[00:00:00] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:00:01] Speaker 01:
We will proceed with case number 192311, Theodore DiCaprio, VA, against the United States.

[00:00:08] Speaker 01:
Mr. Giuliano.

[00:00:11] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:00:11] Speaker 00:
Good morning, and may it please the courts.

[00:00:14] Speaker 00:
Less than two months ago, the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Public Resources ruled that the state of Georgia could not copyright annotations that were part of its official statutory code on the basis that such a right to be incompatible with the public's right to free access to the law of the land

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
which the court stated includes judicial rulings.

[00:00:33] Speaker 00:
For instance, on page 1507, speaking of judicial rulings, the court says it needs no argument to show that all should have free access to its contents.

[00:00:44] Speaker 00:
The government, however, has a different view as to the public's right to free judicial rulings.

[00:00:48] Speaker 00:
According to the government, a ruling is only worthy of opinion status and thus freely accessible to the public if it was designated as an opinion under the authoring of judges

[00:00:58] Speaker 00:
uncontrolled, unconditional, and absolute discretion.

[00:01:02] Speaker 00:
And that's a quote that appears on ACPX 722, regardless of the rule.

[00:01:07] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry?

[00:01:08] Speaker 03:
Counsel, this is not a copyright case.

[00:01:11] Speaker 03:
I mean, I understand you think there's some language that might be helpful in terms of your theories, but you've brought a contract claim.

[00:01:21] Speaker 00:
That's absolutely correct, Your Honor.

[00:01:23] Speaker 03:
Contract.

[00:01:23] Speaker 03:
So why don't you address that?

[00:01:26] Speaker 00:
Sure.

[00:01:27] Speaker 00:
And yes, we're only saying that Georgia supports or actually undermines the government's urgent interpretation of this contract.

[00:01:36] Speaker 00:
But so according to the government, the very class certification denial order that we're speaking of here and many other examples of things submitted, including 30, 50, and even 80 page rulings, properly require a charge of your paper by the public because they were not designated as opinions.

[00:01:55] Speaker 00:
In contrast, according to the government, much shorter and less substantive rulings that plaintiffs submitted as examples were properly freely accessible to the public because they were designated as such.

[00:02:09] Speaker 00:
And just as one example, I mean, we submitted literally one sentence rulings from the same doctrine judges that issued the two rulings that plaintiffs paid to access, and those are available for free.

[00:02:23] Speaker 00:
We submit the condition of the public's right to free judicial rulings on what the government itself below in this very litigation called the, quote, fundamentally unclear, end quote, method of opinion designation violates the, I'm sorry, constitutes a breach of the contract that all pay for users enter into.

[00:02:39] Speaker 03:
Even if we accept the proposition that there's a contract and that contract terms include

[00:02:49] Speaker 03:
the definition of opinion that is included in some of the AO memoranda.

[00:02:58] Speaker 03:
You're not arguing that your contract is with the individual judges who do the designation, are you?

[00:03:07] Speaker 00:
Oh, no, not at all, Your Honor.

[00:03:08] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:03:09] Speaker 00:
We brought suit against the federal, the United States government because

[00:03:14] Speaker 00:
as a district court found that they are ultimately the entity responsible for this contract, although the contract itself is administered by the administrative office.

[00:03:24] Speaker 03:
Okay, so the very documents that you say that define the contract also include the statement that whether something is an opinion will be designated at the complete discretion of the individual judicial officer, right?

[00:03:44] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor, we do not agree with that at all.

[00:03:46] Speaker 00:
I mean, the government is taking the position, and the court below found that complete discretion, or as the district court below said, absolute authority to the designated opinions, though we submit that that is not part of the terms of the contract.

[00:04:01] Speaker 00:
That the district court found under the, I mean, if we can turn to the definition, the definition which Pacer has told its users in 2005,

[00:04:11] Speaker 00:
governs whether a document should be an opinion and thus freely accessible, says that it includes, quote, any document that includes a reasoned explanation, end quote.

[00:04:22] Speaker 00:
I mean, there's other parts of it, but I don't think the government disputes that.

[00:04:26] Speaker 00:
So the key component of the definition clearly is a reasoned explanation.

[00:04:33] Speaker 03:
include that definition also include the statement that whether something satisfies that definition will be determined at the discretion of the judicial officer, right?

[00:04:46] Speaker 00:
It doesn't use the word discretion.

[00:04:48] Speaker 00:
There's actually no explicit grant of discretion, let alone complete discretion, with what Pacer said, told its users in announcements, and the same thing that's in the user manuals, the Pacer user manuals, which the government...

[00:05:01] Speaker 03:
Yes, I'm sorry.

[00:05:03] Speaker 00:
It says that the responsibility for designating opinions, meetings, and definitions rests with the author and judge.

[00:05:10] Speaker 00:
But the law is very clear that contractual, so-called absolute grants of contractual discretion are disfavored and must be expressly stated.

[00:05:19] Speaker 00:
Courts are very reluctant to read and quietly such clauses.

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
And here we submitted law not only to that effect about the

[00:05:29] Speaker 00:
favor of such clauses on Blue Breeze 44, but we also explicitly cited cases addressing virtually identical language about responsibility, which concluded that responsibility is not akin to complete discretion.

[00:05:43] Speaker 00:
For instance, the Cargill Meat case on Blue Breeze 34, in that case, the clause provided that one of the parties was both solely responsible and both

[00:05:53] Speaker 00:
for certain tasks under the contract.

[00:05:55] Speaker 00:
And that party, the party that was given that discretion claimed that they had complete discretion.

[00:06:00] Speaker 00:
And the court rejected that and applying blacks and other common definitions of responsibility said the responsibility in this context was akin to obligation or duty and not complete discretion.

[00:06:13] Speaker 00:
And we also submit that the notion of complete discretion is belied by the memo that you mentioned.

[00:06:21] Speaker 00:
by the judicial conference which the government, and in fact the government can see that both the reason, explanation, definition and the accompanying responsibility language were taken directly from these memos which the administrative office actually called official guidance.

[00:06:37] Speaker 00:
I mean the government says that these are just non-binding recommendations that have basically not really worked much but I mean the judicial conference itself calls them judicial guidance and that memo describes

[00:06:48] Speaker 00:
opinion designation in obligatory terms.

[00:06:50] Speaker 00:
It says, for instance, that it places specific demands in the judiciary and that all courts are, quote, required to provide access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, end quote.

[00:07:02] Speaker 00:
And so we think that's passionately inconsistent with the government's position that there's basically no standard.

[00:07:08] Speaker 00:
I mean, according to the government, for instance, the Senate District of New York could have a policy that only opinions, only rulings of, you know, 20 pages or longer, for instance,

[00:07:17] Speaker 00:
opinions, where I allow the Southern Center District of California to say only summary judgment rules and so on.

[00:07:23] Speaker 00:
I mean, it will never end.

[00:07:24] Speaker 00:
And in fact, the law that the court itself relied on for this time to complete discretion on its summary judgment ruling supports our view.

[00:07:35] Speaker 00:
Specifically, the court cited Barstack on Blue Breeze 39 as saying that, quote, if a contract were forged to grant absolute discretion,

[00:07:44] Speaker 03:
uh... such discretion is authorized but again here there is not even an explicit grand discretion but only the responsibility language which we believe is not uh... close to a very long memorandum that you are now referring to it doesn't say anything in obligatory terms it makes clear that they're mere recommendations to judicial officers uh... and they are guidance but it so the combination of that and saying that it's the judicial officers that'll make the decision

[00:08:13] Speaker 03:
certainly implies that there is discretion and that you are, you know, signing up for PACER and participating in PACER at the risk that a judicial officer might make a mistake.

[00:08:30] Speaker 00:
Well, yes, and I understand that, Your Honor, but I would like to bring up an important point.

[00:08:34] Speaker 00:
I believe that the district court did not address in its summary judgment ruling

[00:08:39] Speaker 00:
Although there is language that's suggesting a recommendation, et cetera, there is one language that we call an objective guidepost among the five terrifying points.

[00:08:51] Speaker 00:
And it says that while it does not define what a reason explanation is, it gives examples of what is not the reason explanation.

[00:08:58] Speaker 00:
And it says that the definition does not cover, quote, routine non-substantive rulings.

[00:09:04] Speaker 00:
And it goes on to give the examples of

[00:09:08] Speaker 00:
a ruling for extension of time, for a motion for extension of time, I'm sorry, and a scheduling order.

[00:09:13] Speaker 00:
And the reason why this language is significant is because the government below, as we discussed on, I believe, Blue Breeze 37, the government, in its very litigation, conceded, despite its position of complete discretion, said that this is the, quote, only clear restriction on the court's discretion given under these memoranda and the definition.

[00:09:35] Speaker 00:
And we submit that

[00:09:36] Speaker 00:
that if we look at the two rulings that plaintiffs paid for to access, they could not reasonably be described as a routine, non-substantive order.

[00:09:44] Speaker 00:
One of the rulings was a three-page order denying a request for judicial notice, and another one was a five-page order granting a preliminary injunction.

[00:09:54] Speaker 03:
And so, I mean... Counsel, you're arguing that the mere fact that they say these routine, non-substantive orders

[00:10:02] Speaker 03:
will never be designated as opinions.

[00:10:04] Speaker 03:
You're saying that somehow that translates to those are the only type of things that can't be designated as opinions?

[00:10:13] Speaker 00:
Oh, no, not at all, Your Honor.

[00:10:14] Speaker 00:
Our position is that, and again, the government sees that this applies.

[00:10:18] Speaker 00:
We believe that the term routine non-substantive implies that anything substantive should be an opinion.

[00:10:26] Speaker 00:
And while there is maybe some debate as to certain types of rulings, I don't think that

[00:10:32] Speaker 00:
an eighty-page or a fifty-page or even a ten-page or five-page ruling that has analysis in this case law set that could be described as non-substance.

[00:10:41] Speaker 03:
We don't have any fifty-page or fifty-page opinions in this record.

[00:10:44] Speaker 03:
We have the two short ones that you have.

[00:10:47] Speaker 03:
And even under your definition, I think it's arguable whether, I mean, while one appears to fall within what, if I were on the district bench, I might designate as opinion, I think the other

[00:11:03] Speaker 03:
doesn't look that way.

[00:11:04] Speaker 03:
So, I mean, this is the problem.

[00:11:06] Speaker 03:
That's why the judges have to have the ability to make the designation.

[00:11:12] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, I understand your position, but we also, even if we take the memoranda out, because the district court actually didn't even apply the memoranda in the summary judgment, and we argued that was inconsistent, because both parties argued the memoranda, and the court itself applied it earlier in the litigation.

[00:11:29] Speaker 00:
But even if we take the memoranda out of the equation,

[00:11:31] Speaker 00:
And we say that to the face of a contract, you know, said, which users, you know, an opinion is a reason explanation and the court and the public courts, you know, and under the government's reputation, that the responsibility language gave discretion.

[00:11:46] Speaker 00:
The law is clear that when a contract vests discretion, but doesn't specify how discretion is to be carried out, which is what the government basically is arguing in the court below rules.

[00:11:57] Speaker 00:
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing acts as a gap filler to impose an objectively reasonable and non-arbitrary standard.

[00:12:04] Speaker 00:
And so, I mean, here, maybe it would be another matter if the contract said, you know, opinions will be designated in the judge's absolute discretion or full discretion or sort of.

[00:12:16] Speaker 00:
But here, I'm sorry.

[00:12:18] Speaker 01:
I'll finish your thought.

[00:12:20] Speaker 00:
Yeah, so that was the thought, basically, that here we think that it falls far short of an absolute discretion standard.

[00:12:27] Speaker 00:
And so even under, without any standards, there was still an implied limitation on the judge's discretion.

[00:12:35] Speaker 00:
And we also, and I realize I'm going on my rebuttal time, but it's fine.

[00:12:40] Speaker 00:
And we also think that it's just, I mean, frankly, bad policy to allow the designations to be subjected to such what we call arbitrary, arbitrariness, because, you know, even if you put aside the principles recognized in the Georgia case,

[00:12:55] Speaker 00:
It's, I just think it's a bad policy that the public should only be entitled to access rulings that, you know, without any standard whatsoever.

[00:13:01] Speaker 00:
But, but at this time I would like to reserve my remaining rebuttal time.

[00:13:06] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:13:06] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:13:07] Speaker 01:
We will hear from the government.

[00:13:09] Speaker 01:
Ms.

[00:13:10] Speaker 01:
Klein.

[00:13:11] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:13:12] Speaker 02:
May it please the court, Elisa Klein for the United States to address Judge O'Malley's questions.

[00:13:18] Speaker 02:
about the way the E-Government Act is implemented, referring to the guidance that was the subject of the colloquy.

[00:13:25] Speaker 02:
On page 398 of the appendix, the opening paragraph on that page makes explicit that the judicial conference is simply providing recommendations for a written opinion, and that is in part because the E-Government Act did not give the judicial conference a thought

[00:13:46] Speaker 02:
to issue a binding definition.

[00:13:48] Speaker 02:
The judicial conference had regulatory authority in certain limited areas, such as to prescribe interim regulations regarding privacy and security pending the Supreme Court's issuance of binding regulations, final regulations.

[00:14:04] Speaker 02:
But there was no authority to bond the various courts of the federal system.

[00:14:12] Speaker 02:
So everything that follows is a recommendation.

[00:14:15] Speaker 02:
And in the bullet point on which the plaintiff relies most heavily, the guidance makes explicit that the responsibility for determining which documents meet the petition rests with the author and judge and the determination should be made at the time the document is filed.

[00:14:39] Speaker 02:
And then just flipping to the next page for 100 of the appendix.

[00:14:44] Speaker 03:
Counsel, let me interrupt you here.

[00:14:48] Speaker 03:
We need to be pretty specific about the language.

[00:14:50] Speaker 03:
It does say that it's a responsibility to make the designation.

[00:14:54] Speaker 03:
So, I mean, your opponent on the other side tries to create that as a very serious obligation on the part of the judicial officer, but you're seeming to make it

[00:15:08] Speaker 03:
a little more loosey-goosey.

[00:15:10] Speaker 03:
It doesn't say the right to make the determination.

[00:15:12] Speaker 03:
It says the responsibility, which implies that they're supposed to exercise some real care in making that determination, right?

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
Well, again, to be clear, this is all under recommendations because the Judicial Conference does not have authority

[00:15:31] Speaker 02:
issue a binding definition.

[00:15:33] Speaker 02:
And so if you read that bullet point in conjunction with the next page, which says the CMACF system will be modified to ask a user filing on behalf of a judge whether the document being filed meets the definition of written opinion at the time of docketing, for among other reasons, practical reasons, there is no one else who at the Pacer Service Center who reads the millions of orders

[00:16:01] Speaker 02:
that judges upload to Pacer.

[00:16:04] Speaker 03:
So what happens is... What is your answer if it's true that district judges on a regular basis fail to designate 100-page opinions that go into great substantive analysis?

[00:16:23] Speaker 03:
You're simply saying that's just tough luck and we don't have any obligation to police that?

[00:16:30] Speaker 02:
Well, correct in that, and it's certainly not a contract claim.

[00:16:35] Speaker 02:
Plaintiff put it, it's a policy argument.

[00:16:37] Speaker 02:
He may well regard it as bad policy, but this would be an argument to direct Congress, which prescribed access to opinion, did not prescribe free access.

[00:16:50] Speaker 02:
This is the point that the district court in this case made in rejecting the plaintiff's statutory claim, which he did not appeal.

[00:16:56] Speaker 03:
Can you talk about your arguments?

[00:16:58] Speaker 03:
that there is no contract.

[00:16:59] Speaker 03:
I mean, putting aside the fact that the district court expressly found a contract and you didn't cross-appeal that conclusion, in Redden, the government argued that a contract was created between a PACER user and the government as soon as the PACER user chose to access documents.

[00:17:22] Speaker 03:
So even if

[00:17:23] Speaker 03:
The registration itself didn't constitute a contract.

[00:17:26] Speaker 03:
Why isn't there a contract can't go one way?

[00:17:30] Speaker 03:
Why isn't there a contract that it's formed exactly as the government argued it was formed in Redden?

[00:17:38] Speaker 02:
So let me clarify both of the points your honor mentioned.

[00:17:41] Speaker 02:
First, there was no need to cross appeal.

[00:17:44] Speaker 02:
The judgment was in our favor and could argue for a firm coming to ground supported by the record.

[00:17:50] Speaker 02:
In Redden, the actual

[00:17:53] Speaker 02:
clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean, clean,

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
that should not in any way lead to the conclusion that established under the e-Government Act, the fee schedules and paper system are contractual compared to the total presumption that such rights would be statutory.

[00:18:35] Speaker 02:
To echo this comment, six states can participate in a contract by

[00:18:49] Speaker 02:
students of the Department of Painting and Special Opinions, even in the narrowest sense, that there was an emphasis on the assessment of policies and procedures that explained to, you know, the box and the legislation.

[00:19:05] Speaker 02:
The District Court recognized that doesn't make any reference to free opinion.

[00:19:08] Speaker 02:
That's in page 643 of the appendix.

[00:19:13] Speaker 02:
Instead, it was a separate payment information page at appendix 638,

[00:19:19] Speaker 02:
that said judicial opinions accessed via Facebook will not generate a charge.

[00:19:26] Speaker 02:
That does not suggest that there is a right to work for free, that are not designated as opinions, and also language is extremely similar to the language that this court, the Chattler decision, concluded does not overcome the presumption against inferring a contract right from a government program.

[00:19:45] Speaker 02:
Instead, the rights are statutory and administrative.

[00:19:52] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:19:54] Speaker 01:
Anything?

[00:19:54] Speaker 01:
Any more questions for Ms.

[00:19:56] Speaker 01:
Klein?

[00:19:57] Speaker 01:
Judge O'Malley?

[00:19:59] Speaker 03:
No.

[00:20:00] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:20:01] Speaker 01:
Judge Wallach?

[00:20:02] Speaker 03:
No, thank you.

[00:20:03] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:20:04] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:20:05] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Ms.

[00:20:06] Speaker 01:
Klein.

[00:20:06] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:20:06] Speaker 01:
You have some rebuttal.

[00:20:08] Speaker 01:
Mr. Giuliano?

[00:20:10] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:20:10] Speaker 00:
Just very briefly, Your Honor, as Judge O'Malley pointed out correctly, we absolutely think that it isn't consistent for government to argue no contract when they have themselves assumed basic users for money.

[00:20:23] Speaker 00:
and, as the Court indicated, was pursuant to a breach of contract.

[00:20:26] Speaker 00:
And the Council for Government cites CHAPLER, but we believe CHAPLER is plainly distinguishable.

[00:20:32] Speaker 00:
There, the contract, the alleged contract, is based on a single statement on the passport application and some related statements on the Department of State's general website, whereas TASER, the single-purpose comprehensive website that, as the District Court found, has all the hallmarks of traditional Internet-based contracts

[00:20:52] Speaker 00:
And in fact, we believe it's basically identical to Westlaw.

[00:20:57] Speaker 00:
A user creates an account with Westlaw in order to receive access to Westlaw's records.

[00:21:02] Speaker 00:
They pay Westlaw money to access those records.

[00:21:05] Speaker 00:
And Westlaw gets the consideration in the form of the money.

[00:21:09] Speaker 00:
Same thing here.

[00:21:09] Speaker 00:
The user has to register for an account in order to use Taster.

[00:21:14] Speaker 00:
And does the district court found pacer gets the consideration of the user fees in exchange for... Oh, good.

[00:21:19] Speaker 01:
This is Julianna.

[00:21:19] Speaker 01:
Let me interrupt you to be sure that I'm clear as to the release you're asking for.

[00:21:26] Speaker 01:
You're asking that any document that a court issues that has the caption order rather than opinion or no caption at all

[00:21:38] Speaker 01:
whether it's a scheduling order, an extension of time, that your brief is the wrong color, or anything else must be available through PACER, free or no matter what.

[00:21:55] Speaker 01:
I would think that users would prefer not to be burdened if they're looking at a particular case.

[00:22:02] Speaker 01:
to get a whole bunch of irrelevant and trivial and non-substantive documents coming their way, whether they pay 10 cents a page for it or not.

[00:22:14] Speaker 01:
So just what release are you asking for?

[00:22:18] Speaker 00:
uh... yes thank you your honor no to be clear over we're not we're always saying that documents don't document or saying should be free for some of the terms of the basic contract our document that that contain a reasoned explanation and the condo where we differ with the government ago

[00:22:34] Speaker 01:
First to decide that, you issue a one sentence order which explains why you're asking someone to do something.

[00:22:43] Speaker 01:
Is this something that you propose should go through some internal process whereby a judge has to decide this is or is not a reasoned explanation?

[00:22:55] Speaker 01:
Or it seems very clear when you look at it that the plan was this is the important stuff.

[00:23:03] Speaker 01:
These are the opinions they're not to be charged for, and it should be routinely handled.

[00:23:09] Speaker 01:
You're saying none of this can be routinely handled according to your request?

[00:23:17] Speaker 00:
Well, somewhat, Your Honor.

[00:23:19] Speaker 00:
It's not so much the routine, but we think the key distinction, again, is reason explanation and the routine, non-substantive language.

[00:23:25] Speaker 00:
We think that it shouldn't be that hard for courts to figure out whether something's substantive or not.

[00:23:30] Speaker 00:
And frankly, the burden should fall

[00:23:32] Speaker 00:
on the government, they're not the users to address any deficiencies with that.

[00:23:37] Speaker 00:
As the government's contract, they've had 15 years to implement it, and under principles both of implied government and construction against the drafter, any doubt as to whether a document should have been labeled an opinion or not should be resolved in favor of inclusion.

[00:23:51] Speaker 00:
And as far as, to go back to our earlier question as to what the documents, I mean, the relief of seeking

[00:23:59] Speaker 00:
We did try to bring a class action here, and we proposed classes that we thought were completely objective, including we believe that all documents that are actually labeled opinions in their title, at least, should be, you know, opinions.

[00:24:14] Speaker 00:
We believe that's sort of common sense.

[00:24:17] Speaker 00:
I mean, if a document has an opinion in its title, it should be an opinion.

[00:24:22] Speaker 01:
in terms of the opinion provision, as I recall.

[00:24:27] Speaker 01:
You were complaining about things that are marked as orders, but they have substantive content.

[00:24:35] Speaker 00:
Isn't that fair?

[00:24:36] Speaker 00:
Well, we provided literally hundreds of examples, including some that had orders in our title, but our overarching point was, again, that we were using these examples as examples of arbitrariness.

[00:24:48] Speaker 00:
Just one really quick point on arbitrariness.

[00:24:50] Speaker 00:
I mean, going back to these definitions,

[00:24:52] Speaker 00:
recommendations.

[00:24:53] Speaker 00:
I mean, one of them says that the definition is expressly intended to apply to magistrate documents in both orders and the reports any time the district court takes action on them.

[00:25:05] Speaker 00:
And we submitted the evidence, including, for instance, one year last year, 46 orders of this type were issued by the summer district Florida, and not a single one was designated as an opinion, even though the official guidance says it's expressly intended

[00:25:20] Speaker 00:
to cover such documents.

[00:25:22] Speaker 00:
So we submit that basically there's really no standard being applied at all and we don't believe that's compatible with the affirms of this contract.

[00:25:35] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:25:35] Speaker 01:
Any more questions for Mr. Giuliano?

[00:25:42] Speaker 00:
No, thank you.

[00:25:45] Speaker 01:
Okay, thank you.

[00:25:46] Speaker 01:
We have the arguments and thank counsel on both sides.

[00:25:50] Speaker 01:
This case is under submission.

[00:25:51] Speaker 01:
And that concludes this court's oral arguments for this morning.

[00:25:57] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:25:57] Speaker 00:
The Honorable Court is adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.