[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
This is 20-2224, Goodrich versus Department of Justice.

[00:00:05] Speaker 02:
Mr. Bruner, whenever you're ready.

[00:00:08] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:00:09] Speaker 01:
Bob Bruner on behalf of the Petitioner Bonnie Goodrich.

[00:00:12] Speaker 01:
May it please the Court?

[00:00:14] Speaker 01:
First of all, I'd like to thank, Your Honor, the panel for your time and attention reviewing the pleadings we've submitted to date and your time this afternoon.

[00:00:23] Speaker 01:
It's been, frankly, a long road to get here over eight years, and myself and Ms.

[00:00:28] Speaker 01:
Goodrich are very appreciative of the opportunity to be here and to have our dean court, so thank you.

[00:00:35] Speaker 01:
Ms.

[00:00:35] Speaker 01:
Goodrich's appeal involves straightforward, simple, undisputed set of facts.

[00:00:43] Speaker 01:
But it's a set of facts that, nevertheless, are unique, that, as best as I can tell, are unprecedented.

[00:00:50] Speaker 02:
Well, Mr. Bruner, just time is short.

[00:00:53] Speaker 02:
So I appreciate that.

[00:00:54] Speaker 02:
And I appreciate your recognition that we've been through the record ourselves.

[00:00:59] Speaker 02:
So it's not without sympathy for your client.

[00:01:03] Speaker 02:
However, the language of the statute is quite clear, is it not?

[00:01:09] Speaker 02:
that one of two circumstances have to be met.

[00:01:13] Speaker 02:
Either you do the PSOV certification or whatever on designation on file, or you have a life insurance policy that has to be on file.

[00:01:26] Speaker 02:
So just looking at the statute without even getting into the regulation, how does the clear statutory language allow your client under the circumstances here to get reimbursed?

[00:01:39] Speaker 01:
Yes, sir.

[00:01:41] Speaker 01:
And immediately, if you took the designation provisions of the statute, you cut them out, you set them on a piece of black paper and just looked at that language in a vacuum by itself, I would concede that you could tease out of that language in interpretation similar to what the Bureau has given in that the designation has to reference the PSOB Act or has to be a designation for

[00:02:05] Speaker 02:
Well, I'm not working hard teasing language out.

[00:02:09] Speaker 02:
I'm just talking about the language that's there that I think is pretty clear.

[00:02:14] Speaker 02:
So I guess I want to know what your argument is.

[00:02:18] Speaker 02:
Are you arguing that your view of this is allowed under the statute, or you're interpreting the statute in a way that would allow this?

[00:02:28] Speaker 02:
And I want to hear what your argument is, if that's it, how you do that.

[00:02:33] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:02:34] Speaker 01:
Yeah, I think the designation provisions are ambiguous in the sense that they... If we start with, you know, the Section 4A talking about the designation of a public safety officer to receive benefits under the subsection in the most recently executed designation of beneficiary, it doesn't purport to define the universe of acceptable designations, and it doesn't purport to define how a designation

[00:03:03] Speaker 01:
must designate a beneficiary for the Act.

[00:03:07] Speaker 01:
And so I think there's ambiguity there.

[00:03:11] Speaker 04:
Well, Counsel, what do you do about the language under this subsection?

[00:03:16] Speaker 04:
I know you've submitted information from the local police department saying that they viewed the state designation as sufficient.

[00:03:30] Speaker 04:
to satisfy a designation under the PSOB, but doesn't under this subsection have to mean something?

[00:03:41] Speaker 01:
Yeah, I agree.

[00:03:42] Speaker 01:
It has to mean something, but I think if you look at the overall structure of the statute, the intent of these designation provisions, and the facts of this fee, I don't think it's that big of a leap to conclude that

[00:03:58] Speaker 01:
under the facts of this case, the designation that was on file was a designation intended to identify Ms.

[00:04:07] Speaker 01:
Goodrich as the beneficiary under the PSOB Act.

[00:04:12] Speaker 01:
That was their intent based on the undisputed evidence in the record.

[00:04:18] Speaker 01:
And I don't read into that section.

[00:04:20] Speaker 02:
Does the definition reference in any way, shape, or form the PSOB Act?

[00:04:24] Speaker 02:
I'm just not sure what you're saying.

[00:04:28] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry, Your Honor, could you repeat that, please?

[00:04:31] Speaker 02:
Does the designation that she did file, is that, how is, did it reference PSOBA?

[00:04:39] Speaker 02:
I thought it was under the local or the Illinois state or whatever, a different document for a different amount of money.

[00:04:51] Speaker 01:
No, that's correct, Your Honor.

[00:04:53] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:04:54] Speaker 01:
Yeah.

[00:04:57] Speaker 01:
The Wellington Group Fire Protection District, they only had one designation form.

[00:05:01] Speaker 01:
That's all that was ever provided to Mr. Jeffers, to any of the volunteer firefighters that served that department.

[00:05:09] Speaker 02:
But that wasn't for the PSOB Act and for the funds available under that Act, right?

[00:05:14] Speaker 02:
That was something different.

[00:05:18] Speaker 01:
It expressly references, yes, just the Illinois statute.

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
It did not reference the PSOB Act.

[00:05:26] Speaker 01:
And it really was not a designation for a private life insurance policy.

[00:05:33] Speaker 01:
But it was, you know, based on all the statements of Chief Budsaw, the other evidence in the record, it was intended to be a designation for this act.

[00:05:47] Speaker 02:
Well, do you have another argument or related argument about subsection B, about the life insurance policy?

[00:05:56] Speaker 01:
Yeah, yeah, yes, yes, Your Honors.

[00:05:57] Speaker 01:
So under subsection B, you know, again, admittedly, the designation was not for a private life insurance policy, and I think the Bureau seizes on that and makes the distinction between a life insurance policy that's a private contract and the Illinois statutory benefit, which was, you know, statutory benefit versus a private contract.

[00:06:24] Speaker 01:
But in their own regularations, they have a definition for life insurance policy on file.

[00:06:31] Speaker 01:
And it includes a policy or a substantial equivalent of a policy or declaration policy, a declaration page, certificate of insurance, any instrument that constitutes a life insurance policy.

[00:06:48] Speaker 01:
The substantial equivalent of any of those

[00:06:51] Speaker 01:
are considered a life insurance policy on file under the Bureau's own regulations.

[00:06:57] Speaker 01:
And it makes sense.

[00:06:58] Speaker 01:
It makes sense to me.

[00:07:00] Speaker 02:
Let me just see if I understand your argument.

[00:07:02] Speaker 02:
You're saying that under the regulation, substantial equivalent of the foregoing, you're saying the foregoing is little i, which is the policy, so that this designation that you had was a substantial equivalent of a life insurance policy?

[00:07:23] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:07:29] Speaker 01:
Yeah, and I think it's consistent with, if you look at, again, the structure in the 10 of these designation provisions, you know, they're not intended to be a gotcha provision to, you know, deny a claim when there's no dispute that a public safety officer, you know, died in the line of duty and earned a death benefit.

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
They're intended to identify

[00:07:52] Speaker 01:
who is the public safety officer's intended beneficiary?

[00:07:57] Speaker 01:
And a designation for a state of Illinois statutory death benefit act that was actually modeled after the PSOB Act looks a lot like it, it's hard to conceive why that designation would not be, at the very least, as probative of the public safety officer's intent as a designation

[00:08:20] Speaker 01:
for a private life insurance policy that has nothing to do with with the public safety... They're not talking about a private life insurance policy.

[00:08:28] Speaker 04:
They're talking about a life insurance policy that's actually provided by the law enforcement agency, correct?

[00:08:35] Speaker 01:
Well, I think in the Bureau's brief, they made the distinction between a private contract for insurance versus a statutory benefit.

[00:08:47] Speaker 01:
But that goes to another point, Your Honor, is that

[00:08:50] Speaker 01:
You know, in this situation, the Wellington Bureau of Fire Department, it's a rural fire department, probably serves less than 1,000 people.

[00:08:58] Speaker 01:
All the firefighters were on a volunteer basis.

[00:09:01] Speaker 01:
And so the fire department did not offer life insurance benefits to its officers.

[00:09:08] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.

[00:09:09] Speaker 02:
You said they did or they didn't.

[00:09:11] Speaker 02:
They did not.

[00:09:12] Speaker 01:
They did not.

[00:09:13] Speaker 01:
OK.

[00:09:14] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:09:14] Speaker 01:
So the Wellington Bureau of Fire Protection District, they didn't have

[00:09:20] Speaker 01:
life insurance policies as a benefit.

[00:09:22] Speaker 01:
They didn't have designations for life insurance policies on file.

[00:09:27] Speaker 01:
They didn't have any other form other than what Mr. Jeffers executed.

[00:09:33] Speaker 01:
That's all that was presented to him, all that he had the opportunity to sign.

[00:09:38] Speaker 01:
And based on all the unrefuted evidence, the Wallington Bureau of Fire Department District, the Fire Chief, Chief Budsaw, Mr. Jeffers all believed

[00:09:49] Speaker 01:
that that designation would be sufficient for this act.

[00:09:52] Speaker 01:
I think in part because the fire department did not have life insurance policy.

[00:09:57] Speaker 01:
So this was all that they had.

[00:10:00] Speaker 04:
So do you have any?

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
The federal government, counsel, has provided a benefit, a substantial benefit.

[00:10:08] Speaker 00:
And it lays down certain rules.

[00:10:10] Speaker 00:
It doesn't just hand out money of this quantity to everybody for reasons

[00:10:20] Speaker 00:
that no doubt it deliberated.

[00:10:23] Speaker 00:
It determines what is required to be entitled to this benefit.

[00:10:29] Speaker 00:
And we're not in a position to question whether they made these requirements too stringent, whether they could have had different lesser requirements.

[00:10:43] Speaker 00:
It's our job to interpret the plain meaning of the statute.

[00:10:49] Speaker 00:
And the deceased firefighter had the opportunity to satisfy the statute.

[00:11:00] Speaker 00:
And it's just most unfortunate that he didn't.

[00:11:08] Speaker 02:
You can respond to Judge Laurie.

[00:11:11] Speaker 01:
Yeah, I appreciate that, Judge Laurie.

[00:11:14] Speaker 01:
And the way I look at it is,

[00:11:18] Speaker 01:
the government, they did provide, you know, a statute for a benefit or a gratuity as the Bureau provides.

[00:11:25] Speaker 01:
And the fundamental elements to trigger that benefit are a public safety officer that dies in the line of duty.

[00:11:33] Speaker 01:
And both of those elements were met here.

[00:11:35] Speaker 01:
The designation provisions weren't intended to be, you know, underlying substantive requirements for treating a benefit.

[00:11:44] Speaker 01:
They're intended solely to identify

[00:11:47] Speaker 01:
the claimant.

[00:11:48] Speaker 01:
And here in this case, Mrs. Goodrich was the only person identified in the only designation that the Wellington Career Fire Department ever had on file.

[00:11:59] Speaker 01:
There was no other designation.

[00:12:01] Speaker 01:
There's never been any other claimant.

[00:12:04] Speaker 01:
So denying her claim, notwithstanding their efforts to comply with the statute as best they could, and at the very least, substantially complying

[00:12:17] Speaker 02:
with that statute has the result of denying the benefit to anyone despite the fact that... Well, but there's nothing clear... I mean, the problem with that argument, I appreciate it, but the problem with that argument is that these aren't benefits that we want to give someone or we have to give someone and we'll just pick the person that was most likely to have been the intended beneficiary.

[00:12:41] Speaker 02:
I do think the

[00:12:43] Speaker 02:
There's nothing to suggest that the intent is if you don't meet these, if nobody meets these requirements, then nobody meets these requirements, right?

[00:12:51] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:12:52] Speaker 01:
No, I agree, Your Honor.

[00:12:53] Speaker 01:
And I think if there had been no designation on file, we have no case.

[00:12:57] Speaker 01:
And I think what makes this one difficult is that there was a designation that was on file.

[00:13:02] Speaker 01:
It was maintained in the personal records of the Wellington Fire Department.

[00:13:06] Speaker 01:
It was maintained for the purpose of the stack.

[00:13:09] Speaker 01:
You can certainly take a strict reading of the statute and say it doesn't meet that.

[00:13:15] Speaker 01:
I can see that.

[00:13:17] Speaker 01:
But I think it's also there's an ambiguity in that statute.

[00:13:20] Speaker 01:
And if you look at the facts and circumstances of this case, I always get back to, would Congress have intended this result if they had contemplated a situation where a fire department, a real fire department that didn't provide life insurance benefits had only a single designation form that it provided its officers and it referenced

[00:13:39] Speaker 01:
a state statutory benefit that really is no different from a life insurance policy in terms of providing a benefit upon death.

[00:13:46] Speaker 01:
If they had contemplated that, would they have written the statute in a way to deny Ms.

[00:13:50] Speaker 01:
Goodrich's claim?

[00:13:51] Speaker 01:
I just don't believe that's the case, and that's fundamentally the underlying principle of my argument.

[00:14:01] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:14:01] Speaker 02:
Why don't we reserve the remainder of your rebuttal and hear from the government?

[00:14:05] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:14:10] Speaker 05:
Thank you, Your Honor, and may it please the Court.

[00:14:15] Speaker 05:
The Public Safety Officer's Benefit Office correctly determined that Ms.

[00:14:18] Speaker 05:
Goodrich did not show entitlement to the legal gratuity that's provided under the PSOB Act.

[00:14:24] Speaker 05:
The clear language of the Act, as Your Honors have discussed, demonstrates that Ms.

[00:14:32] Speaker 05:
Goodrich does not...

[00:14:33] Speaker 02:
This is Judge Prost.

[00:14:34] Speaker 02:
Let me just get to it.

[00:14:35] Speaker 02:
I mean, if we were just dealing with the statutory language, frankly, I think it's quite clear.

[00:14:40] Speaker 02:
What gives me pause is the regulation, and specifically that portion of the regulation which says that it lists the life insurance policy itself under little i, and then under five it says the substantial equivalent of any of the foregoing.

[00:14:59] Speaker 02:
So how are we, I don't know, I mean, the government's going to decide, what's the substantial equivalent of a life insurance policy?

[00:15:10] Speaker 02:
I don't know how, you know, is that just absolutely obvious on the face of it?

[00:15:17] Speaker 02:
Is that your view that there's no ambiguity and that a substantial equivalent of a life insurance policy can only be what?

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
Another life insurance policy?

[00:15:26] Speaker 02:
That can't be right.

[00:15:28] Speaker 05:
No, Your Honor.

[00:15:29] Speaker 05:
And to go to the regulation at the portion of 28 CFR 32.13, it states under life insurance policy on file.

[00:15:41] Speaker 05:
And it lists five instances of what could be considered a life insurance policy.

[00:15:47] Speaker 05:
And the first four, you know, the policy itself, the declarations page, a certificate, or any instrument showing an execution of a policy,

[00:15:58] Speaker 05:
there must be a substantial equivalent to one of those four items.

[00:16:01] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:16:02] Speaker 05:
The designation that is on file here simply references the Illinois state benefit.

[00:16:08] Speaker 05:
It doesn't refer to a policy or a declaration page.

[00:16:12] Speaker 04:
But doesn't the Illinois state benefit operate like a life insurance policy?

[00:16:19] Speaker 05:
No, Your Honor, it does not.

[00:16:21] Speaker 05:
And the record at appendix... Why?

[00:16:24] Speaker 05:
Well, it is similar to

[00:16:28] Speaker 05:
gratuities such as the PSOB Act, as Mr. Berner stated, it was modeled after the Act.

[00:16:36] Speaker 05:
And unlike the life insurance policy, which has a certain person who the policy must be paid out to, if you look at Appendix Page 211, which is the Illinois Line of Duty Compensation Act,

[00:16:50] Speaker 05:
It explains that if there's no designated beneficiary, then there will be nothing payable under the Act.

[00:16:56] Speaker 03:
Right, but there was a designated beneficiary, correct?

[00:17:01] Speaker 05:
For purposes of the Illinois Act, yes.

[00:17:03] Speaker 05:
But unlike a life insurance policy, there's... And I apologize if I'm not making the distinction clear, but the Illinois Act itself does not refer whatsoever to insurance.

[00:17:16] Speaker 05:
contractual obligation to pay under the policy, which at Appendix Page 211, it makes clear that... Well, that's one of my problems with your argument is that you say substantial equivalent of a life insurance policy.

[00:17:28] Speaker 04:
You essentially describe a life insurance policy.

[00:17:32] Speaker 04:
So you're saying it has to actually be a life insurance policy in order to be the substantial equivalent of.

[00:17:38] Speaker 04:
And that doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

[00:17:42] Speaker 05:
Well, Your Honor, to take a step back, there's, in subsection A4, there's first the designation of benefits.

[00:17:50] Speaker 05:
So if Mr. Jeffers had listed in his designation of benefits all benefits under the Act, then you wouldn't get to the insurance policy portion, which is under A4B.

[00:18:02] Speaker 05:
Now, under A4B, if there is any type of life insurance policy, so for instance, you know, federal life insurance policies, frankly, or WAPA,

[00:18:11] Speaker 05:
If there's a policy such as that and there's a printout from a page showing that there is a life insurance policy that is paid in that manner, that there is a contractual obligation of a life insurance policy, that would be sufficient for a life insurance policy on file.

[00:18:29] Speaker 04:
Well, the POSB Act isn't a life insurance policy.

[00:18:36] Speaker 04:
I mean, when this life insurance part was added,

[00:18:41] Speaker 04:
It was wasn't it out of a recognition that some states had the state equivalent of PSOB and but some did not.

[00:18:51] Speaker 04:
And in those instances where there were not many local law enforcement provided life insurance policies to substitute for that.

[00:19:02] Speaker 05:
Your Honor, I I'm not entirely certain that was the intent.

[00:19:05] Speaker 05:
I believe the intent of adding the life insurance policy was another manner of

[00:19:11] Speaker 05:
showing who an individual designated as a beneficiary.

[00:19:16] Speaker 05:
Right.

[00:19:16] Speaker 05:
There's the hierarchy.

[00:19:18] Speaker 04:
And that's the whole point, right, is who did they intend the beneficiary to be?

[00:19:23] Speaker 04:
I mean, I know that there was concern that there was money flowing out too quickly because people would just say, oh, you should give it to me.

[00:19:31] Speaker 04:
Or there were fights between spouses and ex-spouses.

[00:19:34] Speaker 04:
But this isn't the kind of circumstances.

[00:19:37] Speaker 04:
There's a very clear designation of someone.

[00:19:40] Speaker 04:
And that's exactly what the Act was trying to get to, right?

[00:19:45] Speaker 05:
Well, there's a very clear designation of someone for purposes of the Illinois benefit.

[00:19:49] Speaker 05:
There's no designation whatsoever for purposes of the PSOV Act under the clear language of the statute.

[00:19:56] Speaker 02:
Can I just follow up with Judge O'Malley where I think she started, which is if you just look at literally the language of the regulation, it allows for the policy itself or substantial equivalent

[00:20:10] Speaker 02:
of the policy itself.

[00:20:13] Speaker 02:
So can you give us an example of what a substantial equivalent of the policy itself is?

[00:20:22] Speaker 05:
Certainly, Your Honor.

[00:20:23] Speaker 05:
For instance, many policies now are purchased online.

[00:20:27] Speaker 05:
And so if you purchase the life insurance policy online, say, through AAA, and there is some sort of summary page that says, congratulations, you purchased $100,000 of life insurance benefits,

[00:20:41] Speaker 05:
and that was printed out and placed on file, that could be considered a substantial equivalent.

[00:20:46] Speaker 05:
But it has to identify that there is a life insurance policy, the company itself, and that there is a policy number.

[00:20:53] Speaker 00:
So that's... Don't you want to point out that the language is not the substantial equivalent of the policy itself, but the substantial equivalent of any of the foregoing, which include a declaration page, certificate of insurance, or any instrument

[00:21:10] Speaker 00:
that constitutes the execution of a file insurance policy.

[00:21:16] Speaker 00:
So little 5, Romanumor 5, is a broader provision, but none of that has been argued.

[00:21:23] Speaker 00:
Isn't that correct?

[00:21:26] Speaker 05:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:21:27] Speaker 05:
Ms.

[00:21:28] Speaker 05:
Goodrich does not argue that the designation of beneficiary for the Illinois benefits is a life insurance policy or that it represents a policy, but that it should be considered a substantial equivalent.

[00:21:40] Speaker 05:
And as Your Honor correctly points out, it is certainly not a substantial equivalent of the policy, the declarations page, certificate of insurance, or any instrument showing execution of a life insurance policy.

[00:21:53] Speaker 05:
And that is the inherent problem here.

[00:21:56] Speaker 05:
And as unfortunate as it is, and as much sympathy as we certainly have for what appears to be incorrect information given to Mr. Jeffers

[00:22:10] Speaker 05:
Unfortunately, the court cannot attempt to glean his intent based on... Let me ask you, counsel.

[00:22:19] Speaker 00:
The local fire chiefs did not provide Jeffers with the correct PSOB form.

[00:22:25] Speaker 00:
Is that of any consequence to us here?

[00:22:30] Speaker 05:
It is unfortunate, Your Honor, but no, it is not of a consequence because there's ample

[00:22:37] Speaker 05:
Other methods in which Mr. Jeffers could have received that information, PSOB has, the office has outreach, companies that do outreach on its behalf, public interest groups, there's sample forms available online.

[00:22:55] Speaker 05:
And the fact that the chief, you know, apparently after the fact, they did not know this was insufficient for PSOB benefits,

[00:23:05] Speaker 05:
Again, as unfortunate as it is, it still doesn't cure the fact that under the clear language of the statute, Mr. Jeffers did not follow the requirement to designate Ms.

[00:23:15] Speaker 05:
Goodrich as his beneficiary.

[00:23:17] Speaker 00:
But there was a designation of beneficiary form filed, correct?

[00:23:23] Speaker 00:
Even if it wasn't the PSOB form, if it had contained the correct language, that would have sufficed, isn't that correct?

[00:23:33] Speaker 05:
If the form at appendix page 48 had stated for all benefits and was not filed on a form that stated the state of Illinois, then yes, Ms.

[00:23:43] Speaker 05:
Goodrich would have been entitled to recover under the Act.

[00:23:48] Speaker 00:
But unfortunately... Where was that in fact filed?

[00:23:55] Speaker 05:
The form was filed with Mr. Jeffers with the Public Safety Office.

[00:24:02] Speaker 04:
And that's what the Act requires, right?

[00:24:04] Speaker 04:
That that's where a designation be filed with the Public Safety Agency.

[00:24:09] Speaker 05:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:24:10] Speaker 05:
And for purposes of A4A, it must reference specifically the Act or all benefits.

[00:24:16] Speaker 05:
And for purposes of A4B, it must be the life insurance policy itself or a substantial equivalent on file.

[00:24:22] Speaker 05:
And unfortunately, there is the argument by Ms.

[00:24:27] Speaker 05:
Giddrich, complete the two.

[00:24:29] Speaker 05:
And based on the clear language of the Act,

[00:24:32] Speaker 05:
There's simply no way to separate or to conflate them.

[00:24:37] Speaker 05:
They must be separated.

[00:24:43] Speaker 05:
And if there are no further questions, for these reasons, the clear language of the statute makes clear that Ms.

[00:24:51] Speaker 05:
Goodrich does not meet the requirements under either section A4A or A4B, and the court should affirm.

[00:24:58] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:25:00] Speaker 02:
Mr. Bruner, I think you have a couple minutes left for rebuttal.

[00:25:05] Speaker 01:
I think, Yara, I'll be brief.

[00:25:06] Speaker 01:
I just wanted to raise one other point that I didn't make in my opening argument, and that's the legislative history behind the amendment to the statute that added the on-file element of the designation provisions.

[00:25:21] Speaker 01:
On a prior version of the statute, the designation provisions, it just referred to a life insurance policy, whether or not it was on file.

[00:25:29] Speaker 01:
with, with, with, with the department and, and the on file requirement was added solely to help claimants to, to expedite the payment of claims.

[00:25:42] Speaker 01:
So there wasn't any delay in figuring out what is, what is the universe of potential policies out there.

[00:25:48] Speaker 01:
And Mr. Jeffers, he, he did have a life insurance policy, a private one, not one that was offered through the Wellington group fire department, but one that he had, he acquired on his own.

[00:25:57] Speaker 01:
And Mrs. Goodrich was named as the beneficiary under that policy.

[00:26:02] Speaker 01:
So under the prior version of the Act, there would have been no question that Mrs. Goodrich would have been a beneficiary entitled to the benefit under the Act.

[00:26:13] Speaker 02:
Yeah, but just taking what you're saying literally is the reason why we can't rule for her, not a reason why we should.

[00:26:20] Speaker 02:
You're using the fact that the language used to be there that would have helped her, but Congress changed it.

[00:26:27] Speaker 02:
So I don't see how that's helpful to your position.

[00:26:31] Speaker 01:
The only point I was trying to make is that the amendments were intended to help, not hurt, and the interpretation that the Bureau is giving hurts Mrs. Goodridge.

[00:26:48] Speaker 01:
I'll just conclude with

[00:26:51] Speaker 01:
You know, if the Wellington group fire department, if they had retained me as counsel to advise them on formulating designation forms 10 years ago, you know, I would have advised them to include a language, you know, referencing the PSOB Act, but they didn't.

[00:27:09] Speaker 01:
You know, so they're a volunteer fire department.

[00:27:11] Speaker 01:
They didn't have legal counsel.

[00:27:14] Speaker 01:
The evidence shows they did the best they could.

[00:27:17] Speaker 01:
At the very least, they substantially complied

[00:27:21] Speaker 01:
with the statute.

[00:27:23] Speaker 01:
And the unabated use intent is that Mrs. Goodrich was intended to be the beneficiary for this claim.

[00:27:33] Speaker 01:
And I'll just, again, I know my time is up to conclude.

[00:27:35] Speaker 01:
I can't believe that if Congress was presented with this facts scenario, if they were impaneled as a jury to hear these facts, that they would deny Ms.

[00:27:46] Speaker 01:
Goodrich's claim.

[00:27:47] Speaker 01:
And if that's the case,

[00:27:50] Speaker 01:
I don't know how the Bureau can say that its determination is reasonable under the unique facts and circumstances of this case.

[00:27:58] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:27:59] Speaker 01:
Thank you for all three panels.

[00:28:01] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:28:02] Speaker 02:
We thank both sides and the cases submitted.

[00:28:04] Speaker 02:
That concludes our proceeding for this morning.

[00:28:10] Speaker 01:
The Honorable Court is adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.