[00:00:00] Speaker 00: The first case for argument this morning is 23-1094, platform science versus on the tracks. [00:00:08] Speaker 00: Mr. Richards, whenever you're ready. [00:00:11] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:00:12] Speaker 02: Oliver Richards on behalf of platform science, it may please the court. [00:00:16] Speaker 02: This court should vacate the board's decision and remand with appropriate instructions to apply this court's inherency and anticipation case law faithfully. [00:00:24] Speaker 02: The factual record here on appeal is largely not dispute. [00:00:28] Speaker 02: We have a claim here that requires at least one information from one field to be copied from a received message to a response message. [00:00:36] Speaker 02: Facts about the prior art are similarly not really in serious dispute. [00:00:40] Speaker 02: It teaches the same configuration of a perceived message, a response message. [00:00:45] Speaker 00: Can I just ask you just so when you go on maybe you can incorporate my thinking. [00:00:50] Speaker 00: You mentioned inherency and anticipation, but isn't what the word identified as lacking here was an argument with respect to obviousness? [00:01:00] Speaker 02: Certainly, the second part of our claim of error is obviousness, and it has to do with the board parsing the petition and trying to draw this, I would say, artificial distinction between field mapping and copying. [00:01:14] Speaker 02: Field mapping is how the copying is done, and then it just entirely ignored the obviousness arguments. [00:01:20] Speaker 02: Certainly, we've set forward, we believe there is error with respect to how the board treated obviousness, or how the board didn't treat obviousness. [00:01:28] Speaker 00: Why are you saying that it should be remanded for anticipation and inherency? [00:01:35] Speaker 02: Well, and also to consider the obviousness arguments that were made and not considered. [00:01:38] Speaker 02: I would say that that should also be part of any remand. [00:01:41] Speaker 02: This is, I think, one of those cases that sits on a fine line between anticipation and obviousness. [00:01:47] Speaker 02: Certainly, we think that, according to the undisputed facts, [00:01:53] Speaker 02: The reference actually does teach copy. [00:01:57] Speaker 02: The facts here are the same IOD appears in the received message and in the response message. [00:02:03] Speaker 02: Using the language of the patent, it says the IOD is sent back, is sent back. [00:02:09] Speaker 02: There's no discussion of the IOD ever being displayed to the user. [00:02:13] Speaker 02: Again, there's no dispute about this. [00:02:14] Speaker 02: The only input methods disclosed are a set of arrow keys, soft keys. [00:02:19] Speaker 02: Um, our contention below was that it would be a reasonable inference from these things to conclude that automatic copy. [00:02:26] Speaker 00: You know, this court's case law embraces this reasonable inference, you know, going back to Baxter from the- So you want to point me to your petition, because that's- the crux of the matter, unfortunately, is down in the weeds, which is what you've said and what you didn't say. [00:02:40] Speaker 00: So did you say the crux of the matter is whether a copying would have been obvious? [00:02:46] Speaker 02: Sure. [00:02:47] Speaker 02: I'd point the court to Appendix 116 to begin with. [00:02:52] Speaker 02: There it says to the extent that it's not explicitly disclosed, it would have been inherent or obvious. [00:02:57] Speaker 02: The copying would have been inherent or obvious. [00:03:01] Speaker 02: Where is that? [00:03:02] Speaker 00: To the extent that it's not explicitly or inherently disclosed, the information [00:03:07] Speaker 00: field of a received message is copy. [00:03:10] Speaker 00: I mean, I'm not sure. [00:03:12] Speaker 00: And then we're talking about the information field. [00:03:16] Speaker 00: You're not talking about the notion of cup. [00:03:19] Speaker 00: You're talking about field mapping versus the notion of whether or not there was copying at all here. [00:03:24] Speaker 02: I would disagree with the characterization. [00:03:26] Speaker 02: I think that we would say that it was both copied and that it had to be copied using field mapping information. [00:03:31] Speaker 02: I think the context of this statement is also important. [00:03:34] Speaker 02: We had a ground of anticipation and or obviousness, maybe inadvisable to combine them in hindsight, but nonetheless we had a ground solely on copy. [00:03:44] Speaker 02: And so what we said, and again, what the petition says is that copying is actually taught, and to the extent it's not taught, copying would have been obvious. [00:03:54] Speaker 00: Where do you say that? [00:03:57] Speaker 02: Again, I think it's not in those words verbatim. [00:04:00] Speaker 02: I think that is embraced in the first sentence of paragraph 116, to the extent that copy is not deemed to explicitly and inherently disclose that information from an information field of received message is copied. [00:04:13] Speaker 00: uh... it would be a problem i i i i get what you're saying but the standards of review is abuse of discretion the board seems to particularly in oral argument look for you to tell it what it is the theory and maybe they were looking for you to say obviousness of the copy and your answer not you but the answer for you by your client was inherently and [00:04:43] Speaker 00: the board could reject that if that was the only theory, right? [00:04:48] Speaker 00: So you're not saying the board was that inherently should have been the answer. [00:04:52] Speaker 00: You're saying that the board should have read the petition as also including obviousness. [00:04:57] Speaker 00: I don't know. [00:04:58] Speaker 00: That's a question. [00:04:59] Speaker 00: What are you arguing? [00:05:00] Speaker 00: Sure. [00:05:00] Speaker 02: I think the answer was inherently, primarily. [00:05:05] Speaker 02: But sometimes in the heat of oral argument, get interrupted. [00:05:10] Speaker 02: didn't get to give a full answer. [00:05:11] Speaker 02: But, you know, I think we were confused by the board's confusion. [00:05:15] Speaker 02: Again, because what was in the petition was that this reasonable inference, that anticipation allows for drawing a reasonable inference. [00:05:23] Speaker 02: And where the board went wrong with respect to anticipation is it applied an ipsimus verbus test. [00:05:28] Speaker 02: And, you know, this is pretty clear in the board's opinion in Appendix 39 to 40. [00:05:33] Speaker 02: where it discusses our argument. [00:05:36] Speaker 02: Petitioner concludes this portion of the petition stating, it is reasonable to imagine that a person of skill of the art would have not left such a tedious task to be performed by a computer rather than a human. [00:05:47] Speaker 02: It's discussing, you know, what are the reasonable, we were discussing what are the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the prior argument. [00:05:54] Speaker 02: And the board goes on to say, reasonable to imagine is not how one determines whether a claim limitation is disclosed by reference. [00:06:01] Speaker 02: Respectfully, I think the court's precedents say exactly the opposite. [00:06:05] Speaker 02: In the Baxter case, this court's predecessor said the operative question for anticipation is what a skilled artisan would understand for a reference and what a skilled artisan would reasonably infer from that reference. [00:06:20] Speaker 02: Now, going on to what you were getting at is the kind of waiver question. [00:06:25] Speaker 02: We certainly presented a ground on obviousness. [00:06:30] Speaker 02: It is, I think, a pretty black-letter, typical obviousness case. [00:06:34] Speaker 02: I think that what we did in our petition was fair to raise that obviousness case. [00:06:38] Speaker 02: It certainly was before the board. [00:06:41] Speaker 02: Did we put it out as extensively as we've laid it out in our blue brief? [00:06:45] Speaker 02: I have to admit that no. [00:06:47] Speaker 02: But nonetheless, to the extent this court has any concerns, the Sportmacher doctrine is a discretionary doctrine by this court. [00:06:57] Speaker 02: Looking at the capsule case that was cited in the briefs, [00:07:00] Speaker 02: You know, the record here is fully developed. [00:07:03] Speaker 02: There's certainly enough facts that have been developed for this court to ask the board to have taken a look at it. [00:07:09] Speaker 02: We think the board should have taken a look at it below rather than parsing, trying to figure out what theory. [00:07:15] Speaker 02: The theories were anticipation and obviousness. [00:07:17] Speaker 02: Both of those were before the board. [00:07:25] Speaker 02: Again, I do want to briefly talk about inherency. [00:07:29] Speaker 02: There's been a lot of discussion back and forth about some of the inherency case law. [00:07:34] Speaker 02: As is kind of pointed out in our blue briefs, this is not a classic case of inherency where you have a process or a machine disclosed in the prior art. [00:07:43] Speaker 02: The normal operation of that machine results in a certain result. [00:07:47] Speaker 02: This is kind of like the not explicitly disclosed. [00:07:51] Speaker 02: It's there, but we have to look into the mind of the skilled artist and to understand what the skilled artist would be. [00:07:56] Speaker 00: But I guess on the legal issue of inherency, if we accept that there's evidence for the notion that a manual entry was a realistic possibility in coffee, then doesn't your inherency argument feel as a matter of law? [00:08:12] Speaker 02: I take issue with some of the premise of that question. [00:08:15] Speaker 02: And I know that I have to accept the premise. [00:08:16] Speaker 00: Then consider it a hypothetical and answer that. [00:08:18] Speaker 00: And then you can tell me why the premise is wrong. [00:08:21] Speaker 02: If this board considered, sorry, if this court considered that to be a reasonable possibility, I would say that maybe the inherency bucket wouldn't apply. [00:08:30] Speaker 02: But I don't agree that it is a reasonable inference to be drawn from what the teachings of the art are. [00:08:36] Speaker 02: Namely, there's some discussion in coffee about we want to avoid this manual entry. [00:08:42] Speaker 02: manual entry with these, it's a three-digit number, and is it reasonable to expect a person in a truck to push up, down, left, right hundreds of times in order to manually input this number? [00:08:55] Speaker 02: I don't think that's a reasonable inference from the prior art. [00:08:58] Speaker 02: The only evidence in support of that was the testimony of their expert. [00:09:03] Speaker 02: I think that it's not a reasonable inference from the prior art. [00:09:10] Speaker 02: Similarly, the other explanation they offered was to counter. [00:09:14] Speaker 02: There's again no evidence in support of that. [00:09:15] Speaker 02: I think in order for us to have to disprove this, we don't have to disprove all speculative possibilities. [00:09:22] Speaker 02: I think everyone in this room would imagine that if they had an expert come down and said, [00:09:26] Speaker 00: uh... aliens uh... if you have an expert come in and say no i've read coffee and it's absolutely clear to me that the only realistic possibility was uh... not did not include manual yes exactly that i'd point the court for example to appendix fifteen thirteen [00:09:44] Speaker 02: which is the deposition of our expert. [00:09:46] Speaker 02: Of course, he said similar things in his declaration, but at that point he's asked by opposing counsel specifically, isn't it possible to have manual entry? [00:09:56] Speaker 02: He said, no, it's impossible. [00:09:57] Speaker 02: Impossible was the word he used. [00:09:59] Speaker 02: Because? [00:10:00] Speaker 02: Because of the way the entry works is manual entries. [00:10:04] Speaker 02: There's four arrow keys. [00:10:05] Speaker 02: I mean, is it beyond a reasonable doubt? [00:10:09] Speaker 02: Perhaps not, but the standard here isn't beyond a reasonable doubt. [00:10:12] Speaker 02: We're talking about a preponderance of the evidence to show that this is necessarily what Coffey teaches. [00:10:18] Speaker 02: He said a person would not do it this way, was his testimony. [00:10:24] Speaker 00: Well, there may be some ground between a person wouldn't have done it manually and the notion that the copying here was necessarily present. [00:10:39] Speaker 00: Are there any other options, explanations? [00:10:42] Speaker 02: I mean, the option that we presented was this automatic copying. [00:10:46] Speaker 02: There were two other options presented by the other side, neither of which we thought rose beyond the level of just pure speculation. [00:10:54] Speaker 02: I don't think inherency involves disproving every specular possibility. [00:11:02] Speaker 00: Do you agree that the discussion we're having here sort of sounds more like an obviousness discussion than an inherency discussion? [00:11:13] Speaker 02: I would say that there's probably some similarities, and I've spent some time thinking about this, is when we look into the mind of a skilled artisan, what separates anticipation from obviousness? [00:11:25] Speaker 02: Because I think there's no doubt that both involve looking into the mind of this hypothetical skilled artisan. [00:11:30] Speaker 02: I think the difference would be that in the anticipation world, as this court's presidents and baxter say, [00:11:36] Speaker 02: We can look in there, but if it involves any amount of creativity, changing a reference, for example, what was discussed in NIDAC, if you have to change something, that's creativity, you're in the world of obviousness. [00:11:49] Speaker 02: If you're just simply looking into the mind of a skilled artist and just say, how would you understand this reference? [00:11:53] Speaker 02: Then we're in the world of anticipation. [00:11:57] Speaker 02: I would say, again, this case kind of rides the line between anticipation and obviousness. [00:12:03] Speaker 02: I think it probably presents better as an obviousness argument. [00:12:07] Speaker 02: Again, as the facts developed as they did below, where there's a set of three known possibilities, I think it fits directly into this court's case law, like Uber, Echo Brands, et cetera, where you have a number of design choices. [00:12:20] Speaker 02: You're presented with a design need, namely, how do I get this information from this field to this field? [00:12:26] Speaker 02: And you have a number of known design choices for accomplishing that. [00:12:30] Speaker 02: I think it's a textbook, Uber, Echo brands type case. [00:12:34] Speaker 02: We have a design need and known design choices and a very limited set, even given all the creativity. [00:12:40] Speaker 00: So if you're agreeing obviousness was the most apparent, you were given an opportunity by the board to at least show the board, where did you make this argument in your petition? [00:12:52] Speaker 00: And you didn't do that. [00:12:53] Speaker 00: You shifted towards a different argument of inherency. [00:12:57] Speaker 00: Then why, under abuse of discretion standard, [00:13:00] Speaker 00: Notwithstanding, I mean, perhaps there are some boards that would have gone the extra mile and done something differently, or raised different questions to force something out of you that you didn't say yourself. [00:13:11] Speaker 00: But why does this feel as an abuse under abuse of discretion? [00:13:16] Speaker 02: Well, I'd say the board here didn't just stop at that answer. [00:13:19] Speaker 02: I mean, the board itself did conduct a almost line-by-line analysis of the petition. [00:13:23] Speaker 02: It was looking at the petition, and I think misread the petition. [00:13:27] Speaker 02: So I think the abuse of discretion here would be how the board read the petition. [00:13:30] Speaker 02: There was clearly an anticipation ground, and then there was clearly an obviousness ground. [00:13:35] Speaker 00: You had a chance to show the board where you made the argument of obviousness, right? [00:13:39] Speaker 00: And is what you gave to the board what you gave to me on page 116 of the appendix? [00:13:45] Speaker 00: And under an abusive discretion standard, wasn't the board free to read that you didn't reserve that argument? [00:13:52] Speaker 02: I would think during the rebuttal time, we did come back and specifically point them to these pages, yes, after we had a chance to sit down and look at the petition. [00:14:01] Speaker 02: I believe that his appendix, I don't have the pin site here, but it's towards the end of the oral discussion. [00:14:06] Speaker 02: It's in the second kind of snippet we put forward, is we did have an opportunity. [00:14:10] Speaker 02: We pointed them directly to this page. [00:14:12] Speaker 00: Apologies to not looking at the clock. [00:14:17] Speaker 00: Mr. Wilcox, please proceed. [00:14:30] Speaker 01: Thank you, Judge Prost, and may it please the court, Jason Wilcox on behalf of Omnitrax. [00:14:34] Speaker 01: I'm happy to discuss either the inherency or the obviousness arguments, but let me start with obviousness. [00:14:40] Speaker 01: And I think you're exactly right, Judge Prost, that at Appendix 544, the board explicitly asked them, what's your theory for copying, or what's the principle you rely on? [00:14:50] Speaker 01: And they said, inherency. [00:14:52] Speaker 01: I think the board is then allowed to take them at their word, but the board went beyond that to make sure that they got a fair shake. [00:14:58] Speaker 01: As my friend on the other side pointed out, the board, in its opinion, spent six pages of its discussion, from appendix 37 to 42, trying to unpack and understand the arguments that they made. [00:15:09] Speaker 01: And it came to the reasonable conclusion that the arguments they made, including the argument on Appendix 116, were not making an obviousness argument for copying. [00:15:18] Speaker 01: They were, instead, at most, making an obviousness argument for the separate field mapping limitation and assuming that copying had already been established based on the arguments that they made on Appendix 115. [00:15:31] Speaker 00: No, I appreciate that. [00:15:32] Speaker 00: But the starting point, and I started there too, so I'm not playing with you for that. [00:15:38] Speaker 00: Why is that the right starting point? [00:15:40] Speaker 00: I mean, part of what went down here, it seems to me, is they were thinking about this conflating the field mapping issue with the copying. [00:15:50] Speaker 00: And they are sort of one and the same, if you look at them in a certain way. [00:15:55] Speaker 00: To what extent is field mapping doesn't exist, if not for copying from one field to the other. [00:16:03] Speaker 00: So I think their obviousness case was clearly made with respect to field mapping, and the board didn't accept that because they wanted a predicate. [00:16:13] Speaker 00: obviousness analysis on the copying piece of it. [00:16:17] Speaker 00: But why is it improper to conflate the two in the way we're thinking about this case? [00:16:22] Speaker 01: Well, I think it's proper to conflate them because what the board did was it looked at the way that the argument was presented in the petition and said that the way that the obviousness case for field mapping is being argued is it's not being argued that it would have been obvious to copy. [00:16:35] Speaker 01: and therefore obvious to do field mapping. [00:16:38] Speaker 01: Instead, the way that it was laid out if you look at appendix 115 and also if you look at appendix 110 to 111 is the argument was, well, you have these two fields that are the same between the original message and the response. [00:16:51] Speaker 01: Therefore, there must be copying. [00:16:53] Speaker 01: And then all the arguments that flow after that, whether you're looking at appendix 111 to 112 or whether you're looking at appendix 116, [00:17:01] Speaker 01: depending on which limitation you're looking at, then start from that premise that we've already established copying. [00:17:06] Speaker 01: And now I'm explaining to you why it would have been obvious to use field mapping if you've already established that there's copying. [00:17:14] Speaker 01: And you can see that, for example, at the top of Appendix 116 right before the sentence that my friend on the other side read. [00:17:24] Speaker 01: They first say that the disclosure that's in copy, that they've talked about the fact that there's these two fields that are the same, means that copy did employ copying, because otherwise the message would not automatically include information from the two. [00:17:39] Speaker 01: And then they go on to say, moreover, if the copying were not performed based on field mapping, items of information extracted from the received message would not appear in the response message. [00:17:48] Speaker 01: So they're not saying, well, if we have copying, and they think they've already established copying, here's why you'd have to have field mapping. [00:17:55] Speaker 01: If you look at the arguments that they then make on the rest of appendix 116, they're all flowing from that same premise. [00:18:00] Speaker 01: For example, the final sentence on that page says specifically, a person with skill in the art would have recognized that without field mapping information, information in the received message could not be copied to appropriate corresponding fields. [00:18:14] Speaker 01: That's assuming that you know that you're doing copying. [00:18:17] Speaker 01: It's not an argument about why it would have been obvious to do copying. [00:18:21] Speaker 01: So I think at the minimum, given the standard of review that applies here, which is abuse of discretion, the board has wide leeway to read this. [00:18:29] Speaker 01: I think they read the petition in a reasonable way. [00:18:31] Speaker 01: In other cases, like Microsoft versus Enfish, that is enough to affirm the board's decision. [00:18:36] Speaker 00: What about if they had done otherwise? [00:18:38] Speaker 00: Would you have a basis to challenge them that they had read into it, if they had pressed counsel to like? [00:18:44] Speaker 00: talk about obviousness in the context of copying, would you be here arguing that that was improper or do you consider that within their discretion? [00:18:54] Speaker 01: I think that if the board had looked at this and they had said there's an obviousness argument there, we would disagree with it. [00:18:59] Speaker 01: But I don't know that I could win on an abuse of discretion standard of review because I think the board has a wide leeway to read how the petition is framed and [00:19:08] Speaker 01: But I certainly think that here, when you have, again, them saying explicitly, our theory is inherency. [00:19:14] Speaker 01: The board recognized that this was confusing and hard to unpack. [00:19:18] Speaker 01: It wanted to understand, how do I unpack that? [00:19:20] Speaker 01: And it asked them that, how do I unpack that? [00:19:23] Speaker 01: And they said, our theory is inherency. [00:19:25] Speaker 00: What about anticipation though? [00:19:27] Speaker 00: Because they did preserve the anticipation and this seems to ... our cases say it's when one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the prior art reference that every limitation was disclosed. [00:19:42] Speaker 00: So the standard is different than inherency. [00:19:44] Speaker 00: Why didn't they meet that test? [00:19:46] Speaker 00: that one skilled in the art would have reasonably understood. [00:19:49] Speaker 00: Didn't an expert that said that? [00:19:53] Speaker 01: Well, two reasons, Your Honor. [00:19:54] Speaker 01: Number one is, again, they disclaimed any anticipation theory other than inherency to the board at Appendix 544. [00:20:02] Speaker 01: And the board took them out of their word at Appendix 46 to 47 in its decision. [00:20:08] Speaker 01: But also, [00:20:10] Speaker 01: Under that standard, even if you think they made an anticipation argument, though, it still has to be that all the elements are expressly there. [00:20:17] Speaker 01: And the element of copying isn't expressly there. [00:20:20] Speaker 01: Coffee, the reference, is just simply silent about how the information gets over. [00:20:24] Speaker 00: Is that what our cases say? [00:20:26] Speaker 00: That it was expressly there? [00:20:28] Speaker 00: I thought at least one case, Daco, says someone skilled in the art would have reasonably understood or inferred that the teaching was disclosed in the reference. [00:20:40] Speaker 01: uh... because an inherent c case and what they can use but i'm easily understood or inferred is that they would have reasonably understood or inferred that was necessarily present in the reference even though it wasn't expressly disclosed and indigo discord in fact reversed [00:20:55] Speaker 01: and said no it isn't inherent because even reading it from that perspective it's not necessarily present. [00:21:01] Speaker 01: And here we had an expert at appendix 1349 that explained how you could do this through manual data entry. [00:21:08] Speaker 01: So the board at worst had competing experts and got to decide which one to credit. [00:21:13] Speaker 01: But their expert also said at appendix 1529 [00:21:16] Speaker 01: He was asked, was there anything in coffee that makes it not possible to enter the IOD number? [00:21:23] Speaker 01: And the response was, it has a keypad, so it is possible. [00:21:27] Speaker 01: But then he explained why he didn't think it was likely or why it would work that way. [00:21:30] Speaker 01: But even their expert acknowledged it would have been possible, given the keypad that exists in coffee, to type it in and to be able to type it in in that way. [00:21:38] Speaker 01: And that's perfectly consistent with the disclosure in COFFEE at column 55, line 6 to 7, that it does in fact have a keypad, and that it can use the person skilled artisan, as it says at line 7 to 9 of that column, can use that to type in a response or other data. [00:21:59] Speaker 01: So when you have silence about how the IOD makes it over, there's this keypad, and everyone acknowledges you can use the keypad to type in information. [00:22:06] Speaker 01: This is not an inherency case. [00:22:08] Speaker 01: It's not necessarily present. [00:22:10] Speaker 01: And that's why I didn't hear a lot of it today, but in their brief they kind of keep talking about these other standards that could apply, like reasonably infer or what you would at once envisage, even though NYDEC says you can't use that to fill in a missing limitation. [00:22:24] Speaker 01: So I'm happy to answer any other questions the court has, but otherwise we ask the court to affirm. [00:22:29] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:22:49] Speaker 02: I just want to begin by giving you all the pin site. [00:22:52] Speaker 02: I want to point the court to appendix 590 to 591. [00:22:56] Speaker 02: This is during our rebuttal time below. [00:22:57] Speaker 02: And Mr. Wolfe, starting at the bottom of appendix 590, says he would ask the question, judge about copying information and where that was found in the petition. [00:23:07] Speaker 02: And then he points specifically to page 38 and 39 of the petition, which corresponds to appendix 116 and 117, the passages we were just discussing. [00:23:16] Speaker 02: So, in the rebuttal time, the board was specifically pointing to those passages. [00:23:20] Speaker 00: And what were the pages in the appendix you were citing? [00:23:24] Speaker 02: 590 to 591. [00:23:25] Speaker 02: I want to address the point made by my friend on the other side that the petition was confusing and hard to unpack. [00:23:36] Speaker 02: I think the board started out from this false premise, and it's repeated by our friends on the other side, that it has to be expressed in this reference. [00:23:43] Speaker 02: This court has consistently rejected an ipsumus verbus test. [00:23:47] Speaker 02: In other words, it doesn't have to be spelled out in exactly the words in the prior art. [00:23:52] Speaker 02: There's a Shearing-Schaumann case which rejects that ipsumus verbus, and it says it exalts form over substance. [00:23:59] Speaker 02: Again, what we have to do is look through the mind of a skilled artist and understand what the teachings of the reference are. [00:24:07] Speaker 02: That does involve looking beyond what it explicitly says. [00:24:13] Speaker 02: Going on to obviousness, I do think that that issue was fairly before the board. [00:24:19] Speaker 02: I think that we did enough to raise it, and certainly an expert body such as the board is familiar with this court's precedence, has done obviousness a bajillion and a half times. [00:24:28] Speaker 02: I think what we did was sufficient to preserve that. [00:24:31] Speaker 02: If the court does not have any other questions, we will rest on the briefs. [00:24:34] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:24:35] Speaker 02: We thank both sides and the case is submitted.