[00:00:00] Speaker 03:
Our next case is Vernetix versus Vidal, director of the Patent Office, 2017-25-93.

[00:00:08] Speaker 03:
Mr. Zalberger, is it?

[00:00:12] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:00:13] Speaker 03:
Please proceed.

[00:00:15] Speaker 01:
Daniel Zalberger on behalf of Vernetix may please the court.

[00:00:18] Speaker 01:
During prosecution, Vernetix clearly and unequivocally dis- I'm sorry, I'm just curious.

[00:00:23] Speaker 02:
If we were to affirm the first appeal here, then what happens here?

[00:00:27] Speaker 01:
This appeal would be moot, Your Honor.

[00:00:29] Speaker 01:
The only claim at issue in this appeal is claim five, and claim five is at issue in the first appeal that you heard today.

[00:00:37] Speaker 01:
That's certainly not the result we hoped for, and so I'll proceed nonetheless.

[00:00:44] Speaker 01:
During prosecution, Renettex clearly and unequivocally disclaimed from the scope of the claimed indication the act itself of establishing a secure communication link.

[00:00:55] Speaker 01:
In fact, the Patent Office acknowledges at page 32 of its response brief that at least when viewed in isolation,

[00:01:03] Speaker 01:
Renettix's prosecution statement supports Renettix's view of disclaimer.

[00:01:08] Speaker 01:
And there is no dispute that under Renettix's view of disclaimer, he does not teach an indication as claimed.

[00:01:16] Speaker 01:
It's with that backdrop.

[00:01:17] Speaker 02:
Is this your first time arguing prosecution disclaimer to support your claim construction, the indication in establishing the two different actions?

[00:01:27] Speaker 02:
As I recall in the prior litigations, when this dispute arose, you advanced specification disclaimer arguments.

[00:01:36] Speaker 02:
But never before until this proceeding did you make a prosecution disclaimer argument.

[00:01:41] Speaker 02:
Is that right?

[00:01:41] Speaker 01:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:01:42] Speaker 01:
In the prior appeals involving this patent that this court heard, there was a specification disclaimer argument.

[00:01:49] Speaker 01:
But the patent office does not argue waiver, and they don't do so for good reason.

[00:01:54] Speaker 01:
At that time, the underlying proceeding in which the statement was made was, in fact, one of the proceedings that went up on appeal that Your Honor heard.

[00:02:02] Speaker 01:
And as this court has made clear, in fact, in a decision last year,

[00:02:11] Speaker 01:
in cup computing the trend micro, a prosecution history disclaimer isn't effective in the proceeding itself in which it is made.

[00:02:19] Speaker 01:
But subsequently, once that proceeding is complete, it will be binding on the patent owner.

[00:02:25] Speaker 01:
So here we're in that situation where, while prosecution history disclaimer may not have applied back when those prior appeals were heard, it is binding now on the patent owner and on the patent.

[00:02:38] Speaker 04:
Indication is a strange word, I found.

[00:02:42] Speaker 04:
I haven't seen it very much in patents, if at all.

[00:02:45] Speaker 04:
What do you mean by indication?

[00:02:47] Speaker 04:
What would you consider to be sufficient to constitute an indication other than the fact of the event that is supposedly to be indicated?

[00:02:57] Speaker 01:
I think, Your Honor, the best example in our specification of an indication that is separate and apart from the communication link itself

[00:03:05] Speaker 01:
is the Go Secure hyperlink that is discussed at Appendix 97 of our patent, where it really goes to the heart of what the 504 patent is, which is a secure system that can be layered on top of the ordinary internet

[00:03:20] Speaker 01:
where a user will be on their browser browsing normal websites and then they have a go secure hyperlink where they can click on that link that's providing them an indication that the system provides security and when they click on that link the process is initiated.

[00:03:34] Speaker 01:
And this is unlike the system in Kyuuchi where Kyuuchi is really a custom built security system

[00:03:40] Speaker 01:
where the default is security.

[00:03:42] Speaker 01:
The user will log into QC's software system.

[00:03:45] Speaker 01:
The user already knows security is in play because that's the sort of system it is.

[00:03:50] Speaker 01:
QC doesn't need this sort of separate indication that the 504 patent has.

[00:03:56] Speaker 02:
In that underlying re-exam proceeding where he made a statement during that proceeding, I saw that in the right of appeal notice, the examiner rejected that understanding of the claim.

[00:04:09] Speaker 02:
And I guess what I'm wondering is if there was a, let me try, a hypothetical.

[00:04:18] Speaker 02:
The claim is for a car.

[00:04:20] Speaker 02:
And then during a re-exam proceeding, the patent owner says, my car is limited to a green car.

[00:04:31] Speaker 02:
And then the examiner in an office action responds with, no, that's not a reasonable construction of your car.

[00:04:38] Speaker 02:
It's not limited to a green car.

[00:04:40] Speaker 02:
It could be any kind of colored car.

[00:04:44] Speaker 02:
Under circumstances like that,

[00:04:47] Speaker 02:
And if the patent somehow survives the re-exam proceeding, is it permissible for a patent owner to say, my car is a green car.

[00:04:57] Speaker 02:
I still want my green car understanding of the car claim?

[00:05:04] Speaker 01:
I think it would depend on how the statement was phrased during prosecution.

[00:05:08] Speaker 01:
If the patent owner made a clear and unequivocal statement that their claimed invention does not cover the green car, then I think they would

[00:05:23] Speaker 02:
through the whole proceeding, where it was quite clear from the agency's perspective that it wasn't limiting the claimed car to a green car, and went forward on that clear understanding, would a reasonable person reading the prosecution history come away with the idea that the surviving claims are actually limited to a green car?

[00:05:49] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:05:50] Speaker 01:
And I think that's where the question becomes, and as this court has made clear, you need to look at the prosecution as a whole.

[00:05:56] Speaker 01:
And if after, for example, the examiner says... Right.

[00:05:58] Speaker 01:
So let's talk about my hypothetical.

[00:05:59] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:06:00] Speaker 01:
I intend to.

[00:06:02] Speaker 01:
If after the examiner says, I disagree, your claims are not directed to a green car, then the patent under comes back and says, OK, you're right.

[00:06:10] Speaker 01:
I'm going to find patentability in some other way with some other limitation, then that would be the sort of equivocation that this court has identified as perhaps starting against the disclaimer.

[00:06:20] Speaker 04:
The equivocation, the abandoning the disclaimer.

[00:06:25] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:06:26] Speaker 04:
So you're saying that it isn't enough that the examiner says,

[00:06:32] Speaker 04:
I don't accept this as the reasonable construction of the claim.

[00:06:37] Speaker 01:
I don't believe that's enough, Your Honor.

[00:06:38] Speaker 01:
And I believe this court has even declared that simply an examiner not accepting a disclaimer, that fact alone is not enough to say that there wasn't a disclaimer.

[00:06:49] Speaker 01:
I think the other point that's relevant to the facts we have here is that there isn't any argument.

[00:06:55] Speaker 04:
What is the best case for that proposition?

[00:06:59] Speaker 01:
For that particular proposition, Your Honor, I have to admit, I can't think of a case.

[00:07:02] Speaker 01:
I don't think there was one cited in the briefs because this issue didn't come up.

[00:07:07] Speaker 01:
But what I do want to say is that here, there's no argument that there was any of that sort of equivocation in the prosecution case.

[00:07:18] Speaker 01:
Granetics has identified the statement of the prosecution that we say was right.

[00:07:29] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:07:31] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, the Patent Office and the board have not pointed to anything.

[00:07:34] Speaker 02:
Are you familiar with the right of appeal notice that issued in the prior re-examination where the examiner rejected this understanding of the claim?

[00:07:44] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor, I agree the examiner rejected our understanding of the claim with this regard.

[00:07:49] Speaker 01:
But my point is that neither the board in its final decision nor the patent office in its brief point to any of these sorts of equivocating statements as a reason to reject our disclaimer.

[00:08:01] Speaker 02:
The only statements that- So we're not allowed to look at the examiner's right of appeal notice?

[00:08:07] Speaker 02:
when it comes to this legal question of whether there was prosecution disclaimer, and then figuring out what is the proper construction of this claim?

[00:08:16] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, I would respectfully submit that if the court were inclined to identify additional portions of the prosecution that neither the board nor the patent office did,

[00:08:26] Speaker 01:
the preceding should be remanded so that Brunetix has an opportunity to address it.

[00:08:30] Speaker 02:
I thought we already agreed that you're familiar with the right of appeal notice, and you acknowledge that the examiner rejected this particular construction, that the patent number advanced.

[00:08:43] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:08:45] Speaker 01:
But again, I would also point out that in district court, Brunetix's district court adversary, Apple, itself said that this statement was a clear and unequivocal statement that Brunetix had disclaimed acts that are not separate and apart from the secure communication link.

[00:09:02] Speaker 01:
And the district court agreed.

[00:09:03] Speaker 01:
And so if this statement were not found to be a binding prosecution history disclaimer, we'd really be squarely in a world where- Did anybody evaluate the right of appeal notice in that Apple litigation?

[00:09:14] Speaker 01:
I don't know, Your Honor.

[00:09:16] Speaker 01:
I don't think so.

[00:09:21] Speaker 01:
I would also submit, Your Honors, that the Board erred when it relied on the broadest reasonable interpretation standard as a reason to reject the disclaimer that's squarely against this Court's case law.

[00:09:33] Speaker 01:
And in any event, the 504 patent, as Your Honor pointed out a few minutes ago, has expired.

[00:09:38] Speaker 01:
It expired two years ago.

[00:09:39] Speaker 01:
It expired when we filed a request for direct review, where we pointed out that the patent expired, and we identified our reasons why disclaimer applies.

[00:09:48] Speaker 01:
It expired when the director review decision issued, and it was already expired when the proceeding was fully briefed.

[00:09:54] Speaker 01:
And so I would point out that the Phillips standard does apply here, and not the broadest reasonable interpretation.

[00:10:03] Speaker 01:
If there are no further questions, Your Honor, I'll reserve my time.

[00:10:08] Speaker 03:
Mr. Rossello for the PTO.

[00:10:24] Speaker 00:
May it please the court.

[00:10:25] Speaker 00:
I will start saying that we also agree that in the previous argument, if this court affirms that the board's decision finds claim five of the 504 patent anticipated under Lindemann, that this case would be moot.

[00:10:39] Speaker 00:
And we would also not have a problem that once claim five has been affirmed to be unpatentable, then our administrative concerns regarding the vacater of the board's decision under Musingware and Muntingware and VALF SPAR sourcing

[00:10:55] Speaker 00:
would fall away, and we would have no problem with vacating the entire decision.

[00:11:01] Speaker 03:
Why vacate a decision when we can dismiss the appeal as moot?

[00:11:07] Speaker 00:
You could dismiss the appeal as moot as well.

[00:11:09] Speaker 00:
That's correct.

[00:11:16] Speaker 00:
So if for some reason the court does not,

[00:11:20] Speaker 00:
affirm that Claim 5 is anticipated by Lindeman in the previous appeal.

[00:11:26] Speaker 00:
We do believe that the court should affirm

[00:11:28] Speaker 00:
the board's finding here that claim five of the five and four patent is anticipated by the QG reference.

[00:11:34] Speaker 00:
The only claim term now at issue is the indication limitation of claim one.

[00:11:38] Speaker 00:
I think this court should affirm the board's finding that the CHTTP system of QG teaches the claim to comprise an indication that the DNS system supports establishing a secure communications link.

[00:11:51] Speaker 00:
The board identified substantial evidence that Kiuchi teaches indication limitation, and its decision comports with this court's other decisions regarding the Kiuchi reference.

[00:12:16] Speaker 00:
In this case, at appendix five, the board notes that the petitioner's argument that QGT teaches indication limitation because the CHTP server provides an IP address only after the CHTP server determines that the request is legitimate and that the client-side proxy can communicate with the host specified in the URL.

[00:12:37] Speaker 00:
And then at appendix three to four, the board made the finding, substantial evidence in the record, that Kiuchi teaches that the CHTTP server sends the requested IP address if it determines the query is legitimate and the requested server-side proxy is registered and permitted to accept the connection.

[00:12:54] Speaker 00:
Moreover, the board found that there's no temporal requirement for the indication in appendix seven so that it can be part of the messaging that establishes the secure communication link.

[00:13:06] Speaker 00:
Again, this finding is supported by other decisions in this kind of history of the frenetics cases.

[00:13:14] Speaker 00:
This court's finding in the 1368 Mangrove Appeal, namely that when a secure connection between the client side and server side proxies is not permitted, the CHTTP name server returns an error message, not an IP address.

[00:13:29] Speaker 00:
If the client-side proxy receives an error message, then it performs the DNS lookup on its own.

[00:13:34] Speaker 00:
The only time the CHDP nameserver returns an IT address and other indicators like the public key or the nonce values is when it has already confirmed that the query is legitimate.

[00:13:45] Speaker 00:
and the secure communication between the user and the origin is permitted.

[00:13:49] Speaker 00:
This type of binary messaging, this error status or IP address, demonstrates that the messages from the CHGTV server are not the same as those from a conventional DNS system that keeps the claimed indication limitation.

[00:14:01] Speaker 00:
In the same way, this aligns with the Court's decisions in the 1591 Apple Appeal and the 1751 Cisco Appeal, affirming that lend-a-min similarly teaches an indication element by disclosing returning a network address and disclosing the use of access control lists that show the system only performs operations for authenticated and authorized users.

[00:14:24] Speaker 00:
Here in Chiugi, the registration

[00:14:26] Speaker 00:
acts in the same way as that ACL is.

[00:14:29] Speaker 04:
Could you address Mr. Saundberg's disclaimer on you?

[00:14:35] Speaker 00:
Sure.

[00:14:37] Speaker 00:
I think the board's ultimate conclusion regarding the purported prosecution disclaimer from the IPR system also comports with the decisions from both the courts that have looked at this issue.

[00:14:48] Speaker 00:
First, I think it aligns with this court's decision in the 1751 Cisco appeal, where this court rejected Renettix's argument

[00:14:55] Speaker 00:
that the board failed to conduct a proper claim construction analysis in view of the district court's claim construction decision applying a prosecution disclaimer based on the same arguments that Vernettix makes here today.

[00:15:10] Speaker 00:
Second, it aligns with how the district court actually limited the scope and applied the disclaimer.

[00:15:15] Speaker 00:
The district court found that the disclaimer was a disclaimer of a very limited one, one of DNS servers that only returned requested DNS records, such as an IP address or key certificate.

[00:15:28] Speaker 00:
That's an APPX 1131.

[00:15:30] Speaker 00:
Here, the court has already found that QGCHTTP server does more than just return the requested DNS records.

[00:15:38] Speaker 00:
It checks to see whether or not the server-side proxy is registered and is permitted to accept the connection from the client-side proxy, and it will return an error message to the client-side proxy if not.

[00:15:48] Speaker 00:
So I think under either situation, this court has decided that there is no

[00:15:55] Speaker 00:
clear and unequivocal prosecution disclaimer because a reasonable person looking at it would not understand that they disclaimed the full scope of what they're arguing today.

[00:16:09] Speaker 00:
So under either theory, under the theory that there was no prosecution disclaimer because a reasonable person looking at it wouldn't recognize it, or to the extent that

[00:16:19] Speaker 00:
Some disclaimer is recognized.

[00:16:22] Speaker 00:
It's much more limited the scope of that disclaimer is much more limited than what they're arguing for today Which do you think is correct?

[00:16:31] Speaker 00:
I mean, I I think that I Think that the the pre the prior one that there is no

[00:16:42] Speaker 00:
I think the the easier one to defend under the record is that the limited scope does not apply here because what the limited scope that the disclaimer was but there was a disclaimer but only to the limited scope correct correct and that what that limited scope of that disclaimer

[00:17:03] Speaker 00:
only applies to DNS servers that only return DNS records.

[00:17:09] Speaker 00:
Here, the CHDP server does more than that.

[00:17:12] Speaker 00:
It first looks to the registry before it would return an IP address, and second, it returns an error message, that's very important.

[00:17:22] Speaker 00:
If it determines when it goes to the registry that the secure communication link could not be established.

[00:17:33] Speaker 00:
I think it's also defensible that one of a reasonable person looking at the record would not determine that there is a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of whether or not an indication can be part of the establishment, the messages that are used as the establishment of the secure communication link.

[00:17:58] Speaker 04:
The language of the disclaimer is

[00:18:02] Speaker 04:
pretty explicit seems to be taken by itself.

[00:18:05] Speaker 04:
And I think the board acknowledged as much.

[00:18:08] Speaker 04:
And the question is, is there what is the strongest evidence that you have that that disclaimer setting aside

[00:18:19] Speaker 04:
whether it's qualified in any way, that that disclaimer simply cannot be recognized as a disclaimer for purposes of this case.

[00:18:26] Speaker 04:
What's the best evidence you have of that?

[00:18:28] Speaker 00:
I mean, I think the best evidence is this court's decision in the 1755 Cisco appeal, where the argument.

[00:18:35] Speaker 00:
1755?

[00:18:37] Speaker 00:
1751, I'm sorry.

[00:18:37] Speaker 00:
1751 Cisco appeal, where the court rejected Burnettos' argument that the board failed to conduct a proper claim construction in view of the district court's

[00:18:47] Speaker 00:
claim construction applying the prosecution disclaimer.

[00:18:57] Speaker 02:
Are you familiar with the right of appeal notice in the earlier re-exam?

[00:19:01] Speaker 00:
I do know that the examiner did not accept the argument, but I don't have it with me.

[00:19:10] Speaker 00:
My apologies, Your Honor.

[00:19:11] Speaker 04:
What is the legal consequence of that?

[00:19:14] Speaker 04:
Your opposing counsel has suggested that that is ineffective to undermine the effect of the disclaimer.

[00:19:24] Speaker 04:
Do you agree with that?

[00:19:25] Speaker 00:
I disagree with that, I think.

[00:19:27] Speaker 04:
And do you have any authority for the proposition that that's wrong?

[00:19:30] Speaker 00:
I do not have a case that states that.

[00:19:33] Speaker 04:
So we're left with no case on either side.

[00:19:35] Speaker 00:
Unfortunately.

[00:19:36] Speaker 00:
Sounds like we have a novel legal issue.

[00:19:37] Speaker 00:
It seems like it.

[00:19:38] Speaker 04:
Well, why don't you tell us why, in your view,

[00:19:41] Speaker 04:
That is not correct.

[00:19:44] Speaker 04:
In other words, arguing the novelty of the question for the first time.

[00:19:47] Speaker 00:
Because it's a reasonable person standard, whether or not somebody reviewing the record, the entire record, would reasonably believe that there was an unequivocal and clear.

[00:19:57] Speaker 04:
But that really begs the question of what the question is.

[00:20:02] Speaker 04:
Is the question, what a person would think was done by the party

[00:20:07] Speaker 04:
or whether the question is what a person would think was the net effect of the entire prosecution, including the examiner's view as to the scope of the claim that was accepted.

[00:20:20] Speaker 04:
I think it's the latter of those two, not just what the... So no matter how quick the disclaimer that if the

[00:20:32] Speaker 04:
Examiner says I don't accept it then the disclaimer does not become Embedded in the record.

[00:20:38] Speaker 04:
I think that would be part of limiting the scope of the claim I think that would be part of the analysis depending on how clear that that Disclaimer let's assume the disclaimer could not be clear Okay, and and under those facts, what would you say?

[00:20:53] Speaker 00:
I think if the disclaimer could not be clearer, then it would probably be a closer call.

[00:20:58] Speaker 00:
I still think you would have to go through the analysis.

[00:21:01] Speaker 00:
But then it doesn't end there.

[00:21:03] Speaker 00:
Even if you decide that there is a disclaimer, you still have to figure out the scope of the disclaimer as well.

[00:21:10] Speaker 02:
Would it matter if

[00:21:17] Speaker 02:
The applicant during prosecution argued for something very limiting, like the claim when it says car, it really means green car.

[00:21:28] Speaker 02:
And then the claim somehow survives.

[00:21:34] Speaker 02:
And then in litigation, the examiner rejected that construction of car meaning green car.

[00:21:44] Speaker 02:
But then in litigation, the claim survives.

[00:21:47] Speaker 02:
So you get a claim to a car.

[00:21:49] Speaker 02:
And then in litigation, the patent owner says, your black car is infringing my claimed car.

[00:21:58] Speaker 02:
And now we have a situation where it's quite clear that the agency never accepted the idea that the car is limited to a green car.

[00:22:06] Speaker 02:
But now we have a patent owner who has a patent and is trying to advance a position and understanding

[00:22:13] Speaker 02:
the granted claim that is completely contrary to the declaration they made during the course of the prosecution.

[00:22:23] Speaker 02:
Are there somehow a stop from claiming that black cars, red cars, orange cars are infringing the claim caught in light of what they said during the prosecution?

[00:22:39] Speaker 00:
So let me make sure I have the

[00:22:42] Speaker 00:
The question is correct.

[00:22:42] Speaker 00:
So during prosecution, the applicant says, we're only claiming green cars.

[00:22:52] Speaker 00:
And then in a later litigation, they are certain.

[00:22:55] Speaker 00:
And the examiner says no.

[00:22:56] Speaker 02:
The examiner says no.

[00:22:58] Speaker 02:
Your claim is not for a green car.

[00:22:59] Speaker 02:
It doesn't say that.

[00:23:01] Speaker 02:
It's just for a car.

[00:23:03] Speaker 00:
The claim gets allowed.

[00:23:07] Speaker 00:
And then that claim is then asserted against that black car.

[00:23:29] Speaker 00:
I think the court would have to look to see

[00:23:35] Speaker 00:
whether that limited admission or whether that argument, whether one of a reasonable person looking at that entire record would recognize that.

[00:23:51] Speaker 00:
And I think looking to the agency's decision not to apply that would be part of that calculus that they would have to look at.

[00:24:05] Speaker 00:
I think in this case, I think that even if it's recognized that there was some type of disclaimer, that disclaimer doesn't help frenetics here, because Kiyuchi teaches that it goes above and beyond

[00:24:24] Speaker 00:
anything that was disclaimed.

[00:24:25] Speaker 00:
It's not the establishment of the communication link itself, and the CHTP server doesn't just return an IP address.

[00:24:39] Speaker 00:
It goes above and beyond that and does the additional work of deciding whether or not the client side proxy is registered as part of the system.

[00:24:53] Speaker 00:
and also would return an error message if the system determines that it's not registered.

[00:25:02] Speaker 00:
So it does more than just the conventional DNS system, which would just return the IP address.

[00:25:11] Speaker 00:
Regarding the Go Secure example in the specification, that is just one example of a type of indication in the patent owner.

[00:25:26] Speaker 00:
Documents and filings with respect to the IPR they pointed to figures 26 and 27 as supporting the indication not to go secure portions so it's clearly the specification discloses more than just the go secure and it's would be incorrect to limit the claim construction and limit that to just one example in the specification and

[00:25:52] Speaker 03:
regarding the- So as you can see, your red light is on.

[00:25:58] Speaker 03:
Do you have one final statement?

[00:26:00] Speaker 00:
I think my final statement would be that if this court affirms that Claim Five is invalid in view of Lenderman in the previous appeal, this appeal could be dismissed as moot.

[00:26:15] Speaker 00:
And the underlying decision could be vacated.

[00:26:22] Speaker 03:
Mrs. Aylberg has some, the wattle time.

[00:26:27] Speaker 01:
Thank you, your honor.

[00:26:29] Speaker 01:
Prosecution history estoppel should focus on the applicant's position during prosecution.

[00:26:35] Speaker 01:
And during the prosecution, Burnett's statement was as clear as they come.

[00:26:39] Speaker 01:
It said, the act of establishing the secure communication link is something separate from the act of indicating that the DNS system supports establishing a secure communication at appendix 1175.

[00:26:53] Speaker 01:
Even if this court is inclined to accept the Patent Office's view that the more defensible position is the more limited disclaimer quoted from the district court decision, as opposed to no disclaimer at all, even then Piucci would not meet the indication.

[00:27:12] Speaker 01:
One of the acts that the district court specifically identified was the return of an IP address.

[00:27:17] Speaker 01:
That is precisely what is pointed to in Kiuchi as satisfying the indication at page 34 of the Patent Office's response brief, where they say that the return of the network address, which is done as part of the creation of the secure link in Kiuchi, is what satisfies the indication.

[00:27:34] Speaker 01:
So even if that more limited disclaimer is applied, the patent office agrees is more appropriate than no disclaimer at all, QHU does not satisfy the claims.

[00:27:44] Speaker 01:
If there are no further questions, I'll return the remainder of our time to the court.

[00:27:48] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:27:49] Speaker 03:
The case is taken on the subpoena.