[00:00:02] Speaker 00: It's number 21-1648, ARCIS LLC against Unified Patents LLC. [00:00:11] Speaker 00: Mr. Bright, please proceed. [00:00:15] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:00:15] Speaker 03: My name is Pat Bright. [00:00:16] Speaker 03: I'm a lawyer from Los Angeles. [00:00:19] Speaker 03: I want to thank the court for permitting me to appear by Zoom today. [00:00:24] Speaker 03: I appreciate the courtesy. [00:00:26] Speaker 03: I don't know if the panel can hear me okay. [00:00:35] Speaker 00: Yes, we hear you. [00:00:36] Speaker 00: Proceed. [00:00:38] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:00:40] Speaker 03: Well, on behalf of Collin, I just have a couple of things I wanted to call attention to. [00:00:47] Speaker ?: First is the standard of review. [00:00:49] Speaker 03: I think the standard is to know that facts on this appeal are not in dispute. [00:00:58] Speaker 03: My client filed a lawsuit for patent infringement in San Francisco District Court against Tesla. [00:01:05] Speaker 03: a fairly well-known car company. [00:01:09] Speaker 03: One of the patents involved in that lawsuit is also involved in the IPR at the bottom of this matter. [00:01:18] Speaker 03: And in the lawsuit, arsonists asserted claims 21 and 22 against Tesla. [00:01:26] Speaker 03: Not long thereafter, Unified filed an IPR. [00:01:31] Speaker 03: The court may know that Tesla is a [00:01:34] Speaker 03: who dues paying member of Unified, and therefore we have inferred that, at least our system has inferred, that Unified is a stalking horse, or front man, or Tesla. [00:01:47] Speaker 02: Well, Mr. Bright, Mr. Bright, can you hear me? [00:01:49] Speaker 02: This is Judge Prost. [00:01:52] Speaker 02: Good morning. [00:01:53] Speaker 02: Let me just move to the issue, because time is limited. [00:01:56] Speaker 02: There's a regulation that's been issued here, 42.73B. [00:02:03] Speaker 02: And that regulation, as I read it, explicitly directs the board to construe a disclaimer of all claims as a request for an adverse judgment, correct? [00:02:14] Speaker 03: Yes, but it doesn't apply here, because we filed a disclaimer. [00:02:18] Speaker 03: We filed a disclaimer, and the effect of the disclaimer [00:02:21] Speaker 03: is that the claims and issue are treated as if they never existed. [00:02:26] Speaker 02: Ever. [00:02:27] Speaker 02: Well, isn't the regulation, doesn't that direct the board to construe a disclaimer as a request for an adverse judgment? [00:02:35] Speaker 02: So let me ask two questions. [00:02:38] Speaker 02: How would it not apply here? [00:02:39] Speaker 02: I don't understand anything in these pleadings to suggest that you're challenging whether the regulation was properly promulgated or was authorized by statute. [00:02:51] Speaker 02: So I guess you could tell me why [00:02:54] Speaker 02: What the regulation says is not applicable here. [00:02:57] Speaker 02: You file the disclaimer, the regulation says that they can construe a disclaimer as a request for an adverse judgment, which is what they did here. [00:03:06] Speaker 02: What's the problem with that under the regulation? [00:03:10] Speaker 03: Because here the problem is the regulation doesn't apply because we made the disclaimer before the PTAB ever entered the judgment. [00:03:19] Speaker 03: The PTAB entered the judgment [00:03:22] Speaker 03: on claims that did not exist and had to be treated as if they had never existed. [00:03:30] Speaker 03: So if they never existed, how could anyone have any board, any court, have jurisdiction over them? [00:03:35] Speaker 02: Well, the regulation, this is Judge Prosser again, the regulation says the party may request judgment against itself at any time during the proceeding. [00:03:44] Speaker 02: Actions could construe to be requests. [00:03:46] Speaker 02: So I think the regulation is referring to requests that come during the proceeding. [00:03:52] Speaker 03: Right? [00:03:55] Speaker 03: No. [00:03:55] Speaker 03: The regulation assumes there are claims that are still before the tribunal. [00:04:01] Speaker 03: But in this case, there were no claims before the tribunal. [00:04:04] Speaker 03: None when the PTAB entered its judgment. [00:04:10] Speaker 03: The claims that had to be treated by the board and everyone else in the United States of America as if they had never existed at all. [00:04:19] Speaker 00: So you're telling us that. [00:04:20] Speaker 03: At any time. [00:04:21] Speaker 03: Even at the beginning of the IPR, the result of the effect of the disclaimer that we made of all claims in addition to the IPR was to deprive every tribunal that might have had jurisdiction of that jurisdiction. [00:04:37] Speaker 03: That's why Sanofi, among other things, said, when the claims are taken out of place, there's no jurisdiction. [00:04:43] Speaker 03: But you never even reach that here, because the disclaimer before the board entered its finding of validity [00:04:50] Speaker 03: The claims were gone. [00:04:52] Speaker 03: They made a finding on claims that no longer existed and had to be treated as if they never existed. [00:04:59] Speaker 00: So you're telling us that as applied here, it violates Article 3. [00:05:04] Speaker 00: Is that right? [00:05:06] Speaker 03: I cannot understand what you just said. [00:05:12] Speaker 00: You're telling us that as applied here to apply the disclaimer at the time [00:05:20] Speaker 00: at which it was applied, that is, before there was a decision, violates Article 3 of the Constitution. [00:05:27] Speaker 00: Is that correct? [00:05:29] Speaker 03: I think I heard what you said, and it sounded correct, but I must confess the sound is appropriate. [00:05:36] Speaker 03: And at my advanced age, my hearing isn't what it was when I was, say, 45. [00:05:41] Speaker 02: Well, I'll repeat it and scream, because I'm a better screamer. [00:05:46] Speaker 02: Is it your argument that what was done here is a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution? [00:05:57] Speaker 03: It's a little less majestic than that. [00:05:59] Speaker ?: It's simply this. [00:06:01] Speaker 03: The effect of the terminal disclaimer was to render it nuketory, nonexistent, all claims of the IPR. [00:06:11] Speaker 03: And as a consequence, neither the PTAB nor the court in San Francisco or anybody else could render any judgment about these claims. [00:06:21] Speaker ?: None. [00:06:22] Speaker ?: It was too late. [00:06:23] Speaker 03: It's just as if you were bringing suit against someone and that someone died or was dead. [00:06:30] Speaker ?: That ended it. [00:06:31] Speaker 03: Those claims were dead as it were now. [00:06:34] Speaker 03: And they were dead even before the IPR began by reason of the disclaimer. [00:06:41] Speaker 03: So if they weren't in existence when the IPR began, the PTAB panel had no jurisdiction to do anything about those claims. [00:06:50] Speaker 03: Nothing. [00:06:51] Speaker 03: Even if they were trying to help their good friends and unify them. [00:06:54] Speaker 02: How do we get around Arthrex? [00:06:55] Speaker 02: We're bound by Arthrex as a panel. [00:06:57] Speaker 02: How do we get around what Arthrex says about this? [00:07:01] Speaker 03: Arthrex doesn't address the effect of the terminal disclaimer. [00:07:06] Speaker 03: There are three opinions there, one by Judge Dyke, one by Judge O'Malley, [00:07:11] Speaker 03: and one by Judge Newman. [00:07:12] Speaker 03: And none of them talks about the effect of the terminal disclaimer. [00:07:18] Speaker 03: Or if they do, I can't discern it in what they wrote. [00:07:23] Speaker 03: And by the way, Sanofi doesn't talk about Arthur Jesus. [00:07:33] Speaker 00: Can you hear better? [00:07:34] Speaker 00: Are we closer to the microphone? [00:07:37] Speaker 00: Is this clearer than before? [00:07:40] Speaker 03: I can hear you fine, Your Honor. [00:07:42] Speaker 00: Oh, OK. [00:07:43] Speaker 00: You say that Sanofi has nothing to do with Article 3. [00:07:48] Speaker 00: It isn't that fresh in my mind, but my understanding, my recollection, is that it was an issue of whether there was an ongoing controversy at that stage in order to enable the appeal. [00:08:08] Speaker 03: If you mean an archivist, [00:08:09] Speaker 03: There is some discussion of it so far. [00:08:11] Speaker 00: In Sanofi. [00:08:13] Speaker 03: I'm sorry? [00:08:13] Speaker 00: In Sanofi. [00:08:16] Speaker 03: Well, in Sanofi, the case, the patent, the disclaimer took place when the case, when the patent at issue was before an Article III court. [00:08:27] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:08:29] Speaker 03: So, and my opponents argued that the reasoning, therefore, it has no application in this proceeding before the Patent, Trademark, and Appeal Board. [00:08:39] Speaker 03: because that's not an Article III court. [00:08:42] Speaker 03: That's their argument, as I understand it. [00:08:44] Speaker 03: It makes no sense to me, by the way, because any appeal from the PTAB must go to the Federal Circuit, where we are today. [00:08:52] Speaker 03: So why wouldn't that precedent apply here? [00:08:55] Speaker 03: It makes perfectly good sense to me that it should. [00:08:57] Speaker 03: And all my life I've thought, if the court has no jurisdiction over something, game over. [00:09:05] Speaker 03: But the terminal disclaimer trumps the whole thing. [00:09:10] Speaker 03: the claims from consideration, from existence, back to the beginning of time, before the beginning of where, all the way back to the beginning of the night, all the way back to the 1952 statute. [00:09:21] Speaker 02: What is the practical consequence of the distinction between the two actions? [00:09:25] Speaker 02: This is Judge Price. [00:09:27] Speaker 03: Between what? [00:09:29] Speaker 02: Between what was done here and what you're advocating, the non-entry of an adverse judgment. [00:09:37] Speaker 03: Well, the [00:09:40] Speaker 03: The IPR system says that if the board enters a judgment, that judgment can taint any later claims applied for that may be similar to those declared invalid by the board. [00:09:56] Speaker 03: So one of the reasons for this appeal is to remove that taint, if that's the question you're posing. [00:10:03] Speaker 03: But my answer is, I think we need to go any farther than to say that the effect of a terminal disclaimer [00:10:10] Speaker 03: is to remove claims back to the beginning of time and back before the IPR ever asserted jurisdictional. [00:10:18] Speaker 03: That's just the way it works. [00:10:19] Speaker 03: It has nothing to do with me or Unified or anybody else. [00:10:23] Speaker 03: It's just the effect of that disclaimer. [00:10:26] Speaker 03: That's why ARCIS disclaimed all the claims [00:10:45] Speaker 03: to remove all claims that had ever been presented in the IPR for consideration. [00:10:52] Speaker 03: And the disclaimer destroys them for all time. [00:10:57] Speaker 03: It treats them as if they never existed. [00:11:01] Speaker 03: So I can't see how, under those circumstances, the fan dancing over whether we are in an Article III court and Sanofi applies or not makes any sense, frankly. [00:11:16] Speaker 00: Okay, let's hear from the other side, and we'll pursue this further. [00:11:22] Speaker 00: Mr. Foreman, are you here? [00:11:25] Speaker 00: Yes, I am. [00:11:28] Speaker 05: May it please the court? [00:11:30] Speaker 05: This case comes down to two separate or related arguments. [00:11:34] Speaker 05: The first is this argument about the reliance, appellant's reliance on Sanofi, [00:11:41] Speaker 05: I mean, as you read that opinion, it's all about Article III case of controversy. [00:11:45] Speaker 05: And I don't think there's any dispute that Article III case of controversy requirement does not apply to proceedings before the board. [00:11:53] Speaker 02: Can I ask you? [00:11:54] Speaker 02: This is Judge Prost. [00:11:56] Speaker 02: Good morning. [00:11:57] Speaker 02: Can I ask you what I asked your friend on the other side, which is what is the practical consequence for you or your client as to which way this goes in terms of disclaimer versus an adverse judgment? [00:12:09] Speaker 05: So the adverse judgment triggers the application of a stop-all in, that's also in, I think it's 42.73D. [00:12:24] Speaker 05: So if an adverse judgment is rendered, then the patent owner cannot obtain patently distinct claims [00:12:38] Speaker 05: There is no adverse judgment. [00:12:39] Speaker 05: Going back to the article three point, it's clear as this court has said multiple times that [00:12:54] Speaker 01: Can I just ask, I don't see much need to discuss the self-evident proposition that Sanofi is about Article 3 and that Article 3 doesn't apply to the PTAB. [00:13:10] Speaker 01: Why should we not construe the argument made to us as an argument that the regulation is contrary to the statute to 253? [00:13:24] Speaker 05: This court has addressed and rejected that same argument in Gwynn, Gwynn versus Kauff, which is a case about interference practice. [00:13:35] Speaker 01: First of all, do you view? [00:13:43] Speaker 01: the brief submitted to us as including that argument and also view the submissions to the PTAB as including that argument. [00:13:55] Speaker 01: It's not that easy for me to find it there, let alone a developed form of it. [00:14:01] Speaker 05: I don't see it in the arguments in the PTAB. [00:14:05] Speaker 05: I think it's made, and I think it's not made in this case by arguing that when a disclaimer is made, [00:14:13] Speaker 05: the claims are treated like they never existed. [00:14:17] Speaker 05: And that's the requirement under the disclaimer statute, section 253. [00:14:22] Speaker 05: And to the extent that entering an adverse judgment is contrary to that, I think it can be construed as a challenge to the regulations. [00:14:32] Speaker 01: OK, so why, then, is the argument wrong? [00:14:38] Speaker 05: Well, I think that [00:14:39] Speaker 05: As I was saying, this court's decision in Wynn versus Kauff was an interference case applying an almost identical regulation about adverse judgment, saying that if a patent owner displays all of the claims be interference, that will be treated as a request for adverse judgment. [00:15:00] Speaker ?: And this court heard pretty much the same arguments. [00:15:05] Speaker 05: In that decision, the argument that the patent owner made was that [00:15:09] Speaker 05: As a result of the disclaimer, no claim which corresponded to the single economy interference remained, so that no controversy existed between the parties. [00:15:19] Speaker 05: And this court addressed the argument about whether the entry of the adverse judgment was contrary to the disclaimer section, section 253, and found it wasn't. [00:15:31] Speaker 05: So the court concluded the entry of a judgment against weighing if the interference was proper [00:15:37] Speaker 05: inconsistent with his right to disclaim under section 253. [00:15:41] Speaker 05: So I think that I don't see any way to distinguish that case from the current situation, even though that was an interference. [00:15:52] Speaker 05: And this is an IPR of both of our adversarial proceedings before the office. [00:15:59] Speaker 01: What about the, I guess it's the board decision in the CBM context, when was that pre-institution or post-institution? [00:16:10] Speaker 05: The Facebook decision, that was pre-institution. [00:16:13] Speaker 05: That decision held that if prior to the institution decision, a patent or a disclaimed claims, then the board would not consider those disclaimed claims [00:16:24] Speaker 05: in determining whether the patent is a CBM patent and deciding whether it is. [00:16:28] Speaker 01: So how do you square the logic of that with the opposite conclusion here? [00:16:35] Speaker 05: Well, I think, I mean, the big difference here is that, in this case, the IPR had been instituted. [00:16:43] Speaker 05: And I think that, I mean, definitely from the sports artwork's decision, you can see there are a lot of formal questions about how to handle disclaimers pre-institutionally. [00:17:01] Speaker 02: Well, the language of the regulation is during the proceeding. [00:17:05] Speaker 02: I know that's come up in other contexts in other cases. [00:17:08] Speaker 02: During the proceeding, do you know if our cases say during the proceeding includes or excludes pre-institution? [00:17:16] Speaker 05: Also, in the Art of Justice decision, which I believe is the only decision addressing this issue, it was a pre-institution disclaimer in this court held that that was appropriate with [00:17:29] Speaker 05: one judge occurring and one judge dissenting, and those opinions made it clear that there would be some question, if the right arguments were presented in that case, there would be some question about whether pre-institution disclaimer, whether the board had the authority to enter adverse judgment in a pre-institution disclaimer case. [00:17:59] Speaker 05: You know, the language of the regulation, but it's not something that we briefed and it's not something we need to address. [00:18:05] Speaker 05: This happened after institution. [00:18:09] Speaker 01: Why would the question of consistency with the statute be a tougher question? [00:18:16] Speaker 05: Well, I think consistency with the regulation. [00:18:20] Speaker 01: No, no, no, no. [00:18:21] Speaker 01: That's why I was trying. [00:18:22] Speaker 01: I asked the question because you said, look at the language of the regulation. [00:18:27] Speaker 01: I thought the argument that is being discussed here is whether the regulation is consistent with the statute. [00:18:33] Speaker 01: Why would that question, consistency with the statute, change according to whether the disclaimer was before or after institution? [00:18:43] Speaker 05: I apologize. [00:18:43] Speaker 05: I was answering Judge Gross's question about the differences [00:18:46] Speaker ?: in the Arthur's case in this case. [00:18:50] Speaker ?: I think that this isn't consistent with the statute because of a couple of reasons. [00:18:55] Speaker 05: First, I think the appellant was incorrect to say that the board entered an indigeneity judgment, or it did not. [00:19:01] Speaker ?: This was a trial proceeding that was instituted, and the board issued an adverse judgment, meaning that [00:19:19] Speaker 05: So, you know, just because the claims were explained doesn't mean the board can't enter that judgment to end the proceeding. [00:19:27] Speaker 05: I mean, the proceeding has to end in some way. [00:19:30] Speaker 05: And, you know, the patent office has made the determination that if a proceeding is instituted and a patent owner decides to give up by disclaiming, [00:19:49] Speaker 05: and reasonable way to handle it. [00:19:57] Speaker 05: The other issue was that I agree that this court has held that the claims are treated like they never existed. [00:20:19] Speaker ?: and it extinguishes the patent owner's rights. [00:20:23] Speaker ?: But this court has held that a disclaimer doesn't distinguish the rights of the public. [00:20:28] Speaker 05: And so here, the board enters the adverse judgment for the benefit of the public so that the patent owner can't obtain, you know, patent indistinguishable claims down the road and then go try to enforce them against other parties who may not know about what's going on here. [00:20:45] Speaker ?: So, you know, it's a, [00:20:51] Speaker 05: to protect the public interest so that another patent is not obtained and asserted against anyone else. [00:21:04] Speaker 05: I'm happy to answer any other questions. [00:21:07] Speaker 00: All right. [00:21:08] Speaker 00: Well, you've left some time for your colleague, Mr. Seastrunk. [00:21:14] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honors. [00:21:15] Speaker 04: May it please the Court? [00:21:17] Speaker 04: I'd first like to note that while ARCIS' standard or arguments fail under any standard or review, as discussed here today, we do not necessarily agree that their briefing as it's written alleges that the rule is either inconsistent with the disclaimer statute, nor do they allege that the rule was not properly promulgated. [00:21:38] Speaker 04: Instead, we feel like ARCIS simply disagrees with the board's interpretation of the rule and the orders at issue. [00:21:44] Speaker 04: For example, on page 12 of its reply brief, ARCIS uses phrases like properly construed and that the regulation should be read in a certain way for the PTAF to retain jurisdiction. [00:21:56] Speaker 04: So like in all of its briefing, ARCIS uses general principles of subject matter jurisdiction to try to support its interpretation of the rule. [00:22:04] Speaker 04: The point here being that even when ARCIS is talking about the rule, it's talking about it in the context of interpreting the rule and the problems it has with the board's interpretation of the rule. [00:22:14] Speaker 04: So I think that a simpler solution here is that because this court has held that it will accept the board's interpretations of its own regulations unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent and will set aside actions only that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abusive discretion, that is the standard that should be applied here. [00:22:33] Speaker 04: So we believe that deference of the PTO is appropriate where the board was interpreting one of its own regulations and where the board followed the plain language of the regulation in issuing the orders. [00:22:43] Speaker 04: And again, regardless, even under a less differential standard, Wimby Cop dictates that the result would be the same and that the board have the authority and the responsibility to issue the adverse judgment here. [00:22:55] Speaker 04: Your Honor, unless there are any questions, I will just conclude and ask for affirmance of the board's orders. [00:23:01] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:23:03] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:23:03] Speaker 00: No question. [00:23:04] Speaker 00: All right. [00:23:05] Speaker 00: In that case, Mr. Bright will have the last word. [00:23:16] Speaker 00: I think you are muted. [00:23:19] Speaker 03: Sorry, I'm muted. [00:23:21] Speaker 03: I hope everyone can hear me now. [00:23:22] Speaker 03: I thank you for your patience with me. [00:23:25] Speaker 03: I'm not exactly a technological hip. [00:23:29] Speaker 03: A couple of things. [00:23:31] Speaker 03: First of all, in my view, and I've tried to express it as forcefully as I can, the board's finding of immolidity or whatever its finding is called here today [00:23:44] Speaker 03: is like firing a bullet into a dead body. [00:23:48] Speaker 03: There can be no charge of murder because the body of that individual is already dead. [00:23:53] Speaker 03: So even if that shooting is done with malice or forethought, it doesn't matter. [00:23:59] Speaker 03: There's no crime. [00:24:00] Speaker 03: Similarly here, with the disclaimer having removed these claims from existence from the beginning of time, it doesn't matter whether the board followed rule X or rule Y or rule Z. [00:24:15] Speaker 03: The rules don't apply because the board had no jurisdiction, which is why we made the disclaimer. [00:24:20] Speaker 03: This is not some accident. [00:24:22] Speaker 03: It was done on purpose for this reason. [00:24:24] Speaker 03: Now, Mr. Seastrom piously professes to be worried about the public, but we have disclaimed everything that was presented in the IPR. [00:24:32] Speaker 03: So the public is covered in spades. [00:24:34] Speaker 03: Those claims are gone forever. [00:24:37] Speaker 03: So the public interest has been served if we need to be worried about that. [00:24:42] Speaker 01: But not for, I'm sorry. [00:24:44] Speaker 01: There was colloquy before about what the concrete difference is between an adverse judgment and a mere dismissal, and I gather it comes down to the applicability of the regulatory subsection D, which does protect the public against relevantly similar claims. [00:25:07] Speaker 01: So there is something at stake, isn't there? [00:25:11] Speaker 03: if you think that regulation means anything. [00:25:13] Speaker 03: But the devil's always in the details. [00:25:16] Speaker 03: I don't know of any case has ever turned on the application of that rule. [00:25:20] Speaker 03: And I submit to the panel that its application would be difficult even if the panel, the PTAB, had the right to enter this judgment. [00:25:31] Speaker 03: But it did not for the reasons I have stated. [00:25:34] Speaker 03: And I don't want to beat a dead horse here. [00:25:36] Speaker 03: But I think if you look at Sanofi, which comes after Arthur, [00:25:41] Speaker 03: says covers jurisdiction just the way we've all learned it from the time we got out of law school. [00:25:48] Speaker 03: Once the case is, you know, the subject matter is gone, the court's power to rule on it is gone. [00:25:54] Speaker 03: And this PTAE panel had no right to do what they did because they had no power, no jurisdiction to do what they did. [00:26:02] Speaker 03: And the reason is the claims were gone for all time. [00:26:05] Speaker 00: And so the claims are gone. [00:26:07] Speaker 00: What are we fighting about? [00:26:10] Speaker 03: We're fighting about the application of this rule that His Honor just mentioned before. [00:26:15] Speaker 03: It's something that ends with the letter D. The one that says you can't have a claim thereafter that would be patently indistinct from what has been ruled upon by the board. [00:26:27] Speaker 03: We don't need it here. [00:26:28] Speaker 03: The claims are gone. [00:26:29] Speaker 03: We don't need to worry about the public. [00:26:31] Speaker 03: The public's fine. [00:26:33] Speaker 03: And think of the circumstances under which you might even have a chance of getting another claim. [00:26:38] Speaker 03: You'd have to have a continuation, because otherwise these claims can be barred by 102B or something. [00:26:45] Speaker 03: So it's all that concern about the public, which we hear about so much these days, particularly from our liberal friends on the left, is just so much pious path. [00:26:57] Speaker 03: Of course, the claims are gone. [00:26:59] Speaker 03: Let's not worry about whether somebody might apply for a claim that is similar. [00:27:02] Speaker 03: The panelist knows how to deal with that kind of thing. [00:27:05] Speaker 03: And they've been doing it. [00:27:06] Speaker 03: forever under rule 152 statute. [00:27:08] Speaker 03: We don't need to worry about that. [00:27:11] Speaker 03: Anyway, that's all I have to say. [00:27:12] Speaker 03: I thank the panel for, again, for permitting us to appear by its own. [00:27:17] Speaker 03: Normally, I would come in person, and I have appeared in person many a time in the board. [00:27:24] Speaker 03: And I would have done this time but for the problems [00:27:37] Speaker 00: Thanks to all the council. [00:27:41] Speaker 00: This worked quite well. [00:27:44] Speaker 00: The case is taken under submission.