[00:00:00] Speaker 01: All right, Wang. [00:00:02] Speaker 02: Mr. Wang. [00:00:12] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:00:14] Speaker 02: My name is Ken Wang. [00:00:16] Speaker 02: I'm the attorney for a pendant. [00:00:19] Speaker 02: And also, I'm the inventor of this dimension. [00:00:23] Speaker 02: Before I proceed with my oral argument, I want to thank the court for giving me the opportunity to present my invention. [00:00:31] Speaker 02: So I want to talk about a short background about this invention, how it developed. [00:00:37] Speaker 02: So I'm the STEM collector for many years. [00:00:41] Speaker 02: So around 15 years ago, I had a hobby to collect STEM cover. [00:00:46] Speaker 02: So at the moment, most of the popular online auction is from eBay. [00:00:52] Speaker 02: So I participate a lot on the auction through eBay. [00:00:56] Speaker 02: But eBay is open bid auction. [00:00:59] Speaker 02: So really, the auction take seven days. [00:01:02] Speaker 02: So I need to wait a second to win the auction to meet my hobby of collect stem cover. [00:01:08] Speaker 02: So most of the times, I'm busy at lawyer price law. [00:01:12] Speaker 02: I cannot participate last second. [00:01:14] Speaker 02: Then even I win, [00:01:16] Speaker 02: Before the last second, most of the collectors know how it works and outbid me a last second. [00:01:23] Speaker 02: Therefore, most of the time I lost. [00:01:27] Speaker 02: When more and more sellers and other people know I have a habit for certain covers, they always build out price. [00:01:35] Speaker 02: By fake ID, by the register, the bidder try to build out the price. [00:01:43] Speaker 02: If I did not participate in that auction, the price of that kind of cover were low. [00:01:48] Speaker 02: If I participate, the price is very high because people know a bidder. [00:01:52] Speaker 01: So what does that [00:01:54] Speaker 01: have to do with a computer because you could take that same approach without using a computer and just do it on a pencil and paper basis, right? [00:02:08] Speaker 01: Yes, Your Honor. [00:02:08] Speaker 02: So if you have a question, I think Your Honor may read the article. [00:02:15] Speaker 02: that I read the argument, the Professor Simon Parsons, that's an article related to auction and bidding a guide for computer scientists. [00:02:28] Speaker 02: This article, the background information was cited and introduced by the USPTO examiners. [00:02:36] Speaker 02: So in that article, [00:02:38] Speaker 02: the USP2 examiner introduced article means that this article is inadmissible, that he agree with position of the Professor Simmons. [00:02:50] Speaker 03: Is there anything in Professor Parson that says what you're talking about is a technical problem or that there's a technical solution to it? [00:03:01] Speaker 03: It seems that the problems you identify [00:03:05] Speaker 03: also could plague offline auctions as much as online auctions. [00:03:10] Speaker 03: So what in, Professor Parson, would show otherwise? [00:03:14] Speaker ?: OK. [00:03:14] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:03:15] Speaker 02: So if you open the opening brief, page 12, so in the appendix, the page [00:03:29] Speaker 02: 375. [00:03:30] Speaker 02: So the... 375? [00:03:33] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:03:33] Speaker 02: Okay, Appendix 375 and the brief on Document 89, page 15. [00:03:40] Speaker 03: I've got Appendix 375. [00:03:46] Speaker 03: Is this part of Parson? [00:03:47] Speaker 02: Yeah, yeah. [00:03:48] Speaker 02: And you can open the brief. [00:03:51] Speaker 02: The Document 89, page 15, filed on November [00:03:57] Speaker 00: Is it page 15 of your opening brief? [00:04:01] Speaker 02: Yeah, document 89, page 15. [00:04:04] Speaker 02: The blue brief. [00:04:06] Speaker 02: Yeah, opening brief. [00:04:07] Speaker 02: So the professor person very clearly identified the technical problem that in the online auction. [00:04:16] Speaker 02: So if you want to permit me to read short part. [00:04:21] Speaker 02: So this is your read from 375. [00:04:24] Speaker 02: Yeah, yeah. [00:04:25] Speaker 02: So this is the document 89, page 15. [00:04:32] Speaker 02: This is professor clearly identified. [00:04:34] Speaker 02: I'm sorry. [00:04:35] Speaker 01: I'm looking at page 375. [00:04:37] Speaker 01: How can we find the passage that you're referring to? [00:04:43] Speaker 03: Are you referring us at 375 to the paragraph that begins, shills are a particular problem in internet auctions? [00:04:49] Speaker 03: Is that what you want us to look at? [00:04:51] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:04:52] Speaker 02: Let me see. [00:04:56] Speaker 02: Okay, give me one second. [00:05:01] Speaker 03: It would be more helpful just to keep us in the appendix rather than your brief. [00:05:05] Speaker 02: Okay, I think that in our brief, in my brief, give me one second. [00:05:10] Speaker 02: I think that... So in the opening brief, this is the FICA ID and also the page [00:05:27] Speaker 02: 14, I identify e-sniping. [00:05:32] Speaker 02: So online auction, the bidder, all the bidder. [00:05:38] Speaker 03: My question, my concern about your appeal is that you identify problems arguably that do plague online auctions, but it seems like there are also problems for non-online auctions. [00:05:52] Speaker 03: And it seems like all Professor Parsons says that some of these are particular problems or maybe even bigger problems for online auctions, but none of that means that they're not also problems for offline auctions. [00:06:04] Speaker 03: So do you have anything we could look at that would say these are just online auction problems? [00:06:11] Speaker 02: Your Honor, I think that I do raise my brief that the Professor Simmons identified the shield as a particular problem for online auction. [00:06:24] Speaker 02: So think about it this way. [00:06:26] Speaker 02: In the live auction, how many people use fake ID? [00:06:29] Speaker 02: How many? [00:06:29] Speaker 02: Very few people, such as today at policy auction. [00:06:32] Speaker 02: Do you think I will bring my FICA ID? [00:06:34] Speaker 02: Maybe not. [00:06:35] Speaker 02: But on the auction, the people can register with, okay, ABC is my name, and the email is very easy to register. [00:06:43] Speaker 02: So at this moment, the people use the FICA ID and build out the price. [00:06:50] Speaker 01: That's called shield. [00:06:52] Speaker 01: Okay, but if I understand what you're saying is that the computation of the bids [00:06:59] Speaker 01: is not unique to online auctions. [00:07:03] Speaker 01: But the false identification is a problem for online auctions that doesn't exist for in-person auctions. [00:07:12] Speaker 01: Is that correct? [00:07:13] Speaker 02: Yes, that too. [00:07:14] Speaker 02: So from the Professor Simmons, [00:07:20] Speaker 02: he identified because there's no effective solution to previous fake ID. [00:07:27] Speaker 01: And they can do much more. [00:07:27] Speaker 01: OK, but it is correct that the mechanism for computing and recomputing the bid, all that could be a problem in an in-person auction as well as an online auction, right? [00:07:43] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:07:44] Speaker 01: OK. [00:07:44] Speaker 01: So what you're saying is that this is uniquely dealing with the problem of identification? [00:07:52] Speaker 01: But I didn't understand that to be the invention here. [00:07:59] Speaker 02: OK, Your Honor. [00:08:00] Speaker 02: Through the three unique features, that if these three unique features have been implemented through the reverse CUBIT auction, [00:08:11] Speaker 02: then this FICA ID does not affect you anymore. [00:08:16] Speaker 02: So then the debater don't have to register a FICA ID to bid. [00:08:22] Speaker 02: So under this consensus, the concern from the Professor Simon had been resolved by an effective solution. [00:08:33] Speaker 03: When you say Professor Simmons, I think you mean Simon Parson. [00:08:36] Speaker 03: It's the same Professor Parson that we were talking about. [00:08:39] Speaker 02: Yes, Simon Parson. [00:08:40] Speaker 02: Simon Parson. [00:08:41] Speaker 02: Got it. [00:08:41] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:08:42] Speaker 02: And also, Your Honor, if you refer to the document 64, page 13, the examiner [00:08:58] Speaker 02: I'm sorry, is this in the appendix? [00:09:01] Speaker 02: Oh, no, no. [00:09:01] Speaker 02: See, my reply brief. [00:09:03] Speaker 02: Your reply brief. [00:09:04] Speaker 02: Yeah, document 64, page 13. [00:09:10] Speaker 02: The examiner would admit that in the second paragraph, the claims may speak to an improvement to COPD means. [00:09:27] Speaker 02: See, you only see that part? [00:09:28] Speaker 02: I'm not sure if I do. [00:09:30] Speaker 02: Is it on page 13 of your gray brief? [00:09:33] Speaker 02: Document 84. [00:09:34] Speaker 03: Document 64, reply brief, page 13. [00:09:37] Speaker 03: The corrected one is 84, I believe. [00:09:40] Speaker 00: At least that. [00:09:42] Speaker 00: Can I just suggest something, which is that I think you will be better off if you refer us to the appendix and different evidence you have as opposed to your briefs. [00:09:51] Speaker 02: So appendix 158. [00:09:54] Speaker 02: 158. [00:09:58] Speaker 02: under Appendix 1461. [00:10:06] Speaker 02: The USPTO examiner admitted that the claims may speak to an improvement to sealed bid means. [00:10:25] Speaker 03: Sealed bids is one of your two patent applications. [00:10:28] Speaker 03: Is that right? [00:10:29] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:10:30] Speaker 02: And also, I hope the reverse. [00:10:32] Speaker 02: The reverse means that people are looking for lower price. [00:10:36] Speaker 02: Sealed bids, looking for the higher price, higher price. [00:10:40] Speaker 02: So this case, this appeal, it consolidated both applications. [00:10:44] Speaker 03: Which part of 158 is supportive of your argument? [00:10:49] Speaker 02: Support that sealed bids. [00:10:54] Speaker 02: If my answer is correct. [00:10:55] Speaker 03: Right. [00:10:56] Speaker 03: It relates to sealed bids. [00:10:58] Speaker 03: I get that. [00:10:58] Speaker 03: But can you help us identify where on 158? [00:11:02] Speaker 02: So you said one sentence, because I don't bring my appendix. [00:11:06] Speaker 02: So the claim may speak to improvement to sealed bid means. [00:11:21] Speaker 01: I'm still not understanding. [00:11:23] Speaker 01: You've agreed. [00:11:24] Speaker 01: that the bid computation mechanism is not related to a computer that can be in an in-person auction as well as an online auction. [00:11:36] Speaker 01: You're saying that the invention deals with the problem of people using false identities in online auctions. [00:11:48] Speaker 01: Where did you identify that as the [00:11:53] Speaker 01: Inventive concept here or the thing that made this pact eligible. [00:11:59] Speaker 01: Okay, your honor So my invention is that one of the I didn't understand that to be one of the three novel features that you relied on Okay, your honor if my invention had had it been not implemented I [00:12:13] Speaker 02: I will reach the result that the fake ID is not effective anymore. [00:12:19] Speaker 02: So I reach the result. [00:12:21] Speaker 02: It's the target that the professor. [00:12:25] Speaker 01: I don't understand the connection. [00:12:26] Speaker 01: I mean, what does the bidding mechanism have to do with fake ID? [00:12:31] Speaker 02: OK. [00:12:31] Speaker 01: Your Honor, may I explain to you? [00:12:34] Speaker 02: So the people use fake ID because they know who is bidding, how much they bid. [00:12:42] Speaker 02: So I run some page, such as, OK, I bid $10. [00:12:46] Speaker 02: If the guy who is fake, who wants to, oh, $10 is too slow. [00:12:50] Speaker 02: I may bid $20. [00:12:51] Speaker 02: In order for me to win, I have to bid $20 and more. [00:12:55] Speaker 02: So eventually, the guy is fake. [00:12:58] Speaker 02: I pay more prices. [00:13:00] Speaker 01: However, if the seal bid, so the guy who put a fake ID to bid. [00:13:06] Speaker 01: So you're saying that the use of this bidding mechanism discourages the use of fake IDs. [00:13:11] Speaker 02: Yeah, eventually, fake ID doesn't work anymore. [00:13:14] Speaker 02: Nobody use fake ID because he don't know the price. [00:13:17] Speaker 00: Can you tell me where in, say, claim 133 this is reflected? [00:13:24] Speaker 00: Where is this aspect recited in claim 133? [00:13:30] Speaker 02: So fake ID? [00:13:32] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:13:32] Speaker 02: Would you like a paraphrase? [00:13:34] Speaker 00: I would like to know where you've asserted the fake ID aspect is something that's a technological solution to a technological problem. [00:13:42] Speaker 00: I understand you to be asserting that. [00:13:44] Speaker 00: I want to know how that is included in the representative claim. [00:13:49] Speaker 02: OK. [00:13:50] Speaker 02: Your Honor, I do not specify the fake ID in the claim. [00:13:53] Speaker 00: That's OK. [00:13:54] Speaker 00: If you tell me how the claim, what's recited in it, [00:13:58] Speaker 00: relates to fake ID, that would be helpful. [00:14:01] Speaker 02: Yeah, yeah, Your Honor. [00:14:02] Speaker 02: So I agree with you that in the claim, I don't specify that the invention will fix or resolve the fake ID. [00:14:12] Speaker 02: However, what I claim, my invention will resolve the issue of fake ID because the people will not have any incentive [00:14:24] Speaker 02: to use FicaID to bid anymore because he don't know the price at all. [00:14:30] Speaker 02: So use FicaID, the purpose is open bid. [00:14:33] Speaker 02: Such I give you example, I bid $10, people use FicaID bid $20. [00:14:37] Speaker 02: In order for me to win, I should bid $20 and more. [00:14:40] Speaker 02: So therefore, that incentive for people use FicaID to build out price. [00:14:45] Speaker 02: If you use the seal bid, the guy don't have no way to know the price at all. [00:14:50] Speaker 02: So what purpose is FicaID? [00:14:52] Speaker 02: That make no difference. [00:14:53] Speaker 02: However, [00:14:55] Speaker 02: If the people use the regular, the traditional CO bid, the bid I bid $10, people $20, there are a lot of negative things because people said, OK, I don't know the prices. [00:15:08] Speaker 02: I bid $100. [00:15:09] Speaker 02: But second-hand price will be $10. [00:15:12] Speaker 02: I bid too much, $90. [00:15:13] Speaker 02: I don't want pricey CO bid anymore. [00:15:15] Speaker 02: So therefore, I have to develop a mechanism and a way to try to recalculations. [00:15:21] Speaker 02: But what purpose for recalculations? [00:15:24] Speaker 00: Do you agree that your sealed bid mechanism would result in solving some problems were it used in a non-online auction? [00:15:38] Speaker 02: The answer is yes, possibly. [00:15:44] Speaker 02: However, [00:15:45] Speaker 02: you want to seal bid, that for online, so not only resolve the figure ID, but also, you don't seal bid, you cannot open, such that if you open the prices, they cannot call seal bid anymore, until the end of auction. [00:16:00] Speaker 02: So the computer, to recognize the valid bid, such that the price is lower than the start prices, they reject it, that's not happen in the live auction. [00:16:10] Speaker 02: Live auction is you seal the price, so give the people, end of auction, people open. [00:16:16] Speaker 02: Right? [00:16:17] Speaker 02: On that option, people submit the bid. [00:16:20] Speaker 02: So such as the money price is too low, they react automatically. [00:16:23] Speaker 02: They have to sue computer. [00:16:25] Speaker 02: That's not how the manual can do it. [00:16:28] Speaker 02: That means that the suit bid is how to rely on the computer, such as the prices are lower than the prices, then they become invalid and rejected by the computer without anyone else knowing it. [00:16:43] Speaker 02: They have to rely on the computer. [00:16:45] Speaker 01: Okay, I think we're out of time here. [00:16:48] Speaker 01: We'll give you two minutes for rebuttal. [00:16:51] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:16:52] Speaker 01: You have to sit down. [00:17:00] Speaker 01: Is my train docked? [00:17:08] Speaker 04: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:17:10] Speaker 04: I'd like to address the shilling and the sniping as [00:17:15] Speaker 04: a technical solution to a technical problem. [00:17:20] Speaker 04: The Parsons article that we were discussing earlier, even though on page 375 it talks about shilling as a particular problem in internet options, on appendix 370. [00:17:38] Speaker 01: Before you start, help me. [00:17:40] Speaker 01: Was this argument that we're hearing today made [00:17:44] Speaker 01: I mean, it's a surprise to me. [00:17:49] Speaker 01: I thought the invention here was a novel method of calculating the bid, which made it fairer and so on and so forth. [00:18:01] Speaker 01: I didn't understand that it had to do somehow with preventing false identification. [00:18:10] Speaker 04: I believe below, Your Honor, there was a lot more talk about bad faith bidding in general and sniping and shilling. [00:18:17] Speaker 04: And now the blue brief has talked a little bit about fake IDs. [00:18:23] Speaker 04: But the shilling and the sniping were also discussed below at the board. [00:18:30] Speaker 01: OK, but was the argument made that this bid calculation methodology somehow eliminated the problem of fake IDs? [00:18:40] Speaker 04: I believe it was made, Your Honor, but not explained as to how that works. [00:18:46] Speaker 04: So Appellant argued that the claimed three novel features resolve these problems. [00:18:59] Speaker 04: But the connection to how it would be resolved was not explained very well. [00:19:06] Speaker 04: So the Parsons article, [00:19:10] Speaker 04: Also explains on appendix 372 and 374 that shills and sniping were a problem and are a problem in live auctions. [00:19:20] Speaker 04: This is not a specific problem to online auctions. [00:19:27] Speaker 04: At 372, kind of in the middle of the page, there's a paragraph beginning, in any kind of auction with a closing time, sniping can be a problem. [00:19:37] Speaker 04: and is observed in both internet auctions and their low tech cousins, the silent auctions. [00:19:42] Speaker 04: So that's just the reference talking about sniping in general. [00:19:48] Speaker 04: And then two pages later, at the bottom of 374, Mr. Parsons says, shills, briefly mentioned in section two, are one way for sellers and auctioneers to manipulate the price in their favor. [00:20:03] Speaker 04: For example, in English auctions, and then [00:20:06] Speaker 04: Mr. Parsons goes on to explain the history of shilling. [00:20:12] Speaker 04: The blue brief on page 27 and 28 argues that the sealed bid part of the claims is what resolves everything, what resolves shilling, what resolves sniping, and the fake ID. [00:20:31] Speaker 04: It doesn't connect those two things, but that's the argument. [00:20:34] Speaker 04: And the specification does the same on appendix 10. [00:20:40] Speaker 04: I'm sorry, it's not appendix 10. [00:20:41] Speaker 04: It's the specification at paragraph 10. [00:21:00] Speaker 04: So on appendix 254, it's the end of [00:21:04] Speaker 04: Paragraph 10, the first full sentence. [00:21:07] Speaker 04: Since open auctions have many deficiencies, mainly because of publicly visible bid amounts, one of the ways to overcome these deficiencies is through sealed bid auction, where bid amounts are not disclosed during the time of the sealed bid auction. [00:21:22] Speaker 04: So the claims are not directed to a technical problem. [00:21:34] Speaker 04: nor a technical solution. [00:21:36] Speaker 03: Is that a question of fact or a question of law? [00:21:42] Speaker 04: I believe that the technical problem and technical solution usually don't involve a lot of facts. [00:21:49] Speaker 04: Here there's a Parsons reference, and so maybe that is an issue of fact in the actual reference. [00:21:57] Speaker 03: So I mean, how would we resolve it here? [00:21:59] Speaker 03: Because I understand Mr. Wang to be arguing he does have a technical solution to a technical problem. [00:22:04] Speaker 03: You're arguing the opposite. [00:22:05] Speaker 03: Is that something that's factual, or that's something we decide as a matter of law? [00:22:12] Speaker 04: I think the overall decision, of course, Your Honor, is a matter of law that you would decide de novo. [00:22:17] Speaker 04: And I think that based on the record as a whole, even the arguments that appellant makes in the blue brief, [00:22:27] Speaker 04: There's no question here that even the appellant has said that sealing the bids is the thing that solves the problem. [00:22:39] Speaker 00: Can I ask you a question? [00:22:40] Speaker 00: Do I understand you to be saying the claims are directed to an abstract idea of mitigating risk or having a sealed auction? [00:22:53] Speaker 00: and that it's not a technological solution to a technological problem, because this same concept could apply even off the computer, and the computer is being used for conventional purposes. [00:23:04] Speaker 00: Is that your position? [00:23:07] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honor. [00:23:07] Speaker 04: I think that's exactly our position. [00:23:10] Speaker 04: The claims themselves are directed to, as the appellant himself says in the specification, mitigating risks to sealed bid auctions. [00:23:22] Speaker 04: maybe online sealed bid auctions. [00:23:25] Speaker 04: That's still an abstract idea. [00:23:29] Speaker 04: And all of the technology involved in this invention are just general computers, general generic computing elements, and that does not draw the claim out of the abstract realm. [00:23:45] Speaker 03: At step two, Mr. Wang writes, it happens to be in his reply brief at 17, but he says, there's no record to support any of the three novel features of the claim dimensions being well-known, routine, and conventional activities in the relevant auction industry. [00:24:05] Speaker 03: Is he right? [00:24:05] Speaker 03: There's no record to support that? [00:24:08] Speaker 03: And if he's right about that, how could we affirm? [00:24:17] Speaker 04: I don't think that that statement is not supported, Your Honor, because there were three novel features argued. [00:24:25] Speaker 04: Two of them, the board found, were part of the abstract idea itself, and that was the receiving the bids and I think it was the receiving and the collection of the bids. [00:24:41] Speaker 01: The three novel features are solely concerned with the bidding mechanism, right? [00:24:47] Speaker 04: That's correct. [00:24:49] Speaker 01: OK, so if the bidding mechanism is something that could solve problems for an in-person auction, then it's not unique to the computer environment. [00:25:02] Speaker 04: I agree, Your Honor. [00:25:05] Speaker 03: And did you have anything further to say about the third of the three purportedly novel ideas? [00:25:09] Speaker 04: So the third of the three novel ideas was the allocation of the bid [00:25:16] Speaker 04: to the different parties that are involved in the auction and displaying them. [00:25:21] Speaker 04: In the claim, it is claimed as a display of the allocation of bids. [00:25:26] Speaker 04: So again, they're a part of the auction itself. [00:25:30] Speaker 04: And any technology is just in pushing that out to the display, which is also abstract. [00:25:44] Speaker 04: If there are no further questions, I will yield my time. [00:25:47] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:25:47] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:25:49] Speaker 01: Mr. Wang, you have two minutes. [00:25:54] Speaker 02: So, Your Honor, I want to focus on arguments related to inventive concepts. [00:26:00] Speaker 02: So, Your Honor, when you have time to read the brief from both parties, I do think that the government brief or opposition brief [00:26:09] Speaker 02: top of anything related to the inventive concept that I present is not eligible. [00:26:16] Speaker 02: They oversimplified my inventive concept. [00:26:21] Speaker 02: So they don't provide any evidence to prove the commitment, reconciliation, and allocation the three features that are practiced in any traditional [00:26:33] Speaker 02: auction or online auction. [00:26:35] Speaker 02: They did not. [00:26:37] Speaker 02: So therefore, by itself, the government did not meet their burden to reject my patent applications. [00:26:43] Speaker 02: So I think they always had some little bit of experience for auctions. [00:26:51] Speaker 02: When you lose in the auction, [00:26:53] Speaker 02: You don't get anything, even one penny. [00:26:56] Speaker 02: Why? [00:26:57] Speaker 02: You lose. [00:26:57] Speaker 02: The winner wins the auction. [00:26:59] Speaker 02: They pay the money, get something. [00:27:01] Speaker 02: So if you lose, nothing. [00:27:03] Speaker 02: But in this auction that I present, assume that your price is at some point at a second high price. [00:27:10] Speaker 02: I'll use the reference. [00:27:12] Speaker 02: You'll get some money. [00:27:13] Speaker 02: That's the non-generic, never happen in the prior era. [00:27:19] Speaker 02: And this is the inventive because the loser get some portion of the money from the auction. [00:27:27] Speaker 02: So you read the government brief, they did not reject about my inventive concept. [00:27:35] Speaker 02: They talk nothing about my inventive concept. [00:27:38] Speaker 02: They only talk about that the mitigate risk actually [00:27:43] Speaker 02: the government is wrong because my invention not only mitigate risk, my invention at some point is uncertain risk. [00:27:52] Speaker 02: The uncertain risk is totally different, mitigate risk. [00:27:56] Speaker 02: So at some point, the price is higher than the price you bid. [00:28:02] Speaker 02: Sometimes it is lower. [00:28:03] Speaker 02: If lower, of course, you mitigate risk. [00:28:06] Speaker 02: At some point, higher than you bid. [00:28:08] Speaker 02: You increase risk. [00:28:09] Speaker 02: So therefore, the government... I think we're out of time. [00:28:12] Speaker 02: Okay. [00:28:13] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:28:14] Speaker 02: Thank you, Mr. Mayor. [00:28:15] Speaker 01: Thank you.