burdens of proof and heightened standards, the tribunal's not neutral anymore. [00:26:06] Speaker 03: So as to questions of fact, that may be okay, but to apply a heightened standard to questions of law, that's impermissibly not neutral. [00:26:16] Speaker 03: Secondly, a moment ago, I heard Morai say that one of the grounds for asking reversal is Morai did not ask the court to impose sanctions on Mr. Fountain. [00:26:28] Speaker 03: In my gray brief, I questioned how in the world that statement can be made because over and over again in the record they did, I still don't understand how they can make that statement. [00:26:38] Speaker 03: I was hoping for an explanation now, but I don't see it. [00:26:41] Speaker 00: Well, do you have a record site? [00:26:43] Speaker 00: Did you include a record site in Graybrief as to where they did ask for sanctions? [00:26:48] Speaker 03: Yes, ma'am. [00:26:49] Speaker 03: Many locations. [00:26:51] Speaker 03: It's all there, laid out in detail. [00:26:54] Speaker 03: But somehow, we seem to be two ships passing in the night. [00:26:57] Speaker 03: And I'd hate to see that happen, but I guess it did. [00:27:01] Speaker 03: Moving on, Your Honors, do you have any other questions I can help you with? [00:27:09] Speaker 00: No. [00:27:10] Speaker 00: No. [00:27:10] Speaker 00: Why don't you just proceed? [00:27:12] Speaker 00: If you want to give up back your time, that's fine as well. [00:27:15] Speaker 00: It's up to you. [00:27:16] Speaker 03: I think the briefs and the discussion today pretty much deal with everything else. [00:27:22] Speaker 03: I appreciate your courtesy and thank you for your time. [00:27:27] Speaker 00: We thank all sides and the case is submitted. [00:27:30] Speaker 00: Thank you.