[00:00:02] Speaker 06: We hope your time is recovering. [00:00:11] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:00:12] Speaker 02: Yes, I wanted to thank the Court, thank Mr. Wecker, thank our respective clients for accommodating this change in schedule. [00:00:20] Speaker 02: According to the surgeon, the surgery went well. [00:00:23] Speaker 02: He's got 10 bone screws and a metal plate, but he's put back together. [00:00:27] Speaker 02: So thank you very much. [00:00:29] Speaker 06: Before you start, Mr. Constable, we have this combination of video and telephone audio, which is less than satisfactory. [00:00:39] Speaker 06: I just caution you, particularly when it comes time for your argument, that you need to be aware of the fact that when judges are asking questions, we may interrupt you. [00:00:51] Speaker 06: And sometimes it's difficult for you to tell whether that's happened. [00:00:57] Speaker 06: Keep an eye out for it, and let's try to make it work. [00:01:03] Speaker 06: OK, Ms. [00:01:04] Speaker 06: Huntsaker. [00:01:05] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:01:06] Speaker 02: May it please the court? [00:01:08] Speaker 02: I'd like to focus on three issues today, obvious to try, motivation to modify based on common sense, and non-infringement. [00:01:18] Speaker 02: On obviousness to try, the only claim limitation found non-obvious in view of the Yamazawa prior art [00:01:25] Speaker 02: is a support member that runs through the inside of a reflective pyramid. [00:01:30] Speaker 02: But this is only one of two possible ways for implementing the support member in figure one of Yamazawa. [00:01:37] Speaker 02: It's either inside the inner volume of the pyramid, or it is not. [00:01:42] Speaker 02: In these circumstances, Yamazawa renders the crime obvious to try as a matter of law under KSR and this court's application of that case. [00:01:53] Speaker 02: And the district court's grant of summary judgment of non-obvious should be reversed, and summary judgment of obviousness entered for Polycom instead. [00:02:00] Speaker 05: Ms. [00:02:01] Speaker 05: Hunsaker, did your expert explain why it is that when you're looking at the device of Yamazawa, you would instantly, as a skilled artisan, think of a contiguous support member poll running all the way the length from top to bottom of the device? [00:02:23] Speaker 02: Yes, he did, Your Honor. [00:02:25] Speaker 02: At appendix 2903 through 2905, which is paragraphs 80 through 87 of Mr. Keller's declaration submitted in support of Polycom's motion, he articulated five reasons that it would have been a matter of common sense to view the support member of Yamazawa as a [00:02:48] Speaker 02: continuous support member, including passing through the inner volume of the two pyramids that are disclosed. [00:02:54] Speaker 06: So it's really not a common sense case. [00:02:56] Speaker 06: I mean, I know the words common sense were used, but our common sense cases don't involve situations where there's an expert identifying particular reasons to make the combination. [00:03:07] Speaker 06: So I think it's a little bit of a point to regard it as a common sense case. [00:03:14] Speaker 02: In the context of obvious to try, [00:03:16] Speaker 02: We don't rely on common sense in providing the motivation to modify. [00:03:24] Speaker 02: We're relying on our expert's testimony to indicate why a matter of two finite choices [00:03:35] Speaker 02: would be obvious to try either one. [00:03:38] Speaker 02: Why those choices solve a design need, or a market pressure to solve the problem, and a finite number of identifiable, predictable solutions. [00:03:48] Speaker 06: Or even whether it's not as obvious to try, there could still be a motivation to combine the two references, or to extend the reference. [00:03:57] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:03:58] Speaker 02: There still could be a motivation to modify a single reference obvious in this case here. [00:04:03] Speaker 02: Motivation to modify, which KSR says does not have to be based on an explicit motivation found in the prior art. [00:04:12] Speaker 02: And in this case, when we look at the motivation to modify, we're relying on common sense. [00:04:17] Speaker 02: We're relying on the knowledge of those of skill in the art. [00:04:21] Speaker 02: And we're relying on... Why does common sense matter? [00:04:27] Speaker 03: I think the motivation to modify is because you think there's some reason for an improvement. [00:04:34] Speaker 02: Right. [00:04:35] Speaker 02: And so in the context of Mr. Keller's declaration at the appendix sites that I just mentioned, he described the design need. [00:04:46] Speaker 02: He described that camera cables would be able to be passed from top to bottom, and that this was something that he personally had done in the context of his own camera cluster device. [00:04:57] Speaker 02: That is at Appendix 2903. [00:04:59] Speaker 06: I think we're just suggesting to you that this isn't really a common sense case. [00:05:04] Speaker 06: It's a case where there's a specific motivation in the expert testimony to refine the reference. [00:05:14] Speaker 02: Whether called common sense or identifying the design needs and the finite number of possibilities and why a person of ordinary skill would have the knowledge to be able to pursue known options [00:05:27] Speaker 02: and to be able to expect anticipated success. [00:05:31] Speaker 02: These are the elements that Mr. Keller provides in his declaration with his five reasons that he sets forth of why those would be known in New York. [00:05:42] Speaker 03: Why are there only two possibilities? [00:05:44] Speaker 02: Because the claim term at issue provides that there is a support member intersecting an inner volume of the pyramid-shaped element. [00:05:54] Speaker 02: The lower court construed that. [00:05:57] Speaker 02: as requiring the support member to be on the inside of the pyramid. [00:06:01] Speaker 02: So the reason there's a finite number of choices, the reason there's only two, is because under that claim limitation in Yamazawa, it's either inside the pyramid or it's not. [00:06:12] Speaker 02: There can be different shapes or sizes or things that aren't relevant to the claims. [00:06:18] Speaker 02: But what's relevant for purposes of the finite number of choices under KSR and Perfect Web and Uber [00:06:26] Speaker 02: is that there's finite choices in how it can be implemented. [00:06:32] Speaker 05: I suppose in this case, when you're using the finite number of choices language in KSR, it really seems to me it's more in the context of Yamazala, specifically Yamazala in 1998, when we're looking at that photograph or we're looking at that diagram, particularly the photograph. [00:06:53] Speaker 05: and then your expert, Kelly, says, okay, I cannot see what's going on inside those individual pyramids. [00:07:03] Speaker 05: But I conclude it can only be one of two choices. [00:07:07] Speaker 05: Either there's these little individual support member pieces that don't go through the pyramids, or because they're all lined up in a column, they're all in the same vertical plane, [00:07:21] Speaker 05: they suggest the possibility of going straight down top to bottom as a continuous polar. [00:07:27] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:07:27] Speaker 05: And so in the context of this reference, that's why he's invoking this notion of a finite number of possibilities. [00:07:35] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:07:37] Speaker 02: From the image of Yamazawa, you can see the support member on the top, in the middle, and on the bottom. [00:07:47] Speaker 02: And what Mr. Keller says is, [00:07:50] Speaker 02: That suggests to a person of ordinary skill that it could be a continuous support member that goes all the way through. [00:07:57] Speaker 03: Those are the two choices? [00:07:59] Speaker 02: Those are the two choices. [00:08:01] Speaker 02: It's either on the inside of the pyramid or it's on the outside of the pyramid. [00:08:04] Speaker 06: But even without obvious to try, you're still arguing obviousness, right? [00:08:10] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:08:11] Speaker 05: But to clarify, the judge below understood your obviousness challenge. [00:08:18] Speaker 05: to be funneled through two specific theories, one theory being common sense and one being obvious to try. [00:08:25] Speaker 05: He didn't misunderstand the way you were presenting your challenge and organizing it. [00:08:31] Speaker 05: Is that correct? [00:08:33] Speaker 02: He did not misunderstand the way we were presenting the argument. [00:08:38] Speaker 02: He just didn't apply the law as set forth in KSR with respect to obvious to try and then with respect to [00:08:45] Speaker 02: Common Sense, which is really the motivation to modify this piece of prior art that shows three separate pieces, but suggests... Our precedent for Common Sense has some rules. [00:09:00] Speaker 05: Maybe those are rigid rules, but they sound like rules that we're bound by, nonetheless. [00:09:06] Speaker 05: And invoking common sense for a missing limitation, we have certain demands, like it be very simple technology, or it's merely just repeating a set of steps that are already in the prior art reference itself. [00:09:24] Speaker 02: Yeah. [00:09:25] Speaker 02: And I would say two responses to that, Your Honor. [00:09:27] Speaker 02: In this situation, the structural element of a support member is there. [00:09:31] Speaker 02: The question is simply whether it is [00:09:34] Speaker 02: going inside the inner volume of the pyramid or not. [00:09:38] Speaker 02: So the structural element is depicted in Yamazawa on its face. [00:09:43] Speaker 02: As far as when common sense can be applied, we think that this is a perfect example of when common sense under the case law is applied. [00:09:52] Speaker 06: It's really confusing because your expert called it common sense, but it's not common sense. [00:09:57] Speaker 06: He gave specific reasons to make the modification. [00:10:00] Speaker 06: I just think we're [00:10:03] Speaker 02: What our expert was required to do the evidence that we were required to submit when there's not an explicit motivation to combine found in the prior art [00:10:18] Speaker 02: is we have to provide a reasoned explanation for why a person of skill would find. [00:10:26] Speaker 02: And he gave the reasons. [00:10:27] Speaker 02: And he gave the reasons. [00:10:28] Speaker 03: Is there a reason to modify? [00:10:30] Speaker 03: And you say, yes, there's some reasons to modify. [00:10:32] Speaker 03: Well, if there are reasons to modify, then it would have been common sense to do so. [00:10:36] Speaker 03: Well, I think what the presiding judge is saying is your insistence on what almost in common law bleeding back in England and shoving it into the common sense pigeonhole [00:10:48] Speaker 03: feels awkward because the rationale for churning it in the common law, in the pigeonhole of common sense, is that there was a reason to modify, right? [00:10:59] Speaker 03: Right. [00:11:00] Speaker 03: So you understand what the maybe Westgate, think of common law bleeding, whether it's assumption, trespass on the case, trespass, whatever. [00:11:10] Speaker 03: It's just a question of why do you insist on this being analyzed as a common sense case? [00:11:15] Speaker 03: Now, was it fair to pitch the case [00:11:18] Speaker 03: to the district court judge as a common sense case when it's really a motivation to combine tips? [00:11:25] Speaker 02: I don't think we need to get hung up on the common sense, whether it's labeled common sense, whether it's labeled providing reasons why a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would understand that these are two possible finite solutions. [00:11:40] Speaker 02: He sets forth those reasons. [00:11:42] Speaker 03: Can I ask a practical question? [00:11:44] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:11:44] Speaker 03: What happens if this court were to decide that the judge properly denied your summary judgment motion, but on the other hand, the judge erred in granting the summary judgment of motion on the other side? [00:11:58] Speaker 01: Do we go to trial? [00:12:01] Speaker 03: We do believe that we present- What is the practical consequence? [00:12:05] Speaker 03: Say if we decide the judge erred in granting the summary judgment in favor of both of you. [00:12:11] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:12:12] Speaker 03: You may correctly deny several going to the other case. [00:12:15] Speaker 03: You can go to trial here. [00:12:17] Speaker 02: That's right, unless the non-infringement argument prevails. [00:12:22] Speaker 02: But correct. [00:12:24] Speaker 02: If your honor decided that the court properly denied Polycom's motion, but should not have granted Fullview's motion, [00:12:32] Speaker 02: because the experts have presented enough evidence for there to be a tribal issue of fact. [00:12:37] Speaker 03: So in that case, you ought to be putting some time in to try to undercut the summary judgment in favor of your adversary. [00:12:46] Speaker 03: And aren't you arguing that it was error to grant summary judgment in favor of your adversary? [00:12:51] Speaker 02: We are, Your Honor, yes. [00:12:54] Speaker 03: Since that's what would save you a trial, at least. [00:12:56] Speaker 02: Yes, yes, Your Honor. [00:12:57] Speaker 02: We looked at the Perfect Web case. [00:13:00] Speaker 02: We looked at the Uber case. [00:13:02] Speaker 02: We believe that those facts were analogous. [00:13:03] Speaker 02: And in both of those cases, a judgment of obviousness was entered. [00:13:12] Speaker 02: If we have not persuaded Your Honors to that effect, we do believe that the grant of summary. [00:13:19] Speaker 06: How could there not be a jury issue as to whether the motivations that your expert provided were [00:13:25] Speaker 06: sufficient to render it obvious. [00:13:27] Speaker 06: How is that not a jury issue? [00:13:29] Speaker 02: We focused on the obvious to try portion of the argument with respect to the issue of law because we believe that under the cases following KSR that we have a finite number of solutions, a design need, a relatively simple technology and evidence that is unrefuted by [00:13:52] Speaker 02: full view that there was knowledge in the field that people would have known these were the two choices. [00:14:03] Speaker 02: It would have suggested from looking at the Yamazawa image. [00:14:06] Speaker 02: So our obviousness to try argument is where we have focused our legal argument based on the case law that we think warrants a finding of obviousness as a matter of law. [00:14:19] Speaker 02: If, however, Your Honor is not persuaded of that, [00:14:22] Speaker 02: That does not mean that grant of summary judgment for full view was proper, because as the non-moving party on that motion, full view needed to come forward [00:14:37] Speaker 02: and show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. [00:14:43] Speaker 02: We have expert testimony that the court did not credit at all. [00:14:47] Speaker 02: We have expert testimony contrary to what Dr. Nala submitted in his declarations [00:14:54] Speaker 02: that was not credited by the court in summary judgment. [00:14:58] Speaker 05: I think the district court said something about your expert's declaration being unsupported with any evidence. [00:15:06] Speaker 05: It was just assertions, I think, is essentially what he concluded. [00:15:11] Speaker 05: Could you comment on that? [00:15:12] Speaker 02: Well, the declaration was quite detailed. [00:15:16] Speaker 02: The declaration number one indicated that [00:15:20] Speaker 02: Mr. Keller had himself designed before the priority date a camera cluster device that was used as a support member. [00:15:30] Speaker 02: So he has personal experience developing a system like this. [00:15:35] Speaker 02: So he is familiar with the state of the art at the time, the knowledge of persons of skill in the art at the time, and he sets that forth in his declaration. [00:15:43] Speaker 03: in addition to... That's what he said, but the result of what happened was the district court judge is rejecting that declaration as having any weight at all, because otherwise he couldn't have granted the summary judgment from the descendant, correct? [00:15:56] Speaker 02: And we believe that was error. [00:15:58] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor. [00:15:59] Speaker 03: That's your burden here, ma'am, is to specifically explain why there was error in the district court judge rejecting the declaration that Judge Chen just pointed to. [00:16:08] Speaker 02: We believe that there was error in not crediting Mr. Keller's declaration and instead drawing all inferences in favor of full view on their motion, which is the opposite of what the court should have done. [00:16:21] Speaker 03: I thought you also were concerned about having the wrong burden put in the wrong place, right? [00:16:28] Speaker 03: Didn't the judge or court judge say that you had to prove by clear and convincing evidence? [00:16:32] Speaker 02: Correct. [00:16:33] Speaker 02: And when the court... And were there any incorrect legal standards? [00:16:36] Speaker 02: On our motion, [00:16:38] Speaker 02: At the summary judgment stage of obviousness, we would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence. [00:16:43] Speaker 02: In opposing full views motion, our burden would be to show a tribal issue of that. [00:16:48] Speaker 03: What burden did the judge put on you with respect to their motion? [00:16:53] Speaker 02: All the court said with respect to their motion was that as he had just described, we had not proven by clear and convincing evidence. [00:17:01] Speaker 02: So he did shift the burden back to us and didn't perform an analysis [00:17:06] Speaker 03: Well, isn't that the major no-no? [00:17:09] Speaker 02: Certainly in the context of this part of the discussion, absolutely. [00:17:13] Speaker 02: That is the major no-no. [00:17:16] Speaker 03: If you look at the district courts... Well, I mean, you raise it as a major no-no in your blue brief. [00:17:22] Speaker 03: Your adversary in its red brief does not even address the issue. [00:17:26] Speaker 03: And then in your gray brief, you don't bother to say that by failing to have addressed the issue, they waved any defense to it. [00:17:33] Speaker 03: Well, I was a little lost about how seriously you felt about the error in assigning the wrong burden to you in their summary judgment. [00:17:44] Speaker 01: Your Honor, we think that the error of... You say it's reversible error in your library, correct? [00:17:52] Speaker 03: Correct, correct. [00:17:53] Speaker 03: And the other side doesn't respond in his library, and you say nothing in your library. [00:17:59] Speaker 02: We do believe that the court erred in assigning the clear and convincing burden to us with respect to full views motion, rather than looking at our expert testimony, drawing inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and taking Mr. Keller's declaration as creating a tribal issue with respect to obviousness on full views motion. [00:18:22] Speaker 05: I'd like to get to the infringement. [00:18:24] Speaker 05: Before I do, I have one more question, and that's about the confusion between Yamazawa in 1997 and Yamazawa in 1998. [00:18:32] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:18:33] Speaker 05: Specifically, they both appear to show the same drawing, but one in 1997 is described as a cross-sectional view, and then in 1998 it's described as labeled as a front view. [00:18:47] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:18:48] Speaker 05: And I'm not sure, should [00:18:52] Speaker 05: How should we be thinking about it? [00:18:53] Speaker 05: Should we be thinking there's a delta in what these two versions of Yamazawa are disclosing? [00:19:00] Speaker 05: Or are they necessarily disclosing the exact same thing? [00:19:04] Speaker 05: And if it is the exact same thing, what is it, a front view or a cross-section view? [00:19:08] Speaker 02: So we believe that the issue is moot. [00:19:10] Speaker 02: But what happened is Yamazawa 97 is in the case because [00:19:18] Speaker 02: Yamazawa 98 could be sworn behind. [00:19:22] Speaker 02: Now, the inventor did not swear behind it in practice. [00:19:25] Speaker 02: So the differences between 97 and 98 are moot for purposes of this appeal. [00:19:30] Speaker 02: 98 is less than a year before the filing date of the patent ensued. [00:19:39] Speaker 02: And 97 was not. [00:19:41] Speaker 02: 97 was a Japanese original. [00:19:43] Speaker 02: version with an English translation that we believe was mistranslated with respect to the cross-section view. [00:19:49] Speaker 02: 98 is an original English language version. [00:19:53] Speaker 02: And it shows a front view, meaning that it's not a cross-section as the translation of 97 had indicated. [00:20:02] Speaker 02: Because Dr. Nalla did not swear behind, that distinction becomes moot. [00:20:08] Speaker 02: Because you can look at Yamazawa 98. [00:20:11] Speaker 02: and disregard Yamazawa 97 entirely. [00:20:14] Speaker 02: So it's undisputed that the limitation at issue for purposes of infringement, the plurality of image processing devices being secured to the support member. [00:20:35] Speaker 02: We think, based on the evidence that has been presented, that there is no genuine dispute, that that is not literally present. [00:20:43] Speaker 03: There's no dispute. [00:20:44] Speaker 03: What do you mean, not literally present? [00:20:50] Speaker 03: No dispute? [00:20:53] Speaker 02: When Dr. Nalas submitted his declaration in opposition to infringement. [00:20:59] Speaker 03: Why don't you deal with it? [00:21:03] Speaker 03: You made a number of arguments at the hearing on summary judgment motion of infringement and non-infringement as to reasons why. [00:21:16] Speaker 03: So while the queue structure as the circuit board is providing some attaching function because it's the thing that the cameras are attached to, that has no functions. [00:21:30] Speaker 03: And then you got into an argument with the judge and you said, well, if this had simply been a piece of structure with no software on it, if it were a bracket, it would constitute an attaching mechanism. [00:21:47] Speaker 03: But if it were circular, it wouldn't be a bracket. [00:21:51] Speaker 02: It's not the shape. [00:21:52] Speaker 03: Let me just say that it is a shape because you've agreed that if it were a bracket attached to the [00:21:58] Speaker 03: to the member, that would qualify. [00:22:03] Speaker 03: But if it were simply, as it is, a circle, a piece of rigid structure, assume it's got no software on it, and it's attached to the pole, it wouldn't. [00:22:14] Speaker 03: And bracket, all bracket means is, generally, refers to all projecting supports. [00:22:21] Speaker 03: So all my point is that you made these arguments, and then the judge wrote an opinion, he said, you offered no principle [00:22:29] Speaker 03: branch around to explain. [00:22:31] Speaker 03: This includes also the question of whether there's another function being developed. [00:22:36] Speaker 03: Right. [00:22:36] Speaker 03: And you wrote a brief to us in which you don't have any principle reasons. [00:22:43] Speaker 02: Your Honor, we believe the error on infringement is twofold. [00:22:47] Speaker 02: First, the construction of the term [00:22:53] Speaker 02: The construction of the term... Did you ask for claim construction? [00:22:55] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:22:56] Speaker 02: Did you ask for claim construction? [00:22:58] Speaker 02: We did. [00:22:59] Speaker 02: We submitted competing claim constructions to the court. [00:23:02] Speaker 03: Now go to the question of how to reject. [00:23:04] Speaker 02: Go to the question of what the image processing devices must be secured to. [00:23:10] Speaker 02: Both parties agreed. [00:23:11] Speaker 03: So the language of the claim... Now the two proposed constructions that are in the summary judgment briefs [00:23:20] Speaker 03: Simply talk about the rigidity. [00:23:22] Speaker 03: It's going to be attached very securely. [00:23:27] Speaker 02: What Polycom proposed was that the claim term... Did you ask for claim construction on what an attachment mechanism can be? [00:23:38] Speaker 02: We asked for claim construction on what it means to have the image processing devices secured to the support member. [00:23:46] Speaker 06: What was the claim construction you proposed? [00:23:48] Speaker 06: And show us where. [00:23:49] Speaker 06: the claim construction that was proposed. [00:24:05] Speaker 02: It's going to take me a minute to find the proposed claim constructions. [00:24:37] Speaker 06: Your theory is that the circuit board and the chassis are not attached to each other. [00:24:47] Speaker 06: And I'm trying to figure out whether that's reflected in the supposed plank construction. [00:24:53] Speaker 02: So defendant's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement is at Appendix 3817. [00:24:58] Speaker 02: And it was in our motion for summary judgment of non-infringement that we set out what polypons [00:25:07] Speaker 02: proposed construction of the term was, and conversely, what Fullviews proposed. [00:25:12] Speaker 03: Where did we see it? [00:25:15] Speaker 02: What page? [00:25:15] Speaker 02: 3817 is the beginning of the... [00:25:28] Speaker 05: I think I found something at 3967, which shows both sides proposed construction of security. [00:25:43] Speaker 05: I don't know if that's correct. [00:25:49] Speaker 02: 3967. [00:25:50] Speaker 02: 3967 includes both parties proposed constructions. [00:25:58] Speaker 02: proposed construing the plurality of image processing devices being secured to the support member. [00:26:05] Speaker 02: as the plurality of image processing devices are fixed or attached firmly to the support member so they cannot move. [00:26:11] Speaker 02: Fullview's proposed construction, on the other hand, removed the language to the support member, which is the structure provided in the claim itself, and just said, fix or attach something firmly to another so that it cannot be moved. [00:26:26] Speaker 02: So the construction literally removed the structural elements of the claim, namely, [00:26:32] Speaker 02: fixing what does that have to do with whether or not an attachment means that performs some function besides attaching is excluded your honor I think that there is a spectrum of yes if you have an attachment mechanism you have fasteners you have let me just understand what you're saying you're saying if I understand correctly the circuit [00:26:57] Speaker 06: and the chassis and maybe some of the other things that intervene between the support member and the cameras are now attachment mechanisms and therefore the support member is not secured to the cameras or the cameras are not secured to the support member, correct? [00:27:12] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:27:12] Speaker 06: Okay. [00:27:15] Speaker 06: Where did you tell the judge that that was your position? [00:27:19] Speaker 02: That is in the hearing transcript. [00:27:21] Speaker 02: It's also in the briefs. [00:27:23] Speaker 02: I can find the appendix sites, for your honor, but we did have a specific discussion with the court about that during the hearing. [00:27:30] Speaker 03: And what was... And the judge said, why does it make any difference? [00:27:36] Speaker 03: The judge specifically on the question of whether or not the apparatus that's used for attaching can perform a function in relation to attaching. [00:27:45] Speaker 03: the judge said, why doesn't it make any difference? [00:27:49] Speaker 03: And what was your answer? [00:27:51] Speaker 02: Remember? [00:27:52] Speaker 02: Yes, that the claim term requiring that it be secured to the support member is focused on the attachment mechanisms. [00:28:00] Speaker 03: Your answer was there's nothing in the patent that allows it. [00:28:14] Speaker 03: example in the patent is the spacer. [00:28:19] Speaker 02: We use the example in the patent which requires a belt spacer. [00:28:24] Speaker 03: They assume, I mean, that was your answer. [00:28:28] Speaker 03: And then the judge from the summary judgment decision said you get no principle reason, simply saying because the patent doesn't allow it isn't a principle reason. [00:28:38] Speaker 02: No, but that wasn't what we said. [00:28:40] Speaker 02: What we said was that the [00:28:43] Speaker 02: Image devices that are attached to the circuit board have a completely different function than a securing attachment fastening mechanism, with the claim term being construed as secured to. [00:28:57] Speaker 03: But what you said first, when the judge asked you the question, why should it matter that the attachment mechanisms perform functions in addition to securing? [00:29:06] Speaker 03: And you said, well, that's a DOE question, remember? [00:29:11] Speaker 03: Your honor, that would require the analysis of function where result, he said. [00:29:18] Speaker 03: And then he said, no, no, no, I'm not in Dr. Brooks. [00:29:20] Speaker 03: I'm still dealing with literal. [00:29:24] Speaker 03: He says, tell me, why does this make any difference? [00:29:28] Speaker 01: The distinction? [00:29:29] Speaker 03: And you said, no, there's no support in the spec for that kind of arrangement. [00:29:35] Speaker 02: I will find the portion of- I'm reading you exactly what you said. [00:29:39] Speaker 02: Yes, your honor. [00:29:40] Speaker 02: What the distinction that we draw through, the principal distinction that we drew, is between something that is a fastening mechanism, an attachment mechanism, as opposed to something that serves a completely different function. [00:29:54] Speaker 03: Which also, but you have admitted to the judge that the circuit board also performs some attaching function that it won't work without. [00:30:03] Speaker 01: It's attached to the chassis. [00:30:06] Speaker 03: No, the camera is attached to it. [00:30:08] Speaker 03: The claim requires attaching the camera to the support network. [00:30:13] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:30:14] Speaker 03: The claim requires... And so the motherboard is performing some function of attaching the camera, because the camera is attached to the motherboard. [00:30:24] Speaker 03: The... All I'm saying is that the... You're trying to make the argument, I think, here, that the motherboard performs no attaching function at all. [00:30:34] Speaker 03: And that's simply not correct. [00:30:36] Speaker 03: You never made that argument before. [00:30:38] Speaker 02: It's not attached to the support member. [00:30:41] Speaker 03: But the claim requires the attaching of the camera to the support member. [00:30:46] Speaker 03: To the support member. [00:30:47] Speaker 03: So the attachment mechanism has to do both pieces. [00:30:54] Speaker 03: The attachment mechanism has to attach the camera to the support member. [00:30:57] Speaker 01: To the camera to the support member. [00:30:59] Speaker 03: That's right. [00:31:00] Speaker 03: The function of the motherboard, if you want to call it that, in the Hughes device, is that it's what attaches the camera [00:31:08] Speaker 03: It's what secures the cameras. [00:31:11] Speaker 02: Well, it does more than that. [00:31:14] Speaker 03: Of course it does, but the question is, does it matter that it does more? [00:31:20] Speaker 02: It does matter. [00:31:21] Speaker 02: It does matter because it's not secured to the support member. [00:31:25] Speaker 02: It's secured to the circuit board, which is secured to the steel chassis. [00:31:30] Speaker 03: Right, but you agreed with the district board judge that there could be intervening structures. [00:31:35] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:31:35] Speaker 02: There could be. [00:31:36] Speaker 02: For example, the spacers in the patent specification. [00:31:40] Speaker 03: Where does a patent limit the number or kind of intervening that you're going to have? [00:31:48] Speaker 02: I believe it's a spectrum, Your Honor. [00:31:49] Speaker 02: And I believe that in this case, the accused product, which is not in dispute of how it's constructed at all, in this case, we are on the other end of the spectrum. [00:31:59] Speaker 03: I'm trying to understand. [00:32:00] Speaker 03: The district court judge clearly understood all these arguments at the hearing. [00:32:06] Speaker 03: And the district court judge could have backed you into a corner. [00:32:09] Speaker 03: He said, for example, well, what happens if you strip off all the software and you just have a round plate? [00:32:16] Speaker 03: Right? [00:32:17] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:32:17] Speaker 03: You said, oh, no, no, that was still in French. [00:32:21] Speaker 03: No, that wouldn't have been in French. [00:32:23] Speaker 03: And then he said, well, what happens if it's just a bracket, different kind of structure? [00:32:27] Speaker 03: So that would be fine. [00:32:29] Speaker 02: We believe that if the intervening structure is a mounting mechanism, [00:32:33] Speaker 02: a connector, some sort of fastening mechanism, something that is designed to secure the cameras to the support post, that can have an intervening structure if a bracket includes part of its frame that's in between, if there's spacers and so forth. [00:32:51] Speaker 05: The concern I have is that even though you acknowledge that the camera doesn't have to be [00:32:58] Speaker 05: directly contacting, physically contacting the support member and that there can be some kind of intervening attachment mechanism. [00:33:09] Speaker 05: You appear to be arguing for a very specific kind of attachment mechanism, kind of like a pre-existing traditional attachment mechanism, and there's no room allowed for a more creative design of an attachment mechanism where some of the components of that attachment mechanism are doing some form of double duty. [00:33:36] Speaker 05: maybe they have not only are participating in the attachment, but they're also doing some other function. [00:33:45] Speaker 05: And that's the way I understand what you're arguing to us and what you argue below. [00:33:51] Speaker 05: And on that score, it's not clear to me why this functional language of being secured to [00:33:59] Speaker 05: necessarily requires a specific type of attachment mechanism, i.e. [00:34:07] Speaker 05: an attachment mechanism that performs no other function other than mere attachment? [00:34:14] Speaker 02: I don't believe that the line has to be that it performs no other function. [00:34:19] Speaker 02: But I do believe that the structure... Wait, wait, wait. [00:34:22] Speaker 03: You mean it's going to be okay if it performs another function? [00:34:25] Speaker 06: It could be, yes. [00:34:26] Speaker 06: But it's got to perform an attachment. [00:34:28] Speaker 02: If the primary function is an attachment mechanism... So you're backing away now from the argument you made the while and the argument you made in the brief. [00:34:36] Speaker 02: Your Honor, I believe that it's a spectrum. [00:34:40] Speaker 02: I think that there are clear attachment mechanisms where you definitely will have the image processing device that's secured to the support member, and then I think you will have [00:34:48] Speaker 02: complex mechanical configurations in which there is too much intervening structure. [00:34:55] Speaker 03: There's different... I'll give you the hypothetical that I think you would agree with, but I would say you're not giving a rational reason why. [00:35:04] Speaker 03: Let's assume that you're going to connect the cameras to the support means by a form of a bolt. [00:35:10] Speaker 03: Okay? [00:35:11] Speaker 03: And you say, well, that qualifies as a structure, right? [00:35:15] Speaker 03: A bolt or anything that puts things together. [00:35:17] Speaker 03: And let's assume it's a smart bulb. [00:35:20] Speaker 03: And the bulb has in it some software. [00:35:22] Speaker 03: And the bulb can read whether or not it's tightly fixed. [00:35:28] Speaker 03: That's all the software that reads that it's tightly fixed. [00:35:32] Speaker 03: You would agree that that would be sufficient structure, right? [00:35:36] Speaker 03: It's a bulb. [00:35:37] Speaker 03: It has another function. [00:35:39] Speaker 03: It has another function, but the function is related to tying it together, right? [00:35:43] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:35:44] Speaker 03: So you say that's fine. [00:35:45] Speaker 03: Now guess what? [00:35:46] Speaker 03: I have a different version of the bowl, and the difference of both puts additional software into the bowl, which not only decides whether or not the bowl is tightly fixed, but it also decides whether or not the whole system is functioning properly, which is what the motherboard does, right? [00:36:02] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:36:03] Speaker 03: And you would tell me that structure does not qualify, right? [00:36:06] Speaker 02: I believe that is still a mechanism for [00:36:12] Speaker 02: of fixing and securing the image processing device to the support member. [00:36:18] Speaker 03: Well, wait, if it is, then it's just a difference because it's a bolt instead of a disk. [00:36:24] Speaker 03: In order for you to win, you'd have to tell me my second iteration falls outside the scope because that has too many extra functions. [00:36:32] Speaker 06: It has... Your theory is the attachment mechanism. [00:36:37] Speaker 06: There has to be an attachment mechanism and a circuit board is not an attachment mechanism, right? [00:36:41] Speaker 02: A circuit board is not an attachment mechanism. [00:36:44] Speaker 02: And if you look... Because? [00:36:46] Speaker 02: Because of what the circuit board is designed to do. [00:36:52] Speaker 02: Mr. Keller's declaration at appendix 3947 through 3948 and paragraph 69 through 74, he describes what the circuit board is intended to do. [00:37:08] Speaker 02: It routes image data to the FPGA. [00:37:11] Speaker 02: It synchronizes those images on an image board. [00:37:15] Speaker 03: It facilitates distributing power. [00:37:26] Speaker 03: It is attached to... [00:37:32] Speaker 02: It is attached to a steel chassis, which is... In turn, in turn, it is attached to the support member with a bolt that secures an uptight. [00:37:42] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:37:43] Speaker 02: But in the language of the claim is not merely that it be attached to... No, no, no, no. [00:37:50] Speaker 06: Let's pause here and hear from Mr. Wecker. [00:37:53] Speaker 06: OK. [00:38:05] Speaker 06: to this. [00:38:07] Speaker 06: Suppose we're talking about the human body. [00:38:09] Speaker 06: Would you say that as a matter of plain and ordinary meaning that my eye is attacked, is secured to my foot? [00:38:16] Speaker 06: No, right? [00:38:19] Speaker 04: Right. [00:38:23] Speaker 04: That is correct. [00:38:25] Speaker 04: The important point about secured to, as agreed by the parties and found by the judge, [00:38:34] Speaker 04: is whether the parts relative to each other are movable. [00:38:42] Speaker 04: And it's in this infringed device, the camera, the support member, and the reflective surfaces are all secured to each other. [00:39:00] Speaker 06: OK, but that can't wait. [00:39:04] Speaker 06: That can't be sufficient because, I mean, all we can be saying then is if these two items are part of the same overall structure, no matter what's intervening between the two of them, one is the support member is secured to the cameras. [00:39:18] Speaker 06: That can't be true, right? [00:39:19] Speaker 06: It can't be just because they're part of the same overall structure. [00:39:24] Speaker 04: No, I agree that you have to do the analysis that you were discussing with Council about which [00:39:33] Speaker 04: which items attach to each other, but there are two important qualifications to that that Polycom conceded during the proceedings below. [00:39:48] Speaker 04: One is that there doesn't need to be direct contact between the [00:40:04] Speaker 04: attaching function is not necessarily the sole purpose of the item. [00:40:11] Speaker 04: And with those two, the circuit board is clearly an attaching item that secures the cameras to the support memory. [00:40:24] Speaker 06: I'm just not understanding how you're distinguishing that from a situation in which the two are set far apart. [00:40:31] Speaker 06: but are secured to the same overall structure, which is a matter of plain and ordinary meaning. [00:40:37] Speaker 06: It's hard to see that something that's at one end of the structure and one thing that's at the other end of the structure are secured together by the intervening structure. [00:40:47] Speaker 06: That's the problem. [00:40:48] Speaker 06: As a matter of plain and ordinary meaning, you don't think of one secured to the other under those circumstances. [00:40:55] Speaker 06: And I think you agree that that's the case. [00:41:00] Speaker 04: I agree that the issue is when you get to a complex structure, if there are enough interviewing attachments that the language of this claim cannot be extended to the entire device [00:41:29] Speaker 04: say there are particular purposes here, all of which are related to this invention. [00:41:41] Speaker 04: And for example, whether a circuit board can be considered an attachment or not, I think it's important to understand that the court [00:41:57] Speaker 04: also ruled on the basis of doctrine of equivalent that they claim that there was infringement. [00:42:12] Speaker 04: And using a circuit board that has other functions in addition to the attaching function is the same [00:42:27] Speaker 04: using a bolt or a other attachment mechanism. [00:42:39] Speaker 06: Okay, unless my colleagues have further questions about this, let's turn to the invalidity question. [00:42:48] Speaker 06: Is that the case that the district judge was confused about the standard for immolation seeming to require some disclosure that the particular piece of prior art is recognized as needing improvement? [00:43:08] Speaker 04: I do not believe that he [00:43:17] Speaker 04: to provide the motivation. [00:43:19] Speaker 04: He was merely requiring an evidentiary basis for the expert to explain why there was a known need for a modification and that the [00:43:47] Speaker 04: As I understand, Pellant's argument is that they're asserting that having a continuous support member is a matter as simple as repetition, which only comes from the specific Yamazawa [00:44:17] Speaker 04: figure where in fact what Yamazawa had was a stereo imaging device. [00:44:28] Speaker 04: In the normal case and in the cheese device, many examples in the patent, there is only a single pyramid reflective element. [00:44:41] Speaker 04: And so there's no repetition. [00:44:45] Speaker 04: This is not like perfect web or the aerospace. [00:44:52] Speaker 05: Mr. Wecker? [00:44:53] Speaker 05: Mr. Wecker, we also, for common sense, have relied on the notion that if it's really simple technology, then that could also lend itself to a common sense modification. [00:45:07] Speaker 05: And then what do you say about the idea that just extending those individual structural pieces into a single pole would just be a simple technological modification. [00:45:22] Speaker 05: It's just a mechanical thing that one could do. [00:45:25] Speaker 05: And the individual piece is already lined up in a column-like position with each other. [00:45:35] Speaker 04: The simplicity of that is not what one feels in the art would be on reviewing the prior art. [00:45:48] Speaker 04: Prior art, for example, if you consider the reasons to modify as rigidity and the other things that probably Tom's expert talked about, those issues were never an issue [00:46:08] Speaker 04: I-Works, which was the Disney-designed omnidirectional camera 30 years before the patent, had not required a continuous support member intersecting an inner volume of the pyramid-shaped element. [00:46:38] Speaker 04: It's just simply not a problem, as the district court found, to need that type of modification. [00:46:52] Speaker 04: And indeed, Dr. Keller, the polycom expert, conceded that there are other considerations, such as portability, that would [00:47:06] Speaker 04: suggests that you would not want such a structure. [00:47:09] Speaker 06: But why doesn't it at least raise a tribal issue? [00:47:13] Speaker 06: I mean, their expert gave reasons why you would extend a support member throughout the structure. [00:47:22] Speaker 06: And that may be credible or it may not be credible, but there's an affidavit there. [00:47:27] Speaker 06: What's wrong with the affidavit? [00:47:31] Speaker 04: Well, the affidavit was conclusory. [00:47:34] Speaker 04: And according to the authority that this court has created for single reference obviousness challenges, it has the three caveats, which in addition to simple, it is not used to apply missing limitations [00:48:04] Speaker 04: And this limitation about intersecting the inner volume is the inventive aspect of this patent. [00:48:16] Speaker 04: It's not peripheral, it's central. [00:48:20] Speaker 06: What case says that in a single reference obviousness determination, you can't supply a missing claim limitation? [00:48:27] Speaker 06: That's always happening when you're... Are you confusing the common sense cases with the [00:48:34] Speaker 06: with the single reference cases? [00:48:39] Speaker 04: They come, and the single case, single reference obviousness cases, Paulina Rennie, have the three caveats. [00:48:49] Speaker 04: I'm not saying that it's always the case that you couldn't use common sense to supply in the same limitation. [00:48:57] Speaker 04: Just that there are caveats to it, and the three, [00:49:05] Speaker 04: relate to whether it's a missing limitation or just supplying motivation to combine. [00:49:12] Speaker 04: The second is the simplicity of the modification, and the third is whether there's recent support for it. [00:49:25] Speaker 06: Suppose we disagree with you. [00:49:29] Speaker 06: on summary judgment on making findings. [00:49:32] Speaker 06: But suppose we disagree with you that the declaration or affidavit is not conclusive. [00:49:38] Speaker 06: Is it sufficient then to raise a fact issue? [00:49:45] Speaker 04: Well, we don't believe so because of the fact that the prior art is not interoperable as [00:49:59] Speaker 04: as having a continuous support member. [00:50:08] Speaker 04: And thus, even the patent is entitled to a presumption of validity. [00:50:16] Speaker 06: That's confusing. [00:50:18] Speaker 06: We're not talking about anticipation. [00:50:20] Speaker 06: We're assuming that the prior art doesn't disclose a continuous support member. [00:50:25] Speaker 06: That's the assumption as to why we're in the obviousness box rather than the anticipation box. [00:50:32] Speaker 06: So assuming that the expert has given reasons which we find are not conclusory for extending it, for extending the support member, why doesn't that raise a tribal issue of fact? [00:50:53] Speaker 04: I would still quibble with the concept that the expert could just supply reasons without some evidentiary basis. [00:51:03] Speaker 04: What the district court found was that there was no evidentiary basis to suggest that one skilled linear would have known that there was a need for modifying any of the prior art [00:51:23] Speaker 04: And that's a requirement first set forth in KSR that one must show that the motivation or the problem to be addressed was present and known to those skilled in the art. [00:51:51] Speaker 04: I'm not disputing the idea that if your honor is concluding or comes to the conclusion that the district court was in error for having found no material issues of disputed fact, that the remedy would be to reverse on that and send the parties to a trial. [00:52:26] Speaker 06: Okay, anything further? [00:52:28] Speaker 03: That discussion was with regard to the summary judgment that Holocaust made that was denied, right? [00:52:37] Speaker 03: Have you talked at all about the summary judgment was granted in your favor and the challenge to it? [00:52:45] Speaker 04: Well, I think these are really on the flip side of the coin. [00:52:52] Speaker 04: same difference in the argument. [00:52:54] Speaker 03: Except for the possible error by the district court, sir, in putting a burden on your adversary to show by clear and convincing evidence that they could prevail on that summary judgment. [00:53:08] Speaker 04: I don't believe that that's what the district court did. [00:53:12] Speaker 04: I think the district court understood that the stunts that have happened [00:53:21] Speaker 04: patent is that invalidity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. [00:53:29] Speaker 04: What the judge was doing on summary judgment was trying to determine if there were any material facts in dispute and concluded that there were not. [00:53:43] Speaker 04: So I don't believe that the judge imposed some burden on [00:53:51] Speaker 04: that wasn't warranted in this circumstance with respect to indolentity where the patent is presumed to be valid. [00:54:08] Speaker 06: Okay. [00:54:09] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:54:09] Speaker 06: Thank you, Mr. Worker. [00:54:11] Speaker 06: Ms. [00:54:11] Speaker 06: Hansiger, you've got two minutes here. [00:54:14] Speaker 01: I'm sorry. [00:54:14] Speaker 02: Two minutes, sir. [00:54:15] Speaker 06: Two minutes. [00:54:20] Speaker 02: I'll start with Yamazawa. [00:54:24] Speaker 02: Appendix 68 is the portion of the lower court's opinion not changing the burden of proof when he switched from analyzing our motion to analyzing full views motion. [00:54:37] Speaker 02: So we do believe that the court committed error in assigning Polycom the burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence on full views motion. [00:54:50] Speaker 02: alluded there is a good there's at least an argument that declaration is not conclusory. [00:54:56] Speaker 02: Mr. Keller's declaration is at 2903 [00:54:59] Speaker 02: through 2906 of the appendix. [00:55:02] Speaker 02: It includes specific reasons why the motivation to modify is there. [00:55:09] Speaker 02: There are portions that are cited in our brief that were not in my copy of the appendix, Your Honor, and that's at appendix 2889 through [00:55:21] Speaker 02: 2893, which provides additional support that Mr. Keller included in the record on the issue of obviousness. [00:55:29] Speaker 02: So I would like to submit that to the court after the hearing today. [00:55:34] Speaker 02: And unless there's any other questions on obviousness, I would go back to the non-infringement argument for a moment. [00:55:43] Speaker 02: With respect to non-infringement, we believe [00:55:46] Speaker 02: As a matter of law, there is no literal infringement because the claim does not merely require that the image cameras be attached to something. [00:55:56] Speaker 02: The claim literally requires that the image processing devices be secured to the support member. [00:56:03] Speaker 02: And there is no factual dispute in this case that the image processing accused cameras in this case are not secured to the support member. [00:56:14] Speaker 02: The circuit board is not a fastening device. [00:56:18] Speaker 02: Is it connected to other pieces in the mechanical arrangement? [00:56:22] Speaker 02: Yes, it is. [00:56:23] Speaker 02: But the circuit board serves purposes completely separate and apart from fastening any of the pieces together. [00:56:32] Speaker 02: And the portions of Mr. [00:56:37] Speaker 03: Keller's declaration that... But it's true that you did not argue that the circuit board didn't perform some fastening function. [00:56:47] Speaker 02: The circuit board is fastened between the chassis and the cameras. [00:56:51] Speaker 03: In order to attach the camera to the support member in his device, you need the circuit board. [00:57:01] Speaker 02: The circuit board is what the cameras are attached to. [00:57:04] Speaker 03: and the circuit board sits on top of it. [00:57:11] Speaker 02: If there is a fastener and attachment mechanism that has an intervening structure, yes, we agree with that. [00:57:23] Speaker 03: What the cameras are being attached to is not a fastening mechanism at all. [00:57:35] Speaker 03: which participates in the fastening, but it will be excluded from the scope of the claims if it has some character. [00:57:44] Speaker 02: The way we presented the claim construction issue was that the fastening has to happen to the support member. [00:57:51] Speaker 02: And that is the part that the court's construction left out, and that's the part that Fullview's construction left out, is it literally replaced the structural language of the claim. [00:58:00] Speaker 03: You agree that that passing to the support member can be accomplished through the intervening structure? [00:58:08] Speaker 02: And, Your Honor, I believe that there can be an intervening structure, yes. [00:58:14] Speaker 02: I believe that certain fastening mechanisms themselves have structure. [00:58:22] Speaker 02: It's a mounting device. [00:58:24] Speaker 03: It seems to me that in the context of this patent you're saying that what can qualify as a fastening as a member piece of the support assembly is unique for this patent. [00:58:37] Speaker 02: Is you need for this patent? [00:58:40] Speaker 03: You've agreed at the argument that the intervening structure can perform some function other than fascinating. [00:58:47] Speaker 03: The question is what is the intervening? [00:58:50] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:58:50] Speaker 03: I'm trying to dice down what's left for an argument. [00:58:54] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:58:55] Speaker 03: In the light of the presiding judge's comment that, you know, you wouldn't say if in this patent the cameras were connected to the [00:59:05] Speaker 03: support member, if it was a mile away and maybe it was a strand, it wouldn't be sensible. [00:59:11] Speaker 03: But here the materials are all close together. [00:59:14] Speaker 03: And if they had written claims that all that required... What I'm trying to say is shouldn't you have asked for a claim instruction that specifically said that the particular structure, right, has to directly, you're saying it has from the side of [00:59:34] Speaker 03: going up against the support member and you're saying in essence it has to be direct. [00:59:40] Speaker 02: We believe it has to be a fastening mechanism to begin with and that the circuit board is not that. [00:59:46] Speaker 03: And that therefore you don't have literal... If you're saying the circuit board can never be a fastening mechanism, wouldn't that be a question of fact? [00:59:55] Speaker 02: It could very well be a question of fact. [00:59:57] Speaker 03: We believe that because... Should this go back for claim construction and jury determination? [01:00:04] Speaker 02: We believe that it is not exactly present as written in the claims, and that therefore there is no literal infringement. [01:00:11] Speaker 02: And we believe under the doctrine of equivalence, the only evidence in the record on doctrine of equivalence is from Mr. Keller. [01:00:19] Speaker 02: And the Keller declaration regarding DOE is docket 195-4, paragraph 69 through 74, where he goes through why the circuit board performs [01:00:33] Speaker 02: in a substantially different way. [01:00:35] Speaker 02: Fullview submitted no evidence on doctrine of equivalence. [01:00:41] Speaker 02: Dr. Nola's declaration in support of their motion on infringement at docket 190-1 makes no mention of infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. [01:00:51] Speaker 02: His supplemental declaration at docket 198-2 makes no reference. [01:00:59] Speaker 02: And the court's only analysis of doctrine of equivalence is the use of an intermediary structure between the camera and the support member does not substantially change the way cameras are secured. [01:01:19] Speaker 06: I think we have your argument. [01:01:27] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor.