[00:00:00] Speaker 01: Final case this morning is MyPak Holdings versus Samsung Electronics 2023-2024. [00:00:13] Speaker 02: May it please the court. [00:00:15] Speaker 02: Jim Carmichael for Appellant MyPak. [00:00:18] Speaker 02: This is my partner Steve McBride at the council table. [00:00:21] Speaker 02: And we also have Brad Close, who is the executive vice president of MyPak, the patent owner. [00:00:32] Speaker 02: I'm going to focus on the three most glaring legal errors that the PTAB made, which are the claim construction of core state, pawn startup, and processor system, all for de novo review by this court. [00:00:48] Speaker 02: First, core state. [00:00:50] Speaker 02: The legal error committed by the PTAB here was failing to give credit to the inventors acting as their own lexicographer. [00:01:00] Speaker 02: The first time the specification uses the claimed term core state, it uses the parenthetical with quotation marks as C state to explicitly define core state for the rest of the specification. [00:01:15] Speaker 03: This is on column five, right? [00:01:18] Speaker 02: Yes, you are correct. [00:01:21] Speaker 03: But that's in the context of a discussion that began with, now we're going to talk about the advanced configuration and power interface. [00:01:28] Speaker 03: And now everything is being talked about within what's an ACPI, rather than being definitional. [00:01:39] Speaker 02: I would submit that. [00:01:40] Speaker 03: If you want to know what the core state is within ACPI, we're just telling you in that parenthetical. [00:01:46] Speaker 03: That's not definitional. [00:01:48] Speaker 02: Our position is that it is a definition. [00:01:51] Speaker 02: It's consistently used that way throughout the patent. [00:01:54] Speaker 02: And most importantly, that is such a common convention in our field, in all legal documents, even in the first sentence of the PTAB's decision under review. [00:02:06] Speaker 02: They use this convention six times. [00:02:08] Speaker 02: You say a word, you put it in parentheses and quotation marks, and you define it. [00:02:14] Speaker 02: There's no getting around it. [00:02:16] Speaker 02: Whatever part of the discussion it is, the most important part, I think, it's the first time in the specification that core state is mentioned. [00:02:25] Speaker 02: And that's where it's defined. [00:02:27] Speaker 02: As is typical, you don't redefine it again later every time you use it. [00:02:33] Speaker 04: Help me understand what difference it would make if we adopt your construction and say the board was, I guess, too broad in its construction. [00:02:44] Speaker 02: Thank you, Joseph Stark. [00:02:46] Speaker 02: The difference is that the petitioner never contended that the patent claims would be unpatentable if our construction is correct. [00:02:59] Speaker 02: That's because the references they put forth have nothing to do with the ACPI in general or the ACPIC states in particular. [00:03:10] Speaker 04: So even though it seems like ACPI, the C states, there's like a potentially infinite number of C states. [00:03:18] Speaker 04: That is, it seems like it's itself a very broad concept. [00:03:22] Speaker 04: If your claims were limited to the broad ACPI C states, it's unclear to me why there probably wouldn't still be a problem for you. [00:03:34] Speaker 04: But you're saying they haven't even made that argument. [00:03:36] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:03:43] Speaker 02: The specification uses the two terms interchangeably. [00:03:48] Speaker 02: For example, at the 514 patent calling 26, it refers to ACPIC state C0, but then calls it core state C0. [00:04:04] Speaker 02: So they're using those two words to mean the same thing. [00:04:08] Speaker 02: And the party's experts both agreed that [00:04:11] Speaker 02: core state means C states in this patent. [00:04:17] Speaker 02: When specifically asked what is the plain and ordinary meaning of core states in this patent, the petitioner's own expert said core state, they, the inventors, call it a C state. [00:04:33] Speaker 02: He also then went on to say the ACPI describes the C states, which are the core states. [00:04:41] Speaker 03: What do you make of column 9, lines 11 through 14? [00:04:55] Speaker 03: Further examples indicating a system operational state include, without limitation, a signal providing a performance state or a core state [00:05:04] Speaker 03: of a processor, such as a P-state or C-state. [00:05:09] Speaker 02: Yes, thank you for bringing that to our attention, Judge Toronto, because that is something that the board cited. [00:05:16] Speaker 02: But then they stopped halfway through the quotation. [00:05:20] Speaker 03: As I just did. [00:05:24] Speaker 02: So the board, the entire quotation, the relevant part of this sentence goes on. [00:05:34] Speaker 02: Yes, it's a long sentence, that's right. [00:05:37] Speaker 02: And starting with where the board started, it says, the core state of a processor, such as a C state, that's where they stopped, but it goes on to completely have a different meaning than if you just stop reading there, which is of course inappropriate. [00:06:00] Speaker 02: So the entire thought here is, [00:06:03] Speaker 02: core state of a processor such as a C state indicating, for example, that. [00:06:10] Speaker 02: And then there are six examples of what a C state can indicate. [00:06:15] Speaker 02: So that is what is the such as, is the examples of what a C state can indicate. [00:06:23] Speaker 02: And there's six specific technical examples here. [00:06:32] Speaker 04: So it's not examples of what a core state is, it's examples of different types of C states. [00:06:40] Speaker 02: It's examples of what different C states can indicate. [00:06:44] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:06:45] Speaker 04: But it's not saying in your reading that C states are one example of a core state, and there may be a whole bunch of other things that could be a core state in this pattern. [00:06:55] Speaker 02: Right, it's not saying that at all, which is of course why the board and [00:06:59] Speaker 02: The petitioner both put a period in the middle of the sentence when they quoted it to you to have a different meaning than what's actually being said in the patent. [00:07:09] Speaker 03: Are you suggesting that the claims are limited to basically something within this ACPI industry standard? [00:07:23] Speaker 03: There's no reference to that standard in the claim language unless, I guess, your argument is that by saying core state, it's back to saying we are now within the world of the ACPI standard. [00:07:42] Speaker 02: Yes, that's correct. [00:07:43] Speaker 02: This is explicitly defined in the specification that a core state is an ACPI C-state. [00:08:00] Speaker 02: Because of this explicit lexicographic definition, and as we pointed out, Judge Stark, the lack of petitioners saying that they could possibly win under our definition, the board definition should be reversed. [00:08:21] Speaker 02: The court should construe court states as C states, and no remand for further application of that [00:08:29] Speaker 02: is necessary. [00:08:31] Speaker 04: That issue goes to just two claims in the 514 and two claims in the 759 patent, correct? [00:08:36] Speaker 02: Yes, that's correct. [00:08:37] Speaker 04: And are you saying, let's just for the sake of argument, if I agreed with you on this argument you've made on the claim construction, but nothing else in your briefs, I can still, as a matter of law, say your claims have not been proven unpatentable? [00:08:53] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:08:54] Speaker 04: Or might it need to be remanded for other issues that weren't reached with respect to those four claims? [00:09:00] Speaker 02: Yeah, so our position is that you certainly should state that the correct construction is C-States, it's an explicit definition, and that under that definition the claims are patentable and there's no need for a remand for the board to apply the correctly stated [00:09:25] Speaker 04: But are there any unresolved issues that maybe the board didn't reach as part of their challenge to those four claims that are implicated on the core state's limitation? [00:09:37] Speaker 02: So there is another ground based on a reference called Hwang that the board did not reach. [00:09:48] Speaker 04: So we would have to remand at best for you on those claims, correct? [00:09:55] Speaker 02: I know that's the practice of the court, but I disagree with it. [00:10:00] Speaker 02: You have some at 30 that I could rely on? [00:10:03] Speaker 02: Sure, I do. [00:10:04] Speaker 02: And the reason that you wouldn't remand for issues that the Board didn't address is the 12-month deadline that the Board has under 35 U.S.C. [00:10:18] Speaker 02: Section 316, and we're already at 28 months now. [00:10:23] Speaker 02: It is too late for the Board to make a decision on that. [00:10:28] Speaker 02: There are two now, admittedly. [00:10:33] Speaker 02: We've said the opposite of that, right? [00:10:36] Speaker 03: We said that the one-year rule does not preclude decisions on remand, which would be crazy. [00:10:46] Speaker 02: I'm not familiar with there being a precedential decision from the court stating that. [00:10:54] Speaker 02: I'm aware of two dissents by Judge Radina agreeing with me, which I can give you those sites. [00:11:04] Speaker 02: How could that system work? [00:11:08] Speaker 02: Oh, how it could work is the board can follow the statute and under 35 U.S.C. [00:11:13] Speaker 02: 316. [00:11:15] Speaker 03: It could never decide anything on a remand? [00:11:18] Speaker 02: No, that's not true. [00:11:21] Speaker 02: They have to issue a final written decision under 316 within 12 months. [00:11:25] Speaker 02: And on the Hawaiian ground, they didn't do that. [00:11:29] Speaker 02: That doesn't say that you couldn't remand in another case. [00:11:33] Speaker 02: On the same ground? [00:11:35] Speaker 02: Yes, exactly. [00:11:38] Speaker 02: OK. [00:11:38] Speaker 02: So moving to upon startup, I see I have 30 seconds left. [00:11:45] Speaker 02: Upon startup, [00:11:48] Speaker 02: The board legally aired there by concerning upon startup to mean during operation, which would begin at startup. [00:11:57] Speaker 02: The problem with that is the specification defines two separate times. [00:12:02] Speaker 02: This is at column 13, line 39 to 43, appendix page 129. [00:12:06] Speaker 02: It says either one, upon power up of such a system, or two, during its continued operation. [00:12:15] Speaker 02: So both of those time periods, one and two, [00:12:18] Speaker 02: They might be contemplated by the specification, but dependent claims 13 and 18 specifically narrow that down to only time one upon power up and not two, which is during the continued operation. [00:12:36] Speaker 02: And so in the end, the court should rule that the proper construction of upon [00:12:45] Speaker 02: startup means during startup, not after. [00:12:58] Speaker 02: With four minutes left, I guess I'll reserve that for Roboto. [00:13:01] Speaker 01: We will save it for you. [00:13:02] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:13:09] Speaker 01: Ms. [00:13:09] Speaker 01: Pryor. [00:13:10] Speaker 00: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:13:12] Speaker 00: May it please the Court, beginning with [00:13:17] Speaker 00: Core state. [00:13:18] Speaker 00: The board properly construed the core state limitation based on the intrinsic record and the meaning of core state to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. [00:13:31] Speaker 00: My PAC is attempting to argue that there was a lexicographic redefinition of the term core state, but the references to core state in this specification don't include the types of hallmarks or indicia [00:13:46] Speaker 00: of lexicography that this court has relied on and that MIPAC has even pointed to in the case law in which it relies upon. [00:13:55] Speaker 00: This specification uses embodiment language. [00:13:59] Speaker 00: As Judge Taranto rightly pointed out, it uses language including the phrase such as. [00:14:04] Speaker 00: It uses language in describing the figure, an embodiment of processor core states. [00:14:13] Speaker 00: It calls it a representative system design. [00:14:17] Speaker 00: It also references core state without referencing C-State at column 22, line 65, indicating a processor core state. [00:14:26] Speaker 00: So there are examples in the specification where the specification discusses core state and doesn't include any reference to C-State. [00:14:35] Speaker 03: With regard to the particular parent... I think Mr. Carmichael said that the very first use of the [00:14:43] Speaker 03: Two-word phrase, core state in the spec is column five, line 44. [00:14:48] Speaker 03: And that's immediately followed by the parenthetical, quote, C-state, unquote. [00:14:56] Speaker 03: And that that would mean, suggest two things, that that is kind of definitional language. [00:15:06] Speaker 03: And second, once you've defined it, you don't need to keep referring to C-state because it already bears the meaning. [00:15:12] Speaker 00: I disagree that that's definitional language. [00:15:15] Speaker 00: That parenthetical doesn't include the hallmarker that would inform a person of ordinary skill in the art that they're setting forth a definition. [00:15:23] Speaker 00: For example, the signifier IE. [00:15:26] Speaker 00: We grammarians know that IE usually indicates definitional language. [00:15:31] Speaker 00: EG usually indicates exemplary language. [00:15:34] Speaker 00: And none of the parentheticals here that reference C state use that IE definitional signifier. [00:15:42] Speaker 00: And for lexicography to apply, there have to be words that are clear and manifest words of exclusion. [00:15:47] Speaker 04: So what is it you think is being done in the parenthetical? [00:15:53] Speaker 04: Why are they even bothering? [00:15:55] Speaker 00: It's simply providing an example with reference to the ACPI standard. [00:15:59] Speaker 04: So it's EG. [00:16:00] Speaker 00: It's EG. [00:16:01] Speaker 00: It's EG. [00:16:01] Speaker 04: On what basis would we say a person of skill in the art would read in EG as opposed to IE? [00:16:07] Speaker 00: Because the standard for lexicography is that it has to be so clear and manifest [00:16:11] Speaker 00: that a person knows that IE is the only thing that is indicated here. [00:16:17] Speaker 00: And even in this court's SkinMedica case that MIPAC cites in their brief, the court said IE is definitional, but it alone is not absolute. [00:16:27] Speaker 00: You have to give a full effect to the specification. [00:16:29] Speaker 00: And here, the embodiment language, the such-as language, the representativeness language, elsewhere in the specification indicate that the applicant here was not [00:16:40] Speaker 00: lexicographically redefining the term. [00:16:42] Speaker 04: Let's look up a little bit higher in column five, around lines 22, 23. [00:16:50] Speaker 04: For example, the advanced configuration and powered interface paren quotation marks ACPI. [00:16:58] Speaker 04: Is that a definition? [00:17:00] Speaker 00: MyPAC references the way in which in grammar, sometimes we set forth in parentheses [00:17:09] Speaker 00: with a quotation mark and abbreviation, the way that that's done sometimes in legal briefing. [00:17:14] Speaker 00: I actually think that it's the inverse here. [00:17:16] Speaker 00: So ACPI in this is the phrase that's inside of the parenthetical there is setting forth the word that's defining the phrase outside of the parenthetical. [00:17:29] Speaker 00: The way that, for example, Samsung here, that's an abbreviation that's describing the rest of the terminology. [00:17:38] Speaker 00: Samsung is not the definition, the definition. [00:17:42] Speaker 00: It's inverted. [00:17:44] Speaker 04: Is it saying that for purposes of this patent, whenever you see ACPI, you should read in and understand that's the same thing as Advanced Configuration Power Interface? [00:17:57] Speaker 04: I may not have read the words that are written there. [00:18:02] Speaker 00: It's an abbreviation, certainly in this context for ACPI. [00:18:06] Speaker 04: Notwithstanding that the sentence begins, for example, [00:18:10] Speaker 00: I think that it's fair that it's an abbreviation that ACPI is abbreviating the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface specification. [00:18:19] Speaker 00: I don't know there to be another example of Advanced Configuration and Power Interface language. [00:18:26] Speaker 00: It does use the phrase, for example, but there's no other examples of ACPI discussed in the specification. [00:18:33] Speaker 00: There are references in the specification of other things that a core state could indicate. [00:18:39] Speaker 00: CoreState is not always used synonymously with C-State. [00:18:43] Speaker 04: Could you give us your best example of where you think CoreState is being used more broadly than C-State? [00:18:50] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor. [00:18:51] Speaker 00: So I would say the first two examples are at column 22, line 65, where it references CoreState, a processor CoreState broadly, without expressing it as a C-State. [00:19:03] Speaker 00: And the other example would be at column 26, line 7 through 12, in which it describes [00:19:09] Speaker 00: core state as a value greater than or equal to one. [00:19:13] Speaker 00: The second one would be columns 26, so column 26, lines 7 through 12, where it describes core state as a value greater than or equal to one. [00:19:25] Speaker 00: And then the claim language itself reflects the applicant's intent to use a broader claim here than C state. [00:19:32] Speaker 00: It reflects the applicant's intent to claim broadly, to claim any core state, which is [00:19:38] Speaker 00: which indicates the activity level of a processor, consistent with what our experts said and with what the board found. [00:19:46] Speaker 00: The other place is at column five in that discussion, Judge Stark, that you pointed to. [00:19:52] Speaker 00: Towards the bottom of that discussion, beginning at lines 44, although it references core state and it used the exemplary language C-state, it goes on to describe [00:20:05] Speaker 00: how core states are under software operating system control and affect its level of power consumption from another perspective. [00:20:13] Speaker 00: And what the specification tells you when you're reading it in full and in its context is that core state is indicating activity level of the processor. [00:20:22] Speaker 00: It reflects whether it's fully operational, whether it's in some varying level of sleep mode or less than fully operational. [00:20:29] Speaker 00: And that's consistent with what the board found and with what our experts [00:20:32] Speaker 00: testified to that a core state is reflecting activity level of a processor. [00:20:37] Speaker 00: That's exactly what Chagney discloses, the prior art, and so the board had substantial evidence to find that Chagney discloses a core state given the broad language used in the claim. [00:20:49] Speaker 04: The board does its claim construction at A12 and 13, right? [00:20:54] Speaker 04: On the core state's dispute. [00:20:57] Speaker 04: It seemed to me the only argument they made is maybe the only argument you're making today, that there's exemplary language elsewhere in the patent. [00:21:07] Speaker 04: And that would undermine whatever one might think of the parenthetical. [00:21:12] Speaker 04: Do you agree that that's the only argument that the board gives us, or the only point the board makes on behalf of this construction? [00:21:19] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor, that's the only argument the board makes on behalf of the construction because of the exemplary language used in the rest of the specification. [00:21:28] Speaker 00: And that's consistent with this court's case law. [00:21:30] Speaker 00: Again, in SkinMedica, the court said, i.e. [00:21:34] Speaker 00: alone, even that definitional signifier in a parenthetical alone is not sufficient to satisfy this court's standard for lexicography. [00:21:43] Speaker 00: Looking at the rest of the specification, and it was important in that case that [00:21:47] Speaker 00: giving it definitional language comported with, quote, each and every reference in the specification to the term. [00:21:54] Speaker 00: And that's simply not the case here, where the specification refers to core state without reference to C state. [00:22:02] Speaker 03: Was there material, I guess, in the record, I'm not sure there is in this two pages in the board decision, about general usage in the relevant art of the phrase [00:22:17] Speaker 00: core state? [00:22:20] Speaker 00: That would be with reference to what our expert said, that the general usage in the art with reference to core state is that it's indicating the activity level of the processor. [00:22:30] Speaker 03: And that's distinguished, what is a performance state? [00:22:36] Speaker 00: In the patent, the patent describes a performance state also as a power state, which is somewhat confusing because the ACPI standard describes a C state as a power state, so it creates [00:22:47] Speaker 00: some ambiguity to adopt MIPAC's construction. [00:22:50] Speaker 00: But the patent describes a performance state as being achieved by setting the core input voltage and the clock rate of the processor. [00:23:00] Speaker 00: And that conveys information about performance or about power. [00:23:03] Speaker 00: And so it distinguishes core state from a performance state in that capacity as well. [00:23:07] Speaker 00: And that's at column five, starting at line 29. [00:23:11] Speaker 04: Have we said anything about the degree of clarity that's required to define a term in a patent, depending on whether it's really just restating the plain and ordinary meaning that one of SkillMeArt would already ascribe to it versus it's something different than that? [00:23:28] Speaker 04: Have we, like you keep citing, to SkinMedica, is that a case where maybe the patentee was trying to define a term as something other than what one of SkillMeArt might [00:23:40] Speaker 04: otherwise think it was? [00:23:41] Speaker 00: It actually was, Your Honor. [00:23:42] Speaker 00: In that case, the construction was whether to include, to exclude what one of ordinary skill in the art would understand about the phrase culturing in three dimensions. [00:23:52] Speaker 04: And so how do you see this case? [00:23:53] Speaker 04: Is it [00:23:56] Speaker 04: If the patentee was trying to define what court states was, would that be a definition to be consistent with what one of Skilly Art would think, or to be inconsistent or slightly different from what one of Skilly Art would think? [00:24:11] Speaker 00: What MIPAC is arguing is somewhat unclear, Your Honor, because MIPAC says that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and that the plain and ordinary meaning is its lexicographic definition. [00:24:22] Speaker 00: And I don't think that's consistent with this court's case law. [00:24:24] Speaker 00: I think this court says, [00:24:26] Speaker 00: Plain and ordinary meaning applies unless the patentee sets forth a different meaning, its own definition that's different than the plain and ordinary meaning, and then that meaning will apply. [00:24:36] Speaker 00: And here, we don't agree that the plain and ordinary meaning of core state is a C state. [00:24:42] Speaker 00: So we would disagree that plain and ordinary meaning can be used to reach MIPAC's construction. [00:24:47] Speaker 04: Have we ever said, though, that one in writing a patent is not free to define a term consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning just to be careful? [00:24:58] Speaker 00: No. [00:24:58] Speaker 00: I don't think this court's case law has said that. [00:25:01] Speaker 00: But definitely, in looking at what MIPAC's argument is for lexicon, [00:25:06] Speaker 00: lexicography. [00:25:08] Speaker 00: They're arguing that lexicography applies. [00:25:10] Speaker 00: We disagree that the core state has a plain and ordinary meaning as a sea state. [00:25:16] Speaker 00: And we also disagree that the standards for lexicography have been satisfied here. [00:25:22] Speaker 00: To your questions about remand, the board didn't reach the alternative grounds for the Wong reference. [00:25:29] Speaker 00: So we would argue that that would need to be considered on remand. [00:25:33] Speaker 00: The statutory arguments that my tax counsel raised, I don't believe were raised in the briefing. [00:25:39] Speaker 03: Have we, in a precedential decision, said that a remand by the board, an activity on remand to the board can take place after one year, even on an issue that the board initially did not [00:26:01] Speaker 00: I don't have a decision at my fingertips, Judge Toronto, but I'm fairly certain that there are many decisions from this court in which you've remanded for the board to consider alternative grounds that were... Didn't need to be decided initially because of how it was decided, yeah. [00:26:17] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor, and especially in the case when there's a new claim construction that is issued. [00:26:23] Speaker 00: We think that it would be appropriate for the board to consider and make fact findings in the first instance based on that [00:26:29] Speaker 00: new construction. [00:26:30] Speaker 00: And I'll just also point out that the board noted that MIPAC admitted below that core state includes a fully operational state. [00:26:40] Speaker 00: This is at appendix 40 through 41 of the board's decision. [00:26:44] Speaker 00: Chagney discloses a fully operational state. [00:26:46] Speaker 00: It says that its state can be 100% or fully loaded. [00:26:50] Speaker 00: That's at [00:26:50] Speaker 00: 1056, column four, lines 21. [00:26:53] Speaker 04: But you're not arguing that if we were to adopt their proposed instruction that the claims may be invalid under Chagney. [00:27:04] Speaker 04: You never made that argument to the board. [00:27:06] Speaker 04: You're not making it to us, correct? [00:27:07] Speaker 00: We didn't explicitly argue below whether Chagney discloses the ACPIC state. [00:27:14] Speaker 00: But the board did note that MIPAC admitted that Chagney's disclosure [00:27:20] Speaker 00: is that it has a fully operational core state. [00:27:22] Speaker 00: And the board could determine on remand whether that's sufficient. [00:27:25] Speaker 04: So you would ask that, worst case for you, we remand for the board to consider the whang grounds as well as reconsider the Chagney grounds under the construction, if you were to lose on the construction. [00:27:36] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor. [00:27:39] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:27:39] Speaker 00: Briefly to respond to MIPAC's arguments about a pawn startup, the board did not engage in any claim construction and construed the term [00:27:50] Speaker 00: to mean, as MIPAC argued in its opening brief, any time after startup. [00:27:55] Speaker 00: You won't find that construction in the board's decision, because the board, as with the other terms that MIPAC raises on appeal, applied the agreed-upon, plain and ordinary meaning. [00:28:05] Speaker 00: That's reflected at Appendix 8 of the decision. [00:28:08] Speaker 00: And the board found that Chagney sufficiently rendered obvious, because the upon startup claims are for a ground of obviousness. [00:28:18] Speaker 00: that Chagney's disclosure of providing the signal when the device 290 was powered up and providing it continuously, including every millisecond, would have rendered it obvious to provide it upon startup. [00:28:31] Speaker 00: We think that finding is supported by substantial evidence. [00:28:35] Speaker 00: Unless there are any further questions. [00:28:37] Speaker 01: Thank you, Council. [00:28:38] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:28:40] Speaker 01: Mr. Carmichael has some little time if he needs you. [00:28:51] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:28:51] Speaker 02: And I enjoyed the interesting discussion about plain and ordinary meaning versus lexicographic. [00:28:56] Speaker 02: And in this case, they're both the same. [00:28:59] Speaker 02: You end up at the same place. [00:29:01] Speaker 02: Core states means C states. [00:29:03] Speaker 02: But starting with plain and ordinary meaning, when a petitioner's own expert was cross-examined and asked point blank, what is the plain and ordinary meaning of a core state, he said C state. [00:29:19] Speaker 02: That's at appendix page 2036, lines 15 to 23. [00:29:24] Speaker 02: So there seems to be no dispute that that is the plain and ordinary meaning. [00:29:31] Speaker 02: And even if there were a dispute on it, we have our life-synchographic definition just to make sure, like Judge Stark hinted at. [00:29:50] Speaker 02: Kishner discussed the Skin Medica case from this court where there was a parenthetical that had the phrase IE in it. [00:30:01] Speaker 02: It did not have quotation marks in it like we do. [00:30:04] Speaker 02: And as you can see from the very first sentence of the board's decision, and of course all the other many times your honors have seen it, when you put something in parentheses, that's how you define something. [00:30:16] Speaker 02: It's very clear. [00:30:17] Speaker 02: Perhaps if there had been [00:30:19] Speaker 02: quotation marks in Kinmedica, they wouldn't have had a debate. [00:30:25] Speaker 02: Now Petitioner suggested for the first time that what we really mean was EG, but when the patent applicant here wanted to use EG, they did. [00:30:38] Speaker 02: They used it 29 times throughout the specification in parentheses, EG. [00:30:49] Speaker 02: Not this time. [00:30:50] Speaker 02: This time it's just a quotation mark to show exactly what they meant. [00:30:58] Speaker 02: In Skin Media, as was brought up, the parenthetical statement seemed to contravene the normal definition of what was being used. [00:31:12] Speaker 02: The term there was beads. [00:31:15] Speaker 02: in parentheses as IE two dimensions. [00:31:18] Speaker 02: And that was considered to be contravening the plain and ordinary meaning. [00:31:23] Speaker 02: But as we've discussed, their expert and our expert both agree that the meaning of core states here is. [00:31:31] Speaker 03: Can I just take you back for one second to the expert you cited 2036. [00:31:37] Speaker 03: So this is, what's your understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of the term core state answer? [00:31:45] Speaker 03: Also, the patent discusses it in figure 12. [00:31:48] Speaker 03: And it's also in column 25, lines 20 to 28 to 35. [00:31:53] Speaker 03: The core state of the processor is the state of the processor based on its activity level, which are identified in those figures, in that figure, with different core states in terms of, they call it a C state. [00:32:07] Speaker 03: Yes, they call it a C state. [00:32:09] Speaker 03: In figure 12, which figure 12 does. [00:32:12] Speaker 03: That's not conceding that the expression core state in the patent as a whole is defined as C state. [00:32:22] Speaker 03: Figure 12 says C state right on it. [00:32:26] Speaker 02: Right. [00:32:26] Speaker 02: So when the expert said they call it C state in that figure, I'm taking that to mean the inventors, they call it a C state and [00:32:41] Speaker 02: And yes, that figure has C0, C1, C2, C3, C states, which I pointed out on my first time I stood up, is used interchangeably with core state C0 or core state C1. [00:33:03] Speaker 02: Sometimes they call it core state, sometimes they call it C state C0. [00:33:07] Speaker 02: Clearly those two things are the same thing. [00:33:14] Speaker 02: And I see my time is up, and I just want to thank the panel. [00:33:18] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:33:19] Speaker 01: Thank you, Mr. Carmichael. [00:33:22] Speaker 01: I thank both counsels. [00:33:23] Speaker 01: The case is submitted, and that concludes today's arguments.