[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
Ford Drive adjustment at Al versus the United States, 2023-1760.

[00:00:07] Speaker 02:
Good morning.

[00:00:08] Speaker 02:
Mr. Hearn.

[00:00:11] Speaker 02:
Good morning, Your Honor.

[00:00:17] Speaker 01:
May it please the court.

[00:00:20] Speaker 01:
I am Thor Hearn, and I am the counsel for the landowners in this case, the Indiana landowners.

[00:00:26] Speaker 01:
This is a Trails Act-taking case.

[00:00:29] Speaker 01:
It involves the appeal by the owners of 10 parcels of land in Indiana.

[00:00:35] Speaker 01:
And the key issue in this case determines upon whether the interest that these owners' predecessor entitled granted the Peruvian Indianapolis Railroad in the 1840s was an easement entitled to the fee of state in the land.

[00:00:54] Speaker 01:
If it's an easement in the government, the easement terminating the government must pay the owner's compensation.

[00:01:00] Speaker 01:
If the railroad, on the other hand, held title to the fee of state, fee symbol of state, then the government need not pay.

[00:01:07] Speaker 02:
You've asked us to certify this case to the Indiana Supreme Court.

[00:01:17] Speaker 02:
An issue is whether each of the Newcastle and Royal cases, whether each of them is simply dictum on the question of a fee simple.

[00:01:31] Speaker 02:
If we conclude that the statements of this nature are dictum, multiple, and we can look at the charter

[00:01:46] Speaker 02:
and conclude that it sounds like the language sounds like an easement, then we don't need to certify it, right?

[00:01:57] Speaker 01:
That would be correct if the court found that this was, in fact, which we believe is absolutely the case, that the text of the documents that define the interest of railroad acquired are, in fact, clearly an easement.

[00:02:14] Speaker ?:
that there will not be a need to certify.

[00:02:16] Speaker 01:
But we do believe that this is a case of great importance to Indiana, that the Indiana Supreme Court has indicated a past, not just willingness, but invitation for these cases to be certified to them, should there be any doubt on the part of the court as to what it is.

[00:02:35] Speaker 04:
Are there cases in the past where involving these rails-to-trails cases before the Court of Federal Claims or our court

[00:02:44] Speaker 04:
where such an issue was sent to the Indiana Supreme Court?

[00:02:49] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:02:51] Speaker 01:
The first one was Macy Elevator.

[00:02:54] Speaker 01:
That was a case in the Court of Federal Claims where the government itself wanted to have the case certified.

[00:03:01] Speaker 01:
In that case, Judge Firestone found that under the Indiana statute, it could not be certified if you didn't believe it could.

[00:03:08] Speaker 01:
And then there was the Howard series of case

[00:03:11] Speaker 01:
The meets the elevators at 97, federal claim 708.

[00:03:15] Speaker 01:
However, one is the case where Judge Orr, to a contrary conclusion, did certify the case to Indiana.

[00:03:25] Speaker ?:
And Indiana then, in a series of two decisions, accepted the certification and then answered the question.

[00:03:33] Speaker 01:
In that case, the question was the scope of the easement that was granted

[00:03:38] Speaker 01:
There was a very similar question involving the interpretation of the real estate or the real property interest that was at issue in an ancient deed to a railroad line.

[00:03:52] Speaker 03:
Council, do you agree that the language that's in rail is very similar to the language

[00:04:05] Speaker 01:
I don't believe rail answers the question at all that was before the court in interpreting whether it was a fee versus easement.

[00:04:19] Speaker 01:
And on that answer or that point, I know that the amicus brief from Professor Ewing and Professor Saxer provided very good detailed discussion of both rail

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
in the other Indiana Supreme Court decisions concerning this very issue.

[00:04:37] Speaker 03:
Well, let me ask you this question.

[00:04:38] Speaker 03:
How is the portion of rail discussing what land was conveyed, in your opinion, dictum?

[00:04:46] Speaker 01:
Well, it is discussing in rail what they were discussing was the nature of the railroad's charter and what authority the railroad had under their charter.

[00:04:57] Speaker 01:
not so much whether it was a fee versus easement because rail involved a situation where you had a strip of land adjoining.

[00:05:07] Speaker 04:
Council, I'm sorry, I'm going to interrupt you because we have ready.

[00:05:12] Speaker 04:
And let me ask you this, the court and rails, you know, quoted

[00:05:19] Speaker 04:
part of the agreement at issue there.

[00:05:22] Speaker 04:
And it says, I think it says, and assigns release and relinquish to the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company the right of way for so much of said road as may pass through.

[00:05:36] Speaker 04:
And so is that language, it seems to me, that specific language that's in the agreement that was being evaluated in the rail case

[00:05:46] Speaker 04:
that language looks very similar to the language in the agreements at issue in this case.

[00:05:51] Speaker 04:
Do you agree with that?

[00:05:53] Speaker 01:
The question is whether the language in the release document issue is the similar.

[00:06:00] Speaker 01:
I would agree with that, but I do not agree that the court in rail was deciding whether that language was fee versus heathment as opposed to the other questions

[00:06:10] Speaker 04:
What about the specific language that says that relinquishment, as we have construed it, supplemented by section 19, of course, which is about the incorporation, enacting that the right of way when acquired should be held by the company in fee simple, purported to convey to the company an estate in fee simple?

[00:06:33] Speaker 04:
So why doesn't that resolve the question?

[00:06:36] Speaker 01:
When you read the language, I have two answers to the course question.

[00:06:40] Speaker 01:
The first answer is, when you read the rail reference to the charter of the railroad, says that the railroad had the capacity, the legal authority capacity to acquire fee simple title.

[00:06:53] Speaker 01:
But that's not what is, the railroad can certainly acquire less of an interest, i.e.

[00:06:59] Speaker 01:
an easement, than simply getting fee simple title.

[00:07:03] Speaker 01:
So you can't use the charter

[00:07:05] Speaker 01:
But that's a different question, though.

[00:07:10] Speaker 04:
Whether you agree with what the court said in Roehl is a different question than what does Roehl hold.

[00:07:16] Speaker 04:
And so I just read some language from Roehl that sounds like a holding, and now I want to know why you think it's dicta.

[00:07:32] Speaker ?:
detailed discussion of that relative to the other Indiana law.

[00:07:36] Speaker 01:
But when we look at the other Indiana Supreme Court decisions, they have never read rail in the way that the Court of Federal Claims did, as saying, with this instrument, we conclude this must mean that the interest the railroad acquired was fee simple, absolute, tiled to the land.

[00:07:54] Speaker 01:
That is not how any Indiana court has ever read rail.

[00:08:00] Speaker 03:
Well, I would say that at least the Indiana Supreme Court, I believe, has addressed in Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, and Indianapolis Railway Company versus Coburn how it would interpret what I'm going to call kind of the Newcastle slash rail rule, so to speak.

[00:08:23] Speaker 03:
Have you read that case?

[00:08:24] Speaker 03:
Do you know the case of which I speak?

[00:08:26] Speaker 01:
I have, Your Honor, and I would refer to the courts

[00:08:30] Speaker 01:
The Indiana court's decision in the more recent cases, which also looks back at the Indiana history of the cases.

[00:08:39] Speaker 01:
And it does not read, the Indiana Supreme Court currently does not read rail in the same manner that the Court of Claims did.

[00:08:48] Speaker 01:
And again, that's where I circle back to the central issue.

[00:08:51] Speaker 03:
I think that you may have another argument, counsel, that you want to make.

[00:08:54] Speaker 03:
But if you just look at this case that I'm pointing to, where one of the parties is Coburn,

[00:08:59] Speaker 03:
If you look at the pages 559 to 560, and it's talking after its sites to Newcastle there, that under this construction, unconditional relinquishment of the land undoubtedly would have bested in the railroad company the absolute fee simple of the land.

[00:09:14] Speaker 03:
So I feel like if you're at least looking at this, and this is an example of a case, if you have access to it,

[00:09:21] Speaker 03:
would be supportive of what I and Judge Stull have been talking to you about as to what the Indiana Supreme Court has previously held in similar circumstances.

[00:09:33] Speaker 01:
Again, I refer to the LMG-Reeley case, which is one example, and then the more recent Ross case where the Indiana Supreme Court looks at these kind of instruments to railroads.

[00:09:46] Speaker 01:
And this is where we get to the certification question because clearly there's a debate in the ambiguity here about what Indiana law holds.

[00:09:55] Speaker 04:
Are those cases that you're talking about, are they referring to the language in Newcastle as well?

[00:10:03] Speaker 04:
I mean, it sounds like you're saying the Cleveland case should be disregarded because later cases interpret Newcastle differently.

[00:10:15] Speaker 01:
When you say Newcastle, the case in Newcastle was not interpreting a fee versus easement issue at all like this.

[00:10:22] Speaker 04:
Newcastle, as even the Court of Claims... Well, I was talking about the Coburn case that was looking at Newcastle and discussing Newcastle.

[00:10:34] Speaker 01:
I don't understand Coburn to reach that conclusion, but I would have to frankly look at my notes on Coburn to give you a very precise citation to that.

[00:10:45] Speaker 01:
In fact, Coburn's arguably overruled the suggestion of Newcastle and Rail that these wouldn't release documents.

[00:10:57] Speaker 01:
We have conveyed a fee, simple estate in the land.

[00:11:04] Speaker 01:
And again, going back to just fundamental principles of Indiana deconstruction that the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed.

[00:11:14] Speaker 01:
These pre-printed forms are printed with blanks on them that are called a lease and they refer to the interest as a right of way.

[00:11:24] Speaker ?:
That is clearly an easement, a reference to an easement, not a reference to the fee symbol of the state.

[00:11:32] Speaker 01:
For example, the fee symbol of the state would include the minimal interest in the strip of land below the former railroad line.

[00:11:39] Speaker 01:
It would include the area above it.

[00:11:42] Speaker 01:
This is certainly much more than any interest the remit needed.

[00:11:46] Speaker 01:
And that runs clearly contrary to doctrine of public policy that Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed.

[00:11:55] Speaker 02:
Counsel, you want to say you're rebuttaled on?

[00:11:57] Speaker 02:
You can continue or save it.

[00:12:00] Speaker 01:
I will save it, Your Honor.

[00:12:15] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court, David Frankel on behalf of the United States.

[00:12:22] Speaker 00:
By this appeal, plaintiffs seek to unsettle the law and upend property rights that have been well established for generations.

[00:12:29] Speaker 00:
Under Indiana law, certification is available only if there is a lack of clear control and precedent.

[00:12:36] Speaker 00:
But the question at the heart of this appeal was resolved over 170 years ago by the Indiana Supreme Court.

[00:12:42] Speaker 00:
It was confirmed about 30 years after that.

[00:12:46] Speaker 00:
And then in subsequent decisions of both the Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana appellate courts, it has been reaffirmed as binding precedent.

[00:12:54] Speaker 02:
You're talking about Newcastle and Roehl, right?

[00:12:57] Speaker 00:
Newcastle and Roehl are the two primary cases, yes.

[00:12:59] Speaker 02:
Newcastle deals with whether a railroad can transgress another railroad.

[00:13:06] Speaker 02:
It didn't depend on the question of fee simple versus easement, is that right?

[00:13:13] Speaker 00:
That was the dispute in that case.

[00:13:15] Speaker 02:
So the statement with respect to fee simple is dictum?

[00:13:19] Speaker 00:
I don't read it that way, because the statement about fee simple was essential to the reasoning of the case.

[00:13:26] Speaker 00:
Because the question in that case was what interest the railroad got and how to interpret these exact provisions of the charter.

[00:13:36] Speaker 00:
And in finding against plaintiffs and against the railroad in that case, the rationale the court relied on was that

[00:13:44] Speaker 00:
the conveyances were in fee simple, not something different.

[00:13:48] Speaker 00:
And it went through, and in doing that, it went through section 19 of the charter and explained exactly what that language mean, and explained that that language

[00:13:59] Speaker 00:
that it provided fee simple rather than a different kind of interest.

[00:14:03] Speaker 02:
Well, section 19 is sort of ambiguous.

[00:14:06] Speaker 02:
It talks about a right of way and fee simple.

[00:14:09] Speaker 02:
But when you look at section 15, it talks about so much of the land as is necessary for the construction of the road.

[00:14:18] Speaker 02:
That's sort of minimizing language rather than broadening language.

[00:14:22] Speaker 02:
And it sounds like an easement.

[00:14:25] Speaker 02:
And that same language is in the releases.

[00:14:29] Speaker 02:
It talks about right of way.

[00:14:32] Speaker 00:
So I mean it's true that I think an important background point is right of way can have two different meanings.

[00:14:38] Speaker 00:
I think right of way can mean a right of access over a parcel or right of way can also mean the strip of land and the parcel itself in fee simple.

[00:14:47] Speaker 00:
And I think what the charter does here is the charter embodies the legislature's intent

[00:14:53] Speaker 00:
that when the Perlman Indianapolis Railroad Company would acquire right of ways, including under section 15, that the effect of that would be to acquire in fee simple.

[00:15:03] Speaker 00:
And that was a legislative directive pursuant to this specific railroad's charter.

[00:15:08] Speaker 04:
Is the release and relinquish language helpful for the court's determination in either rail or Newcastle about it being a conveyance in fee simple?

[00:15:22] Speaker 00:
I'm not aware that the court focused on those, but I do think what's important is that that language mimics section 15 of the charter.

[00:15:30] Speaker 00:
So it uses language that was in the charter in section 15, which has that relinquishment language.

[00:15:37] Speaker 00:
And then section 19, and this is, I think, the holding of Newcastle, is that section 19 directs how conveyances under section 15 worked.

[00:15:46] Speaker 00:
And when they relinquish pursuant to section 15,

[00:15:52] Speaker 00:
that they shall be seized in fee simple of the right to such land, and they shall have sole use and occupancy of the same.

[00:15:58] Speaker 00:
So the release and relinquish language in the releases is a call back to section 15 of the charter.

[00:16:05] Speaker 00:
And I think Newcastle is precedential on the idea that what does it do when you invoke section 15?

[00:16:11] Speaker 00:
Under section 19, it's a taking in fee simple and not a taking of a lesser interest.

[00:16:17] Speaker 03:
What's the most recent Indiana court to apply the rule in Newcastle and Rio?

[00:16:24] Speaker 00:
I believe that would be the Meyer case, which I think 1916 would be the most recent case.

[00:16:35] Speaker 00:
But I think what's important here is that all of these cases remain good law.

[00:16:42] Speaker 00:
And the length of time, if anything, cuts against plaintiff's argument.

[00:16:47] Speaker 00:
I mean, these are property rights.

[00:16:48] Speaker 00:
There is a special need for predictability and certainty to understand who owns what interest, respectively.

[00:16:55] Speaker 00:
And the property rights within this specific rail corridor

[00:16:58] Speaker 00:
for conveyances to this company under this charter, using exactly the language in these releases, has been a settled question for generations, and has undoubtedly given us.

[00:17:10] Speaker 04:
I respond to opposing counsel's point that under how contracts would be interpreted under the current law, probably wouldn't look to the railroad's charter to figure out what that lease means.

[00:17:27] Speaker 00:
I mean, I think there are some more recent Indiana rail discussing how you would read the question of what is or is not a right of way, but the ultimate, the basic rationale on which Newcastle and rail stand is the idea that companies that were

[00:17:43] Speaker 00:
that companies that were created by these individualized charters, those charters defined their operations and those charters had to be read into the contracts.

[00:17:52] Speaker 00:
And this is a legislated determination of the Indiana legislature that when this specific company took in right of way under Section 15 of the charter, that under Section 19 it was taking in fee simple.

[00:18:06] Speaker 00:
I think that was the law then.

[00:18:08] Speaker 00:
That was the law that was affirmed in Newcastle.

[00:18:10] Speaker 00:
It was reaffirmed 30 years later.

[00:18:11] Speaker 00:
There's an unbroken stretch of law about how this charter interacts with the releases under this charter.

[00:18:16] Speaker 04:
And again, when you say reaffirmed, you're referring to Meijer.

[00:18:20] Speaker 00:
Well, Maya is only one case.

[00:18:21] Speaker 00:
I mean, Maya is one case.

[00:18:23] Speaker 00:
But I would say there's Newcastle, which goes very directly to the operation of Section 19.

[00:18:30] Speaker 00:
There's Rail, which to the extent there's any daylight between how the charter operates in the abstract and how it operates in the context of a particular release with this language, Rail eliminates any daylight there.

[00:18:42] Speaker 00:
I mean, Rail is precedential on this specific release language.

[00:18:46] Speaker 00:
And then you have Coburn after that.

[00:18:48] Speaker 00:
You have Douglas after that.

[00:18:50] Speaker 00:
Both of those cases look back, I believe, one to Newcastle and one to Roehl, and cite, as by no precedent, these specific holdings of these cases.

[00:19:02] Speaker 00:
I think that's a good question.

[00:19:07] Speaker 03:
I think that's a good question.

[00:19:18] Speaker 03:
kind of public policy that the Indiana Supreme Court would be following?

[00:19:22] Speaker 00:
I just think they don't have relevance here because they don't involve the issue here, which is conveyances under this specific charter using these languages would have to be construed according to particular rules elected by the Indiana legislature in this case.

[00:19:38] Speaker 00:
I think the legislature's language is clear and under Indiana law about how to read charters into charters

[00:19:47] Speaker 00:
pre the general railroad statute in 1853, how to read that into these releases.

[00:19:52] Speaker 00:
And then there's five different.

[00:19:55] Speaker 03:
I'm not certain about whether or not we think rail and kind of the progeny answer this question.

[00:20:03] Speaker 03:
What is your position on certification to the Indiana Supreme Court?

[00:20:07] Speaker 00:
I mean, well.

[00:20:09] Speaker 00:
Our top line position is that certification is unavailable because of the presence of queer control precedent.

[00:20:17] Speaker 00:
But I think there's a lot of soft reasons in this case why even if certification was available, this court shouldn't take that opportunity.

[00:20:25] Speaker 00:
I think the Supreme Court has talked about the need for novel and unsettled questions of law.

[00:20:31] Speaker 00:
And certification is not a procedure where you think, well, the court might say something different now than it used to say.

[00:20:37] Speaker 02:
Did I understand, Mr. Hearn, to say that on at least two occasions, the Court of Federal Claims has certified a question to the Indiana Supreme Court?

[00:20:49] Speaker 00:
Yeah.

[00:20:49] Speaker 00:
No, that's right.

[00:20:50] Speaker 00:
And the United States has asked for certification to the Indiana Supreme Court even.

[00:20:54] Speaker 00:
We agree that certification is a powerful tool in the context of a case where there is real doubt about what a state's law says.

[00:21:02] Speaker 02:
You think by now they might think that we ought to be able to figure out the cases on our own?

[00:21:08] Speaker 00:
I think what this court has said, I'll go back to this court's salmon in tows.

[00:21:12] Speaker 00:
I'm probably saying that wrong.

[00:21:13] Speaker 00:
But the court should certify only in the presence of real doubt.

[00:21:19] Speaker 00:
That certification is a procedure that burdens the resources of courts and parties.

[00:21:23] Speaker 00:
It adds delay.

[00:21:25] Speaker 00:
And it's only for cases where there's real uncertainty or real doubt about how a court would come out.

[00:21:30] Speaker 00:
And this is a case where also there's the underlying issue that this involves real property titles.

[00:21:36] Speaker 00:
And there is a special need for certainty and predictability and the likelihood that, even if it had the power, I don't think it has the power to, you know, I don't think this court has the power to certify a question on the thought that a court might revisit its prior precedents, but I think the chances of that are very slim in this case.

[00:21:53] Speaker 00:
When we're talking about real property interests that landowners, that railroads, that governments have relied on for centuries, for generations in this case,

[00:22:02] Speaker 02:
that they might simply turn us

[00:22:11] Speaker 00:
So I would say that certification is available only if it meets the Indiana Supreme Court's test, and then they have the discretion to take it or not take it.

[00:22:22] Speaker 00:
But also the United States Supreme Court has said when a federal court certifies to a state court, it should be because there's a novel or unsettled question of law.

[00:22:31] Speaker 00:
And this is just not a case that presents a novel or unsettled question of law.

[00:22:38] Speaker 00:
I mean, I'll just come back, I think, to what is really fundamental about these cases, which is the language that the Indiana Supreme Court has used.

[00:22:49] Speaker 00:
And I'll just quote a little bit here.

[00:22:50] Speaker 00:
But the court explained that when the company had, quote, procured a right of way under the charter, it had acquired a fee simple title.

[00:22:57] Speaker 00:
in rail, the quote reiterated, that when a grantor, quote, conveyed to the company and estate in fee simple to so much of land as, that one of the very same notices here, conveyed to the company and estate in fee simple to so much of the land as constituted the right of way.

[00:23:13] Speaker 00:
All of these holdings, these parts of the decisions, that language, are essential to the court's decisions in both cases.

[00:23:20] Speaker 00:
They're not dicta.

[00:23:22] Speaker 00:
If there's any doubt about whether they're dicta, the Indiana Supreme Court itself has answered that question, saying it's not, saying that these are holdings in subsequent cases in Coburn and Douglas.

[00:23:33] Speaker 00:
And we would ask the court to affirm it.

[00:23:37] Speaker 00:
I don't have anything else to add here.

[00:23:38] Speaker 00:
I'm happy to rest on my briefs and see the rest of my time, unless there are further questions.

[00:23:43] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Council.

[00:23:45] Speaker 02:
Mr. Horan has some rebuttal time.

[00:23:49] Speaker 01:
Yes, please.

[00:23:50] Speaker 01:
I will use the remaining time.

[00:23:53] Speaker 01:
I note several points very briefly.

[00:23:56] Speaker 01:
First off, in Macy Elevator, we had the court had before the exact same or material, same documents that they have in this case.

[00:24:07] Speaker 01:
And in that case, the government agreed that they conveyed an easement not titled to the fee of state.

[00:24:13] Speaker 01:
There was a disagreement over the scope, but there was no disagreement over the interest conveyed was an easement.

[00:24:20] Speaker 01:
Second point I make is the use of the term right away describes the interest.

[00:24:25] Speaker 01:
And this quote itself recently in Barlow, 86F4,

[00:24:30] Speaker 01:
1347 said as much.

[00:24:33] Speaker 01:
So did the Supreme Court.

[00:24:35] Speaker 03:
That was under different law, right?

[00:24:37] Speaker 03:
It was under Illinois law in Barlow, right?

[00:24:40] Speaker 01:
Well, it's a term right away.

[00:24:42] Speaker 01:
It's a term we use referencing real estate, just like the Supreme Court in Canada.

[00:24:47] Speaker 03:
But just answer my direct question.

[00:24:49] Speaker 03:
Wasn't Barlow under Illinois law, not Indiana law?

[00:24:53] Speaker 01:
Sure, it was under Illinois, but not Indiana, but the word has a common meaning that courts apply to it when it's dealing with an interest in real property, and that is right away as an easement, as the courts have said.

[00:25:06] Speaker ?:
I know two final points.

[00:25:08] Speaker ?:
The reference to the charter as the source of the nature defining the railroad's interest in this piece of real property, the charter is not part of the transaction.

[00:25:19] Speaker ?:
The document that defines the interest,

[00:25:22] Speaker ?:
Order of the real property granted to the railroad is found by looking at the actual written text of the document, which are these release documents that were pre-printed forms of railroad views.

[00:25:35] Speaker 01:
The railroad's charter, I go back anymore in history, does not define in the nature of a transaction between two private parts.

[00:25:43] Speaker 01:
If I'm buying or selling property to a railroad, I don't have to go read their charter to define

[00:25:52] Speaker 01:
And the final point I note on the charter is that if that argument is accepted that the railroad's charter defines the nature of its real property interest, then every piece of property that these railroads that were chartered back in the 1860s acquired would be fee simple, notwithstanding the language in the actual document between the parties.

[00:26:17] Speaker 01:
Then finally, on the certification question, I agree with my friend that it is a very important concept of property law.

[00:26:26] Speaker 01:
And property law is intended to be stable and certain and not change.

[00:26:30] Speaker 01:
And that is why there's any ambiguity that it should be certified to the Indiana Supreme Court.

[00:26:36] Speaker 01:
And what I'm saying here is in terms of the novelty of this is particularly the novelty of the application that the court of claims made

[00:26:45] Speaker 01:
or the interpretation of rail and Newcastle, that's the novelty that is being applied here.

[00:26:53] Speaker 01:
And this will potentially affect many, many other property owners with these ancient riderways across their property.

[00:27:01] Speaker 01:
And to that extent, it does have implications for Indiana public policy.

[00:27:09] Speaker 01:
even the more recent Indiana Supreme Court decisions interpreting conveyances of an interest to a railroad.

[00:27:17] Speaker 01:
I have nothing further.

[00:27:20] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:27:20] Speaker 02:
Both counsel, the case is submitted.

[00:27:23] Speaker 02:
That concludes today's arguments.