[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
We have three argued cases this morning.

[00:00:04] Speaker 02:
The first is number 21-18-19, Schlosser versus United States, Mr. Enney.

[00:00:13] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:00:15] Speaker 02:
Stand at the podium.

[00:00:26] Speaker 00:
Go ahead.

[00:00:28] Speaker 00:
Good morning, your honors.

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
May it please the court.

[00:00:30] Speaker 00:
When a reserve component service member elects not to provide the spouse survivor benefits under section 1448, he gambles with her future.

[00:00:39] Speaker 00:
That is what happened here, and it happened without notice or participation from Ms.

[00:00:42] Speaker 00:
Schussler.

[00:00:44] Speaker 00:
For two reasons, we asked this court to award Ms.

[00:00:46] Speaker 00:
Schussler the survivor benefits she earned.

[00:00:49] Speaker 00:
Our position is not contrary to the plain language of section 1448.

[00:00:54] Speaker 00:
because Mr. Schussler elected to provide an annuity at less than the maximum level.

[00:00:59] Speaker 00:
Second, the development of the law supports the plain reading that requires spousal participation in this retirement decision.

[00:01:08] Speaker 00:
Turning to the first point, Mr. Schussler failed to return his 20-year letter.

[00:01:15] Speaker 00:
That in and of itself was an election under Section 1448 to provide an annuity at less than the maximum level.

[00:01:24] Speaker 00:
0% is included in that.

[00:01:26] Speaker 02:
So your argument is that the 2000 legislation applies here, right?

[00:01:35] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor.

[00:01:36] Speaker 00:
Our argument is that under the plain language of the 1985 amendment, which applied to Mr. Schussler in 1995 when he received his 20-year letter, encompassed this particular situation.

[00:01:48] Speaker 04:
Did you make that argument to either the board or the claims court?

[00:01:54] Speaker 04:
I thought you were arguing something else, really asking for more compassion exception or saying that relying on some, that it would be some form of injustice rather than a legal error under the statute.

[00:02:11] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:02:13] Speaker 00:
At both the Board and at the lower tribunal, we did argue on equitable grounds, specifically under the Board's legal authority under Section 1552 to correct an error or injustice.

[00:02:25] Speaker 04:
Can we conclude that the Board committed a reversible error in its analysis of Mrs. Schussler's arguments based on an argument that the Board never saw?

[00:02:38] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, it's absolutely in the discretion of this court to take up and decide an argument for the first time on appeal.

[00:02:45] Speaker 00:
I recognize that precedent in this court and others typically advises against such an approach, but it's absolutely within the discretion of this court.

[00:02:56] Speaker 00:
And there are a few factors that militate towards that decision.

[00:03:01] Speaker 00:
There are no issues of fact to be decided here.

[00:03:04] Speaker 00:
We're just asking for an interpretation of section 1448 more specifically to apply the plain language of the statute to Mr. Schussler's election.

[00:03:12] Speaker 02:
But you have a problem with the plain language of the 1985 version because it says

[00:03:19] Speaker 02:
a married person who elects to provide.

[00:03:23] Speaker 02:
And then it goes on to talk about these notice requirements or concurrence requirements.

[00:03:31] Speaker 02:
It wasn't someone who elected to provide an annuity.

[00:03:34] Speaker 02:
That's the difficulty with applying the 1985 statute here.

[00:03:41] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honors.

[00:03:42] Speaker 00:
But he did make an election not to provide an annuity.

[00:03:46] Speaker 00:
He elected to provide an annuity at 0% at less than the maximum level.

[00:03:51] Speaker 00:
And that election was binding at least for the next 19 years until he passed or until he would have had the opportunity to send back another letter at age 60.

[00:04:01] Speaker 00:
So he did make an election.

[00:04:03] Speaker 00:
It was to provide an annuity at 0%.

[00:04:09] Speaker ?:
OK.

[00:04:10] Speaker 02:
What about the open season provisions in 1998 and 2004?

[00:04:14] Speaker 02:
I think it was.

[00:04:19] Speaker 02:
The 1998 open season provision is specific that it doesn't

[00:04:28] Speaker 02:
require concurrence of the spouse.

[00:04:31] Speaker 02:
An election to participate or not to participate in the survivor benefit plan is not subject to the concurrence of the spouse or former employee of the spouse.

[00:04:40] Speaker 02:
And yet when we get to the 2004 version, that language is absent.

[00:04:47] Speaker 02:
And apparently there was an argument before the claims court, as I understand it, that

[00:04:56] Speaker 02:
under these open season provisions, particularly the 2004 open season provision that concurrence for an election not to provide an annuity was required.

[00:05:12] Speaker 02:
We don't have the record of what transpired before the claims court in this respect, but was that argument made about the open season provision?

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
To my understanding, Your Honor, to the extent that the open season provision was discussed in the lower tribunal, it's that it was centered around Mr. Schussler's knowledge of the open seasons, not

[00:05:43] Speaker 00:
spousal concurrence or notification as to those open seasons.

[00:05:48] Speaker 00:
And Mr. Schussler's intent is relevant only to the fact that it develops this case.

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We don't know what his intent was and we can't presume what it was.

[00:06:01] Speaker 00:
We don't even know, as was discussed before, whether or not he knew of these open seasons.

[00:06:07] Speaker 04:
Just so I understand, your argument today on appeal is strictly a statutory argument on what is the best understanding of Section 1448 as it existed in 1995?

[00:06:19] Speaker 00:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:06:20] Speaker 00:
And our argument is that Section 1448 as it was at that time includes this particular situation.

[00:06:27] Speaker 03:
I mean, what's the interplay, if any?

[00:06:30] Speaker 03:
I know that he did provide, Mr. Schussler did provide for insurance.

[00:06:35] Speaker 03:
Is that correct?

[00:06:36] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:06:38] Speaker 03:
How does that work?

[00:06:39] Speaker 03:
Was that a one-time payment, or is it a periodic annuity payment?

[00:06:43] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, the service members group WIPE insurance is a policy that service members elect annually.

[00:06:50] Speaker 00:
And to Ms.

[00:06:51] Speaker 00:
Schussler, she was awarded

[00:06:53] Speaker 00:
$400,000, but it is a monthly payment and it terminates eventually.

[00:07:00] Speaker 03:
So you can have, if he had signed up for it, you could have both the survivor benefit plan payment and the monthly insurance payment that you're talking about.

[00:07:12] Speaker 00:
Absolutely, Your Honor.

[00:07:13] Speaker 00:
The monthly insurance payments under the STLI is for when a service member dies while serving, as Mr. Schusler did.

[00:07:21] Speaker 00:
And the survivor benefits are for

[00:07:23] Speaker 00:
post-retirement.

[00:07:28] Speaker 00:
Turning to the second point that the development of the laws support the plain reading to include spousal concurrence in this particular situation, every version of the law has required greater spousal protection and participation.

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dating back to 1972, when it was just notice, and to the present day, when you cannot make any type of election without concurrence.

[00:07:55] Speaker 00:
And Barbara and Kelly, Kelly, this court's decision, emphasized the importance of spouse participation.

[00:08:01] Speaker 00:
This court specifically said that it was Congress's intent not to allow a spouse to find out for the first time upon their service member's death that they were not entitled to these benefits.

[00:08:15] Speaker 00:
And Miss Schussler was denied participation in a binding retirement decision.

[00:08:21] Speaker 00:
I recognize that there is different language between the provision relating to the vested retirees from the reserves, those who have made age 60, and also to active duty soldiers, those who have hit 20 years, and to Mr. Schussler, who was in a gray area.

[00:08:39] Speaker 00:
He had hit his 20 years in the service, but he was under 60.

[00:08:43] Speaker 00:
I recognize that there is a difference in language between those two provisions.

[00:08:49] Speaker 00:
We view that more as a gap in the language, a gap in the law, rather than an explicit inclusion of one provision of not to participate in the former provision.

[00:09:03] Speaker 03:
How does the non-retroactivity

[00:09:07] Speaker 03:
provision factor into this because we as you know we have that language there that says certain amendments don't apply to people to instances before 2000.

[00:09:21] Speaker 00:
Yes your honor and the non retroactivity provision does not apply here.

[00:09:26] Speaker 00:
When we went to the board we asked them to apply their equitable powers under section 1552.

[00:09:32] Speaker 00:
They can use that power regardless of what that statute said.

[00:09:37] Speaker 00:
They could have corrected or should have corrected the error here, the injustice here, with their equitable power.

[00:09:44] Speaker 03:
The board initially, I guess in its initial decision, took the position that he had not received the 20-year letter, right?

[00:09:54] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:09:55] Speaker 03:
And that was the basis for their ruling.

[00:09:56] Speaker 03:
And then that got sort of overturned when it was determined, in fact, that the letter had been received.

[00:10:01] Speaker 03:
Is that correct?

[00:10:05] Speaker 03:
The they didn't seem to be any dispute now that the letter was received.

[00:10:10] Speaker 03:
Am I correct on that?

[00:10:12] Speaker 00:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:10:12] Speaker 00:
We know that the that the 20 year letter was within his Mr. Schussler's military records.

[00:10:20] Speaker 00:
We don't know.

[00:10:21] Speaker 00:
He could have received it and we don't know what happened after that.

[00:10:24] Speaker 00:
We just know that a letter was not returned.

[00:10:36] Speaker 04:
Just curious, is there some advantage to a reservist who gets his or her 20-year letter and chooses to forego electing this annuity, spousal annuity?

[00:10:57] Speaker 04:
and then maybe waiting until the person turns 60, until the reservist turns 60, to perhaps make the election for espousal annuity?

[00:11:06] Speaker 04:
I guess what I'm trying to figure out is if there's some kind of economic advantage.

[00:11:11] Speaker 04:
Maybe if you do

[00:11:14] Speaker 04:
choose not to elect a spousal annuity at the time of your 20-year letter, are you somehow afforded, I don't know, higher retirement payments down the road compared to if you had made the spousal annuity election at your 20-year letter?

[00:11:33] Speaker 04:
I'm just trying to understand what the motivations might have been in this case or any other case where someone chooses to forego electing a spousal annuity upon receiving a 20-year letter.

[00:11:46] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:11:46] Speaker 00:
There is a slight monetary advantage.

[00:11:49] Speaker 00:
So when the service member makes the election or sends back that letter and lacks an amount to give to the spouse, a certain amount

[00:12:00] Speaker 00:
withdrawn from their reserve pay and from their reserve retirement pay to fund that annuity.

[00:12:06] Speaker 00:
So in the short term the service member would see a reduced payment to himself and in the long term the spouse would be provided whatever percentage they agreed upon.

[00:12:19] Speaker 00:
And I would reiterate that we don't know Mr. Schussler's motivation and his motivation in this particular case is not

[00:12:29] Speaker 00:
is only relevant to the extent that it develops the case.

[00:12:33] Speaker 00:
What's at issue here is the participation by Ms.

[00:12:36] Speaker 00:
Schussler in this binding decision.

[00:12:39] Speaker 00:
And I recognize that, as I was speaking to earlier, the difference in language between the provisions that deal with vested retirees and gray area members like Mr. Schussler, who have not yet hit 60 but have hit their 20 years.

[00:12:57] Speaker 00:
Mr. Schussler's election, just as those made by vested retirees, was binding.

[00:13:03] Speaker 00:
Yes, he had the opportunity to elect at age 60 again, because he did not send back the letter.

[00:13:10] Speaker 00:
He made that election at less than the maximum.

[00:13:13] Speaker 00:
But it still was binding.

[00:13:15] Speaker 00:
Absent an open season, which again, we don't know if he knew about or if he had considered them.

[00:13:20] Speaker 00:
We don't know anything about his intent regarding those open seasons or an act of Congress.

[00:13:24] Speaker 00:
The election then was binding on Ms.

[00:13:27] Speaker 00:
Schussler.

[00:13:28] Speaker 00:
And Ms.

[00:13:28] Speaker 00:
Schussler was denied any participation and was caught completely off guard in 2014 when she applied for these benefits.

[00:13:39] Speaker 00:
And you want to save time for revolving?

[00:13:43] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:13:43] Speaker 00:
I'll save the remainder for a bottle.

[00:13:45] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:13:45] Speaker 00:
We'll give you two minutes.

[00:13:50] Speaker 02:
Mr. Angoulon.

[00:14:03] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court.

[00:14:05] Speaker 01:
This appeal presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation.

[00:14:11] Speaker 01:
contends that the board erred in interpreting the spousal notification requirement of the survivor benefit statute, 10 USC 1448.

[00:14:21] Speaker 01:
But at the time that Mr. Schussler deferred his SBP election, the statute plainly did not require spousal notice for a service member in his position.

[00:14:31] Speaker 01:
In fact, before the board, in two separate letters, Mr. Schussler had conceded this fact.

[00:14:37] Speaker 02:
So we're talking here about the 1985 legislation.

[00:14:41] Speaker 02:
And your argument is based on the fact that the concurrence requirements only apply to someone who's elected to participate in the plan, right?

[00:14:51] Speaker 02:
Yes, Your Honor, and in fact... Okay, but so, excepting that, if we look at the 1998 and 2004 legislation, the open season legislation, it perhaps is a bit different there, because the 1998 legislation seems to

[00:15:12] Speaker 02:
characterize an election as both an election to participate and an election not to participate.

[00:15:19] Speaker 02:
And then if you look at the 2004 legislation, if you assume that the 2004 legislation is using election in the same sense as it was in 1998, then there is an argument that there had to be spousal concurrence for the election not to participate.

[00:15:42] Speaker 02:
And I know that's not their argument.

[00:15:44] Speaker 02:
I'm just, at this point, asking whether that is a plausible reading of the 2004 legislation.

[00:15:53] Speaker 02:
Do you understand what I'm saying?

[00:15:54] Speaker 01:
Well, Your Honor, the amendment to the statute that I think opposing counsel is focusing on is the 2000 amendment.

[00:16:02] Speaker 01:
And in the 2000 amendment... Okay, I understand that.

[00:16:05] Speaker 02:
But I'm asking a different question.

[00:16:06] Speaker 02:
I'm asking about the 2004 open season legislation, which

[00:16:12] Speaker 02:
If you define election under that legislation the same way it was defined in 1998, it would include an election not to participate.

[00:16:21] Speaker 02:
And if you accept that, the next step seems to be that there had to be spousal concurrence for that election not to participate.

[00:16:32] Speaker 01:
Mr. Schussler received his letter in 1995.

[00:16:38] Speaker 02:
Help me address what I'm saying about the possible interpretation of the 2004 open season legislation.

[00:16:46] Speaker 01:
Well, to the extent that the 2004 open season legislation required spousal notice, it didn't override the congressional intent in 2000 against retroactivity.

[00:16:59] Speaker 01:
And so there was no spousal notice in 1995, the time that Mr. Shisler received his 20-year letter.

[00:17:06] Speaker 01:
And to the extent that the open season was discussed in the trial court,

[00:17:09] Speaker 01:
It's the last footnote of the trial court's decision.

[00:17:13] Speaker 01:
The focus of the open season was on whether or not Mr. Shuster had the knowledge of that open season.

[00:17:19] Speaker 02:
So I don't believe the issue... I understand that, but really it seems to me not addressing the question I'm asking.

[00:17:26] Speaker 02:
And that is under the 2004 legislation, if the word election includes non-election, or election not to participate,

[00:17:37] Speaker 02:
Isn't there an argument that spousal concurrence was required for the election not to participate?

[00:17:47] Speaker 01:
There could be an argument, I don't believe Appellant has made that argument, but that would also cut against the presumption against retroactivity.

[00:17:55] Speaker 01:
I don't believe that statute would have allowed Mr. Schlisler to enjoy the benefit of that amendment, given the presumption of retroactivity that's applied to statutes.

[00:18:05] Speaker 02:
And that, I think... There's no non-retroactivity for the 2004 amendment, that applied to him, didn't it?

[00:18:13] Speaker 01:
It would have, Your Honor.

[00:18:15] Speaker 01:
Again, my understanding of the open season is that Mr. Schussler was aware of it and elected and in effect did not participate in the open season.

[00:18:26] Speaker 01:
And someone's participation in the SBP benefits

[00:18:30] Speaker 01:
is rooted in the decision that they make when they receive the 90-day letter.

[00:18:35] Speaker 01:
And in fact, Mr. Schuster received that letter in 1995.

[00:18:39] Speaker 01:
So I don't believe the open season can be read in the way that Your Honor suggests to allow the retroactive application of the 2000 Amendment, specifically in light of Congress's clear intent not to apply... The 2000 Amendment, I thought you agreed it does apply to Mr. Schuster.

[00:19:00] Speaker 01:
Well, certainly, Mr. Shuster had the opportunity to enroll in the 2004 Open Season option, and he chose not to enroll.

[00:19:11] Speaker 01:
But I don't believe that would have... I mean, in effect, Your Honor, that would...

[00:19:16] Speaker 01:
That would, in effect, allow anybody to come before this court who clearly deferred their election during the period between 1985 and 2000 and use a 2000 open season period that Congress provided these service members.

[00:19:34] Speaker 01:
to come back and say that they made an election under the statute.

[00:19:38] Speaker 01:
I don't believe that was Congress's intent, Your Honor, specifically in regards to the 2000 Amendment, which very clearly said that they would not apply the 2000 Amendment retroactively to service members in Mr. Schlisseler's position.

[00:19:50] Speaker 01:
And I think beyond that, Your Honor, this argument wasn't presented by appellant... They apparently didn't make the argument either in the claims court or here.

[00:20:01] Speaker 01:
That's certainly correct, Your Honor.

[00:20:03] Speaker 01:
And the whole issue of spousal notice was never raised below.

[00:20:08] Speaker 01:
And in fact, opposing counsel and the board conceded that spousal notice was not required for someone in Mr. Sears's position.

[00:20:15] Speaker 01:
So our first contention is that this argument has been waived.

[00:20:18] Speaker 01:
But even if we do consider the merits of their argument, turning to the plain text of the statute that was in effect,

[00:20:25] Speaker 01:
in 1995, the time that Mr. Schussler received his 20-year letter.

[00:20:29] Speaker 01:
Mr. Schussler would have this court, in effect, read out the first six words or so of the statute, which read, that a married person who elects to provide.

[00:20:39] Speaker 01:
Mr. Schussler made no election.

[00:20:42] Speaker 01:
Instead, he deferred his election to the time when he would turn 60.

[00:20:48] Speaker 01:
In fact, what Mr. Sister would have this court do is conflate subsection A and subsection B. Subsection A is the standard annuity provision, which reads that a married person who is eligible to provide, that's the standard annuity provision,

[00:21:03] Speaker 01:
Here we have the reserve component annuity, which is a married person who elects to provide.

[00:21:07] Speaker 01:
There's clearly a difference between someone who is eligible for the program versus somebody who elects to participate in the program.

[00:21:13] Speaker 01:
And so we would ask this court to give effect to the difference between those different statutory terms.

[00:21:19] Speaker 01:
And then, of course, we look at the 2000 Amendment for greater clarification on the meaning of this statute.

[00:21:26] Speaker 01:
The 2000 Amendment does exactly what Ms.

[00:21:28] Speaker 01:
Schussler is asking this Court to do, to extend eligibility to Mr. Schussler.

[00:21:36] Speaker 01:
the Congress explicitly made that change non-retroactive when they said that this only applies to 20-year letters starting January 1, 2001.

[00:21:46] Speaker 01:
And so we would ask this Court to give respect to or to defer to Congress's intent not to apply this change retroactively.

[00:21:58] Speaker 01:
The government recognizes that this may seem to be a harsh result for somebody in Mr. Schussler's position, and we sympathize with Mr. Schussler, but as your honor recognized during your colloquy with opposing counsel, there's a wide range of reasons that somebody in Mr. Schussler's position may elect to defer coverage to the age of...

[00:22:20] Speaker 02:
There's a reason that he might elect to defer, but it's a little difficult to understand why Congress, in 1985, would not require a spousal concurrence for the non-election to participate.

[00:22:35] Speaker 02:
That, you know, at the same time, requiring a spousal concurrence to elect less than that, it just doesn't seem to make a lot of sense.

[00:22:47] Speaker 01:
So subsection B, which involves the reserve component annuity, is when understood in the greater context that a reservist will have a second opportunity at the age of 60 to make that election.

[00:23:04] Speaker 01:
And when that former service member reaches the age of 60, whatever decision he or she makes would require spousal notice.

[00:23:12] Speaker 01:
Of course, that's no longer the case.

[00:23:13] Speaker 01:
Congress, as Your Honor has recognized, Congress has changed the statute, so spousal notice is required.

[00:23:18] Speaker 01:
in any election, even a deferral.

[00:23:21] Speaker 01:
But to the extent that we can divine Congress's intent in 1985, when understood in the greater context that a reservist has a second opportunity at age 60 to elect coverage, that explains the difference between subsection big A, which

[00:23:42] Speaker 01:
is applicable to all those that are eligible for the program in subsection Big B, which is applicable to those that elect to provide.

[00:23:50] Speaker 01:
And again, to the extent that this creates kind of a harsh or

[00:23:59] Speaker 01:
confusing result.

[00:24:01] Speaker 01:
Congress did address perhaps those concerns that Your Honor has, but in the 2000 amendment, but again, in doing so, they explicitly made those changes non-retroactive.

[00:24:15] Speaker 01:
Ms.

[00:24:16] Speaker 01:
Shishler concedes on page 6 of her reply

[00:24:20] Speaker 01:
that had Mr. Schussler received this letter just six years later or five years later, he would have enjoyed the benefit of that congressional amendment.

[00:24:30] Speaker 01:
Unfortunately, he did not receive it at that time.

[00:24:34] Speaker 01:
He received it in 1995.

[00:24:36] Speaker 01:
And at the law, according to the law at the time, spousal notice was not required.

[00:24:42] Speaker 01:
This court's hands, in effect, are tied by the statute.

[00:24:46] Speaker 01:
This case, Your Honors,

[00:24:48] Speaker 01:
begins and ends with the plain text of the statute, which is limited to former service members who elect to provide coverage.

[00:24:56] Speaker 01:
Mr. Schussler did not elect to provide coverage.

[00:24:59] Speaker 01:
He decided to defer his election to age 60.

[00:25:02] Speaker 01:
Tragically, he passed away before 60, but we ask this Court to respect the personal decision that Mr. Schussler made in accordance with the statute.

[00:25:11] Speaker 01:
and if there are no further questions your honor we would ask this court to affirm the decision of the trial court trial court below thank you very much your honor a few points on rebuttal your honors what I would first

[00:25:40] Speaker 00:
like to address is what the government characterizes as deferral is a binding election on Ms.

[00:25:45] Speaker 00:
Schussler for the next 20 years until Mr. Schussler had reached age 60.

[00:25:52] Speaker 00:
It was binding on Ms.

[00:25:53] Speaker 00:
Schussler.

[00:25:53] Speaker 00:
She needed to be able to participate in that initial election.

[00:26:00] Speaker 00:
And we are not asking this court to retroactively apply the 2000 Amendment.

[00:26:05] Speaker 00:
We are asking the court to apply the plain language of the 1985 amendment as it applied at the time Mr. Schussler received his letter in 1995.

[00:26:16] Speaker 00:
The government also makes an assumption about Mr. Schussler's intent that he knew about the open enrollment seasons.

[00:26:23] Speaker 00:
I would like to reiterate that Mr. Schussler's intent is not relevant here.

[00:26:27] Speaker 00:
What is relevant here is Ms.

[00:26:29] Speaker 00:
Schussler's non-participation in this incredibly important decision.

[00:26:34] Speaker 00:
a decision that would affect her in the latest years of her life.

[00:26:39] Speaker 00:
She was denied participation in this crucial decision, and she is still living with that today.

[00:26:46] Speaker 04:
Just so I understand, the amendments Congress made in 2000 to Section 1448B, those changes, in your view, did not have any consequential difference in impact on

[00:27:03] Speaker 04:
on spousal annuities?

[00:27:07] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor.

[00:27:07] Speaker 00:
They didn't.

[00:27:08] Speaker 04:
I recognize that they included that second... So they were just purely for clarification purposes?

[00:27:13] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:27:14] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:27:16] Speaker 00:
And to address the final issue of a potential floodgate, this is a very small window of applicable persons.

[00:27:24] Speaker 00:
We're looking at reservists from 1985 to 2000 who are in Mr. Schussler's shoes and who died before reaching age 60.

[00:27:32] Speaker 00:
And further, the government should be willing to adjudicate those problems before the ABCMR.

[00:27:37] Speaker 00:
That is the entire purpose of the board, to handle large quantities of errors and injustices.

[00:27:43] Speaker 02:
OK.

[00:27:43] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Mr. Ami.

[00:27:44] Speaker 00:
Thank you.