[00:00:00] Speaker 03:
May it please the court.

[00:00:00] Speaker 03:
You can take your mask off.

[00:00:02] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:00:04] Speaker 03:
May it please the court.

[00:00:06] Speaker 03:
This case has evolved from one involving patent infringement to one involving only state law breach of contract issues.

[00:00:15] Speaker 03:
The parties have presented three such issues.

[00:00:19] Speaker 03:
The first issue is presentment, which is a statutory prerequisite to recovery of attorney's fees under Texas law.

[00:00:27] Speaker 03:
The substance of the presentment issue

[00:00:29] Speaker 03:
is a question of Texas law.

[00:00:32] Speaker 03:
But the procedure for proving presentment is a question of federal law, specifically Rule 54D.

[00:00:39] Speaker 03:
That rule provides that fees are to be determined by post-judgment motion practice rather than a trial, and hence by the court rather than by the jury.

[00:00:51] Speaker 03:
It prescribes the content of a motion for attorney's fees.

[00:00:54] Speaker 03:
which does not include supporting limits.

[00:00:56] Speaker 03:
This depends on your continued success as with respect to your license breach claim against... That is correct, Your Honor.

[00:01:07] Speaker 03:
Wonderful.

[00:01:08] Speaker 03:
I hope you're going to spend some time on... I'd be happy to divert directly to that report, please.

[00:01:17] Speaker 03:
That was my second issue, which is the propriety of the judgment in favor of PHP against Mr. Huang for breach of the royalty agreement resulting in $622,000.

[00:01:29] Speaker 00:
What section of the royalty agreement are you relying on for breach?

[00:01:33] Speaker 00:
My understanding is that it's section five.

[00:01:36] Speaker 03:
Well, it's both sections four and five, Your Honor.

[00:01:39] Speaker 00:
What about the report and recommendation recommending summary judgment

[00:01:45] Speaker 00:
on the breach of the royalty provisions.

[00:01:48] Speaker 03:
Well, the trial court interpreted that as relating to subsection four and based its overruling of the rule 50 motion on section five.

[00:01:59] Speaker 03:
Perhaps that is correct.

[00:02:02] Speaker 03:
Perhaps it is incorrect.

[00:02:04] Speaker 03:
Our position is that it doesn't matter whether it's correct or incorrect.

[00:02:07] Speaker 00:
But you're not appealing that.

[00:02:09] Speaker 00:
You did not appeal that, right?

[00:02:11] Speaker 03:
Well, we did not appeal

[00:02:13] Speaker 03:
We did not raise a point relating to that.

[00:02:19] Speaker 03:
It was subsumed in the final judgment.

[00:02:22] Speaker 03:
And the final judgment was in our favor.

[00:02:25] Speaker 03:
So there was nothing for us to appeal on that point.

[00:02:28] Speaker 00:
OK, maybe I'm misunderstanding.

[00:02:32] Speaker 00:
I thought there was a report and recommendation.

[00:02:35] Speaker 00:
that prohibited your claim for royalties under paragraph four of the assignment agreement.

[00:02:43] Speaker 03:
Am I correct?

[00:02:44] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:02:45] Speaker 00:
And that issue is not before us.

[00:02:48] Speaker 00:
That's a final determination that is not before us.

[00:02:51] Speaker 03:
Right?

[00:02:51] Speaker 03:
I must disagree with that, Your Honor.

[00:02:53] Speaker 03:
The final judgment that is before you is the final judgment rendered by the trial court at the end of the case, which subsumed all interlocutory orders.

[00:03:03] Speaker 03:
Well, how does it subsume a breach of paragraph four?

[00:03:08] Speaker 03:
Well, it subsumes the summary judgment order, which the court then interpreted

[00:03:15] Speaker 03:
as being based on section four rather than section five.

[00:03:23] Speaker 03:
Where did the court interpret that?

[00:03:25] Speaker 03:
In its post-judgment order.

[00:03:28] Speaker 03:
And what did it say?

[00:03:29] Speaker 03:
It said the summary judgment was based on section four

[00:03:34] Speaker 03:
But a breach of Section 5 could give rise to a duty to make periodic payments of royalties.

[00:03:42] Speaker 03:
OK, but how does that translate into the judgment being based on a breach of Section 4?

[00:03:49] Speaker 03:
The judgment was based on the jury's findings of unpaid royalties within four years of the filing of suit.

[00:03:58] Speaker 03:
No, I don't think that's correct.

[00:04:00] Speaker 03:
The jury's verdict was based on a breach of the assignment provision.

[00:04:06] Speaker 03:
It was based on a breach of the royalty agreement.

[00:04:09] Speaker 03:
It was not told.

[00:04:12] Speaker 02:
How was the breach of the royalty agreement before them if summary judgment had already been granted against you on that point?

[00:04:19] Speaker 03:
Because evidence of that breach and resultant damages were introduced at trial.

[00:04:24] Speaker 02:
But without any vacation of that summary judgment order or any indication that the district court had changed its mind on that?

[00:04:35] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor, but also without a timely objection from Mr. Haun.

[00:04:40] Speaker 02:
Well, isn't the better way to understand it is that evidence was introduced as damages for breach of Section 5.

[00:04:47] Speaker 02:
not as some kind of subsilentio re-invocation of a Section 4 argument?

[00:04:53] Speaker 03:
Well, Your Honor, first of all, the jury was not told about the summary judgment.

[00:04:58] Speaker 03:
They were not told you can only find a breach of the royalty agreement based on a failure to obtain consent for a license.

[00:05:07] Speaker 03:
Okay, but were they instructed that they could find a breach of Section 4?

[00:05:11] Speaker 03:
They were not instructed as to Section 4 or Section 5 or any particular section of the agreement.

[00:05:16] Speaker 00:
Doesn't your closing argument rely on the provisions of Section 5?

[00:05:21] Speaker 03:
I don't know, but it wouldn't surprise me if we did.

[00:05:24] Speaker 00:
It does.

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
And when I look at the district court's decision at page 812, the district court says that it granted summary judgment on Section 4, but it didn't grant summary judgment on Section 5.

[00:05:39] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:05:39] Speaker 00:
OK, so the breach is based on Section 5.

[00:05:43] Speaker 03:
In the district court's mind, that's right.

[00:05:47] Speaker 03:
Our position is not necessarily.

[00:05:50] Speaker 02:
Well, you didn't appeal the grant of summary judgment on Section 4 here.

[00:05:55] Speaker 03:
We could not have appealed that.

[00:05:56] Speaker 03:
Of course you could have.

[00:05:56] Speaker 02:
You lost on the Section 4 breach argument.

[00:06:00] Speaker 03:
We recovered all the damages that we could possibly have recovered.

[00:06:04] Speaker 03:
Well, not all that we could have recovered.

[00:06:05] Speaker 02:
Not necessarily.

[00:06:06] Speaker 02:
Not if we conclude your time barred under Section 5.

[00:06:09] Speaker 02:
Section 4 would provide a different independent basis for those damages that isn't subject to a statute of limitations argument.

[00:06:17] Speaker 03:
But we can't appeal the loss of one rationale for relief.

[00:06:21] Speaker 03:
You can appeal it as an alternative ground for sustaining the judgment, right?

[00:06:26] Speaker 03:
You can argue it.

[00:06:27] Speaker 03:
Well, what we did do is we argued that the trial court was entitled to revise its summary judgment.

[00:06:34] Speaker 03:
if it did so without prejudice to the opposing parties.

[00:06:37] Speaker 03:
What's the evidence that the district court thought it was revising its summary judgment ruling when it sustained the jury verdict under Section 5?

[00:06:45] Speaker 03:
It didn't, Your Honor.

[00:06:46] Speaker 03:
There is no such evidence, Your Honor.

[00:06:47] Speaker 03:
We're arguing in the alternative that the trial court correctly interpreted its summary judgment.

[00:06:54] Speaker 03:
Or in the alternative... I thought you just conceded that District Court viewed the judgment as resting on Section 5.

[00:07:03] Speaker 03:
I did, Your Honor, and it did.

[00:07:05] Speaker 03:
So?

[00:07:06] Speaker 03:
That doesn't suggest that the District Court changed its mind about Section 4.

[00:07:11] Speaker 03:
But my colleague suggests that the District Court was wrong in doing so.

[00:07:15] Speaker 03:
What I'm suggesting in the alternative is if the District Court was wrong in doing so, if that was not a correct interpretation of the summary judgment order.

[00:07:25] Speaker 03:
The district court was nevertheless entitled to do what it did.

[00:07:29] Speaker 03:
by way of revision of its summary judgment order.

[00:07:33] Speaker 02:
You say by way of revision, but it didn't revise it, did it?

[00:07:39] Speaker 02:
Well.

[00:07:40] Speaker 02:
Where in the district court's opinions did it say it was revising the summary judgment order on Section 4?

[00:07:48] Speaker 03:
It did not say that, Your Honor.

[00:07:49] Speaker 02:
Well, why do you keep talking about the district court revising its order when it didn't revise it?

[00:07:54] Speaker 03:
Because if the district court improperly interpreted its order,

[00:07:59] Speaker 03:
That could be construed as a revision of the order.

[00:08:03] Speaker 03:
I grant you there is no evidence that the district court was intending to do that.

[00:08:08] Speaker 03:
But my colleague argues that that is the effect of what the district court did.

[00:08:14] Speaker 02:
An argument is... I don't think that's what they're arguing at all.

[00:08:18] Speaker 02:
I think they're arguing that the district court's decision in the jury's verdict is based on a breach of paragraph 5 and that paragraph 5's claims are time barred.

[00:08:29] Speaker 03:
Well... Do you agree that paragraph 5 claims are time barred?

[00:08:32] Speaker 03:
No, Your Honor.

[00:08:33] Speaker 03:
Absolutely not.

[00:08:34] Speaker 03:
What the district court said was a breach of section 5 could give rise

[00:08:40] Speaker 03:
to a duty to make periodic royalty payments.

[00:08:44] Speaker 03:
Not just damages measured by royalties that happen to be paid periodically, but a duty to make periodic royalty payments.

[00:08:52] Speaker 03:
That's what the district court said.

[00:08:54] Speaker 03:
Even if that were true, I don't see how you get outside the statute of limitations.

[00:09:00] Speaker 03:
Wait, wait.

[00:09:01] Speaker 03:
Because the breach is the assignment.

[00:09:06] Speaker 03:
And while a measure of damages or the resultant remedy may be periodic payments, the breach is something that happened outside the statute of limitations.

[00:09:16] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, that's not the only breach of Section 5.

[00:09:19] Speaker 03:
What the district court said was

[00:09:21] Speaker 03:
The jury was entitled to find a duty to make periodic royalty payments received under an assignment that was a breach of Section 5.

[00:09:34] Speaker 03:
Those periodic royalty payments, each failure to make one, is a separate breach.

[00:09:39] Speaker 02:
Where in Section 5 does it talk about a periodic duty to make royalty payments?

[00:09:45] Speaker 02:
It doesn't specifically talk about that whether that's a permissible view of section 5 is a legal question for us, right?

[00:09:53] Speaker 02:
That is correct And we disagree and find that there was only one breach of the licensing agreement the original license some 10 years ago and it's barred by the statute of limitations if the court rejects my argument that the district court was entitled to

[00:10:11] Speaker 03:
And had the effect of, its order had the effect of revising the summary judgment.

[00:10:17] Speaker 03:
If the court rejects that and it rejects the argument that there's a periodic payment of royalties under Section 5, then we have no like to stand on it.

[00:10:29] Speaker 05:
With that, I believe my rebuttal time is near.

[00:10:32] Speaker 05:
Unless the court has any other questions.

[00:10:39] Speaker 05:
OK.

[00:10:41] Speaker 05:
that you've linked drugs to a lineage-independent list, you get to do that.

[00:10:45] Speaker 00:
So you're saying that you need to put something, an input that's lineage-independent.

[00:10:53] Speaker 05:
You could never have an output that's not lineage-independent.

[00:10:58] Speaker 08:
May it please the court?

[00:10:58] Speaker 08:
Good morning.

[00:11:00] Speaker 08:
I, too, will start with the statute of limitations issue, because as the court correctly noted, if you agree with us that the claim is time-barred, then you need not reach

[00:11:09] Speaker 08:
Plastronik's first appeal point on attorney's fees at all.

[00:11:12] Speaker 08:
So a few additional points on this that was not covered in Plastronik's opening argument.

[00:11:19] Speaker 08:
It's important to recognize that Plastronik only presented a breach of paragraph 5 claim to the jury.

[00:11:25] Speaker 08:
as Your Honor correctly noted, that's what their closing argument referred to.

[00:11:29] Speaker 08:
But it's also important to note that a question about whether Mr. Huang had received royalties came up during trial.

[00:11:36] Speaker 08:
And there was a colloquy with the district court about that.

[00:11:40] Speaker 08:
And the district court asked where this was going, because he was trying to decide whether or not he should grant leave from the motion.

[00:11:50] Speaker 00:
Can you give us the appendix page for this?

[00:11:53] Speaker 08:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:11:54] Speaker 05:
This is at Appendix 9449 through 9452.

[00:12:19] Speaker 08:
So the district court is asking Plastronix that this portion of the transcript

[00:12:23] Speaker 08:
where they plan to go with this line of questioning, because the district court is trying to evaluate whether grant leave for them to go into this area of questioning, given there was a motion in Lemonade granted on claims that were already adjudicated.

[00:12:37] Speaker 08:
And Plastronix says they will not pursue the claim.

[00:12:41] Speaker 08:
They will not pursue the issue.

[00:12:42] Speaker 03:
Where assigned?

[00:12:45] Speaker 08:
So this argument, this portion starts at 9449.

[00:12:51] Speaker 08:
I just have a quote where they say, we're not going to pursue this.

[00:12:56] Speaker 08:
Give me one moment to wrap it up.

[00:13:05] Speaker 03:
I guess it's at the bottom of page 9451.

[00:13:09] Speaker 08:
Yes.

[00:13:10] Speaker 08:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:13:11] Speaker 08:
At the bottom of page 9451, Mr. Dalton says, I will stop pursuing this line of questioning, Your Honor.

[00:13:18] Speaker 08:
And when the trial goes back on the record.

[00:13:23] Speaker 03:
What's the motion on Lemonade that he was referring to?

[00:13:26] Speaker 08:
It was a motion in Lemonade that there would be no questioning on claims that had already been adjudicated as summary judgment, which was the paragraph four claim.

[00:13:38] Speaker 08:
And my point in raising this, Your Honor, is that Clastronix only tried a breach of paragraph five claim to the jury.

[00:13:47] Speaker 03:
But where do we find the text of paragraph five?

[00:13:51] Speaker 03:
I know it's in the first one.

[00:13:52] Speaker 08:
The royalty agreement itself is at appendix one two four two seven.

[00:13:59] Speaker 08:
It's at the very, very end of the appendix.

[00:14:01] Speaker 04:
One two.

[00:14:02] Speaker 04:
So the board equated the result, I get to the result, of an off-label text as

[00:14:11] Speaker 08:
And I can read it to your honor if that's helpful as well.

[00:14:13] Speaker 08:
And importantly, you'll note that that paragraph does not itself say anything about periodic payments or royalty payments.

[00:14:26] Speaker 08:
And as we pointed out in our blue brief, every single periodic payment case that's been cited in this appeal requires that the underlying breach be one of an obligation that requires periodic payments.

[00:14:40] Speaker 08:
Paragraph five doesn't require that, so the periodic payment case law is entirely inapplicable to a breach of paragraph five.

[00:14:48] Speaker 03:
And I also wanted to point out that regardless of- So what they did with respect to paragraph five said if we'd consented to the assignment, we would have gotten royalty payments under paragraph four.

[00:15:05] Speaker 03:
That was their theory, right?

[00:15:07] Speaker 08:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:15:08] Speaker 08:
But that goes to the measure of damages for paragraph 5.

[00:15:11] Speaker 08:
That if there was a cause of loss or royalties, and a measure of damages does not impact the statute of limitations analysis.

[00:15:19] Speaker 08:
Because the statute of limitations is a question of liability.

[00:15:21] Speaker 08:
We don't get to damages if their claim is time barred.

[00:15:25] Speaker 08:
The last point I would make is that the case law about amending a summary judgment order requires notice.

[00:15:32] Speaker 08:
And as Your Honor's already pointed out, there was no notice that that happened in this case.

[00:15:38] Speaker 08:
That's important because the damages evidence that HICON CoLimited presented, that the jury ultimately adopted when awarding Plastronix damages on this claim, was based on HICON CoLimited's alternative damages theory for a patent infringement claim.

[00:15:56] Speaker 08:
Mr. Wong did not present any evidence that royalties would be the proper measure of damages for this claim.

[00:16:01] Speaker 08:
And in fact, Plastronix presented evidence that this was properly measured by lost profits.

[00:16:08] Speaker 08:
If the court does not have any other questions on the statute of limitations issue, I will move on to Plastronix's second appeal point, which is the appeal point about socket damages or socket royalties.

[00:16:24] Speaker 08:
Plastronix's argument is that they need not pay a royalty based on sockets because the party that received the obligation to pay under the contract does not make sockets.

[00:16:37] Speaker 08:
Now, it's important to go back to the obligation that the parties originally negotiated in the royalty agreement.

[00:16:44] Speaker 08:
Mr. Huang negotiated a royalty that would be paid when plastronic socket, the pre-merger entity, made or sold sockets, made and sold sockets containing the state tax.

[00:16:55] Speaker 03:
I guess this question is really one of contractual intent.

[00:16:58] Speaker 03:
In other words, when the parties negotiated

[00:17:01] Speaker 03:
this contract, did they contemplate that the entity would pay royalties on pens sold to young people with socks, which they clearly did, and did they contemplate that that obligation could be avoided by this divisive merger, right?

[00:17:22] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:17:22] Speaker 08:
And the answer to that is no, they did not contemplate that this obligation could be avoided.

[00:17:28] Speaker 08:
First, Mr. Huang also negotiated an anti-assignment clause.

[00:17:32] Speaker 08:
But the divisive merger under Texas law cannot be used to avoid a contractual obligation.

[00:17:40] Speaker 08:
And that goes to the cases that we cited in our 28-J letter, in Ray Aldrich-Pump and in Ray DBMP, both of which say that the, quote, unwavering and stated policy behind Texas divisional merger statute

[00:17:53] Speaker 08:
is that a divisive merger cannot abridge any right or rights of creditors.

[00:17:58] Speaker 08:
So under the law, the divisive merger cannot be used to undo a contractual obligation.

[00:18:03] Speaker 08:
And this would obviously lead to abuse if Plastronix, the view of the world, were the one that we live in.

[00:18:09] Speaker 08:
For example, Plastronix could have undergone a divisive merger where they allocated the liabilities under the contract to an entity that has no operations at all.

[00:18:20] Speaker 08:
It doesn't make pins or sockets.

[00:18:22] Speaker 08:
And then their argument would be that they no longer owe any royalty.

[00:18:25] Speaker 08:
And that's clearly not what was negotiated for in the contract.

[00:18:28] Speaker 08:
So the question is twofold.

[00:18:30] Speaker 08:
One, what does the contract say?

[00:18:31] Speaker 08:
What was the contractual intent?

[00:18:33] Speaker 08:
And then the second is, what does the device of merger do to that contractual intent or that contracted royalty?

[00:18:40] Speaker 08:
And the answer is nothing.

[00:18:42] Speaker 08:
It merely changes which hand has to reach into its pocket and pay.

[00:18:46] Speaker 08:
It doesn't change the underlying nature of the obligation.

[00:18:50] Speaker 08:
And this is also supported by the law of the case.

[00:18:52] Speaker 08:
Plastronix argued numerous times in front of the district court that the divisive merger was proper, and that it did not run afoul of the anti-assignment and anti-transfer clauses because it was merely a change of corporate form.

[00:19:05] Speaker 08:
It did not involve an increased risk to Mr. Huang.

[00:19:08] Speaker 08:
And the district court agreed.

[00:19:09] Speaker 08:
I was quoting from the district court's recommendation on 12C at appendix 8218.

[00:19:16] Speaker 08:
The district court also found that a divisive merger cannot alter the relative rights among the parties.

[00:19:23] Speaker 08:
That's it, Appendix 8235.

[00:19:25] Speaker 08:
So several times, Plastronix argued, or Plastronix HPIN argued to the district court that they should be permitted to gain by the divisive merger.

[00:19:34] Speaker 08:
So for example, Plastronix HPIN, the newly created entity, can practice the 602 patent.

[00:19:40] Speaker 08:
Their ability to practice the patent doesn't run afoul of the anti-assignment provisions.

[00:19:46] Speaker 08:
But yet here, they don't want to pay their obligation under the contract.

[00:19:50] Speaker 08:
And this divisive merger cannot be used as both a sword and a shield.

[00:19:56] Speaker 08:
And my last point on this, Your Honors, is that even if the court decides that the district court erred in the law,

[00:20:04] Speaker 08:
You should allow a retrial on damages.

[00:20:07] Speaker 08:
Mr. Wong presented evidence of what damages should be based on the law as the district court had held multiple times.

[00:20:15] Speaker 08:
And he should not be punished with a render for following that law.

[00:20:21] Speaker 08:
And with that, I will yield the rest of my time to rebuttal unless the court has any other questions.

[00:20:26] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:20:42] Speaker 01:
held to the state of New York for all purposes.

[00:20:44] Speaker 01:
So I agree with his honor, but I think it's kind of more fundamental than that.

[00:20:51] Speaker 03:
please the court, I want to try and simplify and restate the limitations issue.

[00:20:57] Speaker 03:
The jury had before it evidence that Mr. Pham had licensed the Korean patent, which came in only over an untimely objection.

[00:21:10] Speaker 03:
It had evidence before it of what the royalties would be

[00:21:15] Speaker 03:
Under that license, it was told that it could award royalties within the four years preceding the filing of suit.

[00:21:27] Speaker 03:
It found a breach, and it found damages consistent with the evidence.

[00:21:34] Speaker 02:
I understand that that's what they were told, but if that was legal error, it doesn't matter what the jury found as the damages.

[00:21:42] Speaker 02:
If the time limitations had already passed for that license breach claim, does it?

[00:21:51] Speaker 01:
But by definition,

[00:21:55] Speaker 03:
It was told that it could award lost royalty payments within the last four years.

[00:22:00] Speaker 02:
That was legal error.

[00:22:02] Speaker 03:
With all due respect, Your Honor, it was not.

[00:22:05] Speaker 02:
By saying that, somehow the district court implicitly revived a breach of royalty claim under Section 4.

[00:22:15] Speaker 02:
Is that what you're saying?

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
Because Mr. Huang allowed evidence of such to come in without objection.

[00:22:21] Speaker 03:
Without timely objection.

[00:22:23] Speaker 03:
That's right, General.

[00:22:24] Speaker 03:
Where's the jury instruction you were just referring to?

[00:22:28] Speaker 03:
I don't have the immediate... Yes, I do.

[00:22:32] Speaker 01:
I think it's just that this is an amorphous concept that if scientists knew it... Page 9944.

[00:22:41] Speaker 01:
9944.

[00:22:42] Speaker 03:
As to the royalty agreement damages... I beg your pardon.

[00:22:48] Speaker 01:
We're going to say we get credit for it.

[00:22:50] Speaker 03:
But fundamentally, Your Honor, it's the two paragraphs beginning, however, in the middle of the page.

[00:22:55] Speaker 01:
The underlying insight that we should be looking to the genotyping, the genetic markers, not necessarily to the cancer, the one original cancer, that was well known.

[00:23:07] Speaker 01:
And we've laid out five examples with Herceptin and Herbatux and Iressa and Gleevec.

[00:23:13] Speaker 01:
And then, more generally, Dr. Spellman talked about, let me get this right, the Sawyer 2004 article that went into it in great detail, why you went into the market.

[00:23:24] Speaker 03:
And so there was pleading, there was evidence, and there was a finding.

[00:23:29] Speaker 03:
And accordingly, there was no valid 50B motion.

[00:23:35] Speaker 03:
So the district court properly rendered judgment on the jury's verdict on that point.

[00:23:42] Speaker 03:
Briefly with respect to the issue of can it can I just back up?

[00:23:47] Speaker 02:
I'm having a hard time following.

[00:23:49] Speaker 02:
Can we go back up to to the it says?

[00:23:52] Speaker 02:
In line four it says in terminating the damages were to mr. Wong you should consider Your honor what plastonics agree to pay that has not paid mr. Wong

[00:24:02] Speaker 02:
As for the assignment agreement, that's the license provision, right?

[00:24:06] Speaker 02:
If you find a breach of that agreement occurred before January 19, then you should not award any damages for breach of the assignment agreement.

[00:24:18] Speaker 01:
Is that the statute of limitations date we're talking about?

[00:24:21] Speaker 01:
That is.

[00:24:22] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:24:24] Speaker 01:
And then it says, as to the loyalty agreement, damages can be made after that date.

[00:24:32] Speaker 01:
Is that...

[00:24:34] Speaker 02:
clear that that's talking about damages to your client, or is that talking about damages to Mr. Wong, who also had a breach of royalty claim?

[00:24:43] Speaker 03:
I would have to check, Your Honor, but I believe that either that is applicable to both sides' claims, or I make a mistake.

[00:24:52] Speaker 02:
I mean, knowing that you had already lost a summary judgment on the royalty agreement, why wouldn't we understand this is only calling for royalty payments to Mr. Wong?

[00:25:02] Speaker 03:
Absent some clear indication that this is directed to your client as opposed to Mr. Wong First of all because the district court submitted a damage question on our breach of the royalty agreement but secondly and I apologize for not having it at the tip of my tongue, but if this is not the provision applicable to

[00:25:24] Speaker 02:
I mean, it starts out at near the top of page 59 talking about what we're going to award to Mr. Wong, not what they're going to award to your client.

[00:25:33] Speaker 02:
Yes, I see that.

[00:25:34] Speaker 02:
Are you pointing to the wrong portion of the jury?

[00:25:37] Speaker 02:
I may be.

[00:25:38] Speaker 02:
I may be.

[00:25:41] Speaker 01:
My time has expired.

[00:25:42] Speaker 03:
Are there any other questions?

[00:25:44] Speaker 03:
Okay, thank you, Mr. General.

[00:25:47] Speaker 03:
Thank both counsels.

[00:25:48] Speaker 03:
The case is submitted.

[00:25:49] Speaker 08:
I will keep this very short.

[00:25:51] Speaker 08:
Your Honor, you're correct that that jury instruction did apply to... I'm sorry.

[00:25:56] Speaker 08:
The possible point is actually the statute of limitations point, so...

[00:26:05] Speaker 08:
Thankfully, we have gotten to speak about that today.

[00:26:07] Speaker 02:
I'm a little confused why this is designated a cross-appeal at all, because the statute of limitations is just a ground to overturn.

[00:26:23] Speaker 02:
I guess it's a ground to overturn that.

[00:26:25] Speaker 02:
I think we've already heard about that.

[00:26:30] Speaker 01:
That's fine.

[00:26:31] Speaker 01:
Unless the court has any other questions.

[00:26:35] Speaker 02:
Okay, thank you.

[00:26:35] Speaker 02:
Thank you very much.